INSTINCT  AND  EEASON 


^ m 


i--^ 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON 


AN  ESSAY 

CONCERNING   THE   RELATION   OF   INSTINCT  TO 

REASON,   WITH   SOME   SPECIAL   STUDY 

OF   THE   NATURE   OF   RELIGION 


BY 

HENRY  RUTGERS  MARSHALL,  M.A. 


THE  MACMILLAN   COMPANY 
LONDON:  MACMILLAN  AND  CO.,  Limited 

1898 

A II  rights  reserved 


fRARy^ 

EDUC. 

PSYCit 
UBRm 


7  ^?33 


PREFACE 

The  writing  of  this  book  was  first  undertaken  because  I 
wished  to  present  the  conception  of  Eeligion,  which  will  be 
found  below.  In  attempting  to  make  my  argument  con- 
vincing I  have  found  it  necessary  to  deal  with  questions 
which  did  not  at  first  appear  to  relate  to  the  subject  I 
wished  to  discuss,  and  tha  study,  of  Eeligion  thus  appears  as 
a  subsidiary  part  of  the  broader  treatment  of  Instinct  and 
Eeason ;  the  reader  will  readily  perceive,  however,  that  it 
stiU  remains  the  most  important  and  most  interesting 
matter  considered. 

It  has  long  ^  seemed  to  me  evident  that  activities  which 
are  so  universal  in  man  as  are  those  which  express  our 
religious  life,  cannot  fail  to  be  of  significance  in  relation  to 
our  biological  development,  especially  as  these  activities 
have  persisted  for  so  many  ages  in  the  human  race.  I 
have,  therefore,  attempted  to  outline  a  theory  which  will 
account  for  the  existence  of  religious  activities,  and  which 
will  explain  their  biological  import. 

In  order  to  present  this  clearly  I  have  thought  it  best 

1  I  find  the  views  here  presented  in  their  main  outlines  in  my  notes  under 
date  of  1885. 


VI  INSTINCT  AND  REASON 

to  make  a  special  study  of  Instinct,  to  which  the  second 
division  of  the  book  is  devoted,  to  show  the  relation  of 
religious  activities  to  instinctive  activities  in  general. 

This  study  of  Instinct  naturally  leads  to  the  study  of 
Impulse  in  division  III.,  and  this  turns  our  thought  to  a 
consideration  of  the  nature  of  moral  standards  which  we 
all  acknowledge  to  be  most  closely  related  to  religious 
activities. 

In  like  manner  the  study  of  Eeason,  while  natural  in 
connection  with  the  study  of  Instinct,  has  also  its  appro- 
priateness in  connection  with  the  consideration  of  the  nature 
of  Eeligion. 

I  have  not  attempted  to  enter  fully  into  discussions 
concerning  the  genesis  of  religious  customs  and  beliefs,  a 
field  which  has  perhaps  been  already  sufficiently  explored  ; 
I  have  touched  upon  such  discussions  only  so  far  as  has 
seemed  to  me  necessary  in  order  to  bring  into  clear  relief 
the  facts  relating  to  the  function  of  religion  in  the  develop- 
ment of  man. 

I  at  first  intended  to  devote  a  separate  division  of  the 
book  to  a  study  of  the  relation  of  religion  to  belief;  but 
this  I  find  unnecessary  to  the  completeness  of  the  argument, 
and  I  have  therefore  abandoned  it  for  the  present  at  least ; 
those  who  read  with  care  will  perceive,  I  imagine,  that  if  the 
doctrines  here  presented  be  accepted,  such  acceptance  will 
in  no  way  militate  against  the  importance  of  the  beliefs 
which  are  attached  to  religious  expressions. 

I  have  some  hope  that  apart  from  their  relation  to 
religious  problems  the  considerations  concerning  Instinct 
and  Keason  may  not  be  without  value  to  the  psychologist. 


PREFACE  vii 

A  large  proportion  of  the  subjects  considered  are,  however, 
of  such  general  interest,  and  are  by  common  agreement  of 
such  profound  importance,  that  I  have  attempted  to  discuss 
them,  so  far  as  possible,  without  having  recourse  to  the 
technicalities  of  psychology;  such  distinctly  psychological 
discussions  as  are  necessary  to  the  argument  I  have  there- 
fore reserved  for  consideration  in  separate  chapters,  which 
the  reader  will  easily  recognise  by  their  titles. 

As  science  advances  individual  investigators  become  less 
and  less  important,  and  although  I  have  made  frequent 
references  in  foot-notes,  I  nevertheless  feel  that  these  are 
altogether  inadequate  as  an  acknowledgment  of  my  in- 
debtedness to  those  who  have  taught  me.  I  take  advantage 
of  this  opportunity  to  express  my  especial  obligations  to 
my  friends  Dr.  C.  L.  Dana,  D.  M'^G.  Means,  Dr.  Dickinson 
S.  Miller,  and  Dr.  Chas.  H.  Strong  for  valuable  criticism  of 
special  parts  of  this  work  given  from  time  to  time  as  it  has 
progressed ;  and  to  the  Editors  of  Mind  for  allowing  me  to 
present  certain  parts  of  my  argument  in  brief  in  the  form 
of  articles  contributed  to  that  Journal. 

New  York,  2Ath  March  1898. 


t 


CONTENTS 

PART  I 
INTEODUCTION 


The  Problem 


CHAPTER   I 


PAGK 

3 


CHAPTER   n 

I.  The  Method 
n.  Mental  and  Physical  Parallelism 


11 
19 


CHAPTER   m 


General  Definitions 


68 


PAET  IT 
CONCERNING  INSTINCT 


CHAPTER   IV 

The  Nature  of  Instinct    . 


85 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON 


CHAPTER  V 

PAGE 

The  Classification  of  the  Instincts         .  .  .101 

I.  Instincts  of  Individualistic  Import  .  .       103 

II.  Instincts    relating   to    Persistence    of   Organic 

Species    .  .  .  .  •  •       127 

III.  Instincts    relating    to    Persistence    of    Social 

Groups    .  .  .  .  .  •       139 


CHAPTER   VI 

Of  certain  Relations  between  Instinct  Groups  .  .160 

I.  The  Order  of  the  Rise  of  Instinct  Groups      .       160 

II.  The  Subordination  of  Instinct  Groups,  and  of 
Instincts  within  these  Groups,  in  a  Definite 
Order     ......       179 

CHAPTER  VII 

The  Conception  of  the  Social  Organism  .  .182 

CHAPTER   VIII 

The  Governing  Instinct — The  Religious  Instinct  .       194 

I.  Of   the   Excessive    Tendency   to   Variation    in 

Social  Aggregates         .  .  .  .194 

II.  Of  the  Means  Nature  adopts  to  repress  Ex- 
cessive Variation  in  Social  Aggregates         .       208 


CONTENTS  xi 


CHAPTEK   IX 

PAGE 

Is  Religion  Instinctive?    .  .  .  .  .218 


CHAPTER   X 

The  Function  of  Religious  Expression    .  .  .247 

CHAPTER   XI 

Certain  Corroborations     .  .  .  .  .301 

I.  Of  Conversion       .  .  •  •  .301 

II.  Of  Phallic  Religions       ....       309 

CHAPTER   XII 

I.  A  Summary       .       '      .             •            •             •  •     ^^^ 

II.  The  Essential  Characteristic  op  Religion  •       325 

III.  A  Criticism    .             •            •            •            .  .       333 

PART  III 
CONCERNma  IMPULSE 

CHAPTER  Xm 

•       341 

The  Nature  of  Impulse    .  •  • 


xil  IXSTINCT  AND  REASON 


CHAPTER   XIV 

PAGE 

The  Hierarchy  of  Impulses  .  .  .  .357 

I.  The  Nature  of  Moral  Codes       .  .  .       357 

II.  The  Relativity  of  Moral  Codes  .  .379 


CHAPTER   XV 

Conscience  and  Duty  .  .  .  .  .385 

I,  Conscience  .  .  .  .  .385 

II.  The  Sense  of  Duty  .  .  .  .396 

III.  Objections  and  Explanations       .  .  .       399 

PART  IV 
CONCERNING  REASON 

CHAPTER   XVI 

The  Nature  of  Reason      .  .  .  .  .413 

CHAPTER   XVII 

The  Nature  of  Variation  .  .  .     '         .426 


,  CHAPTER   XVIII 

I.  The  Function  of  Reason    .  ...       445 

II.  The  Functioning  of  Reason  .  .  .447 

III.  Desire — Reasoning — Impulsp:— Will  .  .453 


CONTEXTS  xiii 


CHAPTER  XIX 

PAGE 

A  Summary  ......       463 


PART  V 

CERTAIN    RELATIONS    BETWEEN    INSTINCT 
AND    REASON 

CHAPTER   XX 

I.  Of  the  Relation  of  Reason  to  Moral  Codes  .       471 

II.  The  Relation  of  Religion  to  Moral  Codes  .  .       475 

CHAPTER   XXI 

The  Solution  of  the  Problem     ....       495 
N  I.  The  Balance  between  Reason  and  Instinct      .       495 

II.  The  Balance  between  Reason  and  the  Religious 

Instinct  .  .  .  .  •   .    528 

CHAPTER   XXII 

Ethics  and  Hedonism         .  .  •  •  .531 

CHAPTER   XXm 

The  Rule  of  Conduct       .  .  •  •  .550 


INDEX        .  .  .  •  •  •  .571 


PART  I 
INTEODUCTION 


CHAPTEK  I 

THE   PROBLEM 

§  1.  All  serious  thinkers  will  agree  that  a  special  and 
characteristic  individuality  has  been  given  to  the  thought 
of  the  century  now  waning  as  the  result  of  the  forcible 
presentation  of  the  doctrines  of  evolution  through  the 
labours  of  Darwin  and  his  co-workers.  No  other  problems 
of  an  intellectual  nature  have  aroused  so  intense  an  interest 
in  our  generation  as  those  brought  into  prominence  in  the 
course  of  the  elaboration  of  developmental  theories. 

Indeed  without  being  accused  of  self-complacency  we 
may  quite  properly  assert  that  if  we  compare  the  intellectual 
movement  to  which  the  discussion  of  these  problems  has 
led,  with  other  powerful  intellectual  awakenings  in  the  past, 
we  are  compelled  to  the  conclusion  that  these  doctrines, 
which  we  may  justly  claim  to  belong  especially  to  our 
time,  have  shown  a  quite  unique  power.  This  has  been 
due,  I  surmise,  largely  to  the  fact  that  the  elementary  data 
upon  which  modern  forms  of  evolutionary  theories  are 
based,  have  been  quickly  brought  within  the  comprehension 
of  the  ordinary  thoughtful  man:  the  problems,  and  the 
explanations  of  them,  were  stated  by  Darwin  himself  with 
so  little  of  technicality,  and  with  such  avoidance  of  obscurity, 
that  the  man  of  general  culture  with  an  interest  in  science. 


4  INSTINCT  AND  EEASON  part  i 

even  though  he  were  not  a  biological  specialist,  could  not 
fail  to  grasp  the  trend  of  the  argument,  and  could  scarcely 
avoid  being  impressed  by  the  importance  of  the  main 
hypotheses  presented  for  examination. 

If  the  reader  will  note  that  much  of  the  attention  of 
evolutionary  thinkers  has  been  given  to  the  study  of,  and  to 
the  interpretation  of  the  meaning  of,  the  instinctive  activities 
which  we  find  in  ourselves,  and  which  we  discover  to  exist 
also  in  the  animate  creation  around  us,  I  think  he  will 
agree  that  the  most  important,  as  well  as  the  most  interest- 
ing, of  the  psychological  problems  of  the  day  are  those  that 
relate  to  the  nature  of  instinct,  and  that  deal  with  the 
relation  of  instinctive  activities  to  those  activities  which 
result  from  processes  of  reasoning;  the  former  of  which 
seem  to  be  in  a  way  forced  upon  us,  the  latter  to  be 
thoroughly  personal,  determined  by  the  very  nature  of  our 
own  egohood. 

When,  at  the  close  of  the  twentieth  century,  students 
shall  again  write  the  history  of  the  development  of  philosophy, 
they  may  tell  our  descendants  that  metaphysics  gained  little 
from  the  thought  of  this  nineteenth  century  which  is  just 
closing.  They  may  say  this,  and  probably  with  little  danger 
of  contradiction  ;  but  they  will  surely  find  it  necessary  to  add 
to  their  statement  the  acknowledgment  that  the  thinkers 
of  this  century,  whatever  were  their  metaphysical  short- 
comings, nevertheless  did  one  great  service  for  speculative 
thought,  in  that  they  left  as  an  heritage  to  their  successors 
a  truer  conception  of  the  nature  and  of  the  importance  of 
instinct  than  had  been  handed  to  them  by  their  philosophic 
fathers,  and  in  that  they  grasped  more  correctly  than  their 
predecessors  had  done  the  true  relations  that  exist  between 
instinctive  and  rational  activities. 

§  2.  Let  us  consider  just  for  a  moment  how  striking 


CHAP.  I  THE  PROBLEM  5 

and  fundamental  is  the  change  that  has  appeared  in  the 
current  of  thought  in  this  particular  in  these  later  times. 
What  we  call  the  modern  philosophy  of  our  western  civil- 
isation, from  its  very  birth  with  the  teaching  Descartes,  is 
seen  leading  her  votaries  to  attempt  to  reach  some  consistent 
conception  of  the  universe,  and  of  ourselves  existent  in  it, 
and  conscious  of  it ;  at  the  same  time  it  teaches  them,  as 
the  scholastic  philosophy  had  taught  their  fathers  before 
them,  to  base  their  metaphysical  structures  upon  purely 
rationalistic  foundations,  and  to  trust  implicitly  the  results  of 
ratiocinative  process.  There  have  indeed  arisen  from  time  to 
time  certain  philosophic  protestants,  in  some  instances  men 
of  great  power  like  Berkeley,  Locke,  and  Hume,  who  have 
drawn  attention  to  the  processes  involved  in  the  argument, 
and  as  a  result  have  raised  questions  as  to  the  vahdity  of 
the  argument  adopted,  and  have  cast  doubt  upon  the  con- 
clusions reached.  But  with  the  spread  of  Kantian  influence 
we  find  again  renewed  the  attempt  to  construct  a  system 
which  shall  enable  us  to  grasp  the  import  of  the  universe 
as  a  whole,  without  hesitancy  basing  the  structure  upon  a 
strictly  rationalistic  foundation.  Kant's  successors  have 
followed  his  leading  in  this  respect  with  a  vigour  and  per- 
sistency at  which  we  marvel. 

The  revolts  that  appear  from  time  to  time  against  the 
evils  to  which  metaphysical  excesses  had  led,  the  objections, 
for  instance,  of  Hartley,  of  Priestley,  of  James  Mill,  were  all 
themselves  dependent  upon  assumptions  of  the  supremacy 
of  Eeason  as  known  in  conscious  reasoning  process. 

The  contributions  of  Comte  the  apostle  of  Positivism, 
and  those  of  John  Stuart  MiU,  and  of  the  lesser  lights 
among  his  followers,  were  altogether  rationalistic;  and  the 
weighty  influence  of  these  men  gave  rise  to  a  semi-popular 
"  positivism"  of  an  aggressively  arrogant  type,  confident  in 
its  reasoned  results ;  a  system  which  became  current  during 


6  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

the  lives  of  these  thinkers,  and  which  has  not  yet  altogether 
disappeared,  although  we  now  see  it  rapidly  losing  its  hold 
upon  men. 

Thus  through  all  this  movement  of  modern  thought  we 
perceive  the  influential  predominance  of  rationalistic  prin- 
ciple; a  thorough  -  going  trust  in  Keason.  We,  indeed, 
occasionally  discern  marks  of  rebellions  against  the  sup- 
posed dicta  of  Eeason,  as  these  were  understood ;  as  an 
instance  of  such  revolt  we  may  mention  the  attempts  to 
emphasise  nature's  leadings  which  are  to  be  found  in  the 
works  of  Eousseau  and  his  contemporaries.  We  note  also 
the  existence  of  a  continuous  and  partially  effective  opposi- 
tion to  rationalism  by  the  established  Christian  Church ;  an 
opposition  which  seemed  exceedingly  perverse  to  the  Church's 
opponents  at  the  time,  which  appears  extremely  reprehensible 
to  the  body  of  thinkers  to-day,  but  which,  I  am  convinced, 
will  not  seem  nearly  so  ill-timed  nor  so  disgraceful  to  those 
who  look  back  from  the  standpoint  which  will  be  attained 
in  the  future,  however  much  they  may  deplore,  as  we  all 
must  do,  the  form  which  this  opposition  took,  and  the 
methods  employed  to  attain  its  ends. 

§  3.  As  we  survey  the  movement  of  thought,  however, 
although  on  the  whole  ultra-rationalistic  influences  appear 
prominent  and  effective,  we  are  nevertheless  able  to  discern 
signs  of  the  working  of  another  and  diverse  force.  We  now 
realise  that  during  a  long  period,  before  this  century  had 
dawned,  there  had  been  developing  among  scientific  and 
philosophic  thinkers  a  deep  conviction  that  a  wider  view  of 
the  philosophy  of  life  might  be  taken  than  that  which  limited 
it  by  the  bounds  of  human  Eeason  as  we  know  it ;  this 
conviction,  indeed,  had  become  so  thoroughly  grounded  that 
the  life  and  the  work  of  a  Darwin  alone  were  needed  to 
make  the  force  of  the  view  strikingly  efi'ective.     The  study 


CHAP.  I  THE  PROBLEM  7 

of  nature  had  gradually  saturated  thought  with  the  notion 
of  a  past  of  which  philosophic  rationalism  told  but  Httle ; 
a  notion  which  seemed  to  crystalHse  instantly  into  forms 
of  practical  and  vital  importance  upon  the  utterance  of  the 
master's  word. 

Consideration  of  the  conceptions  directly  derived  from 
the  study  of  this  notion  call  our  attention  to  the  fact  that 
there  are  mighty  voices  within  us  that  speak  from  the  dim 
past  to  the  more  vivid  aad  engrossing  present;  and  the 
importance  of  this  fact  has  in  our  day  impressed  thoughtful 
men  in  the  most  marked  way ;  has  had  with  us  as  notable 
an  influence  as  the  teaching  of  Positivism  had  a  few  decades 
ago. 

The  effect  of  this  manner  of  thought  is  evident  among 
scientists  in  the  curbing  of  rationalistic  confidence.  Among 
our  men  of  eminence  in  scientific  research  we  find  a  distinct 
distrust  of  rationalistic  dogma  of  all  kinds,  and  beyond  that 
a  hesitant  modesty  in  the  presentation  of  hypotheses  which 
is  as  characteristic  of  the  best  thinkers  of  our  time  as  in 
the  last  century  was  personal  confidence  in  the  individual's 
reasoned  results.  This  spirit  indeed  is  spreading  its  influ- 
ence amongst  the  masses  of  intelligent  men  of  the  race. 
The  leaven  thus  placed  in  our  midst  is  rapidly  leavening  the 
whole  lump.  Even  with  the  theologians  we  find  a  waning 
of  that  confidence  in  individual  ratiocinative  deductions 
which  has  been  so  powerful  since  the  seventeenth  century, 
and  which  then  led  to  such  a  multiplication  of  religious  sects 
amongst  all  Protestant  people. 

This  doctrine  of  the  past  as  influencing  the  present  makes 
itself  felt  to-day  in  every  science.  The  astronomer  concerns 
himself  deeply  with  problems  relating  to  the  genesis  of 
planetary  and  stellar  systems  ;  asks  us  to  hsten  to  discus- 
sions concerning  details  of  the  ever  -  fascinating  nebular 
hypothesis.     The  geologist  leads  us  to  consider,  as  steps  in 


8  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

the  development  of  the  planet  on  which  we  live,  epochs 
which  the  mind  of  man  finds  it  difficult  to  picture;  and 
teaches  us  that  the  geological  formations  surrounding  us 
cannot  be  properly  comprehended  until  we  relate  our  own 
era  to  these  aeons  of  the  dim  past. 

The  chemist  bids  us  imagine  the  conditions  that  may 
have  existed  in  the  past  when  molecular  forces  were  dis- 
tributed as  they  are  not  to-day :  he  searches  for,  and 
believes  he  has  found,  in  the  solid  earth,  the  helium  which 
the  spectroscope  tells  him  exists  in  gaseous  form  under  high 
temperature  in  the  sun ;  he  makes  this  search  because  he 
imagines  that  if  the  molecular  vibrations  in  the  sun  were 
to  become  the  same  as  they  are  in  the  earth  to-day,  the  gas 
would  become  part  of  the  sun's  solid  groundwork;  and 
arguing  that  in  the  past  the  conditions  of  the  molecular 
vibrations  in  the  earth  may  have  been  what  they  are  now  in 
the  sun,  he  comes  to  believe  that  helium  will  be  found  in 
some  solid  constituent  of  the  earth. 

The  biologist  specially  devotes  his  time  to  the  considera- 
tion of  past  conditions  and  manners  of  growths ;  to  him 
indeed  are  we  indebted  for  the  inspiration  which  has  led  to 
the  formulation  of  that  developmental  doctrine  which  shows 
us  the  necessity  of  studying  the  life  that  has  preceded  ours 
in  the  dim  ages  of  the  past  if  we  are  to  gain  valuable  con- 
ceptions of  our  life  of  the  present,  and  of  its  trend  and 
meaning.  The  sociologist  obtains  aid  of  a  closely  allied 
nature  from  conceptions  which  biology  has  given  him ;  he 
gains  the  notion  of  a  quasi-organic  life  of  wider  than  indi- 
vidual scope,  the  genesis  of  which  he  traces  by  comparison 
with  individual  development ;  a  form  of  life  which  he  con- 
ceives to  have  been  born  of  struggle  and  of  adaptation  to 
environmental  conditions,  extending  through  the  ages  of 
which  historical  record  tells  us  nothing. 

In   psychology  we   see   a  most  notable  influence  from 


CHAP.  I  THE  PROBLEM 


this  doctrine  that  the  past  is  working  out  its  ends  within 
us  dwellers  in  the  present.  We  see  this  in  the  emphasis 
of  devielopmental  psychological  doctrines ;  in  studies  of 
childhood  and  of  progressive  growth ;  and,  in  general,  in 
the  use  of  the  "  genetic  method  "  which  is  applied  in  every 
department  of  the  science. 

§  4.  It  is  apparent  that  in  its  very  nature  this  influen- 
tial trend  of  thought  is  likely  to  draw  attention  away  from 
rationalistic  dogma,  and  to  reduce  our  confidence  in  the 
results  of  one's  own  personal  reasoning.  The  development 
of  the  historical  method,  moreover,  has  emphasised  so 
clearly  the  many  failures  of  rationalistic  theory  in  the  days 
gone  by,  that  thoughtful  students  have  from  this  source 
also  learned  a  lesson  of  extreme  caution,  and  have  become 
hesitant  in  the  acceptance  of  any  theories,  even  though  they 
are  stated  in  thoroughly  approved  rationalistic  form. 

This  caution  is  observable  through  all  lines  of  scientific 
effort.  What  in  the  old  days  would  have  been  designated 
as  laws  are  now  not  thus  dignified,  but  are  much  more  likely 
to  be  considered  and  discussed  as  mere  working  hypotheses. 
Our  scientists  are  no  longer  confident  and  aggressive 
rationalistic  positivists,  but  humbler  learners  from  Nature's 
record  of  the  past  as  that  past  speaks  to  them  in  the 
present.  They  are  indeed  dependent  upon  reasoned  process 
as  of  old,  but  they  have  learned  the  danger  of  trusting 
implicitly  to  their  own  reasoned  results,  and  they  make 
their  steps  carefully,  and  are  content  to  hold  their  con- 
clusions tentatively. 

§  5.  It  must  be  clear  to  the  reader,  I  think,  that  de- 
velopmental and  historical  study,  whHst  it  leads  on  the  one 
hand  to  an  emphasis  of  the  failures  of  reasoning,  enforces 
strongly  on   the   other    hand    the   importance  of  Nature's 


10  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

teachings.  As  I  have  said  above,  this  emphasis  is  especially 
notable  and  influential  in  the  science  of  psychology  and  in 
those  sciences  directly  connected  with  it,  and  it  is  from  the 
standpoint  of  psychology  that  I  shall  discuss  the  subjects  of 
our  consideration  in  what  follows.  I  shall  endeavour  to 
indicate  the  relations  that  exist  between  instinctive  and 
reasoned  action,  and  shall  make  an  attempt  to  define  the 
proper  relative  evaluation  of  each :  for  these  relations  and 
evaluations  must  be  finally  determined  before  we  can  make 
those  wider  generalisations  that  will  enable  us  to  place  our 
thought  in  its  true  relation  to  the  universe. 


CHAPTEE   II 

I. — The  Method 

§  1.  In  the  study  that  is  to  follow  I  shall  attempt,  so 
far  as  may  be,  to  give  prominence  to  objective  considera- 
tions, referring  to  subjective  experience  to  be  sure  but  this 
in  order  to  corroborate  conceptions  suggested  by  observations 
from  without  rather  than  to  gain  the  basis  of  these 
conceptions. 

In  the  study  of  reason,  which  is  to  a  great  extent 
appreciated  by  our  inner  experience  while  relatively  few 
clear  marks  of  its  expression  can  be  noted,  this  subordina- 
tion of  subjective  to  objective  consideration  is  more  difficult 
than  in  the  study  of  instinct,  which,  on  the  contrary,  is  to 
a  great  extent  distinguisLed_by  clear  and  definite  expression 
while  in  many  cases  the  subjective  correspondents  of  the 
expressive  activities  produce  little  or  no  apparent  influence 
upon  the  stream  of  consciousness.  In  the  study  of 
instinctive  expression  we  indeed  find  it  quite  possible  to 
look  upon  the  facts  to  a  great  extent  as  thoroughly  dis- 
interested observers, — to  take  the  standpoint  which  we  may 
assume  would  be  taken  by  some  spirit  endowed  with  powers 
of  observation  and  intellectual  consideration  and  yet 
altogether  freed  from  bodily  trammels ;  or,  if  the  existence 
of  such  a  creature  be  held  to  be  inconceivable,  we  find  it 
possible  at  least  to  take  the  same  point  of  view  in  relation 
to  all  instinctive  reactions  which  we  must  take  in  relation 


12  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

to  all  those  instincts  in  animals  of  which  in  the  nature  of 
the  case  we  can  have  no  experience,  e.g.  the  flying  of  birds, 
the  activities  especially  developed  in  the  fishes  inhabiting 
deep  waters. 

One  result  of  the  acceptance  of  this  objective  point  of 
view  has  been  the  construction  of  the  hypothesis  of  organic 
development  generally  known  as  the  theory  of  evolution ; 
of  this  hypothesis  I  shall  make  free  use  in  what  follows, 
adopting  often  what  we  have  come  to  call  the  "genetic 
method."  Concerning  this  hypothesis  and  this  method  I 
must  at  the  start  say  a  few  words. 

And  first  I  wish  to  acknowledge  that  despite  its  value 
this  genetic  method  is  a  dangerous  one  for  the  scientific 
worker  to  use  carelessly;  it  should  indeed  always  be 
employed  with  the  utmost  caution,  for  it  leads  us  to  deal 
with  hypothetical  conditions  of  life  which  existed  long 
before  man  appeared  on  this  planet,  long  before  the  days 
of  which  any  but  the  most  indirect  record  is  available  to  us. 
Indeed  the  farther  back  we  go  in  the  history  of  life  the  less 
susceptible  of  proof  are  the  hypotheses  we  are  led  to  entertain. 

I  think  on  the  whole,  therefore,  we  must  agree  that  from 
a  scientific  point  of  view  the  genetic  argument,  however 
suggestive  it  may  be,  must  not  be  relied  upon  as  final,  that 
genetic  hypotheses  must  not  be  entertained  as  decisive 
unless  they  be  corroborated  by  positive  evidence  of  strength ; 
and  further  that  in  employing  this  method  we  must  avoid 
the  use  of  all  but  the  best  -  established  postulates  of 
evolutionary  doctrine  if  our  argument  is  to  retain  any 
scientific  flavour ;  though  of  course  we  may  go  further  if  we 
acknowledge  that  we  can  attribute  to  our  work  no  more 
than  speculative  values. 

Fortunately  in  the  case  of  the  studies  we  are  to  under- 
take we  have  to  assume  few  postulates  that  are  not  simple 
and  all  but  self-evident ;  and  yet  I  wish  to  warn  my  reader 


CHAP.  II  THE  METHOD  13 

that  SO  far  as  he  thinks  I  deal  with  unverified  hypotheses, 
so  far  must  he  accept  my  results  as  tentative  only. 

§  2.  I  wish  furthermore  to  acknowledge  in  the  beginning 
my  appreciation  of  the  fact  that  the  general  doctrine  of 
evolution  is  subject  to  some  limitations,  not  usually  noted, 
which  distinctly  narrow  its  value  from  a  philosophic  point 
of  view. 

We  are  wont,  for  instance,  to  speak  glibly  of  "  progress  " 
as  part  and  parcel  of  evolutionary  doctrine  as  though  we 
appreciated  clearly  the  import  of  the  term  we  use,  as 
though  progress  were  a  perfectly  definite  objective  fact 
which  could  be  readily  recognised  and  identified.  But  this 
of  course  is  not  true,  for  progress  is  a  conception  of  ours 
determined  by  desires  and  impulses  which,  as  we  all  realise, 
vary  from  race  to  race,  from  individual  to  individual,  and 
from  year  to  year  in  the  same  individual. 

Progress  for  any  person  means  the  recognition  by  him 
of  the  development  of  a  series  of  events  in  an  order  con- 
formable to  his  ideals :  the  notion  of  progress  differs,  there- 
fore, first  with  the  series  of  events  under  consideration,  and 
secondly  with  the  varying  and  variable  ideals  of  the  person 
who  is  considering  them.  Progress  as  defined  by  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer,  for  instance,  is  a  biological  conception  to 
which  he  attempts  to  give  a  universal  appUcation,  and  it  is 
determined  for  him  by  his  own  individual  ideals  of  the 
fullest  life ;  it  is  clearly  not  the  only  available  conception 
even  for  the  biologist,  and  it  does  not  apply  beyond  the 
biologist's  field. 

Moral  progress,  again,  is  quite  a  different  thing,  it  is  a 
concept  determined  by  the  development  of  the  world  in 
accord  with  our  developing  ethical  standards,  and  this 
notion  of  progress  must  evidently  change  in  correspondence 
with  the  alterations  of  our  ethical  standards  which  appear 


14  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

r  as  our  mental  life  unfolds.  Even  if  morality  prove  to  be 
explicable  in  terms  of  evolutionary  theory,  the  ideals  of 
biological  and  of  moral  progress  must  ever  appear  to  our 

\  minds  as  distinct  and  separate  conceptions. 

So  far,  then,  as  we  define  evolutionary  doctrine  in  terms 
of  progress,  even  where  we  do  not  deal  in  mere  tautologies, 
we  are  evidently  not  expressing  the  facts  in  terms  which 
are  necessarily  of  the  highest  value.  If,  for  instance,  I  am 
able  to  show,  as  I  shall  attempt  to  do,  that  religious 
activities  can  be  stated  in  terms  of  our  notion  of  biological 
progress,  if  they  seem  to  have  some  special  biological 
function  which  appears  to  be  of  sufficient  importance  to 
account  for  their  persistence  in  the  race ;  nevertheless  it 
must  be  noted  in  the  first  place  that  this  claim  does  not 
preclude  the  existence  in  connection  with  these  activities  of 
other  functions  of  biological  significance  which  may  be 
pointed  out  by  writers  more  familiar  than  I  am  with 
biological  lore ;  but  especially  must  it  be  noted  that  it  does 
:  not  in  any  way  involve  the  suggestion  that,  in  gaining  a 
conception  of  the  biological  functioning  of  religious  ex- 
pression, we  have  sounded  to  its  depths  the  significance  of 
religion  itself  to  the  souls  of  men  existent  in  this  universe 
Vhich  we  so  imperfectly  comprehend. 

It  will  not  do  for  us  to  rest  satisfied  even  if  we  express 
'all  of  life  in  terms  of  evolutionary  doctrine,  for  we  must 
remember  that  as  under  this  doctrine  our  minds  are  them- 
selves assumed  to  be  products  of  development,  the  expres- 
sion of  experience  in  terms  of  that  doctrine  is  from  a  broad 
point  of  view  little  more  than  a  "  coming  to  oneself "  so  to 
speak.  Indeed  there  is  in  experience  much  of  universal 
significance  which  is  not  even  touched  by  evolutionary 
doctrine :  for  instance  the  whole  question  of  origins.-^ 

1  The  reader  will  find  some  very  acute  criticism  of  this  attitude  from  the 
logician's  point  of  view  in  an  article  by  Mr.  B.  I.  Oilman  in  the  PhilosopJiical 
Review,  vol.  vi.  4.  pp.  403  flF. 


CHAP.  II  THE  METHOD  15 

Darwinism  in  fact,  if  properly  understood,  waives  this 
whole  problem  of  origins,  and  contents  itself  with  an 
attempt  to  state  a  law  of  wide  validity  which  is  of  the 
greatest  service  to  the  biologist  in  enabling  him  to  grasp 
the  phenomena  of  nature  in  which  he  is  interested.  The 
broader  evolutionary  doctrine  is  similarly  limited  in  scope, 
although  a  large  proportion  of  evolutionary  writers  speak 
to  us  as  though  all  the  problems  of  the  universe  would  lie 
clear  before  us  so  soon  as  we  could  state  them  in  terms  of 
this  notion  of  biological  progress. 

The  evolutionary  hypothesis,  moreover,  is  in  general 
lacking  in  proof  from  well- verified  data :  it  is  supported 
principally  by  the  broad  reach  of  the  fragmentary  evi- 
dence we  gain  from  many  sides  in  favour  of  the  general 
view.  But  when  we  come  to  study  any  special  phenomena 
of  life,  especially  when  it  is  of  a  highly  complex  type,  we 
find  the  evidence  altogether  inadequate ;  and  we  should  be 
very  careful  to  avoid  too  great  assurance  of  our  position, 
based  as  it  is  upon  the  complex  facts  before  us.  Especially 
is  this  true  of  those  phenomena  with  which  we  deal  when 
we  study  religious  functioning ;  and  yet  I  think  we  must 
acknowledge  that  in  the  interest  of  science  it  will  be  quite 
worth  the  trouble  taken  if  we  are  able  to  show  that  from 
this  point  of  view  the  phenomena  of  religion  may  be 
brought  under  categories  which  by  other  observations  we 
are  led  to  believe  have  a  wide  scope  in  the  orderly  arrange- 
ment of  experience. 

§  3.  In  the  course  of  the  consideration  to  follow  we 
shall  find  it  advantageous  to  study  the  principal  instincts 
not  only  as  they  appear  in  an  objective  view,  but  also  as 
they  affect  consciousness ;  and  in  this  connection  I  wish  to 
ask  the  reader  to  make  especial  note  of  the  somewhat 
striking    fact  that   when  we  make   the   change   from  the 


16  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

objective  to  the  subjective  point  of  view,  we  discover  that 
we  materially  narrow  our  field  of  study :  for  while  on  the 
one  hand  we  may  from  an  objective  standpoint  consider  the 
actions  of  all  animals  from  the  very  lowest  to  the  very 
highest,  and  may  make  certain  generalisations  from  these 
actions  as  we  observe  them ;  yet  it  is  perfectly  clear  on 
the  other  hand  that  our  view  from  the  subjective  stand- 
point is  very  much  restricted,  inasmuch  as  our  knowledge 
of  the  psychic  coincidents  of  these  actions  of  the  animals 
is  of  necessity  extremely  limited. 

In  the  study  of  the  instincts  as  developed  in  man  we 
are  able,  to  be  sure,  to  compare  our  own  mental  experiences 
with  those  of  our  fellows  so  far  as  they  are  capable  of 
describing  to  us  their  conscious  states ;  but  we  cannot  fail 
to  realise  that  even  here  the  capacity  for  such  description 
is  limited  to  a  relatively  small  number  of  our  kind,  and 
that  our  interpretation  of  such  description  is  always  likely 
to  be  warped  by  our  own  peculiar  traits  of  thought  and 
character.  We  must  acknowledge,  moreover,  that  although 
we  are  able  thus  to  gain  some  inklings  concerning  the 
conscious  life  of  our  fellow-man,  this  aids  us  but  little  in 
the  study  of  the  psychic  side  of  instinct  in  general ;  rather 
does  the  fact  serve  to  emphasise  the  immensity  of  the  mass 
of  those  activities  in  the  animal  world,  which  we  are  able 
to  study  objectively  with  some  thoroughness,  but  which  we 
are  utterly  unable  to  interpret  in  psychic  terms,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  animals  are  entirely  incapable  of 
describing  to  us  their  conscious  states  in  any  way  whatever. 
The  more  we  study  in  this  direction,  the  more  do  we  seem 
to  be  thrown  back  practically  to  the  consideration  of  our 
own  conscious  experience. 

Our  comprehension  of  these  psychic  states  is  also  subject 
to  another  and  a  greater  limitation ;  for  we  notice  even 
within  ourselves  a  great  many  activities    that  vary  very 


CHAP.  II  THE  METHOD  17 

widely  in  their  effect  upon  consciousness.  We  discover, 
in  the  first  place,  many  activities  within  us  that  do  not 
seem  to  affect  what  we  call  consciousness  in  any  respect 
whatever ;  activities  that  we  should  never  know  to  occur 
did  we  not  note  their  results ;  such  activities  for  instance 
as  are  involved  in  secretion  by  the  kidneys,  and  in  the 
general  action  of  the  intestinal  glands. 

In  the  second  place  we  find  certain  other  very  numerous 
sets  of  activities  which  only  occasionally  affect  conscious- 
ness ;  of  which  we  have  example  in  the  activities  of  heart 
and  lungs :  these  organs  may  perform  their  proper  functions 
regularly  for  days  or  years  without  our  gaining  any  direct 
apprehension  of  their  existence  at  all;  and  yet  at  any 
moment  we  may  become  painfully  conscious  of  their 
existence  if  this  regular  functioning  be  disturbed. 

In  the  third  place  we  find  certain  less  numerous  sets  of 
activities  which  always  present  themselves  in  the  light  of 
our  conscious  life  as  often  as  they  occur,  but  which  never- 
theless seem  to  be  all  but  independent  of  what  we  call 
"  ourselves,"  which  seem  almost  to  be  forced  upon  us,  as  it 
were,  from  without  ourselves  :  as  examples  of  such  activities 
we  may  note,  for  instance,  the  functioning  that  goes  with 
the  dodging  of  an  unexpected  blow,  or  with  the  involuntary 
rubbing  of  an  itching  surface,  or  with  a  burst  of  joyous 
laughter. 

Finally  we  come  to  see  that  there  is  an  exceedingly 
narrow  set  of  activities,  relatively  speaking,  which  seem  to 
involve  our  very  selves,  which  demand  our  close  attention, 
involve  our  effort,  and  are  determined  by  what  we  call  our 
will. 

It  becomes  very  clear,  then,  as  I  have  said  above,  that 
there  is  a  strong  contrast  between  the  enormous  breadth  of 
the  field  of  animal  activity  that  we  consider  in  an  objective 
view,   and    the    extreme   narrowness   of   that    field    which 

c 


18  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

presents  itself  to  our  subjective  view  in  consciousness : 
nevertheless  it  is  well  to  study  the  two  fields  together  if 
for  no  other  reason  than  that  the  subjective  field,  although 
so  much  narrower,  has  an  interest  and  a  value  for  us  that 
does  not  attach  to  the  objective  field, — an  interest  and  value 
that  is  given  by  the  fact  that  it  leads  us  to  the  intimate 
study  of  what  belongs  to  our  own  personal  nature. 

It  will  be  apparent  to  the  reader  that  thorough  study  of 
the  subject  before  us  from  both  the  subjective  and  objective 
points  of  view,  implies  in  the  student  a  just  conception  of 
the  relation  between  physical  and  mental  states,  and  to 
this  subject  I  now  turn  in  the  second  division  of  this 
chapter. 


CHAP.  II         OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  19 


II. — Of  Mental  and  Physical  Parallelism 


§  4.  In  the  very  early  stages  of  the  rise  of  intelligence 
men  learned  to  think  of  themselves  as  souls,  as  mental 
beings  who  inhabited  and  made  use  of  the  body.  They 
had  none  of  the  knowledge  we  possess  of  the  nervous 
system,  which  we  know  to  be  so  intimately  connected  with 
mental  functioning,  nor  indeed  did  they  understand  any 
part  of  the  mechanism  of  bodily  functioning;  but  they 
noted  their  companions  making  use  of  their  bodily  members 
in  much  the  same  way  in  which  they  used  the  natural 
elements  around  them,  and  their  own  experience  told 
them  that  the  soul  within  them  seemed  to  determine 
the  actions  of  these  bodily  members  as  much  as  it  seemed 
to  determine  the  picking  up  of  the  stone  or  club.  Perhaps 
it  is  too  much  even  to  say  that  they  noted  anything  of  this ; 
the  conception  must  have  grown  naturally  into  their  lives 
long  before  any  man  reached  the  stage  of  intelligence  which 
was  necessary  before  he  could  think  out  or  express  the 
relation  as  we  here  state  it.  That  early  man  did  gain  this 
notion,  however,  is  clear  from  such  study  as  we  can  give  to 
the  remnant  of  savage  men  now  living. 

They  had  seen  death ;  and  they  interpreted  it  as  the 
permanent  departure  of  the  spirit  out  of  the  body,  so  that 
the  spirit  could  no  longer  make  use  of  it.  They  had  daily 
evidence  of  the  temporary  departure  of  this  spirit  in  the 
recurrence  of  sleep,  which  they  interpreted  in  the  very  same 
way ;  and  the  dreams  recalled  in  waking  hours  were  looked 
upon  as  remembrances  of  the  activities  of  the  spirit  while 
out  of  the  body  during  the  silence  of  sleep.  They  had 
seen  states  of  total  failure  of  bodily  activity  connected  with 


20  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

temporary  unconsciousness,  due  to  violence  or  accident  or 
disease,  and  then  of  the  return  to  full  mental  vigour ;  and 
how  else  could  this  be  interpreted  by  them  but  as  the 
departure  and  return  of  the  spirit  that  used  the  body  as 
through  the  mediate  instrumentality  of  the  body  it  used  the 
club  and  the  stone.  They  had  seen  trance  states  too,  and 
states  of  delirium,  in  which  the  bodies  of  their  companions 
acted  in  unexpected  and  inexplicable  ways,  and  they  judged 
from  the  strange  words  they  heard  at  such  times  that  the 
spirit  which  usually  occupied  and  used  the  body  of  their 
companion  had  gone  out  of  him  and  had  been  displaced  by 
some  other  spirit,  usually  an  evil  one,  which  had  used  the 
same  body  in  this  strange  manner.  Is  it  a  wonder  that 
they  thought  it  proper  to  kill  in  order  to  drive  away  this 
evil  spirit  from  their  midst,  or  to  resort  to  torture  in  order 
to  displace  the  intruder  and  to  recall  the  spirit  which  was 
the  proper  owner  of  the  body  of  their  companion  ? 

Crude  as  these  notions  seem  at  the  first  glance,  a 
moment's  thought  will  convince  us  that  they  have  come 
down  to  our  own  time,  and  that  in  no  greatly  altered  shape 
they  are  held  to-day  not  only  by  the  ignorant  but  by  the 
vast  mass  of  men  of  intelligence. 

It  is  true  that  the  form  of  this  conception  has  changed 
as  man  has  advanced,  for  it  has  become  clear  to  all  that 
our  sensational  and  perceptual  experiences  cannot  be 
produced  by  the  soul,  inasmuch  as  they  are  evidently 
determined  by  the  effects  of  the  environment  upon  us. 

Yet  this  observation  has  not  led  to  an  abandonment  of 
the  theory ;  rather  has  it  led  to  the  acceptance  of  a  limita- 
tion of  soul  life  to  volitional  experience,  to  a  consideration 
of  sensation  and  perception  as  in  a  way  apart  from  the  soul 
life,  to  an  artificial  division  of  consciousness  into  mind  and 
spirit,  with  which  spirit  the  volitional  guidance  of  our 
activities    is    identified,    this    spirit    being    considered    all- 


CHAP.  II        OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  21 

important  in  this  connection :  and  this  conception  has  been 
almost  universally  current  amongst  thoughtful  people  until 
very  lately,  and  is  still  current  with  a  large  proportion  of 
intelligent  people  who  have  not  given  especial  attention  to 
this  subject. 

§  5.  As  a  matter  of  fact  this  theory  of  the  action  of 
mind  upon  and  through  the  body  served  well  to  interpret 
the  activities  of  man,  and  became  fixed,  and  was  believed 
to  be  a  true  conception,  long  before  the  time  when  thought- 
ful men  began  to  study  the  nature  of  the  human  spirit 
itself. 

Most  naturally  one  of  the  early  questions  to  excite  the 
curiosity  of  students  was  that  as  to  the  locus  of  the  spirit 
when  it  resided  in  the  body.  As  spirit  was  conceived  as  a 
unit,  it  was  probably  at  first  supposed  to  have  its  home  in 
some  one  spot  within  the  body,  and  as  we  shall  presently 
see  this  view  has  not  lost  its  hold  in  later  times.  Aristotle, 
we  find,  located  the  central  organ  of  the  soul  in  the  heart, 
which  he  thought  to  be  the  seat  of  sensations ;  the  brain  he 
thought  to  be  an  organ  of  subordinate  importance :  but  in 
this  very  conception  of  the  dominance  of  one  organ  over 
another  he  shows  the  influence  of  suggestions,  which  must 
have  arisen  very  early,  that  the  spirit  was  not  altogether 
a  unit,  but  that  its  different  "  faculties  "  resided  in  different 
organs ;  we  know  that  the  heart,  the  spleen,  the  liver,  were 
at  one  time  thought  to  be  the  special  seats  of  special  parts 
of  the  spirit  life. 

The  modern  discovery  of  the  nature  of  the  nervous 
system  and  of  the  centralisation  of  neural  control  in  the  brain 
has  led  to  a  renewal  of  this  quest.  Descartes  held  that  the 
soul,  as  an  unextended  being,  could  come  in  contact  with  the 
body  only  in  one  point,  and  having  noted  in  the  brain  the 
pineal  gland,  which  is  apparently  simple,  and  not  duplicated, 


22  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

he  suggested  that  in  this  gland  we  had  the  very  seat  of 
spirit  life.  Even  in  our  own  day,  in  which  the  specialisa- 
tion of  definite  parts  of  the  brain  to  special  functioning  is 
so  much  insisted  upon,  we  still  find  men  of  acknowledged 
force  attempting  to  find  a  single  seat  for  mental  control  in 
endeavouring  to  discover  the  organ  of  attention,  which  they 
look  upon  as  the  special  essence  of  egohood  rather  than  as 
a  general  quality  of  all  conscious  life. 

§  6.  Notwithstanding  that  this  theory  has  passed  muster 
for  so  many  centuries,  there  are  certain  facts  of  experience 
of  which  it  takes  no  account  whatever,  and  which  indeed,  as 
we  discover  when  we  examine  the  matter  closely,  it  cannot 
explain.  As  we  have  already  said,  a  most  serious  limita- 
tion of  the  theory  appears  when  we  consider  the  ordinary 
facts  of  sensational  experience.  Here  we  note  the  forces 
of  the  environment  acting  upon  our  bodily  organs  and 
producing  alterations  in  the  stream  of  consciousness.  It  is 
impossible  to  say  that  our  spirits  here  produce  the  effect 
upon  our  bodily  organs,  for  the  effect  is  produced  whether 
we  desire  it  or  not,  and  in  most  cases  the  spirit  finds  itself 
powerless  to  prevent  this  effect  in  consciousness,  which  is 
clearly  determined  in  some  way  or  another  by  the  action  of 
some  part  of  the  body. 

But  passing  over  this  limitation  there  is  a  very  serious 
difficulty  in  interpreting  under  the  theory  the  fact  that  the 
spirit  cannot  be  held  to  use  all  the  bodily  organs.  There 
are  a  great  many  bodily  activities  which  no  defender  of  the 
doctrine  under  consideration  can  claim  to  be  determined  by 
the  mind.  The  so-called  "reflex  actions"  are  the  most 
conspicuous  examples  of  such  activities ;  in  order  to  explain 
them  it  must  be  held  that  the  mind  stands  aside  and  views 
the  mechanical  activities  of  the  body,  only  occasionally 
stepping  in  to  influence  the  action  of  a  limited  part  of  these 


CHAP.  II         OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  23 

activities,  and  avoiding  all  disturbance  of  a  large  part  of 
them,  to  which  it  gives  no  heed  whatever. 

But  our  attention  is  especially  called  to  the  fact  that 
there  are  certain  activities  which  the  spirit  at  times  does, 
and  at  other  times  does  not,  seem  to  influence.  My  breath- 
ing ordinarily  goes  on  without  anything  that  can  be  called 
direction  from  my  spirit ;  and  yet  if  I  wish  I  can  hasten 
or  decrease  the  rapidity  of  both  expiration  and  inspiration. 

This  difficulty  may  of  course  be  overcome  by  supposing  the 
spirit  to  be  an  utterly  reckless  entity,  under  no  restraint  as 
to  its  exercise  of  freedom,  and  capable  of  playing  with  these 
certain  parts  of  the  bodily  organism  whenever  it  chooses  to 
do  so,  leaving  them  to  act  automatically  when  the  play 
becomes  a  bore. 

There  are  certain  of  the  facts  in  relation  to  such  activities, 
however,  which  are  entirely  inexplicable  under  this  view. 
We  find  that  certain  bodily  activities  which  we  could 
play  with  thus  years  ago  have  passed  out  of  our  control 
to-day;  and  as  we  look  a  little  deeper  we  discover  that 
this  has  been  due  to  what  we  have  come  to  call  our  habits 
of  action  in  the  past. 

And  when  we  study  the  phenomena  of  habit  we  note  a 
distinct  and  definite  order  of  these  events  which  is  clearly 
beyond  our  control,  which  is  evidently  forced  upon  us  from 
without,  and  this  clearly  shows  that  we  have  not  (as  at  first 
appeared)  this  capacity  to  play  with  certain  activities 
altogether  as  we  choose.  Certain  actions  in  my  body, 
which  ten  years  ago  could  not  occur  without  a  distinct 
effort  of  will,  I  have  found  becoming  less  and  less  difficult 
of  performance  from  year  to  year,  and  eventually  a  time 
has  come  when  I  have  found  them  occurring  without  any 
effort  on  my  part  at  all ;  furthermore,  at  a'later  time  I  have 
discovered  that  I  have  lost  altogether  the  power  to  control 
them ;  that,  given  the  proper  stimulus,  the  actions  occur  even 


24  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

if  I  wish  they  would  not ;  and  finally  I  have  reached  a 
point  when  I  am  not  at  all  conscious  of  these  habits  of 
action  unless  my  attention  is  especially  drawn  to  them. 

Now,  of  course,  under  the  theory  we  are  examining  it 
might  be  possible  to  hold  in  respect  to  any  one  case  that 
a  person  could  choose  to  lessen  his  direction  of  these 
activities  in  a  decreasing  ratio  until  he  ceased  to  care  to 
bother  with  them  at  all ;  but  no  one  after  serious  thought 
would  for  a  moment  hold  such  a  view,  for  he  knows  by 
daily  experience  that  the  order  of  events  resulting  from 
habit  is  always  and  invariably  the  same,  and  that  this  order 
is  forced  upon  him,  and  that  it  cannot  in  any  way  be 
changed  by  him  so  long  as  the  necessary  repetitions  of  the 
activities  are  given.     To  this  we  refer  again  in  §  12. 


II 

§  7.  These  facts  not  unnaturally  suggest  that  we  may 
have  been  deceived  by  the  point  of  view  from  which  we 
have  been  looking  at  the  subject ;  that  the  activities  them- 
selves may  have  to  do  with  the  production  of  the  effects 
in  consciousness  instead  of  consciousness  having  the  power 
to  produce  bodily  activities ;  that  bodily  activities  may 
result  in  the  rise  of  consciousness  under  certain  conditions ; 
and  that  as  these  conditions  change  in  a  regular  order,  so 
their  power  to  produce  conscious  effects  may  be  lost  in  a 
corresponding  order.  We  are  brought  thus  naturally  to 
consider  the  theory  which  most  people  think  of  as  standing 
in  opposition  to  the  one  just  studied, — the  theory  that  body 
acts  upon  and  affects  mind,  that  conscious  effects  are 
altogether  dependent  upon  and  determined  by  the  activities 
of  the  body  with  which  they  are  connected. 

This  theory  has  clearly  an  advantage  over  the  theory 
just  discussed,  in  the  fact  that  it  offers  an  explanation  of 


CHAP.  II        OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PAEALLELISM  25 

sensational  and  perceptual  experience  which  the  first  theory 
was  altogether  unable  to  give ;  for  here  it  appears  clear 
that  if  the  action  of  bodily  organs  determines  consciousness, 
then  the  direct  effects  from  the  environment  upon  our 
bodies  will  be  the  most  likely  of  all  things  to  influence 
mental  states. 

This  theory  has  gained  great  strength  amongst  men  of 
science  in  later  times  in  consequence  of  the  growing  interest 
they  have  taken  in  explaining  and  relating  the  phenomena 
of  the  environment  in  terms  of  matter  and  motion;  as 
animals  around  us  and  our  fellow-men  are  part  and  parcel 
of  material  nature,  there  has  been  a  most  natural  desire  to 
interpret  their  changes  of  condition  in  these  same  terms, 
and  the  consciousness  which  we  judge  accompanies  at  least 
some  of  their  activities  naturally  presents  itself  therefore 
for  subsumption  under  the  general  formulas  the  scientists 
are  attempting  to  elucidate. 

Indeed  this  view  is  at  the  first  glance  a  most  plausible 
one,  for  we  will  have  to  acknowledge,  I  think,  that  were  we 
beings  far  removed  from  man's  experience,  endowed  with 
powers  of  observation  and  intellectual  discrimination,  and 
withal  acquainted  with  the  methods  of  modern  science,  we 
would  certainly  come  to  look  upon  all  animals,  inclusive  of 
mankind,  as  a  special  type  of  natural  objects  which  are 
differentiated  from  other  objects  mainly  by  the  fact  that 
they  are  nicely  adapted  to  effect  the  transfer  of  ethereal 
and  molecular  forces  into  forms  of  mechanical  energy. 
This  we  would  judge  from  experiment,  by  eliminating  the 
incidence  of  these  ethereal  and  molecular  forces  and  noting 
the  reduction  of  the  mechanical  energies  then  displayed;- 
and  by  noting  also  that  animals  alone,  and  no  other  natural 
objects,  show  this  same  relation  of  mechanical  result  to 
ethereal  or  molecular  incidence.  We  should  then  come  to 
look  upon  animals  as  relatively  permanent  objects,  capable 


26  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

of  recurrent  explosions  upon  the  reception  of  the  proper 
stimuli  correspondingly  recurrent;  as  bodies  capable  from 
time  to  time  of  the  production  of  a  large  amount  of  energy 
of  one  type,  as  the  result  of  the  impression  upon  them  of 
a  small  amount  of  energy  of  another  type. 

As  the  result  of  this  conception,  if  we  became  cognisant 
of  the  existence  of  consciousness  in  connection  with  bodily 
activities  in  man  as  thus  observed,  we  should  most  naturally 
conclude  that  consciousness  was  produced  solely  and  entirely 
by  the  activities  noted. 

§  8.  This  doctrine  has  put  on  a  new  form  in  modern 
times  in  consequence  of  the  discovery  of  the  marked  im- 
portance to  consciousness  of  the  existence  of  the  brain  and 
the  connected  nervous  system,  and  it  has  gained  great 
strength  in  consequence  of  the  close  attention  given  to  the 
study  of  the  mechanical  activities  displayed  in  nervous 
matter. 

So  marked  is  the  influence  of  this  theory  that  the  word 
hrain  is  very  frequently  used  as  a  synonym  for  mind  ;  and 
this  not  only  by  professed  defenders  of  the  mechanical 
origin  of  mental  states,  but  as  often  by  those  who  would  be 
shocked  to  think  they  could  be  accused  of  holding  any 
such  opinion.  It  is  the  commonest  thing,  for  instance,  to 
hear  even  the  firmest  believers  in  the  theory  that  mind 
uses  the  body  speaking  of  men  of  powerful  brain,  and  of 
their  own  brains,  as  being  active  or  inactive,  when  they 
really  refer  to  their  own  minds,  or  to  the  minds  of  others. 

Brain  as  an  Organ  of  Mind  is  the  title  Bastian  gives  to 
a  book ;  the  production  of  mental  phenomena  is  looked 
upon  as  a  function  of  the  brain,  much  as  the  supplying  of 
oxygen  to  the  blood  is  conceived  to  be  a  function  of  the 
lungs ;  the  brain  is  considered  to  excrete  mind,  very  much 
as  the  liver  excretes  the  bile,  and  the  kidneys  excrete  the 


CHAP.  II        OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  27 

urine.  The  theory  is  indeed  not  often  stated  in  so  harsh 
a  form,  but  the  common  statement  that  brain  activity 
produces  consciousness  involves  the  same  conception. 

This  theory  not  only  explains  the  facts  of  sensational 
experience,  as  we  have  already  noted,  as  the  theory  first 
discussed  does  not,  but  it  also  has  the  great  advantage  of 
furnishing  us  with  a  plausible  explanation  of  the  phenomena 
of  habit  which  the  first-named  theory  left  unaccounted  for. 
Consciousness  under  this  view  is  determined  by  resistance 
to  neural  discharge ;  and  the  loss  of  conscious  control, 
and  finally  of  consciousness  itself,  which  gradually  appears 
as  the  result  of  habitual  reaction,  is  explained  as  due  to 
the  gradual  overcoming  of  the  resistance. 

§  9.  But  if  on  the  one  hand  this  theory  appears  plausible 
just  where  the  first-mentioned  theory  breaks  down,  on  the 
other  hand  this  second  theory  breaks  down  just  where  the 
other  theory  proves  most  satisfactory.  As  we  have  seen, 
it  is  not  difficult,  under  the  theory  that  mind  uses  the  body, 
to  explain  the  fact  that  certain  activities  which  are  at 
times  unconscious  are  at  other  times  accompanied  by  marked 
changes  in  our  mental  states,  if  we  suppose  that  the  mind 
in  the  first  instance  does  not  care  to  influence  these  bodily 
activities,  but  in  the  second  instance  chooses  to  determine 
their  form  or  direction. 

But  under  the  mechanical  theory  now  before  us  no 
satisfactory  explanation  of  these  facts  is  presented.  If 
certain  forms  of  brain  activity  "  excrete  "  consciousness  at 
one  time,  why  should  they  not  always  "  excrete  "  conscious- 
ness in  cases  where  habit  has  not  acted  to  produce  uncon- 
sciousness ?  How  can  this  theory  account  for  the  fact  that 
while  I  usually  breathe  regularly  without  any  knowledge 
that  I  am  breathing,  yet  at  times  I  am  able  to  control  this 
breathing?       How  does  it  happen   that  certain   activities, 


28  INSTIISrCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

which  are  unconscious,  but  which  we  know,  although  from 
objective  evidence  only,  to  be  going  on  within  us,  suddenly 
become  conscious,  pass  the  "  threshold,"  as  we  say,  when 
they  rise  to  a  certain  degree  of  objectively  noted  intensity  ? 
How  does  it  happen  that  some  result,  which  we  ordinarily 
reach  through  a  train  of  conscious  reasoning,  is  at  times 
known  only  in  its  final  step,  all  the  preliminaries  being 
unconscious  ?  The  hypothesis  of  "  unconscious  cerebration," 
while  describing  the  facts  in  what  may  be  held  to  be  scientific 
form,  does  not  in  any  way  explain  why,  if  the  corresponding 
brain  activities  do  usually  "  excrete "  consciousness,  they 
should  appear  in  these  other  cases  without  producing  any 
recognisable  mental  effects. 

These  difficulties  are  waived  by  a  large  body  of  those 
whose  attention  is  riveted  upon  the  physical  facts  by  mak- 
ing the  assumption  that  "  consciousness  is  a  phenomena 
superadded  to  movement  and  independent  of  it "  ;  ^  they  ask 
us  to  look  upon  the  conscious  states  accompanying  nervous 
activities  as  mere  "  epiphenomena,"  affecting  the  mechanical 
nervous  action  no  more  than  the  squeak  of  a  cart-wheel 
affects  the  progress  of  the  cart,  to  borrow  a  descriptive 
phrase  from  Professor  Huxley. 

But  it  is  to  be  noted  that  if  we  hold  that  certain 
physical  activities  cause  consciousness  and  others  do  not, 
then  it  seems  pretty  clear  that  the  functioning  in  the  two 
cases  must  in  some  way  differ,  that  consciousness  must  have 
some  efficiency ;  ^  and  if  this  is  the  case  it  seems  highly 
improbable  under  our  conceptions  of  evolution  that  con- 
sciousness, if  it  once  entered  into  the  series  of  mechanical 
biological  phenomena,  should  have  been  able  to  hold  its  own 
and  to  have  become  developed  and  elaborated  if  it  has  been 


^  Richet ;  Essai  de  Psychologie  Generale,  p.  115. 

2  Cf.  Paulhan  ;  Phenomenes  Affedifs,   p.   13,  also  C.  Lloyd  Morgan,   as 
referred  to  in  Chapter  XVII.  §  10,  below. 


CHAP.  II         OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  29 

of  no  moment,  a  mere  "  epiphenomenon,"  a  mere  shadow  of 
a  moving  atom.  If  we  are  to  hold  to  this  last-mentioned 
doctrine,  therefore,  it  appears  that  we  may  be  compelled  to 
abandon  the  theory  of  the  causal  interaction  of  body  and 
mind  altogether.  This  suggests  the  question  whether  this 
theory  of  causal  interaction  is  one  which  must  necessarily 
be  upheld,  and  to  this  question  I  would  now  turn  the 
reader  s  attention  for  a  moment. 

§  10.  Before  doing  so,  however,  I  wish  to  say  a  word 
in  reference  to  both  the  theories  which  we  have  already 
discussed,  and  neither  of  which  we  have  found  to  be  satis- 
factory. As  we  have  already  seen,  it  is  not  unnatural  that 
the  old  notions  of  the  use  of  the  body  by  the  mind  should 
have  clung  to  us,  and  that  we  should  find  a  school  of  thinkers 
who  interpret  the  newly-discovered  facts  in  terms  of  the 
hypothesis  that  mind  influences  the  body,  and  who  are 
unwilling  to  renounce  the  claim  that  human  consciousness 
is  fuller  and  wider  than  neural  reaction.  In  fact  such 
theorists  are  able  to  support  their  position  by  pointing  to 
the  vast  fields  of  conscious  activity  that  cannot  be  positively 
shown  to  be  determined  by  any  known  neural  activity; 
and  they  are  thus  led  to  hold  that  investigation  has  shown 
no  more  than  the  fact  that  special  mental  states  are  in 
themselves  efficient  to  produce  nervous  action;  and  to 
claim  therefore  that  these  mental  states  are  the  all- 
important  matter  for  consideration  in  discussing  the  relation 
between  neural  and  psychic  action. 

My  reader  will  say  truly  that  no  body  of  serious  and 
learned  psychologists  in  our  day  hold  such  an  extreme  view, 
but  he  will  agree  that  this  is  practically  the  position  taken 
by  many  unlearned  in  psychology  who  earnestly  attack  all 
opposed  views  as  dangerous  materialism. 

I  refer  again  to  this  view,  however,  principally  because 


30  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

I  wish  to  note  that  equally  unwarranted  appears  the 
position  of  an  opposite  school  which  includes  amongst  its 
numbers  not  a  few  of  our  eminent  scientists,  who  are  wont 
to  look  upon  those  who  cling  to  that  theory  of  ancient 
pedigree,  of  which  we  have  just  spoken,  as  gullible  fools. 
Those  who  hold  the  theory  to  which  we  now  refer  call 
attention  to  the  fact  that  action  of  nerve  is  explicable 
in  very  much  the  same  terms  in  which  we  describe  the 
mechanical  forces  of  nature  that  surround  us ;  and 
emphasising  the  fact  that  a  great  deal  of  nervous  action 
does  not  appreciably  affect  consciousness  at  all,  they  are 
wont  to  contend  that  therefore  this  action  of  nerve  must  be 
all-important  for  our  consideration  in  discussing  the  relation 
between  mental  and  neural  actions ;  and  some  of  them, 
as  already  noted,  ask  us  to  look  upon  the  accompanying 
conscious  states  as  merely  "  epiphenomena." 

But  why,  we  are  at  once  tempted  to  ask,  is  the  claim  of 
the  extremists  of  one  school  better  than  that  of  the 
extremists  of  the  other,  when  of  these  two  sets  of  facts 
which  we  know  to  bear  a  very  close  relation  to  one  another, 
each  set  in  turn  is  held  to  be  alone  of  significance  ?  And 
this  point  I  wish  to  make  clear :  that  if  the  view  first 
mentioned  assumes  too  much  in  proclaiming  the  all  -  im- 
portance of  the  conscious  aspect  in  relation  to  neural  change, 
equally  may  it  be  held  that  the  second  view  assumes  too 
much  in  proclaiming  the  all  -  importance  of  the  neural 
changes  and  the  total  unimportance  of  the  coincidents  in 
consciousness.  If  one  view  be  rejected  because  of  its 
dogmatism,  then  the  other  view  must  be  rejected  for  exactly 
the  same  reason. 

§  11.  Let  us  now  return  to  the  question  suggested  at 
the  close  of  §  9  —  the  question  whether  the  hypo- 
thesis of  causal  interaction  between  mind  and  body  is  a 


CHAP.  II         OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  31 

necessary  one,  or  one  which  is  likely  to  be  found  to  be 
satisfactory. 

The  two  theories  which  we  have  already  discussed 
involve  assumptions  the  consideration  of  which  might  easily 
lead  us  to  plunge  deep  into  metaphysical  polemics.  This 
I  wish  to  avoid,  and  I  do  not  think  it  necessary,  for  the 
reason  that  the  theories  we  are  here  discussing  are  related 
only  to  the  common-sense  conception  of  cause  and  effect. 
In  passing,  however,  I  may  say  a  word  concerning  the  less 
commonplace  conception  of  causahty. 

As  Professor  Stumpf  has  said,^  definite  processes  appear 
in  the  motor  centres  of  the  cortex  not  merely  in  consequence 
of  physiological  conditions,  but  only  in  connection  with 
co-ordinate  effects  of  a  definite  psychic  type  {e.g.  Emotion, 
Will) ;  and  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  these  psychic  states 
as  other  than  part  of  the  conditions  which  are  antecedent 
to  the  active  resultant,  and  these  conditions  must  one  and 
all  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  discussion  of  causality. 
But  if  we  "take  this  view  it  seems  to  me  that  we  are  led  to 
one  of  two  positions :  either  the  psychic  effects  alter  the 
quantum  of  physical  energy,  and  of  this  I  think  Professor 
Stumpf  agrees  there  is  no  adequate  evidence ;  or  else  we 
must  assume  that  there  is  a  something  psychic  in  connection 
with  all  that  interaction  which  we  describe  as  cause  and 
effect,  and  this  latter  position  is  one  in  favour  of  which,  as 
I  shall  presently  attempt  to  show,  much  may  be  said. 

The  common-sense  conception  of  cause  and  effect,  how- 
ever, does  not  deal  with  any  such  notions  ;  it  deals  altogether 
with  what  it  calls  mechanical  energies,  and  in  the  two 
theories  above  discussed  consciousness  is  always  considered 
as  a  mechanical  thing,  although  few  disputants  appear  to 
recognise  the  fact,  especially  if  they  are  upholders  of  the 
first  theory  studied. 

1  Presidential  address  at  the  Berlin  Psychological  Congress. 


32  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  i 

The  causal  relation,  as  men  usually  consider  it,  involves 
the  action  and  reaction  of  what  appear  to  us  as  diverse 
objects.  We  find,  however,  that  in  practice  objects  can  be 
separated  into  strata,  so  to  speak,  into  divisions ;  that  they 
can  be  measured  by  certain  scales ;  and  we  find  also  that 
the  causal  relation,  as  common  sense  understands  it,  can 
best  be  traced  within  given  strata,  among  the  elements 
of  specific  divisions,  between  those  objects  which  are 
commensurable. 

The  average  man  finds  no  difficulty  in  speaking  of  the 
dynamic  blow  as  directly  causing  the  dynamic  explosion : 
it  is  for  him  not  difficult,  although  less  easy,  to  speak  of 
the  insect  as  causing  the  fertilisation  of  the  flower,  or  of  heat 
as  causing  a  change  in  the  electrical  conditions  of  a  body  ; 
the  elements  here  supposed  to  be  causally  related  are  in  a 
sense  conceived  of  as  belonging  to  the  same  set  of  objects. 
He  finds  it  much  more  difficult,  however,  to  conceive  of  a 
direct  causal  relation  existing  between  the  elements  of  the 
several  divisions,  between  heat  and  the  action  of  the  insect, 
or  between  electricity  and  the  fertilisation  of  the  flower ; 
some  mediating  cause  is  usually  demanded  to  link  together 
these  objects  observed  in  diverse  strata. 

Greater  still,  all  but  impossible,  is  it  for  him  to  conceive 
of  a  causal  relation  as  existing  between  a  whole  object  and 
some  part  of  this  whole ;  he  cannot  easily  think  of  one 
planet  in  the  solar  system  acting  causally  upon  the  whole 
system,  or  of  the  whole  system  acting  causally  upon  one  planet 
which  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  system.  But  it  is  just  such 
a  causal  relation  between  a  part  and  a  whole  which  he  is 
forced  to  consider  when  he  holds  that  mind  produces  bodily 
activity,  or  that  neural  activity  produces  consciousness. 

This  becomes  apparent  if  we  lay  aside  the  crude  dualism 
in  which  we  have  expressed  the  facts  in  what  has  preceded 
this,  and  substitute  a  more  correct  statement  in  terms  of 


CHAP.  II        OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM 


35 


consciousness.  Consciousness  is  a  whole,  a  unit,  within 
which  are  certain  differentiated  parts,  still  of  consciousness, 
which  we  call  objects ;  of  these  objects  there  are  many- 
classes — one  of  these  classes  includes  what  we  call  "  objects 
in  nature."  Of  these  "  objects  in  nature "  there  are  also 
very  many  kinds,  and  one  of  these  particular  objects  is  known 
to  us  as  "active  nerve  matter  in  ourselves."  It  is  this 
part,  of  a  part,  of  a  part,  of  consciousness  which  common- 
sense  strives  to  relate  causally  to  the  whole  of  consciousness. 
This  may  appear  clearer  if  we  present  it  in  diagrammatic 
form. 


1  Ego 


^[objects  of 
Q        \Consciousness 


Here  C  represents  the  whole  of  consciousness :  within 
C  are  two  grand  divisions,  the  "  ego "  represented  by  the 
oblong  1,  and  "  objects  of  consciousness  "  represented  by  the 
square  2.  Within  the  division  "objects  of  consciousness"  (2) 
we  find  many  subdivisions,  say  A  B  G  D  .  .  .  N ;  one  of 
these  divisions  (D)  gives  us  what  we  call  "  objects  in  the 
outer  world."  Within  this  special  subdivision  there  are 
many  subdivisions  of  lower  grade,  one  of  which  (X)  we  call 
"  action  of  our  brain."  It  is  between  the  whole  of  C,  and  this 
part  of  C  which  we  designate  as  X,  that  we  must  conceive 
of  a  causal  relation  under  the  two  theories  we  have  thus 
far  been  studying. 

The  difficulty  of  this  conception  is  so  great  that,  when 
we  couple  it  with  the  difficulties  inherent  in  the  theories 
derived  from  it,  we  are  led  to  ask  whether  there  is  not  some 

D 


34  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

Other  working  hypothesis  which  common-sense  can  easily 
grasp  which  will  enable  us  to  attain  the  end  we  have  in 
view,  namely  the  unifying  of  the  observed  facts  of  conscious- 
ness. It  seems  to  me  that  the  hypothesis  of  causal  inter- 
action is  not  a  necessary  one  to  be  considered  in  this 
connection,  that  there  is  another  equally  tenable,  and  one 
which  serves  our  purpose  well.  I  refer  to  the  hypothesis  of 
parallelism  between  mental  and  physical  facts,  an  hypothesis 
which  waives  the  whole  question  of  causal  relation,  leaving 
to  other  study  the  description  of  the  nature  of  that  cause, 
which  at  one  moment  and  in  one  act  produces  on  the  one 
hand  the  conscious  state,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  physical 
reaction  which  is  coincident  with  it.  If  this  working 
hypothesis  serve  to  account  for  the  relation  observed 
between  the  two  sets  of  phenomena,  and  aid  us  in  the 
unifying  of  the  facts  of  consciousness,  then  we  may  hold  it 
to  be  probably  valid,  and  we  are  warranted  in  clinging  to 
it  until  considerations  are  presented  to  us  by  the  meta- 
physician which  teach  us  that  it  is  untenable.  I  think  it 
can  be  shown  that  this  hypothesis  serves  us  well  in  the  two 
directions  above  mentioned,  and  to  the  consideration  of  it  in 
some  detail  we  shall  now  turn  in  the  following  sections. 


Ill 

§  12.  The  theory  of  parallelism  is  of  course  no  new  one  ; 
the  names  of  Clifford,  of  Fechner,  of  Zollner,  and  of  a  small 
host  of  minor  thinkers  are  connected  in  our  minds  with  its 
statement  and  elaboration.  Let  us  consider  briefly  the 
data  of  experience  which  have  suggested  it. 

It  is  only  as  the  result  of  inference  from  experience  that 
we  come  to  believe  that  there  is  any  consciousness  besides 
our  own.  Noting  that  our  own  actions  are  accompanied 
by  consciousness  we  conclude  that  similar  activities  in  our 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  35 

fellow-men  are  also  accompanied  by  consciousness ;  and  we 
further  conclude  that  the  activities  of  animals  closely 
resembling  ours  are  accompanied  by  consciousness  in 
them  also. 

Having  noted  the  close  connection  between  the  ex- 
pressive activities  which  we  judge  involve  consciousness 
in  others,  and  the  activity  of  nerve  in  them,  we  would 
naturally  be  led  to  hold,  did  we  not  make  careful  cross 
examination  of  experience,  that  all  actions  of  men,  and 
therefore  of  animals,  must  be  accompanied  by  conscious- 
ness. Nor  if  we  take  this  step  can  we  stop  there,  for  it 
appears  that  there  is  little  reason  why  we  should  attribute 
consciousness  to  the  activity  of  nerve  only  among  all 
activities,  no  reason  why  all  activities  should  not  have  corre- 
spondent consciousness.  There  is  no  moment  in  which,  no 
point  at  which,  consciousness  can  properly  be  conceived  to 
enter  in  such  a  continuous  process  as  must  exist  if  the 
theory  of  evolution  be  valid.  As  Professor  James  well 
says,^  "  Consciousness,  however  small,  is  an  illegitimate  birth 
in  any  philosophy  that  starts  without  it,  and  yet  professes 
to  explain  all  facts  by  continuous  evolution." 

This  conclusion  will  be  again  considered  briefly  in  a 
hypothetical  way  as  a  bit  of  metaphysics  in  the  last  section 
of  this  chapter ;  but  here,  where  we  are  trying  to  avoid 
metaphysical  discussion,  we  must  note  that  after  all,  if  we 
question  experience  closely,  we  cannot  come  to  the  con- 
clusion reached  above ;  or  at  least  we  find  it  necessary  to 
modify  our  statement  materially.  For  if  we  consider  our 
own  activities  only,  and  our  nervous  activities  in  particular, 
we  find  that  consciousness  does  not  appear  wherever  nervous 
action  takes  place,  as  was  at  first  suggested  by  our  observa- 
tions ;  we  discover  what  we  call  reflex  actions  in  ourselves, 
which  apparently  do  not  influence  consciousness  at  all :  and 

1  Psychology,  vol.  i.  p.  149. 


S6  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

these  facts  have  led  to  the  widely  accepted  view  that  many 
activities  in  animals  of  low  type  are  altogether  unconscious, 
and  that  the  transfer  of  energy  in  inorganic  masses  has  no 
psychic  coincident  at  all. 

The  difficulty  of  determining  the  special  conditions  of 
activity  which  do  involve  consciousness  are  so  great  that 
some  men  like  Professor  James,  who  see  all  the  facts  before 
them,  are  led  to  hold  -^  "  that  the  particulars  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  consciousness  point  to  its  being  efficacious." 
He  tells  us  that  adaptation  to  a  useful  end  becomes  difficult 
in  a  complex  nervous  system,  just  because  of  the  instability 
of  the  system ;  "  the  performances  of  a  high  brain  are  like 
dice  thrown  for  ever  on  a  table  " ;  and'  he  is  led  to  surmise 
that  consciousness  comes  in  as  an  efficient  force  to  "  load 
the  dice  "  and  determine  the  direction  of  the  activity. 

But  we  have  already  seen  that  this  view  is  incompatible 
with  the  facts  of  the  loss  of  control  as  the  result  of  habit. 
In  many  cases  it  is  true  that  the  facts  are  explicable  under 
Professor  James's  clever  hypothesis,  that  "habitual  actions  are 
certain  and  need  no  extraneous  help  " ;  ^  but  this  hypothesis 
does  not  enable  us  to  understand  the  facts  discussed  in 
connection  with  the  appearance  of  these  habitual  actions 
when  they  are  forced  upon  us  from  without.  Experience 
in  general  and  educational  methods  in  particular  to  a  great 
extent  compel  us,  whether  we  will  or  not,  to  undertake 
activities,  which  in  the  beginning  require  full  consciousness ; 
and  they  compel  our  continuance  of  these  activities  until 
the  coincident  consciousness  loses  its  vividness,  and  in 
extreme  cases  disappears  altogether. 

The  criminal  in  the  treadmill  starts  with  a  full  con- 
sciousness of  the  physical  process,  and  with  an  opposition  to 
it.      But  if  the  work  required  be  well  within  the  capacity  of 

^  Psychology,  vol.  i.  i?.  138  fF. 
2  Op.  cit.  p.  142. 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  37 

the  man  he  may  soon  come  to  forget  it  altogether,  and  may 
"  employ  his  mind  "  on  other  matters  entirely  unrelated  to 
his  routine  actions.  The  child  who  is  compelled  to  "  prac- 
tise "  upon  the  piano  goes  through  a  very  similar  experience. 
Surely  in  such  cases  it  cannot  be  held  that  consciousness 
chooses  to  withdraw  its  concurrence  as  the  nerve  becomes 
educated  to  its  new  work.  Surely  it  is  not  the  necessity 
of  "loading  the  dice"  which  involves  the  consciousness 
nor  the  loss  of  this  necessity  which  involves  unconscious- 
ness :  the  "  dice  are  loaded "  for  us  by  the  forces  which 
affect  us  from  without. 

§  13.  But  if  the  theory  of  causal  interaction  is  to  be 
displaced  for  our  purposes  by  the  theory  of  parallelism,  the 
latter  must  give  some  rational  explanation  of  the  rise  and 
disappearance  of  consciousness  in  connection  with  nervous 
activities  which  are  at  times  accompanied  by  consciousness 
and  at  other  times  not. 

This  difficulty  has  been  overcome  by  certain  defenders  of 
the  "  automaton  theory "  by  holding  that  we  are  in  error 
when  we  state  that  certain  nervous  activities  are  at  times 
accompanied  by  mental  states  and  at  other  times  are  not ; 
by  holding  that  the  facts  are  explicable  under  the  minor 
hypothesis  that  there  are  "unconscious  mental'  states" 
which  are  attached  to  those  nervous  activities  which  we  call 
unconscious. 

This  special  hypothesis  is  not  without  its  difficulties,  to 
which  I  refer  more  fully  below ;  but  it  seems  to  me  that 
these  difficulties  are  for  the  most  part  connected  with  the 
statement  of  the  doctrine  rather  than  with  its  essential 
nature.  At  the  time  when  it  was  brought  into  greatest 
notice  the  facts  of  our  conscious  experience  were  stated  very 
generally  in  atomistic  terms,  and  the  connection  between 
parts  of  consciousness  was  explained  in  the  language  of  the 


38  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

physical  and  chemical  sciences  which  were  then  most 
prominent  in  men's  minds.  We  in  these  later  times  have 
given  up  the  notion  that  consciousness  is  a  mass  made  up  of 
a  lot  of  bits  glued  together,  or  mechanically  attached,  or 
chemically  combined  into  new  wholes,  and  it  is  but  fair  to 
the  hypothesis  before  us  to  make  an  attempt  to  state  it  in 
terms  conformable  with  our  modern  psychological  notions. 

§  14.  Under  the  hypothesis  we  are  now  to  examine 
there  is  something  mental,  a  psychic  somewhat,  in  connec- 
tion with,  and  arising  coincidently  with,  each  neural  activity 
within  us.  This  psychic  coincident  of  neural  activity 
I  shall  from  this  time  on  speak  of  as  mentality.  It 
is  further  claimed  that  under  certain  conditions  which  are 
to  be  determined,  and  only  under  these  conditions,  this  men- 
tality acquires  certain  characteristics  which  ipso  facto  make 
it  consciousness. 

Let  us  briefly  note  some  of  the  reasons  which  seem  to 
indicate  the  possible  existence  of  this  mentality  out  of 
which  consciousness  is  formed,  before  we  attempt  to 
discover  the  conditions  which  may  determine  this  formation, 
or  to  test  the  value  of  the  theory  as  a  working  hypothesis. 

§  15.  In  the  first  place  it  seems  to  me  that  some  such 
hypothesis  is  demanded  to  account  for  the  totality  of  our 
experience  as  it  is  viewed  in  introspection :  for  in  the 
moment  of  reflection  we  find  in  all  cases  what  have  been 
called  the  fields  of  Attention  and  of  Inattention.  We  find 
them  and  nothing  more.^ 

The  field  of  attention  is  that  part  of  the  psychosis  of 
any  moment  which  appears  to  be  most  important  to  us,  and 

^  I  take  this  opportunity  to  express  my  great  obligations  to  Dr.  James 
"Ward,  whose  treatment  of  the  field  of  Attention  in  his  "Psychology"  in  the 
Encyclopsedia  Britannica  first  led  me  to  work  out  the  hypotheses  which  I 
here  present. 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  39 

which  careless  people  for  the  most  part  speak  of  as  the 
whole  of  consciousness.  And  yet  it  is  apparent  to  all  that 
no  line  can  be  drawn  between  the  fields  of  attention  and  of 
inattention  ;  the  former  fades  into  the  latter ;  out  of  this 
field  of  inattention  the  field  of  attention  is  felt  to  rise  with- 
out any  discontinuity. 

Moreover,  the  field  of  inattention  seems  to  dissipate 
itself  into  space,  if  we  may  use  a  simile  determined  by 
the  fuller  psychic  life  ;  it  seems  to  resolve  itself  into  an 
aura  as  it  were,  which  aura  has  now  a  "  feel  "  of  being  fuller, 
and  now  of  being  narrower :  but  withal  there  are  apparent 
no  marks  of  discontinuity  in  the  whole  mass,  although  there 
are  apparently  large  parts  of  this  aura  which  we  are  entirely 
unable  to  get  into  the  field  of  attention  at  all,  or  even  to 
draw  out  of  the  vague  nebulous-like  psychic  mists  which 
mark  the  fading  away  of  consciousness  into  unconsciousness. 

The  observation  that  this  aura  at  times  seems  to  be  fuller, 
and  again  narrower,  surely  points  to  the  existence  of  some- 
thing psychic  beyond  either  the  fields  of  attention  or  of 
inattention,  points  to  the  existence  of  mentality  out  of 
which  consciousness  whether  of  attention  or  of  inattention 
arises. 

In  the  phenomena  of  the  disappearance  of  conscious- 
ness with  the  acquisition  of  habit  we  have  also  a  fading  of 
the  consciousness  into  the  aura :  no  suddenness  of  dis- 
appearance. Furthermore,  before  habits  become  altogether 
reflex  we  note  times  when  the  field  of  inattention  is  affected 
by  the  activities  involved,  and  again  times  when  it  is  not  so 
affected  ;  as  though  the  mere  mentality  which  we  are  assuming 
had  not  yet  in  the  former  case  altogether  lost  the  qualities 
which  make  it  possible  for  it  to  gain  finally  the  character- 
istics of  consciousness. 

It  seems  to  me  that  these  facts,  added  to  the  former  sug- 
gestions made,  are  of  sufficient  moment  to  warrant  us  in 


40  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  •  part  i 

holding  that  the  hypothesis  is  not  unworthy  of  a  somewhat 
detailed  examination. 

§  16.  But  if  we  make  the  assumption  of  the  existence  of 
mentality  as  coincident  with  each  and  every  neural  activity 
we  are  at  once  compelled  to  consider  what  may  be  the 
qualities  which  result  in  the  formation  of  consciousness  out 
of  this  mere  mentality. 

The  most  natural  suggestion  arises  in  connection  with 
the  observation  that  not  all  of  nerve  action  affects  our  con- 
sciousness. It  is  patent  that  the  action  of  nerve  in  other 
individuals  does  not  appreciably  affect  our  consciousness  at 
all,  so  patent  that  it  might  appear  absurd  to  speak  as  though 
it  were  possible  that  it  could  do  so  were  it  not  that  the 
observation  seems  to  give  us  a  suggestion  of  what  might  be  the 
basis  of  the  disappearance  of  consciousness  in  ourselves  :  for 
the  difference  between  nerve  in  others  and  nerve  in  ourselves 
is  a  diiference  of  complete  separateness  ;  and  the  question 
is  not  unnaturally  suggested  whether  it  may  not  be  that  the 
separation  of  certain  active  nerves  from  the  central  brain  system 
will  suffice  to  account  for  the  facts  of  the  absence  of  conscious- 
ness in  connection  with  the  neural  activities  within  us. 

The  possibility  that  this  suggestion  may  be  of  value  is 
strengthened  by  the  observation  of  the  relative  disconnected- 
ness between  the  brain  and  the  nervous  ganglia  which  have 
to  do  with  those  activities  in  our  body  which  are  not 
thought  to  influence  consciousness.  The  spinal  ganglia,  the 
sympathetic  nervous  system  which  has  so  much  to  do  with 
the  rhythmical  activities  of  the  digestive  and  circulatory 
systems,  are  both  practically  separated  from  the  brain,  which 
latter  it  is  possible  to  assume  to  be  the  "  organ  of  mind." 

Although  there  are  difficulties  connected  with  the  ex- 
planation of  the  limits  and  conditions  of  this  disconnection, 
these  might  possibly  be  overcome ;  but  it  is  not  worth  while 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  41 

to  discuss  the  questions  involved  because  there  is  a  serious 
flaw  involved  in  the  main  suggestion :  it  fails  to  account  on 
the  one  hand  for  the  fact  that  activities  in  nerve  tracts 
which  are  evidently  connected  with  the  brain  and  which 
often  affect  consciousness  are  at  times  unable  to  affect  it 
appreciably,  and  on  the  other  hand  for  the  fact  that 
activities  of  nerve  relatively  disconnected  from  the  brain, 
and  which  do  not  ordinarily  affect  consciousness,  do  at  times 
affect  consciousness  without  any  appearance  of  an  increase  of 
the  closeness  of  connection. 

The  auditory  nerves,  for  instance,  are  very  closely  con- 
nected with  the  brain,  and  stimulations  of  the  ear  almost 
invariably  affect  consciousness ;  nevertheless  intense  con- 
centration of  mind  upon  the  solution  of  some  problem  is 
likely  to  prevent  one  from  being  in  any  way  conscious  of 
comparatively  loud  sounds  such  as  the  striking  of  the  clock 
in  the  room.  On  the  other  hand,  the  relative  disconnected- 
ness from  the  brain  of  the  nerves  of  the  digestive  system  is 
acknowledged,  and  referred  to  by  those  who  defend  the  view 
we  are  for  the  moment  considering  in  corroboration  of  their 
contention  that  disconnectedness  from  the  brain  is  the  basis 
of  unconsciousness ;  nevertheless  we  know  that  in  certain 
states  of  consciousness  of  low  grade,  so  to  speak,  in  the 
consciousness  of  dream  life  for  instance,  these  activities  do 
produce  effective  alteration  of  the  psychic  stream. 

§  17.  The  notion  that  disconnection  from  the  brain  is 
the  cause  of  the  failure  of  consciousness  has  real  value, 
however,  in  the  fact  that  it  suggests  a  view  which  seems  to 
be  more  tenable.  If  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  continuity 
of  consciousness  which  we  acknowledge  in  describing  it  as 
a  "  stream,"  or  as  a  "  field,"  we  perceive  that  connectedness 
necessarily  implies  the  existence  of  a  continuum ;  and  this 
in    turn    suggests   that  possibly  contmuity  may  be  of  the 


42  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

essence  of  the  neural  activity  which  is  the  coincident  of 
consciousness,  as  consciousness  is  differentiated  from  mere 
mentality. 

The  mere  action  of  nerve  itself  does  not  involve  con- 
tinuity; but  action  of  a  nervous  system  does  involve 
continuity,  for  it  involves  the  re -establishment  of  the 
conditions  which  make  activity  possible,  by  the  renewal  of 
neural  capacity  through  the  absorption  of  nutriment  which 
is  constantly  offered  to  the  nerve  substance  by  the  arterial 
system. 

A  nervous  system  in  action  thus  appears  as  what  we 
may  call  a  reverberant  continuum,  and  consciousness  on  the 
other  hand  may  itself  be  also  described  as  a  reverberant 
continuum.  This  reverberance  in  consciousness  is  involved 
in  what  is  ordinarily  called  revival ;  and  when  we  come  to 
consider  the  difference  between  the  activities  which  affect 
our  consciousness,  and  those  which  we  call  unconscious,  we 
are  compelled  to  agree  that  we  call  those  conscious  which 
are  revivable,  which  endure  for  some  recognised  period,-^ 
while  the  activities  which  we  say  are  not  accompanied  by 
consciousness  might  equally  well  be  described  not  positively 
as  those  which  are  not  accompanied  by  a  psychic  state,  but 
negatively  as  those  which  are  accompanied  by  no  psychic 
state  that  is  revivable.^ 

Our  attention  is  thus  drawn  on  the  one  side  to  action 
of  a  nervous  system  which  is  in  a  sense  a  relative  continuum, 
and  on  the  other  hand  to  a  coincident  consciousness  which 
is  also  in  a  sense  a  relative  continuum;  and  we  are  now 
prepared,  I  think,  to  make  a  restatement  of  the  hypothesis 
of  parallelism  which  seems  to  me  to  avoid  the  difficulties 
that  have  presented  themselves  to  our  minds  in  connection 
with  the  statements  of  the  doctrine  already  considered. 

^  Cf.  Ribot,  Diseases  of  Memory y  p.  34. 

2  Cf.    Wundt,   Phy.    Psy.  vol.    ii.    ch.    xxi.    s.   1  ;    Hoffding,    Psy.    im. 
Umrtissen,  ii.  v.  ;  Clifford,  Collected  Essays,  p.  255. 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  43 

§  18.  We  may  assume,  then,  that  coincident  with  each 
neural  activity  there  is  a  psychic  activity,  a  certain  mentality, 
and  that  when  neural  activities  are  developed  into  a  system 
which  involves  reverberant  continuance  then  appears  a 
correspondent  form  of  psychic  system  which  also  involves 
reverberant  continuance  and  which  is  consciousness. 

As  thus  conceived  a  consciousness  at  any  moment  is  the 
whole  pulse  of  the  co-ordinated  psychic  activity  coincident 
with  the  co-ordinated  activity  of  a  neural  system. 

Neural  activities  which  are  not  in  any  way  connected 
with  the  neural  system  under  consideration  can  have  no 
efiect  upon  the  pulse  of  its  coincident  consciousness. 
Correspondingly,  neural  activities  which  under  some  condi- 
tions do,  and  under  others  do  not,  form  part  of  the  system, 
will  at  the  one  time  affect  and  at  the  other  time  will  not 
affect  the  coincident  consciousness. 

A  neural  activity  which  is  not  a  part  of  a  system  cannot 
have  corresponding  with  it  any  influence  within  a  con- 
sciousness, although  it  must  be  assumed  to  have  correspond- 
ing with  it  some  species  of  "  mentality  "  which  under  the 
proper  conditions  may  gain  its  place  in  a  consciousness. 

Neural  systems  may  be  of  different  grades  of  complexity 
and  co-ordination,  and  distinct  systems  may  exist  within 
the  same  animal  body.  Such  distinct  neural  systems  may 
under  certain  conditions  at  times  be  separate ;  and  at  other 
times,  and  under  other  conditions,  we  may  conceive  them 
to  form  one  more  or  less  thoroughly  co-ordinated  system  : 
the  total  system  will  be  dependent  for  its  form  upon  the 
forms  of  the  partial  systems,  but  can  in  no  sense  be  looked 
upon  as  a  sum  of  the  partial  systems. 

In  correspondence  with  the  activities  of  these  separate 
neural  systems  we  will  then  have  distinct  consciousnesses 
which  may  exist  in  connection  with  the  same  body,  and 
under  certain  conditions  these  distinct  consciousnesses  will 


44  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

remain  separated,  while  at  other  times  they  may  blend  into 
one  consciousness  of  a  new  form  determined  by  the  whole 
pulse  of  the  psychic  activities  involved. 

Moreover,  each  active  neural  system  will  have  its 
expressive  motor  resultants  which  will  be  complex  as  the 
system  is  complex,  or  simple  as  the  system  is  simple.  Thus 
when  two  distinct  systems  combine  to  form  one  system  the 
expressive  action  will  be  that  of  the  whole  new  system  thus 
formed,  affected  indeed  by  all  the  neural  activities  thus 
joined,  but  not  a  mere  sum  of  the  two  expressions,  any 
more  than  the  activity  of  the  new  system  is  the  sum  of  the 
activities  of  the  two  systems  that  have  been  conjoined,  or 
the  wider  consciousness  a  sum  of  the  minor  consciousnesses 
out  of  which  it  is  formed. 

Corresponding  with  these  expressions  of  neural  activity 
there  will  appear  states  of  consciousness  which  will  alter  in 
breadth  in  proportion  to  the  complexity  of  the  neural 
systems  involved ;  and  when  under  special  conditions  two 
distinct  neural  systems  become  one,  then  the  state  of  con- 
sciousness corresponding  with  the  expressive  activity  will 
be  one  pulse,  influenced  indeed  by  the  different  elements 
involved  but  in  no  sense  the  summation  of  these  elements. 

§  19.  If  we  turn  from  these  general  considerations  to 
the  interpretation  of  the  facts  with  which  we  are  acquainted, 
we  perceive  that  the  disconnection  between  the  neural 
systems  of  different  individual  animals  is  so  far  complete 
that  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  merge,  and  we  should 
expect  to  find,  what  we  do  find  in  fact,  the  general  acknow- 
ledgment that  the  consciousness  of  one  individual  cannot 
merge  with  the  consciousness  of  another ;  ^  that  only , 
indirectly  can  the  content  of  another  mind  be  imagined  by 

^  I  refer  in  the  closing  section  of  this  chapter  to  a  development  of  this 
hypothesis  which  suggests  the  transcendence  of  this  separation. 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  45 

me  through  comparison  with  the  content  accompanying 
certain  expressions  in  myself  which  I  perceive  to  correspond 
with  the  expressions  of  the  other  individual;  that  his 
mental  state,  to  use  Clifford's  phrase,  is  known  to  me  only 
as  an  "  eject." 

§  20.  We  perceive  further  that  we  are  compelled  to 
grant  that,  inasmuch  as  there  are  different  grades  of  neural 
systematisation  in  animals  of  different  grades,  so  there  must 
be  different  forms  of  consciousness  in  animals  of  diverse 
types  corresponding  to  the  varieties  of  neural  systematisa- 
tion appearing  in  them :  and  we  note  that  this  is  generally 
acknowledged  to  be  true. 

But  we  find  it  impossible  to  stop  here,  for  we  note  in 
the  animals  we  are  able  to  dissect  evidences  of  the  existence 
within  their  bodies  of  self-complete  neural  systems  which 
are  almost  if  not  entirely  disconnected  from  each  other, 
which  at  all  events  in  animals  of  lower  grades  may  be 
completely  disconnected  from  each  other  by  the  knife ;  and 
we  note  that  these  separated  nervous  systems  have  each 
their  forms  of  motor  expression  when  thus  separated.  We 
are  thus  forced  to  assume  that  the  activities  of  these 
separate  systems  within  the  same  individual  body  have 
correspondent  to  them  separate  consciousnesses. 

We  note  further  that  as  these  separated  systems  vary  in 
complexity  so  their  motor  expressions  vary  in  complexity, 
and  if  we  view  the  individual  animal  as  a  whole  we  are 
able  to  assert  that  there  is  a  hierarchal  order  in  which 
these  systems  may  be  graded,  and  we  judge  therefore  that 
there  must  be  a  corresponding  hierarchy  amongst  the 
coincident  consciousnesses. 

We  are  able  to  assert  furthermore  that  where  these 
distinct  systems  are  not  totally  separated,  where  systems  of 
less  complexity  are  lightly  connected  with  systems  of  great 


46  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

complexity,  then  the  systems  of  higher  complexity  must  be 
of  the  greatest  moment  in  affecting  the  total  activity  when 
the  distinct  systems  act  as  one  system ;  and  where  we  dis- 
cover some  one  neural  system  which  is  of  immensely 
greater  complexity  and  integration  than  all  other  distinct 
systems  within  the  same  body,  as  the  brain  system  in  all 
higher  animals  is  related  to  all  other  neural  systems,  then 
we  must  assume  that  this  system  is  of  pre-eminent  import- 
ance in  the  total  systemic  action  which  occurs  when  the  less 
important  systems  merge  their  activities  with  the  greater 
system. 

Correspondingly  on  the  psychic  side  we  must  assume 
that,  where  these  distinct  consciousnesses  are  not  wholly 
separated,  the  total  pulse  of  the  new  consciousness  formed 
by  the  unification  must  be  influenced  by  the  elementary 
consciousnesses  which  are  unified,  in  proportion  to  their 
importance ;  and  in  the  case  of  all  higher  animals  where 
one  of  the  neural  systems,  viz.  the  brain  system,  is  of  such 
notable  complexity,  we  must  assume  that  to  it  must 
correspond  a  pre-eminent  influence  in  the  constitution  of 
the  pulse  of  the  new  consciousness  which  is  formed  as  the 
result  of  this  unification. 

§  21.  But  it  is  to  be  noted  further  that  dissection  of  the 
animal  man  shows  the  same  general  arrangement  of  neural 
systems  in  him  that  is  found  in  the  higher  animals,  except 
that  the  brain  system  in  man  is  of  immensely  greater  com- 
plexity than  in  the  case  of  other  animals,  and  correspond- 
ingly dominates  the  whole  complex  system  which  is  formed 
by  the  unification  of  the  separate  neural  systems  which 
exist  side  by  side  with  it.  Such  being  the  case,  we  ought 
to  be  able  to  verify  our  hypothesis  by  direct  appeal  to  our 
own  mental  life. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  what  man  speaks  of  as  his  conscious- 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  47 

ness  appears  to  the  average  observer  to  be  coincident  with 
the  activity  of  his  brain,  which  has  the  same  general  forms 
of  expression  that  are  found  connected  with  brain  action  in 
the  higher  animals ;  although  these  forms  of  expression  in 
man  are  much  more  highly  developed,  are  enormously  more 
complex,  than  the  corresponding  forms  of  expression  in 
animals,  just  as  we  should  expect  them  to  be  in  considera- 
tion of  the  great  increase  in  development  and  complexity 
noted  in  the  brain  of  man  when  it  is  compared  with  the 
brain  of  the  highest  animal  below  him  in  the  scale. 

Activity  in  man's  brain,  as  we  have  said,  has  the  same 
general  forms  of  expression  that  are  found  connected  with 
the  brain  action  in  the  higher  animals,  but  one  special 
form  of  this  expression  in  man  has  become  so  immensely 
developed  that  it  appears  practically  as  an  entirely  new 
type  of  expression  and  is  indeed  the  distinguishing  mark  of 
man's  brain  capacity ;  I  refer  of  course  to  the  form  of 
expression  which  we  call  speech,  with  its  special  elabora- 
tion in  written  language.  It  is  the  pulse  of  consciousness 
coincident  with  the  brain  activity  within  me,  and  which  is 
usually  expressed  in  speech  or  written  language,  which  I 
call  my  consciousness. 

But  as  there  are  usually  within  me  other  minor  neural 
systems  more  or  less  disconnected  from  the  brain  system, 
and  which  have  the  same  general  forms  of  expression  noted 
in  connection  with  the  activities  of  similar  minor  neural 
systems  in  the  higher  animals,  I  must  assume  the  exist- 
ence within  me  of  minor  consciousnesses  coincident  with 
the  activities  of  these  minor  neural  systems  within  my 
body.  There  must  be  minor  consciousnesses  connected 
with  these  expressions  of  activity  of  the  spinal  ganglia,  and 
of  the  sympathetic  nervous  system,  which  seem  to  take 
place  without  disturbance  of  the  action  of  the  brain ;  and, 
as  we  should  expect,  these  actions  under  such  conditions  do 


48  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

not  affect  the  pulse  of  consciousness  which  is  coincident 
with  the  pulse  of  brain  activity. 

It  is  the  pre-eminent  consciousness,  the  brain  conscious- 
ness, the  "  speech  "  consciousness,  which  is  all-important  in 
our  consideration,  for  it  is  the  only  consciousness  within  my 
body  which  has  the  capacity  to  influence  those  trains  of 
thought  which  finally  express  themselves  in  logical  forms 
and  in  spoken  and  written  language,  and  the  only  conscious- 
ness with  which  introspection  and  therefore  psychology 
can  possibly  deal. 

But  inasmuch  as  the  brain  is  not  totally  disconnected 
from  the  minor  neural  systems,  if  our  hypothesis  be  correct, 
we  should  not  be  surprised  to  note  times  when  under 
certain  conditions  the  minor  consciousnesses  and  the  pre- 
eminent consciousness  would  merge  into  one  wider  system 
in  the  constitution  of  which  the  "  speech  consciousness " 
would  of  course  have  a  vastly  preponderant  influence,  but 
in  which  the  form  of  the  pulse  could  not  be  without 
influence  from  these  minor  consciousnesses ;  and  this  is 
exactly  the  fact  which  has  drawn  our  attention  to  the 
difficulties  connected  with  the  ordinary  conception  of  the 
causal  relation  between  neural  and  mental  activities. 

The  psychic  coincidents  of  the  activities  of  the  sympathetic 
nervous  system  and  of  the  spinal  ganglia  do  not  ordinarily 
appear  to  affect  our  pre-eminent  consciousness  at  all,  but 
under  certain  conditions,  to  be  discussed  later  on,  they 
evidently  do  affect  this  pre-eminent  consciousness.  Under 
certain  conditions  we  are  conscious  of  our  breathing  and  of 
the  activities  related  to  digestion  and  to  the  semi-reflex 
activities  due  to  spinal  ganglia  stimulation.  But  in  all 
such  cases  it  is  to  be  noted  that,  as  we  should  expect,  the 
"  speech  consciousness  "  retains  the  preponderant  influence, 
and  we  are  accustomed  to  think  of  the  influence  from  these 
minor   consciousnesses   as   increments  to    the    pre-eminent 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  49 

consciousness,  rather  than  to  think  of  the  new  connection 
as  involving  the  formation  of  a  new  and  temporary  form  of 
consciousness  coincident  with  the  formation  of  a  new  and 
temporary  form  of  neural  system,  as  is  probably  the  case. 

§  22.  There  are  two  other  points  to  be  noted  before 
we  pass  to  other  considerations.  First  it  is  evident  under 
this  conception  that  any  consciousness  is  the  whole  mental 
pulse  coincident  with  the  whole  pulse  of  activity  of  the 
neural  system  involved. 

It  is  true  of  course  that  the  activities  of  the  central 
ganglia  are  most  important  in  influencing  the  form  of  this 
nervous  pulse,  but  so  long  as  any  part  of  the  neural  system 
remains  within  the  system  its  activity  must  to  some  extent 
influence  the  form  of  the  pulse ;  although  it  is  possible  of 
course  to  find  elemental  activities  which  are  relatively  of  so 
little  importance  that  their  elimination  would  in  no  sense 
appreciably  affect  the  form  of  the  total  neural  pulse. 

It  appears  then  (if  for  convenience  we  limit  ourselves  to 
a  consideration  of  the  brain)  that  we  must  assume  that  the 
"  brain  consciousness  "  at  any  moment  is  the  psychic  pulse 
correspondent  with  the  pulse  of  the  whole  neural  system 
which  is  coincidently  active :  that  the  action  of  the 
terminal  organs,  and  of  the  neural  elements  which  connect 
these  terminal  organs  with  the  cortex,  and  of  the  cortex 
itself,  so  long  as  they  are  all  active  and  are  connected, 
must  all  influence  the  conscious  pulse  of  the  moment, 
although  of  course  the  enormous  relative  importance  of  the 
activities  in  the  cortex  must  make  the  mental  coincidents 
of  these  activities  of  enormous  relative  importance  in 
influencing  the  form  of  the  conscious  pulse. 

It  appears  therefore  that  it  is  only  because  we  take  a 
view  of  consciousness  in  cross-section,  if  we  may  so  speak, 
that  we  have  come  to  look  upon  the  cortex  as  the  seat  of 

E 


50  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

consciousness,  and  the  terminal  organs  and  the  connecting 
elements  as  mere  mechanical  media  for  the  stimulation  of 
the  cortex. 

If  C  represent  the  activity  of  the  cortex 

CwithotU  the  stimulus  from  the  terminal 
organ ;  and  if  the  diagram  represent 
the  activity  when  the  stimulus  from 
the  terminal  organ  affects  the  form  of 
the  brain  pulse ;  C  representing  the  activity  of  the  cortex, 
0  the  activity  of  the  terminal  organ,  and  the  line  connecting 
C  and  0  the  activity  in  the  neural  connection  between  the 
cortex  and  the  terminal  organ  ;  then  the  diagram  is  intended 
to  indicate  that  C  is  not  made  materially  different  from  C 

by  the  existence  of  o ;  and  that  it  is  natural  that  the 

only  noticeable  difference  between  the  two  pulses  of  con- 
sciousness should  appear  to  be  determined  by  the  differences 
between  C  and  C. 

What  is  more,  if  at  the  moment  just  before  the  terminal 
organ  is  stimulated  we  have  C  only,  at  the  next  instant  we 
shall  have  the  whole  neural  pulse  represented  by  C  o, 

and  only  later  the  pulse  represented  by  C o ;   and  this 

will  change  rapidly  into  the  forms  C ,  and  C,  and  finally 

back  again  into  C. 

It  is  easy  then  to  see  why  we  have  come  to  consider 
only  the  differences  between  C  and  C,  and  have  learned  to 
believe  that  the  total  pulse  of  consciousness  is  only  differ- 
entiated by  changes  in  the  cortex  activity,  losing  all  track 
of  the  exceedingly  minute  changes  in  the  pulse  which  are 
determined  by  the  activities  of  the  terminal  organs  and  of 
the  connecting  fibres,  which  minor  changes  do  not  affect  the 
pulse  of  consciousness  materially  at  any  moment,  and 
scarcely  affect  it  at  all  at  the  moment  when  the  change 
corresponding  with  actual  activity  in  the  cerebral  hemi- 
spheres attracts  our  attention. 


CHAP.  II        OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  51 

§  23.  The  second  point  to  which  I  would  draw  attention 
is  this,  that  it  is  necessary  to  look  upon  the  brain  as  a 
neural  system  indeed,  but  as  one  which  is  itself  a  complex 
of  intimately  connected  minor  neural  systems ;  and  we  may 
assume  therefore  that  the  brain  under  certain  conditions  is 
capable  of  becoming  temporarily  split  up,  to  use  an  expres- 
sion of  Professor  James's,  into  relatively  unrelated  systems 
which  at  times  may  find  their  expressions  correspondingly 
separated. 

On  the  conscious  side  we  find  corroborations  of  this  view 
in  many  pathological  conditions.  We  note  double  conscious- 
nesses which  appear  in  the  same  person :  in  cases  which 
are  easily  reproduced  for  experiment  one  consciousness  in 
a  man  will  read  aloud  from  a  book,  without  being  disturbed 
by  the  fact  that  the  other  consciousness  is  writing  from 
dictation  whispered  into  the  ear.  These  cases  are  generally 
most  marked  in  men  affected  by  hypnotic  or  other  trance 
states,  and  appear  in  many  forms  in  morbidly  neurotic 
patients ;  but  in  less  marked  forms,  if  we  will  but  note  it, 
they  appear  in  the  perfectly  normal  lives  of  ourselves  and  of 
our  companions. 

A  man  may  work  intently  with  his  eyes,  say  at  drawing, 
and  be  entirely  undisturbed  by  the  fact  that  he  is  himself 
whistling  a  tune,  which  whistling  exasperates  beyond 
measure  some  fellow-man  who  is  listening  to  a  conversation, 
but  who  in  turn  is  entirely  undisturbed  by  the  flash  from 
some  tremulous  light,  which*  itself  is  just  as  exasperating  to 
the  draughtsman  as  the  whistling  is  to  the  listener.  Here 
we  seem  to  have  incipient  double  consciousness,  auditory  on 
the  one  side,  and  ocular  on  the  other. 

But  these  double  consciousnesses  are  merely  extreme 
cases.  As  the  brain  is  made  up  of  multiple  systems  co- 
ordinated into  a  unit,  so  the  pre-eminent  consciousness 
must  be  assumed  to  be  made  up  of  multiple  minor  con- 


52  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

sciousnesses  correspondingly  unified,  which  however  may  be 
at  times  split  up  into  parts  acting  within  the  same  body 
with  diverse  expressive  action.  The  split  -  off  parts  are 
seldom  of  anything  like  equal  importance,  as  they  are  in 
cases  of  double  consciousness  like  those  to  which  we  have 
above  referred.  In  ordinary  cases  the  split-off  parts  are  of 
minor  importance,  and  the  pre-eminent  consciousness  seems 
to  be  but  slightly  limited  by  the  loss  of  what  is  split  off. 

In  cases  of  so-called  double  consciousness  the  only 
evidence  of  the  doubleness  is  objective,  and  attracts  attention 
because  of  the  extraordinary  complication  of  the  two  sets  of 
expressive  actions  involved,  neither  of  which  in  ordinary 
experience  can  be  carried  on  without  vivid  subjective 
experience.  The  subjective  experience  in  the  cases  of 
double  consciousness  is  most  often  as  simple  as  usual : 
where  the  man  reads  from  the  book  while  writing  from 
dictation  whispered  in  his  ear,  what  he  recognises  as  his 
consciousness  is  limited  for  the  most  part  to  the  reading  ; 
it  may  shift  momentarily  to  the  dictation  and  writing ;  but 
even  where  this  shifting  takes  place  he  cannot  properly  be 
said  to  be  conscious  (as  he  usually  employs  this  word)  of 
the  process  of  reading  aloud,  at  the  moment  he  is  conscious 
of  the  dictation :  one  only  of  the  two  sets  of  activities  can 
at  one  time  be  part  of  the  pre-eminent  consciousness. 

And  here  it  may  be  well  to  repeat  that  the  evidence 
which  leads  to  the  general  acceptance  of  the  notion  of 
double  consciousness  is  objective  evidence  based  upon  the 
observation  of  diverse  forms  of  expression ;  and  it  is  im- 
portant to  note  that  if  the  argument  from  this  evidence  to 
the  existence  of  the  double  consciousness  is  valid,  then 
evidently  the  believer  in  double  consciousness  must  agree 
to  the  existence  of  multiple  consciousnesses  within  us 
corresponding  with  the  multiplicity  of  minor  systems  co- 
ordinated   in   the   brain :    beyond   that    he   must   agree  to 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  53 

the  existence  of  multiple  consciousnesses  coincident  with  the 
activity  of  those  other  neural  systems  within  our  body 
which  are  so  far  separated  from  the  brain  that  their  psychic 
coincidents  seldom  or  never  affect  the  pre-eminent  con- 
sciousness ;  multiple  consciousnesses  coincident  with  the 
activity  of  those  other  neural  systems  which  express  their 
activities  not  in  speech  indeed,  but  which  do  express  them 
nevertheless  in  motor  reactions  of  well  -  recognised  co- 
ordinated forms.  The  acknowledgment  of  the  existence  of 
double  consciousness  therefore  corroborates  fully  the  state- 
ments already  made  in  reference  to  the  existence  of  minor 
grades  of  consciousness  in  connection  with  the  action  of 
lower  neural  systems  separated  from  the  brain. 

§  24.  The  pre-eminent  consciousness,  of  which  psychology 
treats,  thus  appears  as  a  stream  which  is  separated  into  two 
channels  at  times,  and  which  joins  again  into  one  stream ; 
which  at  other  times  loses  some  of  its  content  in  lagoons 
and  swamps  by  the  way,  and  again  on  the  other  hand  gains 
new  masses  of  content  from  brooks  and  streams  smaller 
than  itself  which  at  intervals  empty  into  it.  This  conception 
derived  from  introspection  corresponds  with  our  notion  of 
the  action  of  the  brain  in  relation  to  the  subordinate  neural 
systems  of  which  we  have  just  spoken,  and  which  notion  is 
derived  from  objective  observation. 

The  pre-eminent  consciousness  for  the  most  part,  how- 
ever, does  not  seem  to  divide,  nor  to  lose  or  gain  subor- 
dinate masses  of  content;  for  the  most  part  the  stream 
flows  on,  now  turbulently,  now  smoothly,  its  practically 
level  surfaces  being  marked  with  certain  streaks  and  eddies. 
But  if  we  examine  this  stream  of  consciousness  at  some 
special  moment  we  find  the  surface  of  the  stream  broken 
up  into  wavelets,  in  and  amidst  which  some  higher  wave 
appears  and  sweeps  over  the  complex  surface :  we  find  that 


54  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

the  pulse  of  consciousness  is  made  up  of  many  elements,  if 
we  may  so  speak  without  being  thought  to  mean  separated 
elements  in  an  atomistic  sense ;  the  mass  of  these  elements 
on  the  one  hand  are  unemphatic  and  appear  to  form  an 
unanalysable  whole,  while  on  the  other  hand  some  of  them 
are  emphatic  and  stand  out  as  increments,  so  to  speak,  to 
this  unanalysable  whole. 

It  is  this  unanalysable  whole  of  which  we  speak  as  the 
field  of  inattention  if  we  consider  more  than  one  moment  of 
experience  ;  or  we  call  it  ■  the  ego  if  we  consider  merely 
the  moment's  experience.  Or  as  Professor  James  puts  it 
{Psychology,  vol.  i.  p.  301)  :  "  Our  entire  feeling  of  spiritual 
activity,  or  what  commonly  passes  by  that  name,  is  really 
a  feeling  of  bodily  activities  wliose  exact  nature  is  hy  most 
men  overlooked!' 

The  increment  to  this  unanalysable  whole  we  speak  of 
ordinarily  as  the  presentation  to  the  ego  ^  if  we  consider 
merely  a  moment's  experience ;  if  we  consider  more  than 
the  moment,  we  speak  of  the  observed  increments  as  the 
field  of  attention,  which  consists  of  such  elements  as  make 
up  our  recognised  sensations,  emotions,  thoughts,  and  acts  of 
volition  for  instance. 

The  ego  with  which  Psychology  has  to  deal  is  clearly  an 
unanalysable  whole  and  part  of  consciousness ;  as  it  lies  not 
within  the  field  of  attention,  it  must  therefore  lie  within 
the  field  of  inattention  ;  nor  can  I  find  that  there  is  any- 
thing in  this  feeling  of  egohood  that  is  not  in  the  field  of 
inattention  also,  nor  anything  in  this  field  of  inattention 
which  is  not  part  and  parcel  of  my  egohood.      The  ego  and 

1  This  is  a  somewhat  inaccurate  use  of  language,  for,  as  Dr.  James  Ward 
says  :  ' '  Self  then  is  one  presentation  among  others,  the  result,  like  them,  of 
the  differentiation  of  the  original  continuum.  But  it  is  obvious  that  this 
presentation  must  be  in  existence  first  before  other  presentations  can  be  re- 
lated to  it.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  only  in  and  by  means  of  such  relations 
that  the  conception  of  self  is  completed." — Article  "Psychology,"  Ency. 
Britannica,  p.  83. 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  55 

the  field  of  inattention  therefore  would  seem  to  be  one  and 
the  same  thing,  the  differences  in  the  application  of  the 
terms  being  determined  merely  by  differences  of  point  of 
view.  The  ego  appears  to  be  a  persistent  unity  because  it 
is  a  relatively  permanent  continuum,  and  an  unanalysable 
whole  to  which,  or  rather  out  of  which,  the  elements  that 
give  us  the  phenomena  of  attention  appear  to  arise  as 
increments. 

Now  this  experience  of  ours  corresponds  completely  with 
our  conception  of  the  action  of  the  pre-eminent  neural  system, 
i.e.  the  brain.  We  must  conceive  of  the  physical  action 
in  the  co-ordinated  neural  system,  of  which  the  brain  forms 
the  mass  and  centre,  as  a  pulse  of  activity  made  up  of  many 
correlated  subordinate  activities.  Most  of  these  subordinate 
activities  will  be  unemphatic,  and  will  appear  only  as  affecting 
the  unanalysable  whole,  but  some  of  them  are  likely  to  be 
emphatic  and  thus  to  stand  out  clearly  from  the  mass. 
The  emphasis  of  these  special  elements  may  be  due,  and  to 
a  great  extent  either  directly  or  indirectly  is  due,  to  the 
stimulation  of  high  activity  in  the  organic  parts  which 
stretch  out  from  the  brain  mass  as  terminal  organs ;  but  on 
the  other  hand  this  emphasis  may  also  be  due  to  the  rise 
of  activity  in  subordinate  neural  systems  other  than  the 
brain  system,  which  are  ordinarily  without  influence  upon 
the  pulse  of  brain  activity,  but  which  under  certain  special 
conditions  of  activity  influence  the  brain  system. 

§  25.  We  are  now  prepared,  I  think,  to  consider  the 
conditions  which  determine  the  splitting  off  from  the  brain, 
and  again  the  attachment  to  the  brain,  of  these  subordinate 
systems  ;  and  those  conditions  which  determine  the  splitting 
off  into  separate  strata  of  the  brain  activity  itself ;  and  also 
the  differentiations  of  consciousness  coincident  with  this 
splitting  off. 


56  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

As  we  have  already  seen,  we  can  as  psychologists  bring 
forward  in  direct  evidence  only  the  pre-eminent  conscious- 
ness, only  the  psychic  states  coincident  with  the  action  of 
the  brain.  The  pre-eminent  consciousness  we  may  indicate 
by  the  large  letter  C.  Subordinate  consciousnesses  may  be* 
indicated  by  small  c's,  which  may  be  numbered  to  distinguish 
them  from  one  another. 

C  then  is  apparently  what  it  is  because  of  the  possible 
isolated  existence  of  c\  c^,  c^,  c"*,  c^,  .  .  .,  c'K 

Any  c  which  is  but  lightly  connected  with  the  whole 
system  may  be  cut  off  from  C  without  materially  altering 
the  fulness  of  C ;  and  this  may  be  effectecl  in  the  first  place 
by  a  mere  physical  disconnection  of  the  nerve  tract  which 
unites  the  brain  with  the  subordinate  neural  system  in 
question.  Of  this  form  of  disconnection  pathology  and 
surgery  present  us  with  numerous  examples,  and  the  dis- 
appearance of  such  elements  from  the  pre-eminent  conscious- 
ness presents  to  our  minds  no  difficulty. 

If  the  neural  system,  of  which  the  pulse  of  activity 
corresponds  to  the  c  in  question,  is  in  the  mass  of  the  brain, 
then  this  c  may  disappear  from  C  at  times  as  the  result  of 
the  destruction  of  what  we  call  the  "  associative  fibres,"  in 
which  case  it  may  reappear  when  new  fibres  take  the  place 
of  those  destroyed.  Or  c  may  disappear  as  the  result  of 
destruction  of  the  subordinate  neural  system,  in  which  case 
this  c  does  not  itself  reappear :  in  those  rare  cases  of  this 
latter  type  where  the  c  does  eventually  seem  to  reappear, 
we  must  assume  that  some  other  neural  system  than  the 
one  extirpated  has  come  to  act  approximately  as  the  extir- 
pated system  did.  This  case  presents  also  no  special  diffi- 
culty. 

§  26.  But  there  appears  to  be  another  way  in  which 
there  may  be  produced  a  discontinuity  of  the  minor  c's  in 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  57 

relation  to  the  whole  C  without  destroying  the  continuity  of 
either  C  itself  or  of  the  c's  themselves ;  and  this  without 
necessarily  involving  destruction  of  the  neural  connection 
existing  between  the  systems. 

The  action  of  the  pre-eminent  consciousness  C,  or  of  any 
subordinate  consciousness  c,  is  to  be  conceived,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  as  a  reverberant  continuum.  It  seems  not 
illegitimate,  therefore,  to  picture  these  states  as  similar  to 
such  a  physical  reverberant  continuum  as  the  vibration  of  a 
string,  or  better  to  such  an  one  as  the  pulsation  of  an  air- 
wave. 

The  conscious  activity  may  be  spoken  of  in  physical 
symbols  as  having  (1)  amplitude,  and  (2)  time-rhythm. 

This  amplitude  appears  when  we  compare  diverse  states 
as  to  their  relative  intensity ;  this  rhythm  appears  when  we 
compare  diverse  states  as  to  their  relative  excitement  or 
non-excitement.  In  any  one  complex  system  C  any  one  of 
the  component  systems  c^,  (?,  c^,  c^,  c^,  .  .  .,  c^  may  be  sup- 
posed to  vary  in  either  amplitude,  or  in  rhythm,  or  in  both. 

§  27.  If  in  the  brain  the  amplitude  of  some  subordinate 
system,  say  the  neural  system  which  gives  us  c^,  is  in- 
creased, then  we  have  c^  more  or  less  drawn  away  by  its 
mere  emphasis  from  the  mass  of  C ;  and  we  have  c\  c^,  .  .  ., 
c"^,  c^,  .  .  .,  c"'  forming  an  unanalysable  mass  against  which 
appears  c^.  This  mass  we  have  learned  to  caU  the  field  of 
inattention  (c\  c^  .  .  .,  c^  c^  .  .  .,  c""),  standing  opposed  to 
the  field  of  attention  (c^),  and  c^  appears  to  us  to  be  pre- 
sented as  an  increment  to  the  unanalysable  mass  c\  c^  .  .  ., 
c^,  c^,  .  .  .  c^,  which  we  call  the  ego. 

As  above  described  c^  is  conceived  as  a  subordinate 
system  within  the  grand  system  C,  the  corresponding  neural 
system  being  a  subordinate  but  inherent  part  of  the  brain. 
But  some  other  c,  say  c^,  may  be  one  which  is  but  lightly 


58  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

connected  with  system  C,  such  for  instance  as  the  conscious- 
ness co-ordinate  with  the  action  of  a  spinal  ganglion,  or  of 
the  sympathetic  system.  In  this  case  we  shall  have  a  sub- 
ordinate consciousness  (c^),  which  is  usually  merely  a  part 
of  the  unanalysable  mass  that  we  call  the  field  of  inattention 
or  the  ego,  according  as  we  take  one  point  of  view  or 
another;  but  it  is  a  consciousness  which  with  increase  of 
the  amplitude  of  its  action  may,  upon  certain  occasions, 
appear  as  an  increment  to  this  ego,  as  making  up  the  field 
of  attention. 

Examples  of  this  type  of  occasional  rise  into  conscious- 
ness we  have  in  the  persistent  attention  given  to  the 
painful  sensations  accompanying  derangements  of  the 
intestines,  or  accompanying  the  difficult  breathing  in  a 
rarefied  atmosphere ;  the  intestinal  sensations  and  those 
accompanying  normal  breathing  being  usually  quite  apart 
from  this  field  of  attention. 

But  it  is  to  be  noted  that  this  increase  of  amplitude  of 
^  or  c*  is  always  relative  to  the  amplitude  of  the  remaining 
elements  forming  C ;  and  in  the  case  of  c^  here  considered, 
the  rise  into  the  field  of  attention  may  be  due  not  to  an 
increase  of  the  amplitude  of  c^,  but  rather  to  a  reduction  of 
the  amplitude  of  the  elements  c^,  c^,  c^,  .  .  .,  c'\  .  .  .,  c"'. 
Thus  we  find  our  normal  breathing  and  heart-beat  which  is 
usually  unconscious  brought  to  our  attention  at  moments 
of  general  reduction  of  activity,  e.g.  when  we  are  about  to 
fall  asleep. 

Now  from  what  we  know  of  neural  action  it  is  apparent 
that  frequent  recurrence  of  certain  activities  in  one  neural 
system  which  is  a  subordinate  part  of  a  wider  neural  system 
will,  in  the  first  place,  determine  specially  intimate  con- 
nections between  the  subordinate  system  and  all  the  rest  of 
the   whole   larger  system ;    and  will,  in   the  second  place. 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  59 

through  the  establishment  of  nicely  adjusted  nutritive 
relations,  reduce  the  disturbance  of  the  whole  system  caused 
by  the  action  of  the  subordinate  system ;  will,  in  other 
words,  increase  the  tendency  to  activity  of  the  wider  system 
as  a  whole,  upon  the  recurrence  of  the  activity  in  the  sub- 
ordinate system. 

This  we  may  express  in  correspondent  psychic  terms,  by 
saying  that  in  connection  with  the  recurrence  of  the  appear- 
ance of  an  activity  c^  as  a  presentation  to  the  rest  of  C, 
there  will  gradually  appear  a  reduction  of  the  relative 
difference  of  amplitude  between  c^  and  c\  c^,  .  .  .,  c^,  c^,  .  .  ., 
c'\  and  that  finally  c^  will  no  longer  appear  as  a  presentation 
to  the  ego,  as  an  element  of  attention,  but  will  be  lost  in 
the  analysable  mass  of  the  ego,  will  become  part  of  the 
field  of  inattention,  and  will  be  called  unconscious  by  those 
who  identify  consciousness  with  attention. 

We  have  here  then  an  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of 
loss  of  consciousness,  so  called,  in  connection  with  recurrent 
neural  activity,  the  well-known  phenomena  of  habit ;  which 
phenomena,  as  we  have  seen,  although  explained  by  the 
theory  that  neural  action  produces  consciousness,  are  not 
explained  by  the  opposed  theory  that  mind  pivduces  the 
bodily  activities.  There  is,  strictly  speaking,  seldom  a 
complete  loss  of  consciousness  even  in  the  deepest  sleep, 
rather  is  there  a  sinking  of  certain  "  elements "  into  the 
field  of  inattention,  and  a  consequent  loss  of  memory  of 
them  in  the  vivid  consciousness  of  waking  life. 

§  28.  Now  let  us  turn  from  this  consideration  of  the 
phases  of  neural  activity  comparable  to  amplitude  of  vibra- 
tion, to  the  study  of  those  phases  comparable  to  rhythm  of 
vibration,  referring  again  to  our  analogue  in  the  physical 
world. 

We  recall  that  the  pulses  of  air  vibration  affect  us  as 


eo  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

sound ;  that  a  complex  aerial  wave,  formed  by  the  coales- 
cence of  waves  of  commensurable  rhythm,  produces  the 
conscious  effect  which  we  call  a  harmony ;  that  if  another 
air-wave  appears  which  has  a  rhythm  that  is  not  com- 
mensurable with  the  rhythm  of  the  complex  wave,  so  far  as 
the  effect  upon  consciousness  is  concerned  the  two  waves 
exist  side  by  side  as  it  were  without  coalescence ;  there 
are  two  sounds,  the  harmony  is  still  there,  and  beside  it 
a  separate  note.  But  if  this  new  wave  has  a  rhythm 
which  is  commensurable  with  the  rhythm  of  the  complex 
wave  then  there  is  coalescence,  and  so  far  as  the  effect 
upon  consciousness  is  concerned  there  are  no  longer  two 
sounds,  but  one  harmonious  sound  still  more  complex 
than  that  which  existed  before  the  new  wave  effect  was 
experienced. 

Keturning  now  to  the  consideration  of  multiple  con- 
sciousnesses, let  us  attempt  to  express  the  general  nature  of 
the  phenomena  of  which  the  above  is  a  special  example. 

If  the  whole  system  C  is  acting  within  a  certain  rhythm, 
and  if  some  elementary  system  c^  within  this  whole  C  comes 
to  act  in  another  rhythm  which  is  incommensurable  with 
the  rhythm  appearing  in  C,  then  c^  will  be  practically 
disconnected  from  the  remainder  of  C,  i.e.  from  c^,  c^,  .  .  ., 

c^  c^ . . .,  c\ 

Incommensurability  of  rhythm  of  activity  existing  be- 
tween the  whole  brain  system  and  some  subordinate  system 
will  thus  account  for  the  occasional  disappearance  from  con- 
sciousness of  elements  which  usually  come  into  the  field  of 
attention.  Such  cases  are  typified  in  the  well-known  fact 
that  in  the  intense  excitement  of  battle  the  soldier  may 
receive  a  wound  of  which  he  knows  nothing  until  the 
excitement  is  past,  when  he  discovers  the  injury  by  the 
excessive  pain  it  occasions.  Here  a  high  rhythm  in  the 
rest    of    C    excludes   c^\  which  cannot  attain  such  a  high 


CHAP.  II       OF  MEXTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  61 

rhythm,  although  in  ordinary  cases  it  {c"')  would  form  part 
of  the  complete  C  in  its  normal  rhythm. 

In  everyday  life  we  have  learned  to  exclude  a  disagree- 
able psychosis  by  producing  in  ourselves  a  state  of  conscious- 
ness of  a  new  rhythm  with  which  the  rhythm  of  the 
disagreeable  psychosis  is  incommensurable.  To  get  rid  of 
a  moderate  toothache  we  are  wont  to  bite  very  hard  on 
some  substance,  or  press  our  teeth  together  with  great 
force,  so  that  we  get  an  intense  pressure  sensation  which 
determines  the  rhythm  of  the  moment's  consciousness  and 
excludes  the  minor  activity  that  is  disagreeable.  The 
phenomena  which  the  "  faith  cure  doctors  "  make  so  much 
of  are  of  a  similar  nature.  These  "  doctors  "  teach  their 
patients  to  reduce  the  rhythm  of  the  activities  of  the 
unhealthy  parts,  and  they  accomplish  this  by  raising  the 
intensity  of  mental  phases  which  are  exclusive  of  the  phases 
with  which  the  activities  of  these  unhealthy  parts  are  coin- 
cident ;  they  merely  exaggerate  what  we  all  do  when  we 
try  to  forget  our  ills  by  "  thinking  of  something  else."  They 
thus  make  use  of  what  we  may  call  a  sort  of  mental  surgery, 
which  at  the  same  time  involves  rest  from  action  in  the 
neural  parts  which  are  out  of  order;  and  this  rest,  if 
persisted  in,  may  result  in  the  recuperation  of  these  parts, 
provided  the  trouble  is  not  of  a  serious  nature.  This  seems 
to  me  to  be  the  explanation  of  such  real  cures  as  are 
accomplished  by  the  method  of  "  suggestion." 

This  conception  of  connection  through  commensurability, 
and  disconnection  through  incommensurability,  will  also 
account  for  the  occasional  appearance  in  the  field  of  atten- 
tion of  certain  elements  which  usually  do  not  appear  to 
affect  consciousness  at  all ;  cases  which  are  typified  in  the 
well-recognised  fact  that  when  general  excitement  is  lack- 
ing, when  we  are  depressed  in  body  and  spirit,  when  we  are 


62  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

awaking  from  sleep  and  are  dreaming,  then  glandular  and 
stomachic  sensations  affect  the  stream  of  consciousness 
which  cannot  possibly  be  made  to  affect  it  in  the  hours 
of  active  vigorous  waking  life.  Here  a  subnormally  low 
rhythm  in  C  enables  &,  which  cannot  attain  the  normal 
rhythm  of  C,  to  become  part  and  parcel  of  the  whole  of  C 
now  acting  in  a  subnormal  rhythm ;  enables  it  actually  to 
affect  C  by  its  superior  amplitude,  so  that  it  {(?)  appears  as 
an  increment  to  the  ego,  as  part  of  the  field  of  attention. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  (?  and  &,  as  mentioned  above,  even 
when  thus  practically  disconnected  from  the  rest  of  C 
through  the  incommensurability  of  their  rhythms,  must 
still  be  assumed  to  be  consciousnesses,  but  not  conscious- 
nesses which  are  able  to  affect  the  pre-eminent  consciousness 
which  thinks,  and  describes  its  conditions  in  speech  and 
written  word. 

"We  have  here  then  an  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of 
the  occasional  loss  of  consciousness  in  connection  with 
activities  which  are  usually  conscious,  and  also  of  the  gain 
of  consciousness  in  connection  with  activities  which  are 
usually  unconscious  ;  phenomena  which  we  have  seen  above, 
although  explained  by  the  theory  that  mind  produces 
neural  action,  are  not  explained  by  the  opposed  theory  that 
neural  action  produces  mental  effects. 

§  29.  We  thus  see  that  it  is  possible  to  state  the 
hypothesis  of  parallelism  in  terms  which  enable  us  to 
account  for  the  phenomena  which  appear  to  present  in- 
surmountable obstruction  to  the  acceptance  of  both  of  the 
theories  which  are  founded  upon  the  usual  view  of  the 
causal  connection  between  mind  and  matter.  Note  final 
paragraphs  in  §§  27  and  28.  It  seems  to  me,  therefore, 
that  it   is  proper  to  adopt  the  theory  of  parallelism  as  a 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  63 

working  hypothesis,  using  it,  so  far  as  it  is  available,  as  a 
means  of  unifying  mental  phenomena,  until  it  can  be  shown 
to  be  invalid  or  inapplicable.  I  myself  have  not  discovered 
any  directions  in  which  it  fails  of  applicability,  and,  as  will 
appear  in  the  sequel,  we  shall  find  it  very  helpful  in  the 
comprehension  of  many  mental  phenomena  which  are  not 
easily  expressed  in  terms  of  the  theories  which  it  displaces. 

§  30.  Before  passing  from  this  subject  I  think  it  may 
be  well  to  speak  briefly  of  certain  objections  raised  by 
Professor  James  to  the  "  Mind  Stuff "  theory  to  which  the 
hypothesis  here  presented  may  seem  to  some  to  be  closely 
allied.  He  examines  a  number  of  arguments  in  favour  of 
this  theory  for  the  purpose  of  showing  their  weakness : 
these  objections  I  wish  now  to  take  up  in  the  order  of  his 
presentation,  to  show  that  they  do  not  affect  the  hypothesis 
I  support. 

The  first  argument  examined  is  the  Leibnitzian  one, 
which  we  may  quote  from  Professor  James  in  full  {Psychology, 
vol.  i.  p.  164). 

"  The  minimum  visible^  the  minimum  audibile,  are  objects  composed 
of  parts.  How  can  the  whole  affect  the  sense  unless  each  part  does  1 
And  yet  each  part  does  so  without  being  separately  sensible.  Leibnitz 
calls  the  total  consciousness  an  '  aperception,'  the  supposed  insensible 
consciousness  by  the  name  of  '  petites  perceptions.' 

'To  judge  of  the  latter,'  he  says,  'I  am  accustomed  to  use  the 
example  of  the  roaring  of  the  sea  with  which  one  is  assailed  when 
near  the  shore.  To  hear  this  noise  as  one  does,  one  must  hear  the 
parts  which  compose  its  totality,  that  is,  the  noise  of  each  wave,  .  .  . 
although  this  noise  would  not  be  noticed  if  its  wave  were  alone.  One 
must  be  affected  a  little  by  the  movement  of  one  wave,  one  must  have 
some  perception  of  each  several  noise,  however  small  it  be.  Otherwise 
one  would  not  hear  that  of  100,000  waves,  for  of  100,000  zeros  one 
can  never  make  a  quantity.' " 

Professor  James  answers  truly  that  this  is  "  an  excellent 
example  of  the  so-called  fallacy  of  division,  or  predicating 
what  is  true  only  of  a  collection,  of  each  member  of  the 


64  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

collection  distributively."  But  it  is  to  be  noted  that  under 
the  hypothesis  here  presented  there  is  no  dependence  upon 
this  fallacy  of  division.  The  pulse  of  the  complex  system, 
which  makes  up  any  moment  of  our  highest  consciousness, 
is  not  assumed  to  be  made  up  by  the  summation  of  a  lot  of 
smaller  pulses,  although  its  form  is  necessarily  determined  by 
the  form  which  these  subordinate  pulses  would  take  were 
they  not  part  of  the  system.  If  a  subordinate  neural 
element  acts  out  of  relation  to  a  neural  system,  it  involves 
the  existence  of  a  phase  of  mentality  of  a  certain  deter- 
minate character ;  but  if  it  later  on  becomes  part  of  a 
neural  system,  whilst  its  corresponding  mentality  influences 
the  pulse  of  consciousness,  in  the  very  fact  that  it  does  so 
it  cannot  retain  the  determinate  character  which  belongs  to 
it  as  an  isolated  element. 

The  assumption  of  the  "second  proof"  presented  and 
controverted  by  Professor  James  is  that  "  in  acquired  dex- 
terities ...  we  do  what  originally  required  a  chain  of 
perceptions  and  volitions.  As  the  actions  still  keep  their 
intelligent  character,  intelligence  must  still  preside  over  their 
execution." 

Under  our  hypothesis  this  apparent  loss  of  intelligence 
may  be  due  to  the  practical  "  splitting  off"  or  disconnection 
of  part  of  the  conscious  train  as  Professor  James  suggests, 
and  his  further  suggestion  that  memory  may  have  lapsed,  is 
under  our  view  but  a  case  of  this  disconnection ;  but  more 
often,  under  my  view,  this  apparent  loss  of  intelligence  is 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  intelligent  act  becomes  but  part 
and  parcel  of  the  unanalysable  mass  of  unemphatic  con- 
sciousness which  we  call  the  field  of  inattention. 

Professor  James's  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  "proofs"  are 
to  be  similarly  re-expressed ;  and  the  rest  of  them  seem  to 
me,  as  they  seem  to  him,  to  be  no  proofs  at  all. 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  65 

§  31.  As  I  have  said  in  a  preceding  section  of  this 
chapter,  it  is  difficult  to  consider  the  problem  of  the  relation 
of  mental  to  physical  activities  without  being  led  afar  into 
the  dreamland  of  metaphysical  suggestion,  with  which  as 
psychologists  we  should  have  nothing  to  do. 

If  we  assume  the  existence  of  a  psychic  somewhat,  of 
"mentality,"  as  corresponding  to  elemental  neural  action, 
why  should  we  not  also  assume  the  existence  of  some  form 
of  "  mentality  "  corresponding  to  each  and  every  other  form 
of  what  we  call  the  transfer  of  energy  ? 

If  we  assume  that  the  special  form  of  mentality  which 
we  call  consciousness  is  determined  by  the  existence  of  the 
reverberant  continua  which  we  call  neural  systems,  why 
should  we  not  also  assume  the  existence  of  other  forms  of 
consciousness  as  being  necessarily  coincident  with  the  exist- 
ence of  other  similar  forms  of  reverberant  continua  in  the 
physical  world  ? 

May  we  not  assume  that  something  mental  akin  to  a 
consciousness  is  coincident  with  the  vibration  of  the  string 
of  a  violin,  with  the  pulsation  which  determines  a  musical 
note  or  a  musical  harmony ;  may  we  not  suggest  even,  as 
Fechner  and  others  have,  that  types  of  consciousness  nobler 
than  our  own  may  be  coincident  with  the  grander  continua 
which  we  recognise  in  the  solar  system,  and  in  the  broader 
universe  of  which  this  solar  system  is  but  an  element  ? 

Beyond  this,  if  we  assume  that  our  own  pre-eminent  con- 
sciousness is  what  it  is  because  of  the  union  in  one  system 
of  what,  but  for  this  union,  would  have  been  inferior  con- 
sciousnesses, why  should  we  not  also  assume  that  our  own  pre- 
eminent consciousness  may  under  certain  conditions  become 
attached  to  other  consciousnesses,  and  together  with  them  form 
a  still  higher  type  of  consciousness  ?  One  of  such  conscious- 
nesses might  be  determined  by  the  co-ordination  of  many 
human  consciousnesses,  might  be  a  "  social  consciousness." 

F 


66  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

If  such  higher  consciousnesses  exist,  then  my  own  con- 
sciousness when  joining  with  others  in  the  formation  of  a 
consciousness  of  more  complex  type,  while  retaining  its  own 
general  qualities,  must  be  assumed  to  be  modified  in  the  fact 
that  it  becomes  part  of  the  higher  consciousness. 

We  should  not  expect  to  gain  any  direct,  definitely 
unique,  experience  as  the  result  of  becoming  part  of  such  a 
higher  consciousness :  we  should  not  expect  to  be  able  to 
"  know  "  this  higher  consciousness  of  which  our  pre-eminent 
consciousnesses  are  elementary  parts,  any  more  than  we 
should  expect  the  subordinate  consciousnesses  which  go  to 
make  our  pre-eminent  consciousness  to  "know"  our  whole 
pre-eminent  consciousness :  we-  do  not  think  of  a  sensational 
experience  as  knowing  anything  of  the  state  of  the  pre- 
eminent "  brain  consciousness  "  to  which  it  belongs  as  a  part. 

But  on  the  other  hand  the  subordinate  consciousness, 
as  part  of  a  pre-eminent  consciousness,  must  have  a  "  feel " 
different  from  that  which  it  would  have  were  it  isolated  or 
temporarily  disconnected  therefrom ;  and  we  might  expect 
to  experience  a  difference  of  "  feel "  where  our  pre-eminent 
consciousness  becomes  part  of  a  higher  system,  and  a  further 
difference  of  "  feel "  when  this  bond  is  dissolved. 

The  change  of  experience  which  we  note  when  in  a  great 
assemblage  of  enthusiastic  people  whose  minds  were  turned 
in  one  direction,  seems  to  be  the  nearest  approach  we  can 
think  of  to  the  grasp  by  the  individual  consciousness  of  a 
social  consciousness,  if  such  can  be  supposed  to  exist.  Such 
a  change  of  my  experience  may  not  impossibly  be  due  to 
this  subsumption  for  the  time  of  my  limited  egohood  in,  and 
as  part  of,  a  higher  egohood.  Who  has  not  felt  this  in- 
fluence, which  may  have  much  to  do  with  the  power  of 
revivalist  assemblages,  of  "  Christian  Endeavour  "  congresses, 
of  political  conventions. 

Moreover,  we  are  not  without  indications  at  times  of  the 


CHAP.  II       OF  MENTAL  AND  PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM  67 

subsumption  of  our  egohoods  within  still  broader  egohoods 
than  those  of  a  social  nature.  We  often  feel  that  we  are 
swayed  by  some  far-reaching  but  ill -defined  influence  of 
this  nature,  the  effects  of  which  we  experience  principally 
negatively  when  we  break  away  from  it.  One  might  indeed 
carry  this  speculation  much  further  than  would  be  appro- 
priate in  a  work  like  this,  but  I  shall  refrain,  contenting 
myself  with  quoting  certain  lines  from  Lowell's  poem 
"  Under  the  Willows,"  where  he,  with  a  true  poet's  insight, 
has  expressed  most  beautifully  the  experience  to  which  I 

refer. 

My  soul  was  lost, 
Gone  from  me  like  an  ache,  and  what  remained 
Became  a  part  of  the  universal  joy. 
My  soul  went  forth,  and,  mingling  with  the  tree, 
Danced  in  the  leaves  ;  or,  floating  in  the  cloud, 
Saw  its  white  double  in  the  stream  below ; 
Or  else,  subHmed  to  purer  ecstasy, 
Dilated  in  the  broad  blue  over  all. 
I  was  the  wind  that  dappled  the  lush  grass. 
The  tide  that  crept  with  coolness  to  its  roots. 
The  thin-winged  swallow  skating  on  the  air ; 
The  hfe  that  gladdened  everything  was  mine. 

Was  I  then  truly  all  that  I  beheld  ? 
Or  is  this  stream  of  being  but  a  glass 
Where  the  mind  sees  its  visionary  self. 
As,  when  the  kingfisher  flits  o'er  his  bay. 
Across  the  river's  hollow  heaven  below 
His  picture  flits, — another,  yet  the  same  ? 

But  suddenly  the  sound  of  human  voice 

Or  footfall,  like  the  drop  a  chemist  pours, 

Doth  in  opacious  cloud  precipitate 

The  consciousness  that  seemed  but  now  dissolved 

Into  an  essence  rarer  than  its  own, 

And  I  am  narrowed  to  myself  once  more. 


CHAPTEE    III 

GENERAL   DEFINITIONS 

As  the  title  of  this  chapter  indicates,  I  do  not  intend  here 
to  do  more  than  make  clear  to  the  reader  the  general  sub- 
ject of  our  study.  In  later  chapters  (notably  Chapters  IV. 
and  XVI.)  I  shall  attempt  to  define  in  a  more  accurate  and 
scientific  manner  the  several  subjects  of  discussion. 

§  1.  Instincts  are  fprces  within  _  us,  which  are  organic, 
which  appear  in  us  because  we  are  organisms ;  which  lead 
us  to  undertake,  without  forethought,  actions  of  a  very  com- 
plex nature  involving  the  movement  of  many  parts  of  the 
body  in  relations  which  are  more  or  less  fixed,  actions 
which,  as  the  biologists  say,  are  more  or  less  thoroughly  co- 
ordinated. 

One  would  say,  for  instance,  that  I  act  instinctively  when 
I  suddenly  raise  my  hand  and  arm  to  ward  off  the  blow  from 
a  ball  which  some  boy  has  inadvertently  thrown  towards  me 
in  the  ardour  of  his  play.  The  action  in  this  case  involves 
most  complicated  muscular  adjustments,  and  is  determined 
by  nervous  changes  of  a  very  intricate  kind ;  and  yet  this 
action  takes  place  automatically  as  we  say :  I  may  feel  it 
as  it  goes  on,  or  I  may  feel  its  effects,  but  I  do  not  have  to 
consider  how  it  will  be  best  for  me  to  act  under  the  cir- 
cumstances ;  in  fact,  if  I  had  to  enter  into  such  considera- 
tion, I  should  be  unable  to  devise  the  proper  means  of 
protection  in  time  to  save  my  head. 


CHAP.  Ill  GENERAL  DEFINITIONS  69 

Such  actions  as  these  have  significance  for  our  welfare 
as  organic  beings  ;  they  guide  us,  for  instance,  in  the  search 
for  food,  in  efforts  towards  self-protection,  and  they  enable 
us  to  gain  many  advantages  of  wider  significance  which  are 
to  be  studied  in  detail  later  on.  But  it  must  be  noted 
that  they  are  not  dependent  in  any  degree  upon  our 
appreciation  of  the  advantages  they  bring  to  us  :  they  are 
called  into  action  without  our  will,  and  in  many  cases 
cannot  be  restrained  by  our  will.  I  do  not  realise,  for 
instance,  as  I  throw  up  my  arm,  that  my  skull  is  in 
danger  of  being  cracked  if  that  ball  hits  it ;  I  do  not  throw 
up  my  arm  because  I  consciously  desire  to  avoid  the  blow ; 
in  fact  if  I  know  the  ball  cannot  reach  me,  because  its 
flight  is  limited  by  being  attached  to  a  string  held  by  the 
boy,  I  still  am  likely  to  throw  up  my  arm  unless  I  make  a 
effort  not  to  do  so. 

In  common  speech  all  organised  actions,  similar  to  those 
above  described,  which  take  place  without  forethought  are 
wont  to  be  called  instinctive ;  but  even  common  sense  ob- 
serves one  distinction. which  we  shall  see  later  on  to  be  a 
most  important  one.  We  all  note  that  some  actions  which 
are  deliberately  undertaken  at  the  first,  if  often  repeated, 
gradually  take  on  the  qualities  of  instinct  actions :  we  gain 
what  we  call  hahits  of  action  which  lead  us  to  act  automatic- 
ally, without  forethought,  in  very  complex  ways.  The  pianist, 
for  instance,  learns  to  play,  the  bicycle  rider  learifis  to  balance 
himself;  but  finally  the  muscular  and  neural  adjustments 
involved  in  the  playing  and  the  riding  become  quite  auto- 
matic :  it  becomes  difficult  for  the  pianist  to  play  the  wrong 
notes  when  the  proper  scale  is  placed  before  his  eye,  actually 
difficult  for  the  bicyclist  to  lose  his  balance  when  obstacles 
do  not  too  suddenly  appear  before  him. 

Now  although  the^xistence  of  habit  is  commonly  noted, 
the  distinction  between   habit   and   instinct   is   not    made 


powerful 


70  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

much  of  by  common  folk ;  but  it  is  necessary  to  bear  it  in 
mind.  Habits  may  be  called  ^se'Z^c^o-instincts,  and  this  draws 
our  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  true  instincts  are  not 
learned,  that  they  are  born  in  us,  that  they  are  inherited 
from  our  ancestors  with  the  bodily  structure  which  is  given 
to  us.  ^ 

The  importance  of  this  distinction  at  once  becomes 
evident  when  we  perceive,  as  we  do  as  soon  as  we  study 
the  subject  with  care,  that  the  true  instincts  have  been 
acquired  by  our  race  because  in  the  long  run  they  have 
been,  as  they  in  general  still  are,  valuable  to  life  under  the 
conditions  which  normally  arouse  them.  Had  not  blows 
upon  the  skull  been  destructive  of  life,  and  protection  from 
such  blows  advantageous  to  those  animals  from  which  we 
have  descended,  our  ancestors  who  gained  habits  of  protect- 
ing the  skull  by  throwing  up  the  arm  would  not  have  won 
in  the  struggle  for  life,  whilst  those  of  their  kind  who  did 
not  act  thus  were  destroyed  without  leaving  descendants.^ 
^  The^consideration  of  Instincts  then,  from  a  developmental, 
standpoint,  shows  that  they  lead  us  to  act  as  our  ancestors 
have  acted  under  conditions  similar  to  those  by  which  we 
are  surrounded.  ^ 

§  2.  Eeason^  as  we  usually  use  the  term,  is,  on^  the_ 
other  hand,  that  which  leads  us  to  adapt  ourselves  to  new 
condiiiOBS,  to  guide  and  change  the  actions  which  are  deter- 
mined by  instinct,  and  is  what  we  may  call  the  variant 
factor  in  psychic  life.  The  word  "  reason  "  is  thus  used  in 
a  broad  way  to  cover  much  that  is  usually  spoken  of  as 
intelligence ;  a  usage  which  I  explain  in  the  more  technical 
chapters  to  follow. 

We  discover,  if  I  may  use  again  the  same  example,  that 

^  I  purposely  omit  here  all  reference  to  the  complications  caused  by  the 
effects  of  experience  upon  innate  Instinct.     See  Chapter  IV. 


CHAP.  Ill  GENERAL  DEFINITIONS  71 

the  flight  of  the  boy's  ball  is  restricted  by  the  string ;  we 
reason  that  it  is  absurd  to  jump  and  throw  up  our  hands 
each  time  he  throws  it  at  us,  for  it  cannot  reach  us,  and 
cannot  hurt  us.  Although  at  first  we  may  not  be  able  to 
control  our  instinctive  response,  we  finally  gain  ability  to 
control  our  action,  although  this  can  usually  be  done  only 
by  indirect  process,  by  not  noticing  the  boy  and  his  ball, 
or,  in  other  words,  by  turning  our  attention  in  some  other 
direction. 

§  3.  Instinct  is  thus  seen  to  be  a  torce  within  us  which 
tends  to  make  us  act  under  certain  conditions  as  all  others 
act  who  are  of  the  same  organic  type,  which  leads__us_to 
undertake  typical  reactions.  Eeason,  on  the  other  hand, 
appearsjia_the_force  which  tends  to  make  us  vary  from  such 
typical  actions.  The  meanings  I  attach  to  these  terms  I 
believe  are  thus  made  clear,  and  I  think  the  reader  will  find 
no  difficulty  in  understanding  my  usage  in  the  succeeding 
chapters. 

§  4.  Perhaps  this  distinction  may  be  made  clearer,  how- 
ever, by  looking  at  the  subject  from  a  different  point  of 
view.  Let  us  turn  to  the  study  of  the  very  beginnings  of 
that  animal  life  which  is  to  occupy  our  thought  to  so  large 
an  extent  in  the  pages  that  follow,  starting  with  a  somewhat 
vague,  hypothetical  consideration.  Let  us  commence  by 
making  only  the  smallest  of  assumptions,  by  taking  for 
granted  nothing  more  than  the  existence  of  the  very  simplest 
possible  forms  of  living  matter  capable  of  growth,  and 
supposing  them  placed  in  an  environment  that  furnishes 
the  nourishment  upon  the  assimilation  of  which  this  growth 
depends. 

With  such  living  matter,  under  such  conditions,  I  believe 
it  will  be  granted  that  it  is  necessary  to  assume  a  tendency 


72  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  pakt  i 

to  what  is  called  "  fission  "  in  the  living  mass,  or  in  other 
words  necessary  to  postulate  the  breaking  up  of  the  living 
mass  as  it  grows ;  for,  as  Prof.  C.  Lloyd  Morgan  ^  has 
happily  expressed  it,  in  such  masses  "  volume  tends  to 
outrun  surface.  But  in  the  organic  cell  the  nutritive 
material  and  oxygen  are  absorbed  at  the  surface,  while  the 
explosive  changes  occur  throughout  its  mass.  Increase  of 
size,  therefore,  cannot  be  carried  beyond  certain  limits,  for 
the  relatively  diminished  surface  is  unable  to  supply  the 
relatively  augmented  mass  with  material  for  elaboration 
into  unstable  compounds.  Hence  the  cell  divides  to  afford 
the  same  mass  increased  surface.  This  process  of  cell- 
division  is  called  fission,  and  in  some  cases  cleavage." 

That  such  fission  or  cleavage  does  take  place  in  low 
grades  of  living  matter  is  well  recognised  by  all  those  who 
use  the  microscope.  But  if  we  once  assume  that  this  fission 
or  cleavage  takes  place,  it  is  evident  that  in  general  the 
new  masses  will,  after  the  fission,  at  first  be  placed  con- 
tiguous to  one  another,  and  as  the  process  of  division 
continues  that  they  will,  unless  disturbed,  tend  to  form  a 
group  which  we  may  call  an  aggregate.  Furthermore,  if 
the  process  continue  indefinitely,  it  seems  to  me  to  be 
apparent  that,  unless  forces  in  the  environment  sweep  the 
newly-formed  elements  apart,  we  shall  soon  have  an  aggre- 
gate in  which  some  of  the  living  cells  are  prevented  from 
absorbing  nourishment  by  the  mere  fact  that  they  are 
entirely  surrounded  by  their  fellow-cells,  and  thus  cut  off 
from  contact  with  the  environment  which  contains  this 
nourishment. 

It  would  clearly  be  of  advantage  to  these  simple  living 
forms  if  this  difficulty  could  be  overcome,  and  the  most 

^  Animal  Life  arid  Intelligence,  p.  37.  Prof.  Morgan  thinks  this  should 
be  known  as  "Spencer's  Law,"  as  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  first  clearly  enunci- 
ated it. 


CHAP.  Ill  GENERAL  DEFINITIONS  73 

effective  variation  in  this  respect  would  be  found  if  the  new 
cells,  as  they  were  formed,  developed  a  tendency  to  separate 
themselves  from  the  parent  cell.  As  a  matter  of  fact  in 
very  low  forms  of  life  we  find  what  the  biologist  calls 
"  cilia  " ;  minute,  and  more  or  less  active,  prolongations  of 
the  cell  substance  which  must  tend  to  bring  about  separa- 
tion between  the  cells.  The  microscope,  indeed,  shows  us 
still  more  simple  forms,  so  low  in  the  scale  of  life  that 
we  often  scarcely  know  whether  to  call  them  animal  or 
vegetable,  which  have  this  power  of  separating  themselves 
from  their  fellows,  through  the  agency  of  no  discoverable 
cilia,  but  through  processes  which  we  fail  entirely  to 
comprehend. 

But  we  must  not  stop  to  consider  these  low  forms  of  life 
too  closely,  fascinating  as  such  study  might  be,  for  our 
interest  in  them  here  is  merely  in  relation  to  their  survival 
after  they  have  come  into  existence  through  the  division  of 
the  parent  cells.  What  is  of  more  interest  to  us  is  the 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  in  quite  another  way  the  new- 
born cells,  necessarily  tending  to  form  aggregates  as  the 
result  of  fission,  may  accommodate  themselves  to  their 
environment,  even  if  they  fail  in  the  attainment  of  mutu- 
ally repulsive  capacities.  For  this  accommodation  may  be 
accomplished  by  the  acquisition  of  certain  differentiations 
in  functioning,  so  that  the  cells  of  the  surface  of  the  aggre- 
gate, and  those  that  are  shielded  directly  from  contact  with 
the  nutritive  environment,  will  tend  to  react  differently,  and 
in  such  manner  as  will  result  in  a  transfer  of  the  nutriment 
from  the  environment  to  those  cells  that  are  placed  distant 
from  the  surface. 

§  5.  Let  us  turn  our  attention  to  the  simplest  possible 
forms  of  such  aggregation  of  which  we  can  conceive. 


^*^        OF  TBTB        ^  r 

UNIVERSITY 


74  INSTINCT  AND  REASON 


OoOqO 

o  o  o  o^ 


O  Or,0 


O 


O 


oqO 


For  the  purpose  of  illustration  let  us  take  the  above 
diagram  to  represent  a  cross-section  of  such  a  simple  aggre- 
gate which  may  be  supposed  to  be  approximately  spherical 
in  form.  We  may  suppose,  then,  that  any  change  in  any 
one  cell  of  such  an  aggregate  will  tend  to  bring  about  some 
alteration  in  the  cells  adjacent  to  it ;  and  on  the  other  hand 
that  these  latter  will  react  to  modify  the  action  in  the  cell 
first  changed ;  thus  the  action  in  the  cell  first  affected  will 
not  be  the  same  as  would  have  resulted  had  this  cell  not 
been  contiguous  to  the  other  cells. 

If,  then,  a  disturbance  of  any  kind  whatever  from  the 
environment  reach  one  of  the  outer  cells  of  such  an  aggre- 
gate, this  cell  will  tend  primarily  to  react  upon  the  dis- 
turbing force  from  the  environment  as  though  it  were  an 
isolated  cell ;  and,  secondarily,  this  action  will  be  modified, 
or  repressed,  or,  as  the  biologist  says,  inhibited  more  or 
less  fully,  by  the  influence  of  the  other  cells  of  the  aggregate. 

Thus  in  the  very  beginnings  of  the  life  of  cell  aggrega- 
tion, we  have  two  influences  at  work ;  first,  the  elemental 
variant  influence  which  would  lead  any  cell  to  act  for  itself 
alone,  to  become  accommodated  more  or  less  perfectly  to  a 
stimulus  from  without  itself  without  reference  to  the  effect 
of  such  accommodation  upon  the  aggregate  as  a  whole  :  and 
we  have,  second,  the  modifying  influence  from  the  aggregate, 
of  which  the  stimulated  cell  is  an  element.     It   is    to   be 


CHAP.  Ill  GENERAL  DEFINITIONS  75 

especially  noted  that  this  influence  from  the  aggregate  will 
come  into  play  later  than  the  elemental  variant  influence. 

The  reader  will,  of  course,  realise  that  these  influences 
which  seem  so  diverse,  as  we  view  complex  organisms 
objectively,  are  in  fact  both  but  aspects  of  that  which 
appears  to  us  as  the  basic  tendency  to  the  persistence  of 
life ;  they  appear  in  opposition,  because  of  the  fact,  which 
will  become  more  clear  in  the  sequel,  that  the  tendency 
to  aim  towards  the  persistence  of  life  is  fundamentally 
elemental,  and  only  secondarily  relates  to  more  or  less 
integrated  aggregates  of  elements.  But  it  is  with  these 
aggregates  of  more  or  less  complex  organic  form  that 
biology  has  to  deal,  and  I  believe  that  I  shall  not  be  mis- 
understood if,  for  the  sake  of  brevity,  I  often  refer  to  those 
divergent  tendencies  as  we  actually  note  them,  without 
reiterated  reference  to  their  basic  unity. 

§  6.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  it  is  highly  probable  that 
where  a  stimulus  from  the  environment  reaches  such  an 
aggregate  as  we  are  considering,  and  where  it  acts  power- 
fully upon  the  superficial  cells,  then  they  will  tend  to 
react  in  answer  as  though  they  were  isolated  cells,  reacting 
thus  because  no  sufficient  time  can  elapse,  between  the 
reception  of  the  stimulus  and  the  reaction,  to  permit  the 
influence  from  the  aggregate  to  come  into  play. 

Again,  if  we  suppose  the  superficial  cells  which  are 
stimulated  to  be  more  or  less  separated  from  the  mass  of 
cells  forming  the  aggregate ;  then,  again,  even  though  the 
stimulus  from  the  environment  be  not  very  forceful,  we 
should  expect  to  find  these  cells  that  receive  the  stimulus 
reacting  as  though  they  were  isolated  cells  rather  than  as 
elements  of  an  aggregate. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  environmental  stimulus 
demand  less  forceful  and  immediate  reaction  in  the  cells 


76  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

directly  stimulated,  or  if  this  reaction  to  the  stimulus  be 
delayed  in  any  way,  then  the  influence  from  the  aggregate 
will  be  likely  to  be  pronounced. 

And  yet  it  is  very  clear  that  if  the  action  of  these 
aggregates  is  to  be  effective  for  their  own  persistence  as 
aggregates,  then  the  tendencies  to  elemental  variant  action 
in  the  component  cells  must  on  the  whole  be  subordinated 
to  their  action  as  parts  of  the  aggregate.  For  it  is  not 
easy  to  understand  why  there  should  be  persistence  of  such 
aggregations  of  differently  acting  cell  units,  unless  the  cells 
which  form  the  aggregates  are  at  least  as  well  adapted  to 
meet  the  exigencies  of  their  environment  in  the  form  of 
aggregates,  as  they  would  be  if  they  were  separated  one 
from  another ;  and  it  is  quite  impossible  to  understand  how 
there  could  occur  any  increase  in  complexity,  and  any 
marked  differentiation  of  functioning  in  the  cells  thus 
brought  together,  unless  we  suppose  that  they  are  better 
adapted  to  their  environment  in  the  form  of  an  aggregate 
than  they  would  be  if  they  undertook  separate  existences. 

We  therefore  find  ourselves  compelled  to  admit  the 
great  probability  that  in  these  aggregates  advantage  in  the 
persistence  of  cell  life  is  the  basis  of  such  increase  as  we 
find  in  complexity,  in  closeness  of  relations  between  the 
parts,  and  in  division  of  labour  of  the  several  parts  through 
differences  in  functioning;  the  cells  acting  severally,  yet 
always  as  parts  of  an  aggregate,  and  in  general  under 
normal  conditions  keeping  their  tendencies  to  elemental 
variation  in  subordination. 

§  7.  Now  let  us  turn  to  the  consideration  of  forms  of 
life  a  little  more  complex ;  and  at  the  start  let  me  ask  the 
reader   to    note   again   that    the    beginnings  of  the  diver-, 
gencies  of  functioning,  which  become  of  so  great  importance 
in  all  higher  life,  are  involved  with  the  very  differences  of 


CHAP.  Ill  GENERAL  DEFINITIONS  77 

action  that  occur  in  the  outer  cells  and  in  the  inner  cells 
of  the  simple  aggregates  we  have  been  studying ;  differences 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  stimuli  from  the  environment 
directly  affect  the  outer  cells  only,  the  inner  cells  being 
called  into  action  in  answer  to  stimuli  received  from  the 
outer  cells  which  alone  are  directly  stimulated  by  environ- 
mental changes. 

Now  evidently  such  aggregates  as  we  are  considering 
cannot  hold  together  unless  the  relation  of  the  activities  in 
the  cells  is  more  or  less  definite ;  unless  these  activities  are 
more  or  less  "  integrated,"  as  the  evolutionist  is  accustomed 
to  say ;  unless  the  cells  depend  upon  one  another. 

So  soon  as  the  difference  of  functioning  becomes  marked, 
the  aggregate  becoming  complex  in  its  nature  and  the 
interdependence  or  integration  between  its  elements  gaining 
in  definiteness,  then  we  no  longer  have  mere  aggregates,  but 
we  have  what  we  usually  call  organisms. 

In  these  organisms,  from  the  very  fact  that  their  cell 
units  are  more  or  less  dependent  upon  one  another,  each 
influence  from  the  environment  upon  one  cell  will  necessarily 
become  more  or  less  effective  upon  each  and  all  of  the  cells 
of  the  organic  whole ;  and  the  closer  the  relation  between 
the  elemental  parts  of  the  organism  the  more  marked  will 
this  width  of  effect  become.  At  the  same  time,  pari  passu 
with  the  growth  in  complexity  and  in  integration  of  the 
several  elements,  the  secondary  influence  upon  any  one  cell 
from  the  mass  of  the  other  cells  of  the  organism  will 
evidently  become  more  and  more  complex,  and  hence,  with 
scarcely  a  doubt,  in  many  cases  less  immediately  effective. 

Here  again,  as  with  the  simplest  aggregates  above  spoken 
of,  we  see  that  when  a  stimulus  from  the  environment 
reaches  the  organism,  affecting  directly,  as  it  does,  only  the 
superficial  parts  of  the  organism,  if  it  be  very  powerful, 
these  superficial  parts  are  likely  to  react  as  though  they 


78  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

had  no  relations  to  the  organism  as  a  whole ;  for  in  such 
cases  we  may  suppose  that  the  time  that  elapses  between 
the  reception  of  the  stimulus  and  the  reaction  is  insufficient 
to  permit  the  influence  from  the  organism  as  a  whole  to 
come  into  play.  And  we  also  see  that  any  weakness  of 
integration,  any  failure  of  the  bond  between  the  parts,  will 
result  in  a  tendency  to  the  occurrence  of  this  reaction  of 
the  stimulated  parts  as  though  they  had  no  relation  to  the 
organism  at  large,  even  if  the  force  to  which  they  are  called 
upon  to  react  be  not  especially  forceful 

But  on  the  other  hand  if  the  stimulus  which  reaches 
the  superficial  parts  of  the  organism  be  one  that  demands 
no  forceful  nor  immediate  reaction  in  the  stimulated  part, 
or  if  this  reaction  be  delayed  in  any  way,  then  the  influence 
from  the  aggregate  is  likely  to  be  effective. 

On  the  whole  we  see  that  in  all  cases  the  superficial 
part  will  tend  primarily  to  react  upon  the  stimulus  from 
without  as  though  this  superficial  part  existed  independent 
of  the  organism;  and  only  secondarily  will  its  action  be 
modified  by  the  influences  from  the  organism  as  a  whole. 
Here  again  we  see  the  same  two  influences  at  work :  first, 
the  elemental  variant  influence,  and  second  the  modifying 
influence  from  the  organism ;  this  latter  influence  coming 
into  play  later  than  the  former. 

In  what  follows  I  think  it  will  appear  that  these 
characteristics  are  observable  in  all  the  developments  of 
animal  life. 

§  8.  It  must  be  granted,  I  think,  that  organic  wholes 
would  not  persist,  and  increase  in  complexity  and  in  inter- 
relation or  integration,  unless  the  cells,  or  the  cell  aggregates 
which  form  their  differentiated  parts,  had,  as  parts  of  the 
general  organism,  some  advantage  that  they  would  not 
have  if  they  existed  as  separate  cells  or  separate  differentiated 


CHAP.  Ill  GENERAL  DEFINITIONS  79 

parts.  Or  to  put  the  matter  in  other  words,  the  very 
existence  of  these  organic  forms  shows  clearly  that,  under 
the  stress  of  conflict,  certain  types  of  cells,  or  parts  formed 
of  aggregated  cells,  run  the  best  chance  of  survival,  provided 
they  subordinate  their  tendency  to  immediate  reaction  as 
individual  cells,  or  individual  parts,  to  the  tendency  to 
react  as  inherent  parts  of  the  whole  organism  of  which 
they  are  elements ;  this  being  the  case  because  the  organism 
is  better  adapted  to  accommodate  itself  to  environmental 
conditions  (with  incidental  protection  to  its  elemental 
cells  or  cell  parts)  than  any  of  the  elemental  cells,  or 
parts  formed  of  aggregated  cells,  would  themselves  be  if 
they  acted  merely  as  elements.  As  we  have  said  above, 
there  is  no  other  easily  conceived  basis  upon  which  the 
development  of  these  organic  aggregations  can  be  accounted 
for. 

And  if  this  be  so,  then  it  seems  very  clear  that  if  the 
action  in  these  organisms  is  to  be  effective  the  tendencies 
to  elemental  variant  action  in  the  parts  of  the  organism 
must  in  the  main  be  subordinated  to  their  action  as  parts 
of  the  organism  as  a  whole,  where  conditions  of  stimulation 
tend  to  stability. 

This  last  point  I  would  impress  upon  the  reader's 
attention,  for  as  he  will  discover  later  it  is  of  importance 
to  our  argument. 

§  9.  I  think  we  shall  find  ourselves  convinced  in  the 
course  of  the  chapters  that  are  to  follow;  first,  that  the 
activities  that  are  determined  by  influences  from  the  organism, 
leading  us  to  act  for  the  benefit  of  the  organism,  are  what 
we  know  in  the  higher  forms  of  life  as  instinctive  actions ; 
these  as  we  find  them  being  more  or  less  modified  by 
experience :  and  second  that  the  actions  determined  by  the 
elemental  variant  influences  are  those  that  we  know  in  the 


80  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

higher  forms  of  life  as  actions  which  are  determined  by 
more  or  less  developed  forms  of  reason. 

Speaking  broadly  we  may  say  that  we  call  those  actions 
in  our  fellow  man  instinctive  which  we  know  we  perform 
as  well  as  he,  but  which  are  carried  on  by  us  without 
conscious  initiation  on  our  part,  without  effort,  without 
volition,  without  thought  of  end  to  be  reached,  or  purpose 
to  be  attained,  and  which  have  not  been  learned  by  us 
during  our  life  experience ;  actions  which  occur  in  him  and 
in  us  because  we  are  organisms ;  actions  which  are  in  part 
conscious  but  in  no  case  the  result  of  rational  foresight  or 
of  act  of  will  We  extend  the  term  to  describe  the  actions 
of  the  dumb  animal  friends  who  surround  us  and  who  act 
in  many  respects  as  we  do,  and  then  to  the  lower  orders  of 
animals  with  which  we  are  familiar. 

In  a  similar  manner  we  call  those  actions  in  our  fellow 
man  intelligent,^  determined  by  reason,  which  we  perform 
as  well  as  he,  but  always,  or  usually,  after  some  form  of 
conscious  reasoning  process  and  of  choice.  We  extend  this 
descriptive  terminology  again  to  indicate  certain  of  the  actions 
of  the  higher  animals  which  surround  us  and  which  act  in 
many  cases  as  we  do;  and  then  we  are  compelled  by  parity 
of  reasoning  to  extend  it  further  to  the  lower  animals. 

The  intelligent  activities  we  set  over  against  the  instinc- 
tive ones  because  we  realise  that  our  instincts  often  call 
upon  us  to  act  in  ways  which  we,  at  the  moment,,  perceive 
to  be  lacking  in  intelligence ;  or  in  ways  which,  after  the 
fact,  seem  to  us  to  have  been  utterly  irrational ;  and  because 
we  realise  that  it  is  by  means  of  reasoned  activities  that  we 
are  wont  to  oppose  those  activities  that  are  natural  to  us  in 
the  fact  that  we  are  organisms.  We  act  intelligently  when 
we  would  override  and  vary  the  actions  to  which  we  are 
naturally  led  by  our  organic  instincts.     As  we  shall  eventu- 

^  Of  the  more  accurate  use  of  this  word  I  speak  below. 


CHAP.  Ill  GENERAL  DEFINITIONS  81 

ally  see  there  is  a  very  close  relation  between  Instinct  and 
Eeason,  but  upon  this  we  cannot  enlarge  here :  for  notwith- 
standing this  fact  the  broad  distinction  above  made  is 
perfectly  clear. 

When  we  deal  with  animals  which  cannot  tell  us  of  their 
mental  states  there  is  not  a  little  difficulty  in  assigning  the 
boundaries  of  instinct  actions  as  exclusive  of  actions  deter- 
mined by  will  and  foresight,  a  difficulty  which  gave  rise  in 
times  past  to  the  Cartesian  notion  that  animal  activities  of 
all  sorts  and  kinds  are  automatic  and  unconscious.  We, 
however,  have  a  way  of  judging  whether  the  actions  of  our 
fellow  men  are  instinctive  or  reasoned  out,  even  when  they 
do  not  tell  us  their  mental  experiences :  viz.  by  noting  the 
evidences  of  choice  which  are  present  when  they  act  deliber- 
ately and  rationally,  and  which  are  lacking  when  they  act 
instinctively  and  non-rationally.  ^The  signs  of  choice  are 
also  found  in  the  lower  animals,  and  in  like  manner  should 
lead  us  to  judge  that  processes  of  reasoning  and  will-effort, 
in  germ  at  least,  are  present  with  them,  and  that  these 
actions  of  theirs  that  are  thus  the  outcome  of  rational  or 
volitional  acts  are  not  to  be  counted  as  instinctive.  But  on 
the  other  hand  those  actions  of  theirs  that  are  performed 
without  any  evidence  of  choice  we  may,  roughly  speaking, 
consider  to  be  instinctive,  and  only  conscious  in  the  limited 
manner  in  which  our  own  instinctive  actions  are  conscious. 
Of  the  connection  between  reason  and  choice  I  shall  speak 
more  at  length  later  on. 

§  10.  I  of  course  cannot  claim  that  this  brief  treatment 
has  justified  the  statement,  made  in  the  beginning  of 
section  9,  that  instinct  actions  are  determined  by  organic 
influences  that  lead  to  typical  actions  of  significance  for  the 
^organiim,  and'*that  reasoned  actions  are  determined  by 
influences  leading  us  to  vary  from  these  typical  forms  in  the*" 


82  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i 

^^@aner_  above  described.  A  large  part  of  this  book  will  in- 
deed be  devoted  to  a  detailed  consideration  of  these  points, 
and  to  the  justification  of  the  statement  thus  made.  I  hope, 
however,  that  the  position  thus  taken,  if  not  acquiesced  in 
from  the  start,  will  be  found  acceptable  after  we  have  traced 
the  development  of  those  acts  which  we  know  in  ourselves 
as  instinctive,  and  those  that  we  consider  to  be  rational,  from 
their  beginnings  in  the  lower  forms  of  life  that  surround  us._ 

The  reader  will  realise  at  all  events  that  when  I  use  the 
term  instinct  actions  in  what  follows  I  shall  mean  to  indi- 
cate those  activities  which  are  thus  determined  by  influences 
from  within  the  organism,  and  that  when  I  use  the  term 

elemental  variant  actions  I  shall  mean  to  indicate  the  reaction 

\ 
of  a  part  of  the  organic  whole,  for  itself  as  though  it  stood 

apart  fpm  the  whole,  in  answer  to  changes  in  its  environ- 
ment ;  and  my  meaning  will  be  clear,  I  think,  whether  he 
agree  or  disagree  with  me  as  to  the  propriety  of  the 
terminology,  or  even  if  he  disagree  with  me  in  relation  to 
the  theses  which  I  defend  in  what  follows. 


PART   II 
CONCERNING    INSTINCT 


CHAPTEE    IV 

THE    NATURE    OF   INSTINCT 

§  1.  In  Chapter  III.  I  have  endeavoured  to  make  clear 
the  general  nature  of  Instinct  and  of  Eeason ;  I  shall  now 
attempt  by  some  special  arguments  to  justify  the  position 
thus  taken  in  reference  to  Instinct,  and  to  mark  the  breadth 
of  the  application  of  the  term. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  word  Instinct  should  properly 
be  used  in  an  objective  sense,  and  in  an  objective  sense  only. 
It  is  not  infrequently  used,  to  be  sure,  with  subjective  con- 
notation, but  I  think  the  tendency  amongst  the  clearest 
thinkers  is  to  avoid  such  usage.  Darwin,  for  instance,  always 
employed  the  word  to  describe  certain  actions  in  animals 
and  men  as  viewed  objectively.-^  I  find  it  difficult  indeed 
to  see  how  the  word  "  instinct "  can  be  used,  even  in  speak- 
ing of  one's  own  actions,  except  in  an  objective  sense  to  give 
a  name  to  the  capacity  which  determines  certain  trends  of 
activity,  as  they  appear  after  the  fact.  At  all  events  I 
shall  use  the  word  instinct  objectively;  but  in  order  to 
avoid  any  difficulties  connected  with  this  word  I  shall 
as  far  as  possible  employ  a  special  terminology   which   I 

■^  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan  has  indeed  not  long  since  defined  Instinct  as 
**  the  congenital  psychological  impulse  concerned  in  instinctive  activities," 
which  might  lead  one  to  believe  that  he  intends  to  give  a  subjective  connota- 
tion to  the  word  ;  but  he  writes  to  me  that  he  is  now  disposed  "to  drop 
'  instinct '  as  a  term  for  the  subjective  aspect "  altogether ;  and  this  is  in 
harmony  with  his  usage  in  his  latest  book,  Habit  arid  Instinct.  Cf.  also 
Nature,  22nd  August  1895. 


86  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

believe  cannot  be  misunderstood.  I  shall  use  the  com- 
pound word  "  instinct  actions "  to  describe  the  actions 
involved  in  the  expression  of  Instinct ;  and  this  term  I  shall 
intend  to  employ  only  in  an  objective  sense. 

But  clearly,  if  to  describe  the  "  organised  trains  of  co- 
ordinated activities "  which  are  the  expression  jof  instinct, 
we  thus  use  a  special  term  which  does  not  involve  any 
recognition  of  the  psychic  coincident  of  these  actions,  then 
we  are  in  need  of  a  correspondent  term  to  describe  this 
psychic  coincident  of  these  co-ordinated  activities ;  and 
accordingly  I  employ  the  term  "  instinct  feelings  "  to  describe 
the  consciousness  coincident  with  the  instinct  actions  :  ^  this 
term,  as  is  evident,  I  use  in  a  subjective  sense. 

So  far  then  as  I  employ  the  word  "  instinct "  I  use  it  as 
above  explained  in  an  objective  sense  to  refer  to  any  capacity 
in  an  animal  which  enables  it  to  perform,  without  learning 
by  experience  during  life,  certain  "  organised  trains  or 
sequences  of  co-ordinated  activities  in  common  with  all  the 
members  of  the  same  more  or  less  restricted  group  in 
adaptation  to  certain  circumstances  oft  recurring  or  essential 
to  the  continuance  of  the  species."  The  words  in  quotation 
marks  are  from  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan's  Animal  Life  and 
Intelligence. 

But  I  shall  use  the  word  "  instinct "  in  a  much  wider 
sense  than  that  in  which  Professor  Morgan  employs  it.  It 
seems  to  me  that  we  are  logically  compelled  to  extend  the 
meaning  of  the  term  to  cover  certain  manifestations  of 
activities  that  are  of  very  wide  reach,  that  have  not  attracted 
any  great  amount  of  study  from  biologists,  and  that  therefore 
have  not  been  commonly  identified  with  the  instincts  in 
general:  for  instincts  are  usually  studied  by  biologists  in 

^  Cf.  my  Pain,  Pleasure,  and  Esthetics,  p.  69.  The  word  "feeling"  is 
here  not  equivalent  to  pleasure-pain,  but  is  used  in  its  widest  sense  as 
employed  by  Hodgson,  James,  Spencer,  and  others. 


CHAP.  TV  THW  NATURE  OF  INSTINCT  87 

those  forms  where  pe  expressive  action  is  relatively  definite 
and  fixed  in  character.^ 

I  am  upheld  in  my  position  by  the  usage  not  only  of 
ordinary  men  but  also  of  a  large  number  of  writers  upon 
biology  and  psychology,  and  notably  by  that  employed  by 
Darwin.  A  serious  attempt  has  lately  been  made,  however, 
by  Professor  Morgan  to  restrict  the  meaning  of  the  term 
in  a  manner  which  must  be  considered. 

§  2.  If  the  reader  will  note  the  quotation  from  Professor 
Morgan  just  made,  he  will  agree,  I  think,  that  one  marked 
characteristic  of  instinct  actions  is  this,  that  they  tend 
towards  some  more  or  less  definite  biological  end.  As  a 
matter  of  fact  this  seems  like  stating  a  truism,  for  we 
recognise  the  biological  end  in  connection  with  the  most 
prominent  of  the  co-ordinated  actions  which  we  call  instinct 
actions,  and  I  think  we  must  hold  that  all  series  of  actions 
which  are  congenital,  which  are  determined  by  the  con- 
stitution of  the  organism,  and  which  appear  to  subserve 
definite  biological  ends,  must  be  classed  together  as  Instincts. 

It  is  thus  that  I  am  accustomed  to  employ  the  word 
Instinct.  But  to  this  usage  Professor  Morgan  objects.^  He 
holds  in  opposition  to  my  extension  of  the  term  that 
biologists  "  have  grown  accustomed  to  the  application  of 
the  term  instinct  to  the  manifestation  of  particular 
activities";  and  he  says,  "The  term  instinctive  should 
in  my  judgment  be  applied  to  those  activities  which  are 
congenital,  and  which  are  also  relatively  definite." 

To  the  limitation  of  the  word  Instinct  to  those  activities 
which  are  congenital,  i.e.  which  are  not  acquired  during  life, 
I,  of  course,  agree  in  a  general  way,  if  we  follow  Professor 

1  Cf.  my  note  in  Nature  for  6tli  June  1895. 
2  See  article  in  Nature  above  referred  to. 


88  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

Morgan  in  adopting  a  subsidiary  classification  of  instincts 
which  are  "  connate,"  i.e.  those  which  are  perfectly  formed 
at  birth;  and  "deferred,"  i.e.  those  which  appear  only  some  time 
after  birth,  of  which  we  have  a  notable  example  in  the  sexual 
instincts.  As  we  examine  the  higher  forms  of  instinct  in 
what  follows  we  shall  find  that  the  nature  of  the  instincts 
which  we  call  deferred  instincts,  which  do  not  arise  until  some 
time  after  birth,  is  more  or  less  obscured  by  the  fact  that 
during  the  experiences  of  life  animals  gain  habits  which  alter 
instinctive  reactions,  or  which  themselves  become  almost  as 
thoroughly  co-ordinated  as  instincts  of  congenital  type.  I  do 
not  wish  to  minimise  this  difficulty  of  observation,  but  I  shall 
endeavour  to  show  in  all  the  complex  cases  treated  that 
however  much  the  instincts  referred  to  are  affected  by  life 
experience,  and  by  imitation,  they  are  still  determined  by 
congenital  capacities,  although  these  are  in  some  cases 
deferred  in  their  appearance  until  long  after  birth. 

But  this  limitation  itself  cannot  be  accepted  without  a 
further  explanation ;  for,  as  we  shall  see  later  (Part  IV.), 
the  modifications  of  a  given  instinct,  the  acquirements  during 
life,  are  themselves  due  to  the  influence  of  instincts  of  another 
and  simpler  order  than  that  which  is  modified,  these  simpler 
instincts  being  brought  into  action  by  stimuli  which  are 
better  fitted  to  call  out  these  modifying  instincts  than  they 
are  to  call  out  the  instinct  which  is  modified. 

"We  make  a  much  more  correct  statement,  T  think,  if  we 
say  that  activities  are  due  to  Instinct  when  they  are  the 
result  of  certain  co-ordinations  which  are  inherited  with  an 
animal's  neural  structure,  and  which  (we  may  add),  in  the 
nature  of  that  inherited  neural  co-ordination,  tend  in 
general  to  subserve  some  biological  end  which  has  been  of 
advantage  to  its  ancestors ;  and  that  so  far  as  co-ordinated 
activities  tending  to  advantage  to  organic  forms  of  a  certain 
order  have  been  acquired  during  life,  they  cannot  be  said  to 


X 

CHAP.  IV  THE  NATURE  OF  INSTINCT 

be  due  to  instincts  of  this  same  order ;  nevertheless  these 
acquisitions  must  themselves  be  dependent  upon  the 
existence  of,  and  upon  the  co-ordinate  action  of,  instincts 
of  another  order. 

Thus,  as  Professor  Morgan  shows,  the  swallowing  of 
water  by  the  thirsty  chick  is  instinctive  as  soon  as  it  gets 
its  bill  into  the  water,  but  the  putting  of  its  bill  into  the 
water  is  not  instinctive  from  the  same  point  of  view,  for  it 
has  to  be  taught  to  peck  at  the  water  by  imitation  of  its 
mother.  Nevertheless  the  process  of  imitation  is  itself 
instinctive ;  the  action  of  pecking  is  learned  because  the 
little  chick  has  inherited  with  its  structure  the  tendency  to 
follow  the  lead  of  the  mother  hen.  Thus  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  acquisition  through  experience  of  this  habit,  which 
is  not  due  to  an  instinct  of  a  certain  order  determined  by 
the  existence  of  an  organic  type  of  a  high  degree  of 
intricacy,  is,  nevertheless,  dependent  upon  the  appearance 
in  the  chick  of  instinct  actions  of  another  order  determined 
by  the  existence  of  a  less  complex  organic  form,  of  a  co- 
ordination of  a  lower  order  which  is  inherited  with  its 
normal  structure. 

This  simple  example  will  be  found  in  what  follows  to  be 
typical  of  accommodative  action  in  general,  accommodative 
action  which  determines  the  modifications  of  inherited  in- 
stincts, or  of  the  more  or  less  complex  habits  acquired  during 
life ;  modifications  indeed  of  instincts,  and  acquired  habits, 
which  bear  relation  to  biological  ends  of  one  order,  although, 
in  fact,  they  are  determined  by  the  combination  of,  and 
co-ordination  of,  instincts  which  serve  biological  ends  of  a 
different  order.  The  full  bearing  of  this  explanation  will 
appear  later  when  we  consider  more  in  detail  the  nature  of 
variation  and  accommodative  modification. 

§  3.  If  we  turn,  then,  to  the  question  of  the  definiteness 


90  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  pakt  n 

of  the  reaction,  we  note  at  once  that  while  Professor  Morgan 
lays  stress  upon  this  fixedness  of  reaction  in  instincts,  he  is, 
nevertheless,  compelled  to  acknowledge,  as  he  does  in  the 
use  of  the  phrase  "  relatively  definite,"  -^  that  this  fixedness  is 
variable :  it  seems  to  me  that  this  variableness  is  so  wide 
that  definiteness  of  reaction  cannot  for  a  moment  be  used  as 
a  differentia  in  relation  to  instinct  without  narrowing  our 
conception  of  the  bounds  of  instinct  in  a  manner  to  be 
deplored. 

It  appears  that,  apart  from  their  congenital  nature, 
instinct  actions  as  ohjectively  viewed  by  the  biologist  are 
determined  first  by  their  organisation,  but  especially  by 
some  biological  end  which  this  organisation  subserves. 
When  we  consider  them  suhjectively  we  add  the  differentia 
that  they  are  automatic,  i.e.  that  the  organised  actions  take 
place  without  our  will,  whether  we  recognise  the  end  to  be 
subserved,  or  whether  we  do  not,  and  in  most  cases  we  do 
not. 

If  this  be  true,  then  the  definiteness  and  the  fixity  of  the 
actions  is  of  very  secondary  moment,  that  which  is  im- 
portant being  the  fact  that  there  exists  a  biological  end 
which  determines  the  trend  of  these  organised  activities. 

This  is  made  more  clear,  I  think,  if  we  study  the 
instincts  with  the  object  of  noting  how  variable  are  the 
actions  involved  in  their  expression. 

It  is  true  that  we  usually  take  as  examples  of  the 
typical  instincts  those  which  express  themselves  in  what 
seem  to  us  to  be  practically  invariable  actions  occurring  in 
definitely  co-ordinated  relation  to  one  another,  so  that  the 
actions  appear  to  be  always  the  same,  and  to  be  aroused 
always  by  the  same  stimuli.  As  an  instance  of  such  an 
instinct  we  may  take  Professor  Morgan's  happy  example  of 

^  He  uses  the  words  "  a  certain  amount  of  definiteness  "  in  his  latest  book, 
HaMt  and  Instinct,  cf.  pp.  16,  17. 


CHAP.  IV  THE  NATURE  OF  INSTINCT  91 

the  instinctive  reactions  in  the  chick  in  connection  with 
drinking,  above  referred  to. 

Here,  as  his  experiments  show,  there  is  no  tendency  to 
look  for  water ;  the  thirsty  little  birds  apparently  have  no 
conception  of  the  basis  of  their  discomfort ;  they  will  walk 
through  water  without  any  effort  to  drink  unless  they  happen 
to  perform  the  very  definite  act  of  pecking  at  the  water, 
when  at  once  the  instinctive  explosion  takes  place,  they 
perform  the  seemingly  definite  actions  resulting  in  the 
throwing  up  of  their  heads,  and  they  drink. 

But  if  we  study  this  very  case  with  care  we  see  at  once 
that  of  the  chicks  in  a  brood  no  two  are  likely  to  strike  the 
water  with  the  bill  under  conditions  which  will  produce 
exactly  the  same  relations  of  stimulation,  and  therefore 
with  each  of  the  chicks  the  co-ordination  of  complex  actions 
which  result  in  the  drinking  must  be  different,  although 
in  ways  that  are  with  difficulty  observable. 

It  appears,  then,  that  the  fixity  of  reaction  is  an  ideal 
to  which  instinct  actions  indeed  tend,  but  which  we  may 
assume  is  seldom,  if  ever,  quite  reached,  and  which  when 
reached  give  us  what  we  usually  speak  of  as  reflex  actions.^ 

But  if  the  instinct  actions  themselves  are  only  relatively 
definite,  the  biological  end  to  be  attained  is  much  more 
fixed ;  and  this  fact  in  connection  with  organisation  is,  in 
my  view,  the  objective  mark  of  an  instinct,  to  which,  as  I  say 
above,  must  be  added,  on  the  subjective  side,  absence  of  any 
influence  produced  by  conception  of  this  end. 

It  seems  to  me  that  there  are  many  of  the  lower  types 
of  instinct  which  show  very  clearly  that  their  efficiency 
depends  not  upon  any  set  of  actions  which  can  be  spoken  of 
as  even  relatively  definite,  but  rather  upon  the  trend  of  the 
activities  they  induce,  even  if  the  circumstances  of  stimula- 

1  Cf.  below,  §  5. 


92  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

tion  vary ;  or  even  if  the  stimuli  themselves,  and  consequently 
the  reactions  to  the  stimuli,  differ  to  a  certain  degree.  The 
young  chick  after  being  taught  to  peck  may,  I  think,  with- 
out question  be  held  to  show  an  instinctive  tendency  to 
search  for  food,  but  it  expresses  this  instinct  by  turning 
this  way  and  that,  by  jumping  back  or  rushing  forward,  by 
grasping  much  that  it  cannot  digest,  in  the  effort  to  gain 
what  will  serve  as  nourishment ;  the  general  end  being 
reached,  as  the  reader  will  perceive,  through  widely  varying 
co-ordinations  of  actions. 

And  when  we  turn  to  a  study  of  instincts  of  slightly 
more  complex  form,  our  point  is  much  more  clearly  seen. 
The  actions  connected  with  preparation  for  self  -  defence, 
those  connected  with  protection  of  the  young,  with  nest- 
building,  with  migration,  etc.,  these  actions  are  surely  to  be 
classed  as  instinctive;^  and  yet  they  are  exceedingly  variable 
and  unpredictable  in  detail ;  all  that  we  can  predict  is  the 
general  trend  of  the  varying  actions  which  result  from 
varying  stimuli  under  varying  conditions,  and  which 
function  to  some  determinate  biological  end. 

Clearer  still  does  this  become  when  we  study  the  higher 
instincts,  those,  for  instance,  which  relate  to  the  foundation 
of  the  family  in  the  human  animal,  instincts  which  express 
themselves  indirectly  through  many  activities  tending  to  the 
accumulation  of  food  or  property  by  the  man,  and  to  pro- 
tective care  of  the  young  by  the  woman.  But  if  definiteness 
or  relative  fixedness  of  the  activities  involved  were  the  mark 
of  an  instinct,  as  those  who  object  to  my  usage  would  hold, 
then  these  actions  that  we  have  just  mentioned  could  not  be 
called  instinctive.  Yet  who  will  agree  to  such  a  position ; 
who  will  abandon  the  application  of  the  term  to  the  activities 
connected  with  fatherhood  and  motherhood ;  who  will  object 
to  speaking  of  the  paternal  and  maternal  instincts  ? 

^  Cf.  Morgan's  Habit  and  Instinct,  chap.  xi. 


CHAP.  IV  THE  NATURE  OF  INSTINCT  93 

The  point  that  I  especially  wish  to  note,  however,  is  this : 
that  if  I  am  right  in  the  contention  thus  made,  then  there 
are  certain  series  of  activities  of  a  most  complex  nature 
which  we  must  also  speak  of  as  instinctive;  namely,  those 
series  of  actions  which  through  many  complications,  and 
without  influence  from  any  recognition  of  the  biological 
ends  they  subserve,  lead  to  the  protection  of  the  weak ;  to 
the  prevention  of  tyranny  and  violence  through  opposition 
to  murder,  theft,  lying,  adultery ;  to  the  strengthening 
of  social  bonds ;  and  to  the  emphasis  of  social  consolida- 
tion. We  are  thus  brought  to  see  that  we  are  war- 
ranted in  speaking  of  the  ethical  instincts,  of  the  patriotic 
instincts,  of  the  benevolent  instincts,  and  of  the  artistic 
instincts. 

It  is  indeed  true  that  instincts  of  great  complexity  and 
of  the  "  deferred  "  type,  which  do  not  appear  until  long  after 
birth,  are  difficult  to  separate  from  individually  acquired 
habits,  which  grow  up  with  them,  and  in  many  cases  be- 
come attached  to  them.  Nevertheless  we  are,  I  think, 
warranted  in  assuming  that  true  instincts  exist  when  the 
activities  noted  are  very  widely  distributed,  and  have  long 
existed  in  the  race,  and  when  they  have  obvious  relation  to 
some  advantage  which  is  of  biological  moment  to  the  race 
in  which  the  activities  appear. 

§  4.  Professor  Morgan  has  suggested  ^  that  it  would  be 
proper  to  use  the  term  "  impulse  "  rather  than  "  instinct " 
in  description  of  these  less  definite  and  more  complex 
activities  which  I  hold  to  have  all  the  essential  charac- 
teristics of  instinct  actions.  But  I  think  I  may  rightly 
protest  against  such  usage;  for  "instinct,"  as  I  use  it  in 
this  connection,  is  surely  employed  (as  I  think  it  should 
always   be   employed)    as    an    objective    term,  to   describe 

1  Nature,  18th  April  1895. 


94  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

certain  activities  which  occur  in  organisms  as  we  note 
their  life  actions  ;  and  the  word  "  impulse  "  cannot,  I  think, 
be  properly  applied  in  psychology  with  such  objective  sig- 
nificance. For  "  impulse  "  should  in  my  opinion  always  have 
subjective  significance  in  psychology ;  it  is  the  word  we  use 
to  describe  those  more  or  less  painful  states  of  conscious- 
ness which  are  determined  by  the  presence  in  mind  of 
persistent  images  of  the  realisation  of  distinctly  motor 
activities  which  are  not,  in  fact,  realised.  Impulses,  as  I 
shall  attempt  to  show  in  Chapter  XIII.,  are  mental  phases 
which  in  an  objective  view  we  always  find  to  be  determined 
by  the  inhibition  of  instinct  actions  as  these  are  more  or 
less  modified  by  experience ;  which  instinct  actions  have 
been  stimulated  by  the  presence  of  the  conditions  that 
might  normally  call  them  out,  but  which  for  one  reason  or 
another  are  not  at  once  realised. 

But  whether  or  not  this  be  accepted  as  true,  it  will  be 
granted,  I  think,  that  the  word  "impulse"  is  widely  em- 
ployed in  psychology  to  describe  psychic  phenomena  pure 
and  simple,  and  that  it  has  gained  this  significance  through 
long  usage  in  the  study  of  introspective  psychology  and  in 
the  allied  philosophical  studies,  notably  in  ethics,  where  it 
is  constantly  used  with  subjective  reference. 

It  is  true  indeed  that  students  of  physics  and  of  physio- 
logy have  become  accustomed  to  use  the  word  "  impulse " 
objectively  to  describe  distinctly  physical  processes;  one 
billiard  ball  is  said  to  impart  its  impulse  to  another  ball ; 
the  neurologist  speaks  of  the  impulse  from  the  terminal 
nerve  organ  reaching  the  cortex  of  the  brain. 

But  just  because  this  usage  of  objective  science  exists, 
it  is  especially  to  be  desired  that  the  greatest  care  should 
be  taken  to  discriminate  between  the  subjective  and  objec- 
tive use  when  we  employ  the  term  in  a  science  in  which 
the  subjective  significance  is  usual,  and  proper,  and  import- 


CHAP.  IV  THE  NATURE  OF  INSTINCT  95 

ant.  It  is,  I  am  confident,  because  Professor  Morgan  has 
not  freed  himself  from  his  habit  of  speech  as  a  physiologist, 
that  in  writing  upon  psychology  he  occasionally  lapses  into 
the  objective  use  of  the  term ;  as,  for  instance,  where  he 
suggests  that  "  we  understand  by  impulse  an  organic  tend- 
ency which  may  have  a  conscious  accompaniment."  ^  This 
tendency  is  surely  a  fact  objectively  noted. 

But  if  we  consider  the  matter  subjectively,  unless  intro- 
spection deceives  me,  we  are  warranted  in  saying  that  we 
experience  in  this  connection  two  mental  states  only :  1st, 
the  "  instinct  feelings "  which  are  coincidents  of  the  "  in- 
stinct actions,"  which  latter  are  the  objective  evidences  of 
this  "  tendency " ;  and  2nd,  what  Professor  Morgan,  using 
rather  popular  language,  has  elsewhere  called  "  the  relative 
instability  of  a  need  or  want,"  in  direct  connection  with 
these  possible  "  instinct  actions " ;  and  this  last  state  of 
mind,  I  think,  is  what  writers  in  philosophy,  in  psychology, 
in  ethics,  and  sociology  call  "  impulse." 

§  5.  Having,  as  I  believe,  justified  my  extension  of  the 
term  instinct  to  cover  broader,  less  definite  reactions  than 
those  to  which  the  biologist  ordinarily  applies  the  term,  I 
shall  now  attempt  to  show  that  there  are  reasons  for  an 
extension  of  the  application  of  the  term  in  an  opposite 
direction  to  apply  to  those  less  complex  forms  of  activity 
which  do  not  involve  the  whole  of  a  complex  organism,  but 
only  some  specialised  part,  or  so-called  organ. 

In,  and  making  part  of,  the  bodies  of  ourselves  and  all 
the  higher  animals  we  note  special  parts  which  have  the 
appearance  of  being  organised  in  themselves,  although  in- 
cluded as  parts  of  the  wider  organism.  The  heart  in  man 
acts  to  a  great  extent  like  an  individual  organism  which  is 
for  the  most  part,  during  normal  life,  quite  indifferent  to 

1  -Habit  and  Instinct,  p.  141. 


96  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

the  general  activities  of  the  organism  in  which  it  is  found. 
This  independence  is  much  more  marked  when  we  descend 
in  the  animal  scale. 

The  heart  of  the  frog,  for  instance,  may  be  cut  out,  and 
if  it  be  stimulated  properly  it  will  go  on  beating  and  per- 
forming its  life-work  as  a  special  individual  organism  long 
after  separation  from  the  body  in  which  it  was  originally 
placed.  The  whole  upper  part  of  the  frog  may  be  cut 
away,  and  the  lower  part  will  act  as  though  it  were  com- 
plete in  itself;  irritate  one  leg  with  acid,  and  the  other  leg 
will  attempt  to  rub  away  the  irritant. 

These  organs,  or  parts,  thus  perform  "  certain  organised 
trains  or  sequences  of  co-ordinated  activities  in  adaption 
to  certain  stimuli  and  circumstances  oft  recurring  or  essen- 
tial to  the  continuance "  of  their  own  continued  existence ; 
and  these  are  the  marks  of  instinct  action,  if  we  look  at 
them  as  quasi-individuals  included  in,  and  forming  elements 
of,  a  wider  organism  of  which  they,  however,  are  relatively 
independent. 

We  find  floating  about  in  our  blood  certain  low  forms 
of  life,  what  we  call  phagocytic  corpuscles,  which  cannot  be 
thought  of  as  parasites,  in  which  appear  self- protective 
reactions  corresponding  completely  with  the  self-protective 
instinct  actions  observed  in  independent  low-grade  organ- 
isms, such  as  exist  outside  of  our  bodies ;  which  in  other 
words  act  exactly  like  independent  organisms,  and  which, 
nevertheless,  are  apparently  necessary  to  the  protection  and 
continuance  of  the  life  of  the  large  and  complex  organisms 
in  whose  blood  they  swim  about. 

In  comparison  with  these  we  cannot  help  thinking  of 
ourselves  who  may  live  and  act  as  individuals  quite  inde- 
pendent in  many  ways  of  the  social  aggregate  of  which 
each  man  normally  forms  an  elementary  part,  and  yet 
showing  in  our  very  selves  instincts  which  are  determined 


CHAP.  IV  THE  NATURE  OF  INSTINCT  97 

by  the  fact  that  our  ancestors  have  for  ages  past  lived  as 
social  beings.  In  us  appear  individualistic  instincts  and 
tendencies  to  purely  individualistic  reaction ;  and  yet  as  we 
shall  see  later  ^  there  is  evidence,  which  we  cannot  waive 
aside,  which  leads  us  to  believe  that  we  are,  from  one  point 
of  view,  merely  elements  of  a  complex  social  aggregate 
which  is  itself  an  organism  of  a  very  highly  complex  nature, 
but  of  a  very  low  organic  form. 

§  6.  All  this  leads  us  to  a  still  broader  conception  of  the 
meaning  of  instinct  than  we  have  thus  far  adopted. 

In  the  simplest  conceivable  protoplasmic  mass  which 
continues  to  live,  a  stimulus  will  produce  a  reaction  tend- 
ing to  produce  change  which,  as  the  result  of  contest  for 
survival,  will  result  in  such  accommodation  as  will  prevent 
its  destruction.  When  simple  units  of  this  nature  aggre- 
gate, then  we  note  action  of  individual  elements  which  is  of 
advantage  to  themselves,  and  which  also  is  of  advantage  to 
the  aggregate,  and  this  is  what  we  may  properly  call  an  "  in- 
stinct action,"  the  mark  of  the  existence  of  an  instinct  within 
the  mass;  this  simple  aggregation  then  performs  "certain 
organised  trains  or  sequences  of  co-ordinated  activities  in 
common  with  all  members  of  the  same  more  or  less  re- 
stricted group,  in  adaption  to  circumstances  oft  recurring, 
or  essential  to  "  its  continuance ;  and  the  words  in  quotation 
marks  above  are  taken  from  Professor  Morgan's  definition 
of  Instinct  which  we  have  agreed  is  correct,  so  far  as  it 
goes. 

As  the  organism  becomes  larger  and  more  complex,  we 
find  groups  of  ceUs,  themselves  organised  as  special  individual 
parts,  taking  the  place  of  the  simple  cells  which  were 
aggregated  in  forming  the  very  simple  organisms  we  have 
just  been  describing ;  and  yet  we  find  these  organised  parts 

1  Chapter  VII. 
H 


98  INSTINCT  AND  KEASON  part  ii 

exhibiting  instinct  actions  of  their  own,  subordinate  instinct 
actions  we  may  call  them,  which  nevertheless  appear  at  the 
same  time  as  the  expression  of  instincts  relating  to  the 
whole,  larger,  organism. 

As  organisms  become  more  complex,  the  relations  be- 
tween the  parts  become  more  complex :  in  some  cases  the 
relation  between  the  elements  is  close,  and  interdependence 
relatively  perfect,  in  other  cases  the  relation  is  a  loose  one, 
and  interdependence  relatively  imperfect ;  but  in  all  organ- 
isms, from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  we  find  the  same 
relation  of  action  of  part  to  action  of  whole:  neither  the 
thorough  organisation  nor  the  interdependence  of  the  ele- 
ments indeed  being  ever  absolutely  complete,  so  long  as  the 
organism  holds  together ;  but  on  the  other  hand  also,  the 
subordination  of  the  part  to  the  whole  being  never  abso- 
lutely complete,  the  part  being  always  to  some  extent 
organised  as  a  system  apart  from  the  whole  larger  organism. 

Physiologists  have  indeed  made  an  artificial  distinction 
between  certain  forms  of  these  actions,  by  reference  to  our 
own  conscious  experience,  for  we  have  found  that  the  instinct 
actions  of  the  parts  that  upon  occasion  act  most  distinctly 
as  independent  of  the  whole  organism  do  not  affect  our  con- 
sciousness appreciably ;  and  we  come  to  call  these  actions 
"  reflex  actions." 

Professor  Bain  in  his  Sensation  and  Intellect  classifies 
"  reflex  action "  under  Instinct ;  he  thus  stands  in  opposi- 
tion to  Mr.  Spencer  and  to  the  large  number  of  physiolo- 
gists who  emphasise  the  distinction  between  reflex  and 
instinctive  action. 

Professor  Morgan  {Habit  and  Instinct,  p.  7),  following 
Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  would  have  us  distinguish  between 
reflex  action  and  instinctive  activity — a  reflex  action  being 
described  as  "  a  restricted  and  localised  response  involving  a 
particular  organ  or  a  definite  group  of  muscles  "  which  "  is 


CHAP.  IV  THE  NATURE  OF  INSTINCT  99 

initiated  by  a  more  or  less  specialised  external  stimulus  " ; 
an  instinctive  activity  on  the  other  hand  as  "  a  response  of 
the  organism  as  a  whole  "  which  "  involves  the  co-operation 
of  several  organs  and  many  groups  of  muscles " ;  Instinct 
being  thus  "  compound  reflex  action "  in  Mr.  Spencer's 
terms. 

This  distinction,  however,  is  evidently  an  artificial  one, 
as  I  have  said  above ;  for  the  "  particular  organ "  and  the 
"definite  group  of  muscles"  are  in  themselves  organised 
systems,  lesser  organisms  in  fact,  which  have  become 
perfected  and  have  taken  their  place  as  parts  of  a  wider 
organism.  All  reflex  actions  have  the  characteristics  of 
the  instincts  in  that,  as  we  have  seen,  they  enable  the  animal 
to  perform  (to  use  again  Professor  Morgan's  definition  of 
Instinct)  certain  "  organised  trains  or  sequences  of  co- 
ordinated activities  in  common  with  all  the  members  of  the 
same  more  or  less  restricted  group  in  adaption  to  certain 
circumstances  oft  recurring  or  essential  to  the  continuance 
of  the  species."  We  make  the  distinction  between  instinc- 
tive and  reflex  actions  for  practical  convenience  merely,  for 
the  reason  that  we  usually  concern  ourselves  with  instincts 
which  relate  to  the  whole  of  very  complex  organisms,  and 
the  so-called  "  reflex  actions "  are  instinctive  reactions  of 
less  complex  parts  of  these  organisms. 

The  question  as  to  whether  there  are  psychic  correspond- 
ents of  these  reflexes  we  must  pass  over ;  it  has  been  already 
treated  in  Chapter  II. :  but  I  submit  that  if  we  could  eliminate 
all  knowledge  of  our  own  bodies,  and  could  look  upon  animal 
life  in  the  broadest  way,  and  impartially,  from  an  objective 
standpoint,  it  would  never  have  occurred  to  any  one  to  make 
the  distinction  between  reflex  action  and  instinct  action  to 
which  I  here  refer.  In  all  cases  from  the  very  lowest  to 
the  very  highest  we  find  automatic  action  of  elements  or 
parts  for  the  benefit  of  the   organism  of  which   they   are 


100  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

parts.  In  the  highest  forms  of  life  we  find  these  parts 
themselves  highly  organised  and  closely  interdependent ; 
and  as  we  descend  in  the  scale  of  life  we  find  in  some  cases 
reduction  of  the  interdependence  between  the  parts  without 
corresponding  loss  of  organisation  in  the  parts  themselves. 
As  we  trace  life  in  still  lower  forms  we  find  varying  degrees 
of  organisation  in  the  special  parts,  and  varying  degrees  of 
interdependence  between  these  parts,  and  we  find  a  constant 
decrease  of  this  organisation  and  interdependence ;  but  we 
have  never  been  able  to  discern  any  form  of  life,  so  far  as  I 
know,  however  low  it  be  in  grade,  in  which  appears  any 
divergence  from  the  general  form  of  action  of  parts  for 
themselves  and  yet  also  for  the  aggregate  of  which  they  are 
parts;  a  form  of  action  which  in  the  highest  types  of 
organic  life  we  call  instinctive  action. 

In  closing  this  special  discussion  I  must  ask  the  reader 
to  note  that  under  the  conception  above  considered,  all 
instincts,  whether  simple  or  complex,  are  brought  under 
one  category ;  that  all  instincts  appear  as  modes  of  that 
simplest  of  all  forms  of  activity,  the  reaction  of  a  living  cell 
to  the  stimulus  received  from  its  environment. 


CHAPTEE  V 

THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF   THE    INSTINCTS 

§  1.  The  number  of  the  instincts  which  we  observe  in 
animals  and  in  man  is  so  indefinitely  large  that  it  is 
necessary, to  classify  them  in  some  manner  before  we  can 
study  them  with  any  accuracy  or  with  any  advantage. 
Such  classification  may  be  made  on  various  lines :  the  one 
I  present  below  is  adopted  because  it  brings  into  prominence 
the  order  of  the  appearance  of  instincts  in  the  evolution  of 
animal  life ;  the  existence  of  such  an  order  will  be  seen  to 
be  of  importance  when  we  come  to  study  the  nature  of 
Impulse  in  Part  III. 

§  2.  The  instincts  we  are  about  to  consider  are 
capacities  which  result  in  co-ordinated  actions  of  organisms 
as  wholes,  and  which  subserve  certain  ends  of  biological  sig- 
nificance for  these  organisms.  It  is  well,  however,  to  remind 
ourselves  at  the  start  that  the  differentiated  parts  of  the 
higher  organisms  {e.g.  the  heart,  the  lungs)  are  themselves 
more  or  less  organised,  that  they  themselves  act  as  units 
to  a  great  extent,  and  that  these  special  differentiated 
parts  of  the  larger  organic  wholes  themselves  function  to 
ends  of  importance  to  their  own  organic  existence.  In 
one  sense,  therefore,  these  differentiated  parts  may  be 
said  to  act  instinctively,  as  I  have  shown  in  the  closing 
sections  of  Chapter  IV.,  and  did  they  not  to  so  large  an 


102  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

extent  act  in  fixed  orders  and  relations,  or  reflexly  as  we 
say,  we  might  be  compelled  '  to  treat  them  at  some  length 
here. 

But  these  actions  of  differentiated  parts  are  of  import- 
ance to  the  higher  organic  life  only  in  relation  to  the 
wider  reaction  of  the  whole  organism,  and  we  shall  there- 
fore not  stop  to  consider  them  here  further  than  to  call 
attention  to  two  facts  : — 

(1)  That  so  long  as  they  receive  their  normal  stimuli 
to  activity  they  act  normally  and  for  the  most  part  reflexly 
as  we  say ;  and  so  far  as  we  can  judge  by  our  own  experi- 
ence the  psychic  coincidents  of  these  activities  in  affecting 
consciousness  merely  form  part  of  an  unanalysable  psychic 
mass  which  in  ourselves  we  call  Ego. 

(2)  That  if  the  normal  stimuli  to  their  normal  action 
be  interrupted  these  parts  themselves  act  more  or  less  as 
individual  organisms  do,  changing  their  action  to  meet  the 
unusual  demands  placed  upon  them ;  and  under  such 
circumstances  the  psychic  coincidents  of  their  unusual 
activities  produce  not  infrequently  an  appreciable  effect, 
and  often  a  most  noticeable  effect,  upon  consciousness. 
The  heart  and  lungs,  for  example,  under  excessive  stimuli 
will  undertake  excessive  work  and  will  bring  clearly  into 
consciousness  their  working  which  under  normal  conditions, 
when  the  physical  reactions  are  mere  "  reflexes,"  do  not 
affect  consciousness  appreciably. 

These  facts  will  be  found  to  have  their  parallel  in  the 
instincts  of  animals  which  we  are  now  about  to  treat. 


§  3.  If  we  consider  the  instincts  from  an  objective 
point  of  view,  as  they  appear  in  the  lives  of*  men  and  of 
the  higher  animals  that  surround  us,  and  apart  from  those 
effects  upon  consciousness  which  our  own  experience  teaches 
us  to  attach  to  them,  we  cannot  fail  to  note^  that  in  the 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS 


103 


main  they  easily  cast  themselves  into  three  grand  divisions 
determined  by  the  laws  of  organic  development :  / 

(1°)  We  have  a  great  mass  of  instincts  which  function  to 
the  preservation  of  the  individual  organic  life.^ 

(2°)  We  have  a  special  set  of  instincts  which  function  to 
the  preservation  of  the  species  to  which  the  individual  life 
belongs. 

(3°)  We  have  a  very  complex  set  of  instincts  which 
function  to  the  preservation  of  those  social  groups  which 
we  discover  amongst  many  species  of  animals,  and  which 
appear  most  markedly  in  the  highest  animal — man. 

As  this  distinction  seems  to  me  important  and  intrinsi- 
cally interesting  I  shall  consider  each  of  these  groups  by 
itself.  \^^ 


I. — Instincts  Kelating  to  the  Persistence  of  the 
Individual  Organism 

§  4.  We  find  much  evidence,  when  we  study  the  lower 
forms  of  life  existing  around  us,  that  in  the  earliest  formed 
types  of  organic  aggregates,  individual  existence  from  a 
biological  point  of  view  was  all-important.  In  certain 
cases  the  presence  of  other  individuals  of  the  same  type 

1  It  has  been  suggested  to  me  that  there  is  a  logical  objection  to  this 
classification  in  the  fact  that  what  I  call  individualistic  instincts  only  appear 
as  such  in  the  fact  that  they  are  contrasted  with  social  instincts,  and  that  if 
the  instincts  of  the  first  class  are  to  be  separated  from  those  of  the  third 
class  they  should  be  called  by  some  other  name  :  say,  instincts  of  isolation. 

I  think  the  criticism  is  valid  from  a  narrow  point  of  view,  but  in  consider- 
ing animal  life  objectively  the  individual  elements  of  an  aggregate,  when 
they  separate  from  the  aggregate,  are  looked  upon  only  as  individuals  ;  and 
thus  it  becomes  quite  possible,  without  logical  inconsistency,  to  consider 
separately  the  instincts  which  belong  to  the  part  and  not  to  the  whole.  I 
would  adopt  another  term  to  describe  these  earliest  of  instincts  could  I  easily 
do  so  without  rendering  my  meaning  obscure  :  but  I  think  the  reader  will  be 
in  no  danger  of  misunderstanding  me,  in  consideration  of  the  references  on 
future  pages  to  the  fact  that  in  complex  life  the  instincts  of  the  first  class 
can  never  be  considered  to  be  more  than  relatively  independent 


104  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

would  be  a  distinct  disadvantage ;  e.g.  where  the  supply 
of  nutriment  in  the  environment  was  limited ;  and  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  the  presence  of  other  individuals  of  the 
same  type  could  be  of  advantage  where  co-operation  was 
not  possible,  as  was  often  the  case :  and  especially  would 
this  be  true  so  far  as  the  presence  of  other  individuals  was 
not  necessary  to  the  continuance  of  the  type,  for  the  lowest 
organic  forms  even  as  we  observe  them  to-day  are  able  to 
reproduce  their  kind  by  mere  division  of  the  individual 
parent  mass,  as  we  have  already  seen. 

It  is  true,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  division  of  this 
chapter,  that  very  early  in  the  development  of  animal  life 
we  find  nascent  reproductive  systems  and  incipient  sexual 
processes  through  which  continuance  of  type  is  determined 
by  the  co-operation  of  different  individuals ;  still,  even  in 
these  low  organic  types  we  note  many  forms  of  repro- 
duction without  sexual  differences  or  relations ;  and  many 
which  are  independent  of  conjugation  between  different 
individuals — parthenogenesis,  hermaphroditism,  and  the 
like ;  and  in  certain  types  where  sexual  reproduction  is 
possible,  and  sometimes  where  it  is  usual,  we  find  it  often 
replaced  rhythmically  or  irregularly  by  non-sexual  repro- 
duction, which  latter  makes  the  individual  self-dependent 
in  this  propagation  of  its  kind. 

All  this  makes  it  appear  probable  that  individual 
organic  life,  with  inherent  power  of  reproducing  its  own 
kind,  long  persisted  on  the  earth  before  the  slight  advantage 
gained  by  sexual  differentiation  began  to  make  the  existence 
of  different  individuals  of  importance,  and  dependence  of 
one  individual  upon  another  necessary,  if  the  type  were  to 
persist.  And  during  this  long  period  the  animal  must 
have  been  self-dependent  individually ;  in  it  must  have 
arisen  and  grown  to  perfection  many  instincts  which 
related  only  to  its  own  individual  persistence. 


CHAP.  V  THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  105 

Thus  very  early  in  the  growth  of  complex,  diverse, 
functioning,  in  low  forms  of  life  which  we  ourselves  can 
observe,  we  find  the  appearance  of  special  activities  tending 
to  gather  nourishment,  others  fitted  to  produce  its 
absorption,  others  functioning  in  the  removal  of  unused  or 
toxic  products  of  the  assimilative  process ;  all  these 
activities  being  essential  to  individual  existence.  As 
organisms  increase  in  complexity  the  variety  of  these 
differentiated  functionings  increases  enormously,  as  all 
those  who  have  studied  even  the  rudiments  of  biology 
know  well.  And  it  is  clear  to  the  observer  that  these 
actions  as  above  described  are  organised,  are  congenital, 
and  tend  to  produce  results  of  biological  significance  to  the 
organism  in  which  they  appear ;  and  that  they  are  true 
instincts. 

Modifications  of  these  instincts  which  developed  before 
conjugation  was  necessary  for  reproduction,  are  found  in 
all  animals  of  higher  types,  and  in  man.  But  in  the 
higher  animals  we  find  still  more  complex  instinct  actions 
of  purely  individualistic  import,  which,  in  consideration 
of  the  existence  in  the  lower  animals  of  the  simple  purely 
individualistic  instincts  just  referred  to,  I  think  we  may 
take  it  for  granted  have  been  developed  solely  on  account 
of  their  value  to  the  individual  organism. 

Amongst  all  animals  we  find  certain  complex  co- 
ordinations of  activities  of  the  most  diverse  kinds  looking 
to  protection  of  the  individual,  e.g.  the  instinct  actions 
which  lead  the  chameleons  to  assume  the  colour  of  the 
material  upon  which  they  happen  to  be  standing;  those 
which  lead  the  hedgehog  to  roll  itself  up  into  the  form 
of  a  spine-covered  ball  upon  the  approach  of  danger; 
those  which  lead  animals  of  diverse  species  to  feign  death 
in  many  ways.  Many  other  illustrations  will  be  found  in 
the  works  of  evolutionary  biologists. 


106  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

We  find  still  other  co-ordinations  which  result  not 
merely  in  protective  action  but  which  bring  positive  in- 
dividual advantage,  e.g.  the  actions  by  means  of  which 
animals  of  very  diverse  kinds  manage  to  store  away 
surplus  food ;  the  ant  in  its  hill -like  storehouse,  the 
squirrel  in  its  tree  hollow,  the  dog  in  the  hole  which  it 
freshly  digs  in  some  soft  bit  of  earth. 

It  is  to  be  observed  here  that  as  these  forms  increase 
in  complexity  it  becomes  a  question  of  doubt  how  far  the 
activities  are  congenital  and  how  far  modified  by  experi- 
ence, but  that  they  have  a  congenital  basis  I  think  none 
will  doubt. 

I  would  here  ask  the  reader  to  note  that  if  the  specific 
organs  whose  activities  are  involved  in  these  processes  be 
urged  to  unusual  functioning  by  some  condition  of  hyper- 
normal  stimulation,  then  they  are  liable  to  act  as  though 
they  were  independent  of  the  organism  as  a  whole. 

Under  conditions  of  morbid  stimulation  the  lungs  and 
heart  will  often  undertake  extraordinary  work.  This 
action  may  be  modified  by  the  influences  from  the  rest  of 
the  organism  sufficiently  to  prevent  disaster  to  the  organism 
itself;  but  on  the  other  hand  the  excessive  activity  may, 
and  not  infrequently  does,  result  destructively  to  the 
system  as  a  whole  before  this  modification  through  systemic 
influences  can  take  place. 

The  intestines,  in  like  manner,  will  function  with 
excessive  vigour  to  throw  off  colonies  of  poisonous  microbes, 
and,  if  the  restraining  influences  from  the  organism  are  not 
effective,  their  action  may  bring  death  to  the  whole 
organism  through  the  general  exhaustion  caused  by  efforts 
to  function  for  the  advantage  of  the  special  part. 

We  shall  find  the  value  of  this  observation  as  we 
proceed. 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  107 

§  5.  Inasmuch  as  we  find  all  the  individualistic  instincts 
above  referred  to  evidenced  in  the  life  of  man,  we  may  well 
enquire  how  far  they  are  appreciated  in  our  pyschic  life. 

It  seems  to  me  that  we  should  expect  to  find,  as  we  do 
find,  that  a  very  large  part  of  the  instinct  feelings  corre- 
sponding to  those  instinct  actions  relating  to  the  attain- 
ment of  and  to  the  assimilation  of  nourishment,  and  relating 
to  those  which  have  to  do  with  the  removal  of  waste 
products  of  the  assimilative  process,  would,  as  a  rule,  affect 
consciousness  merely  as  elements  of  the  unanalysable  mass 
that  we  call  our  Ego,  if  they  affect  the  pulse  of  brain 
consciousness  at  all :  and  we  are  led  to  see  that  this  is 
necessary  for  the  reason  that  they  have  attained  great 
regularity  of  action  and,  relatively  speaking,  are  not  at  all 
forceful. 

When  we  learn  by  anatomical  observation  that  these 
activities  are  governed  principally  by  the  special  nervous 
system  called  "  the  sympathetic,"  which  is  only  indefinitely 
related  to  the  brain  system,  we  see  that,  in  all  probability, 
a  large  part  of  the  psychic  coincidents  of  these  instinctive 
acts  cannot  enter  into  our  higher  consciousness  at  all 
under  any  conditions  for  the  very  reason  that  the  neural 
elements  that  are  thus  active  are  to  a  great  extent,  under 
ordinary  conditions,  practically  disconnected  from  the 
the  brain.  We  see  also  that  another  large  part  of  these 
activities  will  influence  consciousness  only  at  rare  intervals 
under  conditions  of  exceptionally  forceful  functioning. 

Thus  we  come  to  understand  how  it  happens  that  a 
large  proportion  of  those  more  or  less  rhythmical  activities 
that  are  going  on  in  our  body  at  all  times,  the  action  of 
heart  and  arterial  and  venous  systems,  the  action  of  lungs, 
of  stomach,  of  kidneys,  of  intestines,  altogether  fail  to  be 
represented  in  the  clear  light  of  attentive  consciousness. 
Thus  we  see  also  how  it  is  that  these  organic  activities,  so 


108  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

far  as  they  influence  consciousness  at  all,  do  so  only  in 
certain  states  of  general  quiescence,  as  during  the  incom- 
plete consciousness  of  dream  life,  and  during  the  hypnotic 
trance:  or  else  in  states  where  these  systemic  functionings 
are  abnormal  in  degree ;  we  find,  for  instance,  to  our  great 
discomfort,  that  we  have  stomach  and  intestines  only 
because  irritants  occasionally  stimulate  those  excessive 
activities  that  involve  painful  sensations  in  connection 
with  the  functioning  of  these  organs. 


The  more  complex  self-protective  instinct  actions  of  which 
we  have  spoken  above,  have  also  become  so  thoroughly 
organised  that  their  instinct  feelings  cannot  be  expected  to 
be  held  in  the  light  of  vivid  attention :  but  for  all  that, 
we  should  expect  them  to  affect  consciousness  in  some  way 
unless  they  are  dependent  entirely  upon  actions  that  are 
disconnected  from  the  moment's  pulse  of  the  brain  system, 
and  we  should  look  for  their  appearance  therefore  in  more 
or  less  clearness  in  proportion  to  their  forcefulness. 

Such  instinct  actions,  perfected  by  life  experience,  we 
recognise  in  the  powerful  and  suddenly  developed  move- 
ments that  occur  with  self-preservation  as  an  end,  when 
one  slips  in  walking ;  when  one  jumps  back  from  under 
the  head  of  a  horse  that  is  about  to  run  one  down ;  when 
one  shields  one's  head  from  an  unexpected  blow :  and  the 
instinct  feelings  corresponding  to  these  actions  we  also 
recognise  well,  even  if  we  have  no  special  names  for  them, 
this  lack  of  naming  being  due  to  the  fact  that  the  elements 
of  these  psychic  states  are  not  often  experienced  in  the  same 
definite  proportions  and  relations. 

The  stimulations  from  the  environment  (of  moment, 
be  it  noted,  to  the  organs  stimulated)  which  in  their 
turn  act  as  stimulants  to  these  instinct  actions  (of 
moment  to  the  whole  organism)  are  usually  vivid  enough. 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  109 

and  have  as  their  coincidents  marked  effects  in  conscious- 
ness, unless  they  are  pressed  upon  us  for  too  short  a  time 
or  are  too  soon  obliterated  by  the  forcefulness  of  the  instinct 
feelings  that  follow  in  their  train. 

§  6.  I  wish  now  to  consider  certain  activities  of 
individualistic  import  which  are  clearly  congenital  and 
therefore  instinctive,  which  produce  marked  disturbances 
in  our  consciousness,  although  they  seem  to  have  been 
developed  very  early  in  the  life-history  of  those  organic 
forms  from  which  we  may  suppose  we  are  descended. 

It  seems  to  me  that,  without  too  great  a  straining  of 
probabilities,  we  may  surmise  that  the  earliest  formation 
of  organisms  out  of  mere  simple  aggregates,  of  which  we 
have  spoken  in  the  preceding  chapter,  would  result  in  the 
appearance  of  certain  tendencies  to  activities  involving  the 
whole  of  the  aggregate. 

We  might  expect  to  find — 

(1)  A  tendency  to  a  complex  state  of  hypernormal 
assimilative  activity  in  the  system  as  a  whole  arising  upon 
the  appearance  of  certain  changes  in  the  environment. 

This  tendency  if  once  acquired  would  certainly  become 
connected  with  the  appearance  of  objective  conditions 
which  in  themselves  would  be  likely  to  bring  advantage  to 
the  organism  as  a  whole:  for  if  one  group  of  organisms 
became  thus  generally  active  in  directions  involving 
assimilative  functioning  upon  the  appearance  in  the  en- 
vironment of  substances  that  could  not  be  assimilated 
without  disadvantage,  then  this  group  would  surely  tend 
to  be  obliterated  in  favour  of  another  group  which  might 
happen  to  remain  quiescent  under  the  same  conditions. 
On  the  other  hand  if  one  group  became  thus  active  when 
the  environmental  change  brought  to  it  material  that  could 
be    advantageously    assimilated,   this    latter    group    would 


no  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

persist  and  tend  to  increase  its  kind.  In  the  long  run 
therefore  we  should  find  the  persistent  race  tending  to 
become  thus  generally  active  upon  the  appearance  of 
advantageous  assimilative  conditions. 

(2)  Again  this  general  organic  activity  would  certainly 
tend  to  be  reduced  in  the  direction  of  normal  quiescence 
when  the  specially  advantageous  condition  disappeared. 

(3)  In  similar  manner  we  may  surmise  that  in  these 
simple  organisms  there  would  arise  tendencies  to  the 
appearance  of  states  of  abnormal  quiescence  of  the  system 
as  a  whole  upon  the  appearance  of  certain  diverse  changes 
in  their  environment. 

The  occurrence  of  such  general  quiescence,  such  shrink- 
ing, would  become  connected  with  the  appearance  of 
objective  conditions  which  would  be  disadvantageous  to  the 
organism,  as  certainly  as  the  occurrence  of  general  activity 
(1  above)  would  become  connected  with  the-  appearance  of 
advantageous  conditions.  For  where  the  environment  con- 
tained elements  that  could  not  be  assimilated  without 
danger,  those  groups  of  organisms  which  became  thus 
abnormally  quiescent  when  these  elements  were  presented 
would  evidently  have  an  advantage  over  those  that  under 
such  circumstances  remained  in  normally  active,  or  hyper- 
normally  active,  condition. 

(4)  Again  this  subnormal  quiescence  would  clearly 
tend  to  give  place  to  normal  functioning  when  the  un- 
usually disadvantageous  condition  disappeared. 

As  organisms  became  more  complex  these  tendencies  to 
increase  and  decrease  of  the  general  activities  as  related 
to  assimilation  would,  it  seems  to  me,  in  all  probability 
be  likely  to  become  extended  to  general  conditions  other 
than  those  that  directly  relate  to  this  assimilation  of 
nourishment ;    would  be  likely  to  be  aroused   by  general 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  111 

conditions  which  although  related  only  indirectly  to  as- 
similative functioning  were  nevertheless  connected  with 
objective  conditions  dangerous  to,  or  of  value  to,  the 
organism  as  a  whole :  thus  we  might  expect  to  find  in  all 
animals : — 

(1°)  A  tendency  to  general  hypernormal  activity,  of 
a  systemic  kind  arising  upon  the  appearance  of  certain 
changes  in  the  environment  that  are  of  advantage  to  the 
organism. 

(2°)  We  might  expect  to  find  a  tendency  to  the  re- 
currence from  these  states  of  hypernormal  activity  towards 
normal  or  quiescent  states  of  systemic  action,  upon  the  dis- 
appearance of  these  advantageous  conditions. 

On  the  other  hand  we  might  expect  to  find  in  all 
animals : 

(3°)  A  tendency  to  a  repressal  of  general  activities  of 
a  systemic  kind,  upon  the  appearance  of  environmental 
changes  that  are  of  disadvantage  to  the  organism ;  and 

(4°)  A  tendency  to  the  return  from  these  conditions  of 
subnormal  action  toward  the  normal;  a  tendency  which 
would  appear  upon  the  disappearance  of  the  disadvantageous 
conditions. 

All  of  these  actions  would  be  congenital  actions  of  the 
organism  towards  some  biological  end  of  advantage  to  the 
organism,  and  hence  under  our  definition  would  be  true 
instinct  actions,  the  expression  of  true  instincts. 

These  instincts  having  once  become  fixed  in  organisms 
of  low  grade  would  be  likely  to  persist  in  organisms  of 
higher  grade  which  develop  from  the  lower,  because  it 
would  on  the  whole  be  of  advantage  also  to  these  higher 
organisms  to  become  functionally  active  in  general  when 
approached  by  what  is  advantageous  (1°  above) ;  and  to 
become  subnormally  quiescent  when  approached  by  what 


112  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

is  disadvantageous,  where  definite  means  of  escape  were  not 
available  (3°  above). 

I  think  it  will  be  acknowledged  to  be  highly  probable 
that  in  all  animal  life  from  the  very  lowest  to  the  higher 
forms,  even  in  man  himself,  such  instinct  actions  do  take 
place;  at  all  events  it  is  clear  that  in  the  animal  life  that 
comes  under  ordinary  observation  we  do  note  these  in- 
stinctive tendencies  to  general  hypernormal  activity, — to 
general  organic  excitement, — arising  upon  the  approach  of 
what  we  can  see  to  be  on  the  whole  of  advantage  to  the 
organism  which  acts  in  this  way :  and  on  the  other  hand 
we  note  corresponding  instinctive  tendencies  to  general 
repression  of  activities, — to  shrinking, — to  depression  of 
energetic  functioning, — upon  the  approach  of  what  we  can 
see  to  be  on  the  whole  disadvantageous  to  the  organism  so 
acting. 

If  the  existence  of  these  instinct  actions  (1°  and  3°  above) 
be  granted,  then  the  existence  of  the  two  states  (2°  and  4° 
above)  determined  by  recurrence  towards  more  normal 
conditions  must  be  granted  also. 

§  7.  Now  let  us  ask  what  effect  we  should  expect  these 
instinct  actions,  if  they  exist  in  us,  to  have  upon  our  con- 
sciousness. It  is  true  that  in  us  these  instinct  actions  of 
ancient  lineage  must  be  thoroughly  co-ordinated,  of  almost 
reflex  type,  but  it  is  also  to  be  noted  that  they  must  be 
very  widely  distributed  in  the  body  and  must  involve  the 
disturbance  of  the  whole  system :  moreover  they  will  be  in 
their  nature  only  occasionally  recurrent,  and  when  recur- 
ring must  in  general  be  immediate  in  reaction  and  hence 
forceful  if  they  are  to  be  valuable  to  us :  all  of  these 
characteristics  tend  to  differentiate  them  from  what  we 
ordinarily  call  the  reflex  'actions.  It  seems  to  me  clear 
then  that  we  may  properly  expect  them  to  be  distinctly 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  113 

recognised  in  consciousness,  and  as  the  actions  involved  are 
of  a  relatively  definite  and  fixed  character,  wherever  they 
do  occur,  we  should  not  be  surprised  to  find  them  recognised 
undef  definite  forms  with  definite  names. 

In  a  previous  work^  I  have  attempted  to  show  that 
the  instinct  feelings  corresponding  to  the  instinct  actions 
of  this  type  are  a  certain  class  of  that  general  group  of 
mental  phenomena  which  we  call  the  emotions. 

(1)  We  discover  in  ourselves  states  of  very  general 
organic  excitation,  and  corresponding  with  them  the  psychic 
state  which  we  call  the  emotion  of  Joy ;  and  when  we 
study  the  subject  closely  we  find  evidence  that  on  the 
whole  the  organic  activities,  and  their  psychic  corre- 
spondents, appear  when  we  perceive  the  approach  of 
objects  or  conditions  which  must  in  the  past  have  been 
advantageous  to  our  ancestors  in  favouring  the  persistence 
of  individual  life. 

(2)  We  note  the  return  towards  normal  or  even  to  sub- 
normal activity  upon  the  departure  of  these  advantageous 
objects  or  objective  conditions,  and  corresponding  to  these 
activities  we  note  the  emotion  of  Sorrow. 

(3)  Again  we  discover  in  ourselves  states  of  general 
shrinking;  and  corresponding  with  the  organic  activities 
involved  the  emotional  state  which  we  call  Dread:  and 
when  we  study  these  actions  closely  we  find  that  on  the 
whole  they  appear  when  we  perceive  the  approach  of 
objects  or  conditions  which  must  in  the  past  have  been 
disadvantageous  to  our  ancestors  in  being  unfavourable  to 
the  persistence  of  individual  life. 

(4)  We  note  the  return  from  such  forcible  quiescence, 
such  shrinking,  to  conditions  of  normal  activity  upon  the 
departure  of  the  disadvantageous  objects  or  objective  con- 

^  Pain^  Pleasure,  and  Aesthetics,  chap.  ii. 
I 


114  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  pakt  ii 

ditions,  and  corresponding  with  these  changes  we  note  the 
emotional  state  which  we  call  Eelief. 

The  consciousness  which  is  coincident  with  these 
general  instinctive  actions  is  noticeable  as  I  have  said  above 
not  because  of  any  special  vividness  of  particular  psychic 
elements,  but  because  of  the  width  of  the  effects  produced, 
because  of  immediacy  of  the  total  reaction,  because  of  the 
mass  and  forcefulness  of  the  reactions  involved. 

Here  let  us  note  that  in  these  very  simple  functioniixgs 
which  we  have  been  considering  we  have  first  the  influence 
upon  the  cell  parts  which  are  directly  affected  by  the 
change  of  environment ;  and  these  cell  parts  as  a  result 
of  this  influence  tend  to  react  directly  to  the  stimulus 
reaching  them  in  a  manner  natural  for  them  as  mere 
cells :  and  only  secondly  appears  the  influence  from  the 
aggregate  leading  these  cell  parts  to  react  as  above 
described  in  accordance  with  the  habits  which  have  served 
best  in  the  past  to  bring  advantage  to  the  organic  ag- 
gregate rather  than  to  the  elemental  parts  which  first 
receive  the  stimulus. 

So  far  as  the  elemental  parts  of  the  organism  are  con- 
cerned, therefore,  we  should  expect  to  note,  primarily, 
action  of  these  elemental  parts  as  they  tend  to  function 
for  their  own  benefit ;  and,  secondarily,  action  of  these 
elemental  parts  as  they  tend  to  function  for  the  benefit  of 
the  organism  as  a  whole :  a  course  of  events  which,  as  I 
have  already  remarked,  I  think  can  be  traced  through  all 
activities  of  organisms. 

As  a  result  we  should  expect  to  find  forceful  elemental 
action  preventing  the  occurrence  of  the  action  for  the 
benefit  of  the  organism  as  a  whole,  and  this  should  be 
noted  in  our  conscious  life.  And  if  my  reader  will  think 
of  this  matter  for  a  moment  he  will  realise  that  on  the  one 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  115 

hand  forceful  presentation  of,  and  great  interest  in,  the 
objects  themselves  that  usually  arouse  these  emotions,  or 
on  the  other  hand  vivid  resultants  from  such  presentations, 
may  prevent  the  occurrence  of  these  emotions  within  us. 
Some  marked  change  of  dress  in  our  friend  may  absorb  our 
thought  and  prevent  the  appearance  of  joy  at  meeting  him. 
The  doctor  may  become  so  interested  in  unusual  symptoms 
that  he  will  fail  to  feel  the  sorrow  that  would  normally 
arise  upon  the  appreciation  of  the  fact  that  he  must  lose 
his  friend  by  death. 

§  8.  Let  us  now  consider  certain  instincts  of  a  higher 
grade  than  those  which  up  to  this  time  we  have  been 
studying ;  higher  instincts  which  are  indeed  of  individual- 
istic import,  but  which  are  so  frequently  determined  by 
the  presence  in  the  environment  of  living  objects  which  are 
other  individuals  of  the  same  species  that  the  individualistic 
nature  of  the  instinct  is  often  lost  sight  of. 

The  lowest  animal  forms  with  which  we  are  acquainted 
are  almost  passive  in  relation  to  their  environment,  and 
such  actions  as  we  have  described  in  the  previous  two 
sections  involve  little  more  than  this  mere  passivity.  But 
as  we  rise  in  the  scale  of  life  we  find  the  animal  no  longer 
merely  passively  awaiting  the  approach  of  what  may  be  of 
advantage  to  it,  and  allowing  the  departure  of  what  may  be  of 
disadvantage  to  it.  We  find  the  animal  acquiring  capacities 
which  enable  it  to  move  in  its  environment.  We  find  that 
the  appearance  in  its  environment  of  objects  that  primarily 
stimulate  certain  of  its  elemental  parts,  is  followed, 
secondarily,  and  more  or  less  promptly,  by  movements  of 
the  whole  organism ;  movements  which  involve  subordina- 
tion of  all  the  related  parts  to  the  requirements  of  the 
organism  as  a  whole,  and  imply  an  interdependence,  an 
integration,  between  the  parts  of  a  much  higher  order  than 


116  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

is  implied  in  the  existence  of  the  "  instinct  actions  "  con- 
sidered in  §§  6  and  7. 

First  let  us  speak  of  movements  of  two  special  kinds/ 
those  (a)  carrying  the  whole  animal  towards  the  object  that 
stimulates  its  special  parts,  and  those  (^8)  withdrawing  it 
from  the  object. 

It  is  evident  that  the  former  actions  (a)  will  become 
connected  with  the  stimulations  produced  by  objects  that 
will  be  of  advantage  to  the  organism ;  for  those  groups 
would  tend  to  be  destroyed,  that,  having  attained  this 
capacity  of  approach,  found  themselves  stimulated  to  the 
activities  involved  by  objects  that  were  of  disadvantage  to 
them. 

It  is  equally  clear  that  the  actions  (/3)  bringing  about 
withdrawal  of  the  whole  animal  from  the  object  stimulating 
some  special  parts  would,  as  the  outcome  of  elimination, 
become  connected  with  the  approach  of  objects  that  are 
of  disadvantage  to  the  organism :  for  the  individuals  of 
certain  groups  would  be  at  a  disadvantage  in  the  struggle 
for  life,  which,  having  attained  this  capacity  of  withdrawal, 
found  themselves  stimulated  to  the  activities  involved  by 
objects  that  were  of  advantage  to  them.  This  disadvantage 
in  the  strife  would  arise  because  other  groups  which  did 
not  withdraw  from  these  advantageous  objects,  and  which 
did  withdraw  from  the  disadvantageous  objects,  would  tend 
to  be  successful  in  the  struggle  for  persistence. 

In  all  animal  forms  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest  we 
note  the  existence  of  these  two  types  of  instinct  actions. 
A  stimulation  is  produced  in  the  eye  of  the  fish  by  the 
movements  of  a  fly  on  the  surface  of  the  water ;  this  is  the 

^  The  classification  in  this  section  has  already  been  suggested  in  my  book 
above  referred  to. 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  117 

primary  effect :  but  secondarily  there  arises  a  violent,  well 
co-ordinated,  reaction,  involving  in  greater  or  less  degree  a 
large  proportion  of  the  parts  of  the  organic  whole ;  a  re- 
action which  results  in  the  fish's  rushing  to  the  surface 
and  snapping  at  the  fly.  The  chick  just  out  of  the  shell 
will  in  similar  manner  dart  at  and  swallow  bits  of  food,  or 
of  material  resembling  food-stuff. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  cry  of  the  hawk,  which  at  first 
merely  stimulates  the  ear,  will  secondarily  send  the  same 
chick  running  with  panic  away  from  the  sound.  The 
distinct  scent  of  man,  borne  on  the  gentlest  breeze  to  the 
delicate  sensory  organ  of  the  deer,  will  result  secondarily  in 
its  rapid  flight. 

In  all  these  cases  the  reader  will  have  noted  that  the 
instinct  action  which  appears  secondarily  relates  to  the 
welfare  of  the  organism,  and  only  most  indirectly  to  that 
of  the  part  stimulated  which  is  primarily  affected.  The 
action  of  the  fish  in  darting  at  the  fly  can  be  of  no  direct 
advantage  to  the  eye  which  is  first  stimulated ;  only  of 
indirect  advantage  to  it  in  that  the  eye  is  nourished  with 
the  rest  of  the  body  as  the  result  of  this  action :  but  that 
the  action  in  reference  to  the  fly  is  of  great  advantage  to 
the  organism  as  a  whole  is  self-evident.  The  flight  of  the 
deer  can  surely  be  of  only  the  most  indirect  advantage  to 
the  organ  of  smell,  the  stimulation  of  which  aroused  the 
reactions  connected  with  running :  but  that  this  flight  is 
of  value  to  the  whole  body  of  the  deer  is  very  clear. 

Again  (7)  we  find  certain  still  more  complex  and  more 
thoroughly  co-ordinated  activities  which  bring  about 
approach  of  an  organism  to  an  object  which  is  dis- 
advantageous to,  or  the  killing  of  which  is  important  to, 
the  organism  which  approaches ;  the  object  approached 
being  either  weaker  than  the  organism  that  approaches,  or 


118  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  pakt  ii 

one  with  which  it  is  usually  able  to  cope.  But  the 
approach  in  such  cases  is  accompanied  by  actions  very 
different  from  those  observed  as  accompanying  the  instinct 
to  approach  described  under  (a)  above  ;  the  actions  here  are 
no  longer  of  a  receptive  but  of  a  hostile  nature,  they  now, 
if  effective,  result  not  only  in  approach  but  in  the  dis- 
ablement or  repulsion  of  the  object  which  it  is  important 
to  disable  or  to  repel. 

And  here  too  we  note  that  these  actions  of  the  organism 
as  a  whole,  for  the  benefit  of  the  organism  as  a  whole,  occur 
secondarily,  following  upon  the  primary  stimulation  of 
certain  special  parts  of  the  attacking  organism,  due  to  the 
presence  of  the  object  that  is  to  be  repelled  or  disabled. 
In  illustration  of  these  actions  it  is  only  needful  to  speak 
of  the  suddenness  of  attack  by  the  spider  upon  the  fly,  by 
the  cat  upon  the  mouse,  by  the  tiger  upon  the  antelope, 
or  by  spider,  cat,  or  tiger  upon  its  competitors  in  sexual 
relations:  and  it  is  to  be  noted  that  in  all  these  and  like 
cases  the  action  involves  all  parts  of  the  organism  to  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  all  parts  working  together  for  the 
safety  of  the  organism  that  has  been  stimulated  only  in 
some  special  parts ;  these  special  parts  themselves  being  in 
no  way  capable  of  being  harmed  by  the  stimuli  which 
reach  them. 

Again  (S)  we  find  certain  still  more  complex  activities 
tending  to  produce  the  attraction  to  the  active  organism  of 
objects  the  approach  of  which  will  in  one  way  or  another 
be  of  advantage  to  it.  Of  this  type  are  the  little  under- 
stood fascinations  produced  in  the  bird  by  the  snake ;  as 
well  as  those  actions,  for  instance  the  strutting  of  birds, 
the  spreading  of  the  peacock's  tail,  which  Professor  J.  Mark 
Baldwin  has  suggested  that  I  call  the  "  self-exhibiting  re- 
actions," and  which  seem  to  have  no  other  primary  function 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  119 

than  the  attracting  of  attention  to  the  animal  thus  exhibit- 
ing itself.  All  these  actions,  it  is  again  to  be  noted,  are  of 
the  organism  and  tend  to  conserve  the  organism  rather 
than  the  part  which  is  first  stimulated ;  as  we  shall  presently 
see,  certain  of  these  activities  are  further  elaborated  and 
put  to  a  still  more  complex  use  as  development  proceeds. 

Again  (e)  we  find  similarly  a  large  variety  of  actions  of 
the  whole  organism  which  are  brought  about  by  stimuli 
that  are  of  doubtful  import ;  actions  which  bring  the 
animal  into  those  positions  in  which  it  is  able  to  perceive 
clearly  and  with  the  greatest  distinctness.  I  refer  to  those 
sudden  actions  connected  with  alertness  and  attention  that 
we  see  in  animals  of  all  grades;  the  facing  of  the  stag 
towards  the  hunter  whose  scent  is  not  clearly  discerned ; 
the  spring  to  the  feet  with  ears  erect  of  the  resting  dog, 
when  he  hears  the  step  of  an  unseen  walker. 

The  reader  will  be  ready  to  grant  that  all  6f  the 
instincts  above  described  are  exhibited  in  the  lives  of  men, 
the  highest  of  animals. 

§  9.  If  we  now  ask  ourselves  how  far  these  instinct 
actions  should  be  expected  to  affect  our  consciousness  we 
are  led  as  we  were  in  §  7  to  look  for  special  psychic  effects, 
because  although  these  instinct  actions  are  thoroughly  co- 
ordinated, nevertheless  they  are  in  their  nature  only  occa- 
sionally recurrent,  and  when  recurring  they  must  be  im- 
mediate in  reaction  and  forceful  if  they  are  to  be  of  value  to 
us  as  individuals.  Moreover  the  actions  we  have  under 
discussion  are  also  relatively  definite  and  fixed  in  character 
whenever  they  do  occur,  and  we  should  expect  them  therefore 
to  be  recognised  under  definite  forms  and  with  names 
classifiable  in  the  same  category  with  the  states  Joy,  Sorrow, 


120  INSTmCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

Dread,  and  Eelief  already  considered:  in  other  words  we 
should  expect  them  to  be  recognised  subjectively  as  dis- 
tinctly emotional  states. 

Now  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  do  find  within  ourselves 
complex  instinctive  actions  (a),  involving  excitations  of  a 
very  wide  nature,  which  result  in  a  tendency  to  go  out 
towards  certain  kinds  of  objects  which,  in  a  large  proportion 
of  cases,  we  are  able  to  see  when  we  study  the  matter,  must 
have  been  in  the  past  of  advantage  to  our  ancestors,  or 
which  are  still  to-day  of  value  to  us  as  individuals  of  the 
human  race.  Corresponding  to  the  pulse  of  physical 
activities  determined  by  this  instinct  we  should  expect  to 
find  within  us,  a  special  psychic  pulse.  This  pulse  of  con- 
sciousness, I  have  endeavoured  to  show  in  the  same  chapter 
of  the  work  above  referred  to,  can  be  identified  with  the 
emotion  of  Love,  using  the  word  with  its  widest  significance. 

Again  we  find  within  ourselves,  complex  instinctive 
actions  (yS)  involving  excitations  of  a  very  wide  nature, 
which  result  in  a  tendency  to  withdraw  from  certain 
objects ;  and  others  (7)  which  result  in  a  tendency  to  drive 
away  these  same  objects :  and  we  discover  upon  study  that 
the  objects  referred  to  in  a  large  proportion  of  such  cases 
must  have  been  in  the  past  of  disadvantage  to  our  ancestors 
if  they  are  not  of  disadvantage  to  us  to-day.  Corresponding 
to  the  pulses  of  activities  determined  by  these  instincts  we 
should  expect  to  find  within  us,  special  psychic  pulses,  and 
these,  in  the  same  chapter  referred  to  immediately  above,  I 
have  claimed  can  be  identified  with  the  emotions  of  Fear 
and  Anger  respectively. 

It  seems  to  me  clear  that  this  group  of  instinct  actions 
must  have  been  developed  very  early  in  the  history  of  our 
race,  and  although  this  fact  would  lead  us  at  the  first 
thought  to  expect  the  disappearance  of  their  coincident 
psychic  states  within  the  mass   of  unanalysable  elements 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  121 

that  makes  up  the  body  of  our  ego -consciousness,  inas- 
much as  such  disappearance  usually  takes  place  where 
activities  have  become  thoroughly  organised ;  yet  on  the 
other  hand,  here  again,  the  efficiency  of  the  activities  is 
dependent  upon  immediacy  of  forceful  reaction,  and  this 
forcefulness  itself  should  lead  us  to  expect  to  note  the 
appearance  of  these  "instinct  feelings"  in  consciousness. 
Furthermore,  as  the  activities  involved  are  of  a  relatively 
fixed  nature  and  co-ordination,  it  does  not  seem  to  me  that 
we  should  be  surprised  to  be  able  to  identify  them  with 
such  relatively  fixed  psychic  states  as  are  named  in  Love, 
Fear,  and  Anger. 

For  the  same  reason  we  should  expect  to  find  marked 
in  consciousness  the  instinct  feelings  corresponding  to  those 
complex  instinctive  activities  that  determine  effective 
attention  (e)  with  its  accompaniment  of  clear  perception ; 
for  these  instinct  actions  are  forceful  and  immediate  in  re- 
action. I  think  we  are  able  to  recognise  these  instinct 
feelings  in  consciousness  in  the  complex  state  known  as  the 
emotion  of  Surprise. 

The  "self-exhibiting  reactions"  (3)  considered  in  the 
last  section,  occur  too  seldom  in  men  of  the  higher  types 
to  warrant  us  in  expecting  their  instinct  feelings  to  be 
identified  with  any  marked  conscious  state ;  and  the  imita- 
tive actions  and  those  other  actions  spoken  of  above  which 
relate  to  individual  advantage  are  so  varied  in  their  nature, 
involve  so  little  regularity  of  reaction  and  so  little  special 
forcefulness,  that  their  instinct  feelings  also  must  be  expected 
to  fail  of  marked  recognition  in  our  conscious  life.  That 
these  expectations  are  realised  I  think  my  reader  will 
readily  grant. 

These  emotions.  Love,  Fear,  Anger,  Surprise,  are  thus 
seen  to  be  "  instinct  feelings  "  correspondent  to  certain  co- 
ordinated   "instinct    actions"    of   individualistic    moment. 


122  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

These  latter,  be  it  noted,  are  actions  of  organic  import, 
which  are  normally  stimulated,  as  in  the  case  of  the  physical 
actions  connected  with  Joy  and  Dread,  by  certain  objective 
stimuli  from  the  environment  which  act  forcefully  upon 
some  one  or  more  specific  parts  or  organs.  We  should 
expect  therefore  to  find  the  perception,  which  is  the  in- 
ceptive agent  of  the  emotion,  to  be  in  normal  cases  a  vividly 
conscious  state.  And  this  we  find  to  be  a  fact  of  general 
experience.  The  objects  which  are  loved,  feared,  and  which 
anger  and  surprise  us,  are  of  great  importance  in  conscious- 
ness. 

These  objects  are  clear  to  our  minds  because  they 
produce  reactions  of  specific  organs  and  the  resultants  of 
the  same,  reactions  in  themselves  of  direct  moment  only  to 
the  elemental  organs  that  react :  but  on  the  other  hand  it 
is  very  evident  that  the  instinct  actions  which  they  bring 
into  existence  are  of  direct  moment  to  the  life  of  the 
organism  as  a  whole  and  only  very  indirectly  of  value  to 
the  elemental  organs  first  affected. 

Here  again  then  we  are  prepared  to  find  that  on  the 
one  hand  forceful  presentation  of,  and  great  interest  in,  the 
objects  themselves  which  usually  bring  these  emotions  into 
existence,  and  on  the  other  hand  vivid  resultants  from 
such  presentations,  may  prevent  the  occurrence  of  the 
emotions  in  us.  Or  to  speak  in  objective  terms,  the  primary 
elemental  action,  if  sufficiently  powerful,  may  prevent  those 
reactions  of  the  organism  as  a  whole  which  are  of  general 
organic  import.  The  terminal  organ  itself,  the  eye  for 
instance,  may  be  so  powerfully  affected  as  to  act  to  its  own 
self-protection  by  the  closing  of  its  lid,  thus  preventing  the 
perception  which  is  necessary  to  the  production  of  the 
specific  emotion.  Or  this  perception  itself  may  lead  to 
some  purely  analytical  interest  in  the  object  perceived,  and 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  123 

this  interest  again  may  be  so  powerful  as  to  prevent  the 
emotional  reaction. 

The  dread  of  danger  by  explosion  is  lost  by  the  chemist 
who  becomes  keenly  interested  in  the  production  of  some 
unusual  chemical  combination ;  nor  is  relief  felt  under  such 
conditions  when  the  dangerous  experiment  has  been  made, 
and  the  unrealised  peril  is  past.  In  other  words  the 
instinct  feelings  of  organic  import  often  fail  to  appear  if 
the  elemental  stimulation  is  excessive  or  if  its  resultants 
find  ready  attention. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  stop  here  to  give  further  examples  ; 
the  facts  to  which  I  call  attention  are  clearly  observed, 
although  less  clearly  than  they  will  appear  later  when  we 
come  to  consider  organic  actions  of  less  fixed  relation,  which 
occur  in  organisms  the  parts  of  which  are  less  intimately 
integrated. 

§  10.  In  what  has  pi;eceded  this  I  have  said  so  much 
about  the  emotions  that  I  cannot  refrain  from  reminding 
the  reader  that,  until  late  years,  the  only  current  view  in 
relation  to  emotional  reaction  was  that  which  came  down 
to  Darwin,  and  which  Darwin  himself  held,  namely,  that 
the  emotions  cause  the  expression,  cause  the  special 
"  instinct  action  "  as  I  would  express  it.  The  reader  will 
remember  also  that  Professors  James  and  Lange  have 
within  the  last  few  years  presented  almost  simultaneously, 
and  quite  independently,  the  theory  that  the  emotion  does 
not  cause  the  expression,  but  that  on  the  other  hand  the 
expression,  the  "  instinct  action,"  causes  the  emotion.  This 
contention  is  largely  involved  with  the  hypothesis  of  what 
I  may  call,  in  the  language  of  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan,^  the 
"back  stroke"  theory  of  the  conscious  side  of  emotional 
expression,  a  theory  which  contends  that  all  the  emotional 
1  Cf.  HaUt  and  Instinct^  chap.  ix. 


124  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  i. 

consciousness  is  due  to  effects  sent  back  to  the  brain,  after 
the  act,  by  the  ingoing  nerves. 

I  do  not  find  myself  deeply  sympathetic  with  this  view 
because,  as  the  reader  of  Chapter  II.  will  appreciate,  I 
think  there  is  a  high  probability  that  the  whole  pulse  of 
activity  of  the  whole  connected  neural  system,  brain,  nerve 
fibre,  terminal  organ,  is  concerned  in  the  pulse  of  conscious- 
ness of  any  one  moment.  But  the  whole  question  is  laid 
aside  if  we  express  the  relation  between  emotional  ex- 
pression and  the  emotion  itself  in  other  terms  which  give 
us  a  definition  that  will  not  break  down  even  if  the  "  back 
stroke"  hypothesis  should  eventually  turn  out  to  be 
stronger  than  I  think  it  is. 

The  definition  I  propose,  as  already  expressed  in  previous 
sections,  is  this :  emotional  expressions  are  a  certain  type 
of  "  instinct  actions,"  and  the  emotions  are  the  "  instinct 
feelings "  concomitant  with  these  "  instinct  actions,"  and 
appearing  coincidently  with  them. 

The  "  back  stroke "  theory  above  referred  to  naturally 
emphasises  the  importance  of  the  muscular  sensational 
elements  in  the  total  emotional  complex,  and  Professor 
James,  in  his  exposition  of  this  subject,  has  given  what 
seems  to  me  just  ground  for  criticism  in  that  he  gives  one 
the  impression  that  these  muscular  sensations  are  more  im- 
portant than  on  the  whole  they  really  are.  For,  as  I  have 
stated  some  years  since,^  and  as  Professor  Morgan  brings  out 
clearly  in  his  book  above  referred  to,  differences  of  muscular 
reactions  in  expression  do  not  make  the  differences  in 
emotional  states  that  we  should  expect  they  would  under  the 
theory  which  holds  that  the  elements  of  muscular  reaction 
are  all-important ;  fear,  for  example,  is  to  a  great  extent, 
although  not  by  any  means  altogether,  the  same  whether 
we  strive  to  escape  danger  by  flight  or  by  crouching. 
^  Pain,  Pleasure,  and  Esthetics,  p.  83. 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  125 

Furthermore,  apparent  similarity  of  muscular  reactions  in 
expression  does  not  necessarily  involve  marked  likeness  of 
emotional  experience ;  a  child  may  express  love  by  running 
to  his  friend,  and  fear  of  some  object  also  by  running  to 
this  same  friend,  and  the  most  obvious  and  vivid  muscular 
reactions  are  in  both  cases  those  connected  with  running. 

But  these  difficulties  have  induced  Professor  Morgan  to 
defend  an  hypothesis  which  seems  to  me  to  be  of  an  even 
more  doubtful  nature  than  the  one  he  opposes :  leads  him 
to  hold  that  the  "  visceral  feelings  "  are  of  the  essence  of 
the  emotions.  But  what  can  be  more  difficult  to  define 
than  the  meaning  of  this  term  "  visceral  feelings." 

I  think  we  are  more  likely  to  be  found  correct  eventu- 
ally if  we  say  that  the  emotional  psychic  experience  is  the 
coincident  of  the  total  reaction  of  the  neural  system  con- 
cerned at  the  moment  of  emotional  expression ;  and  that 
we  must  not  judge  from  the  obviousness  of  the  perceived 
outer  movements  that  the  part  they  play  in  the  total 
reaction  is  by  any  means  the  most  important  one;  nor 
that  the  coincidents  of  these  muscular  reactions  are  the 
most  effective  elements  in  differentiating  the  form  of  the 
total  pulse  of  conscious  life  at  the  moment  of  the  emotional 
reaction. 

§  11.  In  closing  this  imperfect  review  of  the  individual- 
istic instincts,  I  desire  to  lay  especial  stress  upon  the 
necessary  implication  which  appears  in  connection  with  the 
study  as  thus  far  made,  viz.  that  if  complex  organic 
individuals  are  to  persist,  the  tendencies  to  action  of  their 
organic  elements  for  themselves  alone  must  necessarily  on 
the  whole  be  subordinated  to  tendencies  to  action  in 
reference  to  the  organism  as  a  whole :  or  in  other  words, 
elemental  variance  must  in  the  main  be  subordinated  to 
instinct.     In   general  we  may  argue  (although   there  are 


126  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

exceptions  to  which  we  refer  below)  that  only  because  the 
action  of  the  parts  in  subordination  to  organic  demands  is 
of  indirect  advantage  to  the  parts,  through  the  direct 
advantages  gained  by  the  organism  as  a  whole ; — only  thus 
can  we  account  for  the  elaboration  of,  and  the  persistence 
of,  these  general  organic  "  instinct  actions  "  which  we  have 
been  studying.  Were  this  subordination  of  elemental 
variance  to  instinct  not  of  importance  to  the  organism  (and 
hence  indirectly  to  its  parts),  the  "  instinct  actions  "  would 
probably  not  have  become  co-ordinated  at  all,  and  would 
have  been  very  unlikely  to  have  persisted,  even  if  such  co- 
ordination had  once  appeared  in  the  process  of  development. 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  127 


II. — Instincts    eelating   to   the   Persistence   of   the 
Species  to  which  the  Individual  Organism  belongs 

§  12.  In  the  sections  preceding  this,  we  have  been  con- 
sidering certain  instincts,  some  of  which  have  appeared  to 
be  very  complex  in  their  nature,  and  yet,  as  we  shall  pre- 
sently see,  all  of  which  are  relatively  very  simple  indeed ; 
this  relative  simplicity  being  determined  by  the  fact  that 
they  have  concern  with  the  welfare  of  individual  organ- 
isms only,  while  the  very  complex  instincts  to  which  we 
now  turn  our  thought  are  concerned  with  functioning 
which  has  a  wider  bearing  than  upon  individual  life  alone. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  appearance  in  animal  life  of  a 
set  of  activities  which  are  in  part  of  new  and  unique  type, 
and  yet  in  part  but  specialised  developments  of  certain  of 
those  instincts  already  considered ;  activities  which  in  all 
cases  relate  not  so  much  to  the  advantage  of  the  individuals 
of  a  certain  race  as  to  the  race  itself ;  instincts  which  have 
to  do  with  the  persistence  of  species  by  reproduction. 

Far  down  in  the  organic  scale  appears  the  development 
of  habits  of  conjugation,  which  lead  to  the  reproduction  of 
organisms  through  the  fusion  of  two  individuals.  This 
means  of  multiplication  of  individuals  gives  place,  in  higher 
forms,  to  the  fusion  of  specialised  parts  of  the  two  indi- 
vidual organisms  concerned,  this  occurring  in  all  animals 
of  late  development  within  the  body  of  one  of  the  two 
organisms.  This  process  continues  to  increase  in  complexity 
until  it  gives  us  the  highly  differentiated  reproductive 
systems  found  in  the  animals  highest  in  the  scale  of 
development.  Into  the  fascinating  details  of  the  evolution 
of  these  processes  of  reproduction  I  do  not  think  it  worth 


128  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  ii 

while  to  enter  here ;  even  were  I  capable,  I  could  at  best 
give  but  an  imperfect  sketch  of  this  development  in  such 
a  book  as  this,  and  I  think  it  better  to  refer  the  interested 
reader  to  strictly  biological  works  which  treat  of  the  subject. 
I  shall,  however,  ask  him  to  examine  with  me  some  general 
points  in  connection  with  these  processes  that  are  of  im- 
portance for  our  argument. 

§  13.  The  actions  directly  relating  to  conjugation  when 
opportunity  occurs  are  in  a  large  proportion  of  cases 
separable  from  the  simpler  individualistic  reactions,  and 
appear  later  than  these  simpler  individualistic  reactions 
both  in  the  life-history  of  races  and  in  that  of  individuals 
of  a  race. 

But  we  find  appearing  a  little  later  still  in  race  and 
individual  development  certain  differentiations  of  the  indi- 
vidualistic instincts  already  acquired,  differentiations  which 
are  also  made  to  subserve  purposes  not  relating  to  indi- 
vidualistic advantage  at  all  but  to  the  persistence  of  the 
species  through  reproduction. 

Let  us  suppose  that  certain  stimuli  reach  a  special  organ 
of  some  animal,  say  the  organ  of  smell ;  the  activity  thus 
set  up  under  certain  conditions  in  a  limited  part  of  the 
body  brings  about  in  certain  cases,  as  we  have  seen,  secondary 
resultants  which  lead  the  animal  to  attack  what  is  its 
individual  enemy;  while  in  other  cases  these  secondary 
resultants  may  lead  the  animal  to  approach  an  object  that 
is  likely  to  bring  advantage  to  it.  As  we  have  already 
noted,  in  neither  case  does  any  advantage  accrue  as  a 
result  of  these  activities  directly  to  the  special  part  which 
is  active  in  smelling,  but  great  advantage  does  accrue  to 
the  individual  organism,  which  in  gaining  advantage  brings 
benefit  indirectly  to  the  special  part. 

But  we  may  take  a  step  beyond  this  and  note  that  the 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  129 

above-mentioned  tendency  to  go  out  towards  the  object 
affecting  the  senses  may  result  in  activities  which  relate 
solely  and  entirely  to  the  reproduction  of  new  individuals 
of  the  same  species ;  and  here  we  have  a  series  of  activities 
which  no  longer  relate  to  the  sensory  organ  affected,  nor, 
except  incidentally,  to  the  active  organism  itself,  but  which 
do  relate  to  the  perpetuation  of  the  species  to  which  the 
organism  belongs.  The  reader  will  perceive  that  we  have 
here  to  deal  with  a  series  of  activities  which  is  exceedingly 
complex ;  and  he  will  also  agree,  I  think,  that  in  these 
cases,  in  consequence  of  this  complexity,  the  reactions  will 
tend  to  be  slower  in  following  the  stimulus ;  slower  not 
only  than  the  primary  actions  in  the  organs  first  affected, 
but  also  than  the  instinct  actions  of  merely  individualistic 
significance  which  these  primary  actions  might  induce. 

Of  this  type  of  organic  activities  which  function  for  the 
benefit  of  the  race  of  which  the  individual  organisms  are 
for  the  time  being  the  representatives,  we  have,  as  just 
noted,  certain  elaborations  of  the  instincts  that  lead  to  the 
approach  to  the  advantageous,  elaborations  which  result  in 
the  development  of  tendencies  to  approach  those  particular 
members  of  the  opposite  sex  that  in  the  long  run  have 
turned  out  to  be  best  fitted  to  act  with  individuals  like  the 
one  approaching,  to  the  end  that  new  and  vigorous  organisms 
of  their  kind  may  be  reproduced.  Again  we  have  also 
certain  instincts  that  lead  to  the  attraction  towards  the 
active  animal  of  those  individuals  of  the  opposite  sex  whose 
approach  is  advantageous  in  this  same  respect. 

Both  of  these  instincts  are  widely  elaborated  in  the 
course  of  animal  development,  forming  two  distinct  classes : 
in  the  first  class  belong  all  those  varied  instinct-actions  that 
relate  to  sexual  pursuit ;  in  the  second  class  belong  such  of 
those  "  self-exhibiting  reactions,"  above  referred  to,  that  tend 
to  bring  the  object  of  attraction  into  prominence  in  sexual 

K 


130  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

relations ;  such  instincts,  for  example,  as  lead  to  the  strut- 
ting and  display  of  plumage,  by  birds. 

But  there  is  a  further  and  still  more  complex  series  of 
activities,  relating  also  to  the  reproduction  of  effective 
offspring,  which  arise  much  later  than  the  activities  which 
have  to  do  directly  or  indirectly  with  sexual  conjugation. 
I  refer  to  those  immensely  complex  instincts  which  relate 
to  more  or  less  permanent  mating,  which  have  nothing  to 
do  with  momentary  sexual  gratification,  but  which  result 
in  the  protection  of  the  mother  during  the  period  of  the 
growth  of  embryonic  life  within  her ;  lead  to  the  making 
of  preparation  for  the  care  of  the  offspring  which  are  to  be 
born  to  her,  and  for  the  protection  of  the  offspring  until 
they  have  gained  strength  to  cope  with  their  adversaries. 

§  14.  It  becomes  clear  in  connection  with  these  instincts 
that  the  instinct  action  is  secondary  in  its  production  to 
the  primary  action  in  the  individual.  We  have  here 
instincts  which  may  originally  harve  had  individualistic 
functions,  which  functions,  however,  have  been  modified  to 
subserve  racial  ends ;  and  we  note  that,  if  a  stimulation 
which  might  bring  out  the  original  individualistic  reaction 
be  excessive,  the  individual  will  be  likely  to  follow  his 
individualistic  tendencies  and  act  with  reference  to  this 
individual  advantage  and  without  reference  to  racial 
demands ;  and  this  for  the  very  reason  that  in  general  the 
more  complex  instincts  are,  as  we  have  just  seen,  slower  in 
reaction  than  the  less  complex. 

For  instance,  the  force  born  of  starvation,  which  is  of 
individualistic  import,  will  overcome  the  racial  sexual 
demands,  will  divert  the  male  from  search  for  the  female, 
and  will  also  prevent  the  indulgence  in  attractive  self- 
exhibition.  The  sight  of  some  favourite  food  will  lead  one 
bird  to  turn  in  its  course,  whilst  all  its  fellows  imitatively 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  131 

follow  their  leader  in  the  migratory  flight  towards  the 
breeding-ground  in  which  only  they  can  rear  their  young. 
The  very  migratory  instinct  itself,  which  is  felt  as  an 
individualistic  demand,  if  it  be  induced  by  the  sight  of  the 
flocking  of  other  birds  of  her  species  about  to  leave  the 
breeding-ground,  will  often  lead  the  mother  bird  to  abandon 
her  lately  hatched  brood,  leaving  them  to  certain  death 
from  exposure  while  she  follows  her  fellows  in  their  flight. 
Further  examples  of  an  objective  kind  seem  scarcely  needed 
here,  and  we  may  pass  on  to  the  consideration  of  the  psychic 
aspect  of  these  instinctive  actions. 

§  15.  I  am  willing  to  pass  to  this  study  of  the  conscious 
side  of  these  instinctive  tendencies,  which  are  of  import  for 
racial  persistence,  after  such  a  very  brief  reference  to  their 
objective  appearance  in  the  lives  of  other  individuals  of  our 
race  and  of  other  animals  surrounding  us,  because  of  the 
fact  that  we  are  now  dealing  with  instincts  which  appear 
as  very  important  factors  in  the  life  of  man,  the  effects  of 
which  upon  consciousness  we  must  therefore  expect  to  be 
able  to  discern  with  a  good  deal  of  clearness.  This  fact 
will  lead  us  to  treat  the  psychic  aspect  of  these  instincts 
with  more  fulness,  and  will  sufficiently  supplement  the  very 
brief  statement  from  the  objective  standpoint  just  made. 

The  instinct  actions  connected  with  sexual  connection 
are  of  the  earliest  origin  and  are  thoroughly  organised,  so 
thoroughly  indeed  that,  as  we  know,  they  may  take  place 
in  certain  of  the  lower  animals  after  the  brain  has  been 
extirpated.  We  should  expect,  therefore,  that  a  great  mass 
of  their  corresponding  instinct  feelings  would  but  dimly 
figure  in  consciousness  at  all ;  although  inasmuch  as  the 
actions  involved  are  called  out  during  our  life  most 
irregularly,  and  yet  are  singularly  forceful  when  they  do 
appear,  we  should  expect  to  find  some  effect  recognisable  in 


132  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

our  conscious  life.  We  should  expect  then  to  discover  in 
their  case  a  general  mental  state  of  the  most  pervasive  and 
voluminous  character  with  some  special  lines  of  very  marked 
vivid  consciousness :  and  this  expectation,  I  think,  is 
fully  realised. 

Those  complications  of  the  love  instincts  which  relate 
to  sexual  pursuit  are  attended  by  sets  of  activities  which 
are  thoroughly  organised,  and  which,  nevertheless,  are  upon 
occasion  brought  into  such  powerful  action  as  to  force  their 
psychic  correspondents  into  the  clear  field  of  our  conscious 
life :  but  besides  these  there  are  certain  less  well  organised, 
but  very  powerful  reactions  which  become  most  emphatic  in 
the  mental  state  of  the  moment. 

That  we  may  be  turned  aside  from  this  pursuit,  however, 
with  no  great  difficulty,  by  interests  arising  in  the  course 
of  the  development  of  the  instinct  actions,  is  also  clear. 

For  obvious  reasons  it  is  not  desirable  to  treat  this 
special  subject  at  length,  especially  as  this  is  unnecessary, 
inasmuch  as  the  points  I  wish  to  emphasise  are  as  well  or 
better  exemplified  in  connection  with  other  groups  of 
instinct  feelings. 

The  elaboration  of  the  "self-exhibiting  reactions,"  so 
closely  connected  in  function  with  those  relating  to  sexual 
pursuit,  have,  to  a  great  extent,  lost  their  value  to  such 
men  and  women  as  will  read  this  book,  and  as  they  are 
also  well  organised  where  they  do  occur  their  instinct 
feelings  do  not  figure  prominently  in  our  mental  life ;  they 
are  recognisable,  however,  I  think,  in  what  we  call  the 
feelings  of  self-consciousness,  which  accompany  all  effort  to 
affect  our  neighbours  by  our  actions.  The  objects  which 
we  try  to  fascinate  by  our  self-exhibitions  furnish  vivid 
elements  in  consciousness. 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  133 

§  16.  We  may  now  turn  to  the  study  of  the  psychic 
correspondents  of  certain  instinctive  reactions  which  it  is 
possible  to  treat  with  greater  freedom  because  they  carry 
with  them  less  relation  to  sexual  demands,  although  they 
are  nevertheless,  as  all  must  acknowledge,  explicable  only 
as  related  to  the  reproduction  of  the  species.  I  refer  to 
those  instinct  actions,  already  mentioned  above,  which 
relate  not  to  the  sexual  act  but  to  that  more  or  less 
permanent  mating  which  is  so  important  to  the  offspring 
in  connection  with  the  protection  of  the  mother  and  the 
guardianship  of  those  born  to  her. 

Here  we  become  acquainted  with  certain  instinct  feel- 
ings which  we  find  affecting  still  more  closely  the  life  of 
the  species  than  the  comfort  or  welfare  of  the  individual 
who  experiences  them. 

In  many  cases  of  this  type  the  process  through  which 
the  instinct  works  itself  out  is  so  slow,  and  so  many  of 
the  steps  taken  by  the  instinct-led  man  or  woman  come 
so  clearly  into  consciousness,  that  we  are  often  loth  to 
acknowledge  the  instinctive  nature  of  the  actions,  loth  to 
agree  that  the  mental  states  involved  are  instinct  feelings 
at  all.  Moreover  we  are  here  dealing  with  instincts  which 
relate  to  combinations  of  organic  elements  that  are  less 
closely  related  than  in  the  cases  thus  far  considered, 
instincts  therefore  which  are  more  subject  to  disturbance 
by  individual  variance  than  those  are  which  we  have 
already  studied.  Furthermore,  the  instincts  to  which  I 
refer,  if  they  exist,  are  of  the  "  deferred  "  type  which  do 
not  appear  until  long  after  birth,  and  their  expressions 
are  therefore  subject  to  confusion  with  actions  determined 
by  life  experience  in  connection  with  the  functioning  of 
our  imitative  instinct.  I  believe,  however,  that  a  little 
thought  will  convince  us  of  the  truly  instinctive  nature  of 
the  conscious  states  we  are  now  to  describe. 


134  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

Young  men  and  women,  as  soon  as  they  reach  the  age 
of  puberty,  find  themselves  gossiping  about  those  of  the 
other  sex  who,  as  we  realise  when  we  think  of  it,  might 
possibly  become  sexual  partners  with  them  under  favourable 
conditions.  They  find  themselves  discussing  the  attrac- 
tions and  worth  of  their  acquaintances  of  the  opposite  sex 
and  then  giving  themselves  up  to  efforts  to  gain  friendship 
with  those  that  please  them  best,  the  young  man  in  our 
civilisation  usually  putting  forth  effort  in  one  way  or 
another  to  enable  him  to  offer  the  attractions  of  a  favour- 
able home  to  some  one  of  some  type  who  is  conceived  by 
him  to  be  a  desirable  companion. 

In  such  cases  the  racial  end  is  very  seldom  recognised 
at  all  by  those  who  act  in  the  way  described,  and  further- 
more the  steps  in  the  process  are  so  emphatic  in  conscious- 
ness, are  so  intimately  bound  up  with  our  will  in  connec- 
tion with  the  immediate  ends  which  we  do  keep  in  view, 
that  we  not  unnaturally  hesitate  to  acquiesce  in  any 
statement  that  connects  them  with  instinct  in  any  way. 

But  why  is  it  that  at  this  special  time  of  life  the  sight 
of  one  of  the  opposite  sex  starts  up  these  special  trains  of 
thought  and  action.  They  do  not  appear  in  our  lives  in 
any  marked  form  much  before  the  age  of  puberty ;  and 
furthermore,  after  men  and  women  have  married  and  are 
surrounded  by  children,  as  a  rule,  these  special  sets  of 
mental  activities  are  no  longer  aroused  in  this  particular 
way  in  the  lives  of  well-regulated  people,  but  give  place  to 
other  thoughts  and  sentiments  of  which  we  shall  presently 
speak.  Surely  this  emphasis  of  these  particular  mental 
activities  at  this  moment  of  life  is  due  to  forces  which 
arise  within  the  organism :  and,  as  I  have  said  above,  when 
we  consider  the  matter  carefully  we  find  that  this  em- 
phasis is  distinctly  related  to  racial  advantage  in  the  fact 
that  it  has  to  do  with  the  choice  of  mates  who  with  the 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  135 

choosers  may  perpetuate  the  species;  this  emphasis  then 
must  surely  be  held  to  be  grounded  upon  the  existence 
within  us  of  well-organised  racial  instincts,  however  much 
these  may  be  obscured  by  the  facts  above  noted. 

As  I  have  said  above,  these  actions  are  not  generally 
taken  account  of  as  instinctive  in  origin  because  the 
thought  of  the  immediate  end  to  be  gained  is  so  prominent 
in  mind,  and  because  this  end  appears  to  the  individual 
to  be  of  personal  importance  only.  The  presence  of  the 
attractive  young  man  is  all  that  is  important  in  the  mind 
of  the  girl,  nor  does  the  lad  stop  to  ask  why  he  wishes  to 
please  some  particular  girl ;  nevertheless  he  finds  his 
attention  engrossed  in  all  sorts  of  devices  by  which  to  gain 
her  companionship.  The  young  man  does  not  as  a  rule 
ask  why  it  is  that  he  suddenly  conceives  a  desire  to  work 
for  a  fortune  that  he  may  be  able  to  marry  into  some 
special  class,  nor  why  a  girl  of  that  class  is  chosen  by  him ; 
but  nevertheless  he  gives  his  attention  to  the  effort  to 
gain  this  fortune.  And  yet,  I  am  sure  it  will  be  granted, 
that  these  individual  actions,  the  coincidents  of  which  are 
so  prominent  in  the  individual's  consciousness,  would  not 
exist  were  they  not  of  value,  in  the  direction  already 
stated,  to  the  race  to  which  this  individual  belongs. 

So  much  for  the  instinct  feelings  which  are  here 
evidently  strongly  emphasised  in  consciousness.  The 
activities  of  the  system  which  are  instrumental  in  the 
production  of  these  racial  reactions  are  always  more  or  less 
prominent  in  consciousness  as  perceptions  which  force  our 
attention. 

We  are  here  dealing  with  instinct  actions  that  are 
determined  by  the  co-ordinated  action  of  individual 
elements  of  a  loosely  aggregated  racial  body ;  individual 
elements  less  closely  related  to  their  fellow  elements  than 


136  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

is  the  case  with  those  which  determine  the  form  of  the 
instinctive  reactions  previously  considered.'^  We  should 
expect  then  to  note  that  if  the  individual  be  powerfully 
acted  upon  from  his  environment  in  directions  which 
oppose  these  racial  instincts,  he  will  be  very  liable  to  act  as 
an  ;  individual  without  reference  to  the  racial  forces  by 
which  normally  he  would  be  carried  away. 

We  may  note  in  illustration  of  this  suppression  of 
instinct  feelings  by  elemental  variant  influences,  how  the 
desire  for  individual  success  as  a  student,  or  as  a  pro- 
fessional worker,  or  in  a  business  pursuit,  often  leads  the 
young  man  to  repress  the  instinctive  tendencies  we  have 
been  discussing ;  and  how  the  craving  for  social  position 
may,  and  often  does,  prevent  the  realisation  of  these  in- 
stinctive tendencies  in  the  direction  to  which  nature 
guides. 

The  distinction  between  instinct  feeling  and  individual 
variant  consciousness  is  less  marked  here,  however,  than  it 
will  be  found  to  be  in  other  directions;  for  the  special 
instincts  relative  to  companionship  between  those  of 
opposite  sexes  are  of  so  much  importance  to  racial  life  that 
they  are  often  kept  emphatic  in  consciousness  through  long 
periods  of  life ;  a  fact  indeed  which  adds  to  the  difficulty 
of  recognising  their  instinctive  character  at  all. 

§  17.  Let  us  now  consider  another  closely  allied  group 
of  instinct  feelings,  which  are  also  related  to  racial  persist- 
ence. After  men  and  women  have  married,  or  have 
become  betrothed,  we  find  appearing  in  them  certain 
instinctive  tendencies  that  vary  markedly  in  the  different 
sexes.  The  average  natural  man  in  all  but  uncivilised 
communities  under  such  circumstances  finds  himself  in- 
terested in  home  making,  and,  if  opportunity  offers,  in 
^  Cf.  Chap.  VII.  for  a  further  study  of  this  subject. 


CHAP.  V  THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  137 

actual  house  building ;  his  coincident  instinct  feelings  must 
be  quite  parallel  with  the  instinct  feelings  of  the  birds 
that  build  their  nests -^  and  of  the  wolves  that  prepare 
their  cave-like  dens. 

The  average  natural  woman  on  the  other  hand,  under 
the  same  circumstances,  finds  her  mind  concentrated  upon 
what  will  some  day  be  of  advantage  in  the  care  of  children. 

Both  with  the  man  and  with  the  woman  these  thoughts 
result  in  the  rise  of  trains  of  rational  consciousness  which 
lead  them  to  overlook  altogether  the  instinctive  nature  of 
the  inception  of  these  sets  of  acts.  So  far  as  the  mere 
individual  is  concerned  the  companionship  of  the  loved  one 
would  satisfy;  why  then,  do  these  thoughts,  differing  in 
their  trend  according  to  sex,  so  constantly  recur  to  the 
two.  Surely  it  is  a  force  from  within  the  organism  which 
guides  to  something  other  than  the  particular  efficiency  of 
the  two  individual  organisms  concerned,  which  in  fact 
guides  to  the  efficiency  of  the  race ;  for  it  certainly  tends 
to  result  in  the  protection  of  the  offspring  that  are  likely 
to  be  born  as  a  result  of  the  union. 

Here  again,  so  lightly  do  the  racial  bonds  affect  us  that 
we  often  see  the  individualistic  elemental  emphasis  re- 
pressing the  instinct  actions  and  their  instinct  feelings : 
the  desire  for  personal  ease,  the  dislike  of  the  cares  that 
fatherhood  and  motherhood  entail,  the  love  of  sensuous 
things,  the  unwillingness  to  give  up  the  boyish  and  girlish 
plays  of  society  life ;  these  purely  individualistic  considera- 
tions often  lead  to  the  repression  of  those  instinct  feelings 
within  us  which  by  their  recurrence  would  naturally  lead  to 
the  establishment  of  homes,  and  to  the  rearing  of  families. 

^  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan,  who  is  ever  alert  to  trace  back  activities  to 
acquired  habit  rather  than  to  instinct,  agrees  with  me  here.  Cf.  Habit  aiid 
Instinct,  chap.  ix. 


138  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

At  this  stage  in  the  development  of  our  complex  mental 
lives,  the  repression  of  the  instinct  feelings  and  the  emphasis 
of  elemental  variance  become  more  distinctly  conscious  and 
intelligent.  It  is  by  processes  that  are  very  often  clearly 
recognised  as  reasoning  that  we  learn  to  overthrow  these 
racial  tendencies  within  us  and  thus  make  our  lives  to  vary 
from  the  racial  type.  The  desire  for  personal  ease  spoken 
of  above  is  recognised  and  thought  of  by  men  and  women 
as  a  rational  end :  the  avoidance  of  the  cares  of  normal 
everyday  family  life  is  boasted  of  by  many  a  bachelor  as 
indicative  of  his  personal  astuteness  in  having  eschewed 
matrimony.  Evidently,  here  we  see  very  clearly  the 
relation  of  intelligence,  of  reasoning  process,  to  elemental 
variance. 

§  18.  In  closing  this  study  of  the  instincts  which 
relate  to  the  persistence  of  species,  I  would  ask  the  reader 
to  note  again  that  in  the  life  of  organic  individuals,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  primary  action  in  response  to  stimuli 
from  without  upon  the  cells  is  in  general  subordinated  to 
secondary  actions  tending  to  produce  efficiency  of  the 
individual,  in  case  the  two  are  not  thoroughly  adjusted  to 
the  same  end.  And  in  similar  manner  the  tendencies  to 
individualistic  reaction  are  in  general  subordinated  to 
actions  tending  to  bring  about  the  persistence  of  the 
species  in  case  the  two  sets  of  activities  are  not  thoroughly 
adjusted  to  the  same  end. 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  139 


III. — Instincts  eelating  to  the  Persistence  of 
Social  Groups 

§  19.  The  instinct  actions  we  have  been  studying  thus 
far  have  all  related  either  to  the  persistence  of  individuals 
made  up  of  organic  aggregates,  or  else  to  the  persistence 
of  the  species  to  which  these  organic  aggregates  belong. 
But  if  we  examine  the  habits  of  animals  of  higher  grade 
we  find  evidence  in  them  of  the  existence  of  instincts  that 
seem  to  relate  not  to  the  welfare  of  the  individual  organism, 
nor  more  than  very  indirectly  to  the  persistence  of  its 
kind,  but  that  do  relate  clearly  to  the  welfare  of  aggregates 
of  individuals,  to  the  welfare  of  tribes,  of  social  groups 
of  greater  or  less  complexity  and  size. 

Moreover,  what  we  find  thus  in  many  of  the  more  highly 
organised  animals  we  find  also  in  man,  viz.  instinct  actions 
which  lead  individual  men  to  work  together,  not  for  the 
advantage  of  the  individuals  themselves  at  all,  nor  for 
anything  that  appears  to  further  directly  man's  persistence 
as  a  species,  but  which  do  guide  the  individuals  to  act  in 
ways  that  are  clearly  of  value  to  the  tribal  aggregates  of 
which  they  are  elements ;  instincts  which,  nevertheless, 
thus  indirectly  further  the  persistence  of  their  species,  and 
bring,  although  still  more  indirectly,  advantage  to  the 
individual  and  to  the  special  parts  of  the  individual. 

We  find  protective  action  accomplished  in  this  way 
which  would  not  be  possible  did  the  individuals  of  the 
tribe  act  singly ;  of  this  we  have  example  in  the  attacks  in 
combination  that  are  made  by  all  the  more  highly  organised 
animals:  bands  of  ants  defend  themselves  thus  from  their 
enemies ;  wolves  make  attack  as  a  pack  upon  larger  beasts 
of  prey  with  which  they  could  not  cope  singly ;  and  man 


140  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

himself  thus  keeps  in  control,  or  overpowers,  those  other 
men  whom  he  counts  as  his  enemies. 

Again,  we  find  instincts  leading  on  the  one  hand  to 
combination  in  the  search  for  food,  as  shown  in  the  wolf 
pack  as  it  attacks  the  buffalo  herd ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  combinations  of  a  diverse  kind  tending  to  defensive 
tribal  action,  of  which  we  have  an  example  in  the  herding 
together  of  these  same  buffalo  to  resist  these  attacks  from  the 
wolf  pack.  In  man  we  see  similar  offensive  and  defensive 
action.  That  all  these  actions  are  in  their  main  trend 
organic,  instinctive,  non- deliberative,  I  think  will  be 
granted  without  argument. 

We  find  the  natural  appearance  of  many  kinds  of  action 
which  imply  great  specialisation  of  work  and  which,  there- 
fore, involve  mutual  aid  amongst  individuals,  tending 
directly  to  tribal,  and  only  indirectly  to  individual  advan- 
tage. The  specialisation  of  work  for  tribal  advantage  is, 
of  course,  most  clearly  exemplified  in  the  life  of  man ;  but 
we  discover  a  very  close  approximation  to  our  own  instinct 
actions  of  this  type,  not  only  in  many  of  the  higher 
animals,  but  very  distinctly  even  amongst  the  insects : 
indeed,  we  find  one  of  the  best  examples  of  such  actions  in 
the  life  habits  of  the  bee  tribe,  in  which  the  drones  do 
their  appointed  task,  the  queen  bee  and  the  developed 
males  perform  their  special  functions  in  the  tribe  life,  all 
in  co-operation ;  and  all  these  actions,  we  note,  tend  to 
the  protection  and  furtherance  of  the  tribal  life. 

Here,  again,  we  see  how  very  indirect  is  the  relation 
between  the  instinct  action  and  the  welfare  of  the  in- 
dividual ;  and  how  still  more  indirect  the  relation  between 
the  instinct  action  and  the  welfare  of  the  parts  of  the 
individual  that  are  affected  by  the  stimuli  from  the 
environment.     The    stimuli    from    the   environment    must 


CHAP.  V  THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  141 

first  tend  to  produce  certain  specific  actions  in  the  organs 
which  are  directly  affected ;  these  actions  in  the  elemental 
parts,  if  they  are  not  perfectly  adapted  to  the  welfare  of 
the  individual,  must  be  modified  by  influences  from  the 
individual.  Again,  these  actions,  as  thus  modified,  if  not 
completely  in  accord  with  the  advantage  of  the  tribal 
aggregate  must,  in  their  turn,  be  modified  by  influences 
which  lead  to  tribal  rather  than  individual  efficiency. 

These  influences  are  highly  complex  and  indirect  in 
their  means  of  producing  effects,  and  hence  are  likely  to  be 
slow  in  reaction ;  and  this  would  lead  us  to  expect  to  find 
in  connection  with  this  class  of  instincts,  clear  evidence  of 
tendencies  to  hesitancy  and  choice,  resulting  primarily  in 
elemental,  and  later  on  in  individual  variance  ;  for  often- 
times if  the  stimulus  reaching  the  individual  were  power- 
ful, even  if  the  organ  stimulated  did  not  tend  to  react  for 
itself  without  regard  to  the  organic  individual  of  which  it 
is  a  part,  the  individual  would  surely  be  likely  to  react  as 
an  individual  without  waiting  for  the  more  complex,  and 
more  slowly  acting,  tribal  influences  to  modify  his  action. 
This  expectation  we  find  realised.  The  wolf,  tempted  by 
some  bit  of  rich  booty  which  he  has  discovered,  will 
desert  his  pack  in  the  combined  attack  upon  the  buffalo 
herd.  A  heavy  blow  may  frighten  an  individual  wolf  and 
lead  him  to  desert  the  pack  that  attacks  an  enemy.  I 
shall  not  enlarge  upon  this  point  here  with  reference  to 
man's  action,  for  I  refer  to  that  at  length  below. 

When  we  considered  above  the  instincts  of  individualistic 
import,  we  saw  that  they  could  scarcely  have  arisen  and 
have  come  to  endure  unless  on  the  whole  it  had  been  more 
advantageous  for  the  elemental  part  to  act  as  a  subordinate 
part  of  the  organism,  than  to  act  as  an  isolated  element. 
So  here  we  see  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  conceive  how 
these  instincts  of  social  import  could  have  arisen,  and  could 


142  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

have  come  to  endure  without  subordination  of  elemental 
individual  life  to  racial  life,  and  equally  difficult  to  under- 
stand how  this  subordination  could  occur  unless  the 
elementary  parts  of  the  individuals,  and  also  the  indi- 
viduals themselves  as  elements  of  the  social  body,  were  on 
the  whole  better  adapted  to  continued  existence  in  their 
environment  as  parts  of  the  tribe  whole,  than  they  would 
be  as  elements  or  individuals  existing  in  isolation. 

This  parallelism  between  the  instincts  of  individualistic 
import  and  the .  instincts  of  social  import  not  unnaturally 
suggests  to  mind  that  the  tribal  or  social  aggregations  of 
which  we  have  been  speaking  may  themselves  be  of  an 
organic  nature  similar  to  that  which  we  note  in  the  case  of 
the  individual  organisms  which  we  have  been  studying ; 
the  organism  in  the  case  of  tribal  life  being,  however,  of  a 
more  complex  order ;  one  in  which  the  individuals  are 
elements  even  as  in  the  individual  itself  the  special  organs 
or  the  cells  are  elements.  This  conception  we  shall 
discuss  at  some  length  in  the  seventh  chapter.  Suffice  it 
to  say  here  that  we  shall  find  reason  to  agree  that  the 
conception  of  social  life  as  organic  cannot  be  lightly  cast 
aside ;  but  that  whilst  we  are  compelled  to  look  upon  social 
aggregates  as  organisms,  nevertheless  they  appear  as 
organisms  of  a  very  low  type  indeed. 

§  20.  The  conception  of  social  life  as  organic,  of  the 
social  body  as  an  organism  even  though  of  low  type,  will 
aid  us,  I  think,  in  the  continuation  of  our  study  of  the 
instincts  relating  to  tribal  persistence,  in  treating  finally 
of  a  group  of  instinct  actions  of  the  most  complex  form, 
which  are  doubtless  of  the  latest  development,  and  which, 
although  appearing  at  times  in  some  completeness  in  all 
the  higher  mammalia,  are  best  exemplified  in  the  life  of 
man :    I  refer  to  certain  very  complex  actions  which  tend 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  143 

to  produce  tribal  advantage,  which  are  undertaken  without 
apparent  reference  to  individual  values  and  without  direct 
reference  to  persistence  of  the  species  in  which  they  appear, 
but  often  indeed  in  opposition  to  both  individual  advantage 
and  to  persistence  of  type.  I  shall  refer  to  the  expressions 
of  the  instincts  of  this  class  but  briefly :  their  psychic 
correspondents  are  so  prominent  in  our  mental  life  that 
detailed  consideration  of  them  will  naturally  appear  in 
later  sections. 

We  have,  for  instance,  instincts  which  lead  men  to  lay 
aside  all  the  delights  of  home  life,  to  give  up  personal 
comfort,  to  become  careless  of  their  property,  to  let  their 
families  shift  for  themselves,  all  in  order  that  they  may 
join  with  their  fellows  in  fighting  against  a  common  tribal 
enemy. 

We  find  men  instinctively  restraining  their  wide  sexual 
instincts  and  living  monogamous  lives,  such  actions  bringing 
no  value  to  the  individual,  nor  directly  tending  to  persist- 
ence of  species,  but  apparently  leading  to  tribal  advantage, 
and  thus  in  a  special  but  indirect  way  to  the  persistence  of 
a  special  type  of  the  species  and  of  the  individuals  of  that 
type. 

We  note  men  who,  rather  than  resort  to  murder,  suffer 
personal  loss  which  might  be  averted  by  the  killing  of  a 
human  enemy ;  we  find  them  enduring  privation  and  even 
the  pangs  of  hunger,  which  might  easily  be  avoided  if  they 
were  willing  to  take  that  which  belongs  to  their  neigh- 
bours ;  and  clearly  both  of  these  inhibitive  instincts  relate 
to  the  perfection  of  tribal  life,  not  to  individual  welfare ; 
nor  more  than  very  indirectly  do  they  refer  to  the  persist- 
ence of  species. 

We  find  men  helping  wounded  companions  at  the  risk 
of  their  own  lives,  and  sparing  no  pain  nor  labour  so  long 
as  they  can  thereby  aid  one  of  their  kin. 


144  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

We  find,  finally,  a  group  of  instincts  which  function 
apparently  altogether  to  the  emphasis  of  social  consolida- 
tion. Those  instincts  which  enable  a  man  to  attract  others 
to  him  by  his  rendering  of  useful  service  to  them,  i.e.  those 
\\^hich  we  speak  of  as  the  benevolent  instincts ;  and  those 
which  enable  him  to  attract  others  to  him  by  his  production 
of  works  which  bring  them  pleasure,  the  highest  elaboration 
of  which,  as  I  have  argued,  we  find  in  the  art  instincts.^ 

These  instincts  also  are  evidently  worked  out  for  the 
most  part  without  reference  to,  and  often  in  opposition  to, 
the  advantage  of  the  individual,  and  to  those  courses  of 
action  that  tend  towards  persistence  of  our  species. 

As  the  tribal  combinations  become  more  thoroughly 
consolidated,  and  the  relations  between  individuals  in  the 
tribe  more  fixed  and  intimate,  we  find  the  existence  of 
instinct  actions  in  groups  which  seem  to  have  less  signifi- 
cance for  these  groups  than  they  have  for  groups  of  groups. 

Some  critic  who  agrees  with  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan 
may  say  that  I  am  here  discussing  many  habits  of  action 
which  are  not  congenital  and  hence  not  instinctive.  I 
agree  fully  that  all  these  habits  are  greatly  modified  by  the 
experience  of  life,  and  that  indeed  from  within  the  social 
environment  only  can  appear  the  stimulus  essential  to  the 
rise  of  these  activities ;  nevertheless  I  think  it  must  be 
granted  that  the  tendencies  to  the  main  drift  of  these 
activities  are  born  in  us  and  are  truly  instinctive,  although 
they  are  of  the  deferred  type,  and  although  they  are  pro- 
foundly differentiated  by  the  surroundings  of  the  man 
expressing  them.  This  becomes  clearer  when  we  study 
their  psychic  effects  in  the  following  sections. 


1  Of.  my  Fain,  Pleasure,  and  Esthetics,  p.  98  ff.  Cf.  also  Professor 
J.  Sully's  suggestion  {Mind,  N.S.  No.  15)  that  the  community  of  individuals 
in  the  very  admiration  of  works  of  art  is  a  powerful  indirect  aid  to  social 
solidarity. 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  145 

§  21.  Let  us  turn  from  this  brief  objective  study  of  this 
group  of  social  instincts  to  a  consideration  of  their  corre- 
spondents in  our  conscious  life. 

In  correspondence  with  the  instincts  which  we  have 
described  in  Section  19  we  find  ourselves  conscious  of 
impulses  leading  us  to  act  for  the  protection  of  tribal 
interests ;  it  is  because  of  this  instinctive  tendency,  for 
instance,  that  such  large  numbers  of  men  in  our  time  find 
it  in  them  to  defend  on  non-selfish  grounds  those  enormously 
complicated  systems  of  governmental  protection  of  com- 
mercial interests  which  to-day  give  rise  to  the  most  fervent 
of  party  contests  in  political  life  ;  and  this  notwithstanding 
the  evidence  that,  for  the  most  part,  these  systems  are 
based  upon  the  strife  for  gain  and  are  intrinsically  de- 
moralising. This  is  an  instance  of  a  very  highly  differ- 
entiated type,  but  one  that  will  appeal  to  all  students  of 
modern  life ;  simpler  examples  without  number  will  occur 
to  the  reader. 

We  find  natural  conscious  impulses  leading  men  to 
work  together  in  the  acquisition  of  food-supply  or  of  other 
goods ;  and  in  contending  for  the  protection  of  tribal  or 
class  properties  or  advantages. 

We  find  naturally  arising  within  us  clearly  conscious 
impulses  which  lead  different  men  to  assume  with  enthusiasm 
those  specialisations  of  work  which  are  so  important  for 
the  existence  of  our  modern  tribal  life :  some  young  men 
naturally  long  to  become  ranch-men  and  farmers ;  the 
ambition  of  others  leads  them  to  undertake  the  soldier's 
vocation ;  others  find  themselves  drawn  to  the  practice  of 
law  or  of  medicine ;  others  to  the  artistic  professions ;  and 
others  still  to  special  lines  of  business :  and  in  very  many 
cases  these  wishes  can  be  traced  to  no  influences  upon  the 
individual  life  from  the  lives  of  those  around  them ;  special 
tastes  have  evidently  been  given  the  individuals  with  their 
bodily  structure. 


146  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

§  22.  Let  us  now  consider  some  of  the  correspondents 
in  consciousness  of  the  tribal  instincts  of  a  higher  type  men- 
tioned briefly  in  §  2  0  above ;  instincts  which  emphasise 
the  conception  that  our  social  life  of  to-day  may  be  the 
beginning  of  the  evolution  of  a  social  organism  which  is  as 
yet  in  its  early  stages  of  development. 

Under  certain  special  conditions  of  stimulation,  e.g.  upon 
hearing  of  aggressive  action  by  our  neighbours  among  the 
nations,  or  upon  noting  opportunity  for  tribal  aggrandise- 
ment, there  arise  in  us  the  mental  states  which  are  roughly 
grouped  together  under  the  name  of  the  feelings  of  patriotism  : 
impulsive  states  which  lead  us,  in  common  with  our  neigh- 
bours, to  complicated  sets  of  acts,  defensive  and  offensive ; 
states  which  clearly  have  usually  little  individual  signi- 
ficance, which  are  very  seldom  thought  of  as  tending  to  the 
persistence  of  our  human  species,  but  which  are  easily 
recognised  as  having  great  significance  for  our  tribal  com- 
munity. The  acts  that  are  set  up  are  purposeful,  and  at 
times  have  their  inception  in  thoughts  which  seem  in- 
dividualistic, concerned  as  they  are  with  the  protection  of, 
or  the  glory  of,  what  we  feel  pride  in  calling  our  own 
country :  but  the  persistence  of  the  notion  of  action  for  the 
country's  good  is  surely  altogether  determined  by  instinctive 
forces,  and  the  actions  that  result  can  clearly  be  none  other 
than  "  instinct  actions,"  their  conscious  correspondents  none 
other  than  "  instinct  feelings." 

The  man  will  lay  aside,  with  regret  indeed,  but  without 
hesitation,  the  well-recognised  joys  of  home,  and  all  sorts 
and  kinds  of  personal  advantages ;  will  leave  behind  him, 
alone,  afflicted,  and  unprotected,  those  whom  be  loves ;  and 
in  place  of  comfort  and  joy  will  undertake  hardship,  endure 
loss,  and  face  danger,  under  the  pressure  of  these  dominant 
impulses  within  him.  Surely  nothing  relating  to  in- 
dividualistic values,  nor  to  persistence  of  species,  can  account 


CHAP.  V  THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  147 

for  the  common  wish  for  greatness  of  empire  which  we  find 
the  lowly  citizen  considering  ample  reason  for  his  sacrifice 
of  self  and  of  his  family  interests,  nor  for  the  enthusiasm 
which  is  felt  for  leaders  who  add  to  the  national  glory. 

That  we  are  dealing  with  feelings  corresponding  with 
true  instincts  becomes  perfectly  clear,  it  seems  to  me,  by 
observing  certain  cases  of  tribal  aggregation  of  long  standing, 
where  division  of  labour  has  become  more  complete,  where, 
as  in  parts  of  India  and  China  for  instance,  some  special 
caste  of  warriors  has  come  into  existence.  Then  in  other 
castes  we  find  that  impulses  to  patriotic  action  have  almost 
lost  their  force,  and  that  the  conditions  which  normally 
stimulate  the  man  of  western  parentage  to  enthusiastic 
devotion  to  his  country's  needs  appear  to  bring  no  similar 
sense  of  obligation  to  the  one  whose  life  has  always  been 
devoid  of  thought  of  fighting  for  more  than  his  own 
occasional  individual  need.  It  is  stated  that  in  the  late 
Chinese-Japanese  war  the  labourers  continued  their  work  in 
the  fields  while  fighting  battalions  were  near  at  hand,  the 
labourers  themselves  taking  little  interest  in  the  contest  or 
its  outcome  so  long  as  they  were  not  in  immediate  danger. 

§  23.  At  this  point  let  us  again  note  that  under  certain 
conditions  of  stimulation  the  individual  variant  force  may 
become  so  powerful  as  to  overmaster  the  racial  force  within 
us.  The  thought  of  personal  loss,  of  personal  danger,  may 
become  prominent  in  the  citizen's  mind  and  then  the  man's 
tribal  instinct  feelings  may  fail  him  altogether,  and  he  may 
become  what  his  fellows  call  unpatriotic. 

Here  our  reader  easily  perceives  that  the  intelligent,  the 
rational,  nature  of  these  variant  actions  comes  into  promi- 
nence ;  for  it  is  not  only  the  man  who  is  overcome  by 
personal  fear  who  fails  in  patriotism,  but  also  the  man  who 
reasons  with  himself  that  his  personal  affairs  are  of  too  great 


148  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

moment  to  warrant  the  possible  sacrifice  of  his  life  for  the 
good  of  his  country ;  indeed,  large  numbers  of  men  in  our 
modern  communities  often  self-sophisticate  themselves  under 
such  circumstances  until  they  bring  themselves  seriously  to 
believe  that  they  can  serve  their  country  better  by  remain- 
ing at  home  than  by  entering  the  armies  as  volunteers. 

§  24.  The  particular  instinct  feelings  of  tribal  import- 
ance which  we  have  just  studied  have  indeed  their  special 
significance  for  tribal  existence,  but  they  have  still  to  some 
extent  individual  significance  as  well.  For  instance, 
patriotic  feelings  pure  and  simple  are  aroused  upon  thought 
of  danger  to  the  tribe,  and  although  patriotism  of  the 
highest  type  has  in  it  no  selfish  element,  still  in  ordinary 
cases  the  danger  to  the  individual  himself  whose  patriotism  is 
aroused  cannot  be  wholly  separated  from  the  man's  thought, 
and  it  must  ordinarily  be  emphasised  if  we  wish  to 
strengthen  the  impulses  of  the  masses  to  self-sacrifice  for 
their  country's  need. 

But  in  this  section  I  shall  turn  to  the  study  of  another 
type  of  instinct  feelings,  and  of  those  psychic  states  related 
to  them ;  feelings  which  have  no  individualistic  significance 
whatever,  which  lead  us  often  to  act  knowingly  in  opposi- 
tion to  what  seems  to  us  to  be  our  own  direct  personal 
advantage,  and  which  will  be  well  recognised  as  the  mental 
states  connected  with  our  ethical  life. 

Here  we  have  to  do  with  instincts  involving  the  most 
complex  of  bonds  between  individuals ;  instincts  which 
result  in  actions  that  are  of  benefit  to  others  rather  than  to 
ourselves,  and  that  are  concerned  in  that  social  consolidation 
which  would  be  impossible  without  mutual  aid.  As  these 
instincts  are  of  relatively  late  development,  and  are  therefore 
not  likely  to  be  thoroughly  co-ordinated,  we  should  expect 
to   find  their   instinct    feelings  sharply  distinguished   and 


CHAP.  V  THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  149 

easily  recognisable  in  consciousness.  But  especially  should 
we  expect  these  tribal  instinct  actions  to  appear  in  opposi- 
tion to  well-grounded  individualistic  instincts,  and  we  should 
thus  expect  their  psychic  effects,  and  the  psychic  side  of  the 
individualistic  instincts  that  are  opposed  to  them,  to  be  most 
emphatic  in  the  form  of  impulses,  which,  as  the  reader  will  see 
in  Part  III.,  are  the  psychic  coincidents  of  the  inhibitions  of 
instinctive  tendencies.  That  this  view  of  the  nature  of 
impulse  is  correct  is  indeed  evidenced  in  the  clearness  with 
which  we  note  the  oppositions  which  bring  into  evidence 
the  impulses  in  this  more  complex  mental  life. 

Few  men,  even  the  best  of  us,  fail  to  recognise  the 
tendency  to  possess  ourselves  of  that  which  would  not 
come  to  or  belong  to  us  in  the  nature  of  the  circumstances 
which  surround  us,  and  yet  which  we  think  it  would  be  of 
advantage  for  us  to  gain.  In  its  completed  form  this 
tendency  would  result  either  in  stealing,  which  in  its  in- 
cipient form  brings  into  our  mind  the  impulse  we  call 
covetousness ;  or  else  it  would  result  in  attempts  to  gain 
advantage  for  ourselves,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  misre- 
presenting the  truth, — by  lying.  But  fortunately  in  the 
man  of  higher  type  we  find  these  impulses  brought  into 
consciousness  (controlled,  we  say),  by  the  very  fact  that 
opposed  impulses  rise  in  conjunction  with  them  and  lead 
us  to  avoid  taking  what  is  not  evidently  our  own,  to  oppose 
covetousness,  and  to  consider  lying  contemptible. 

Clearly  this  psychic  opposition  to  the  impulse  towards 
stealing  and  towards  lying  has  no  relation  to  our  own 
individual  welfare.  In  our  complex  civilisation  it  is  indeed 
strengthened  by  our  thought  of  customs  and  laws  which 
will  entail  punishment  upon  one  who  thus  offends  against 
them ;  but  in  the  higher  type  of  man,  the  opposition  to 
the  thought  of  stealing  or  lying  seems  clearly  to  be  ante- 


160  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

cedent  to  any  thought  of  punishment ;  the  law  is  in  fact 
determined  by  the  existence  of  the  impulse :  it  must  be 
granted,  I  think,  that  these  oppositions  are  of  a  distinctly 
instinctive  character. 

y  In  like  manner,  the  natural  individualistic  impulses  to 
kill  our  enemies,  and  to  commit  sexual  excesses,  are  thwarted 
by  repulsion  to  murder  and  to  adultery ;  repulsions  which 
themselves  bring  immediate  individualistic  distress  or  dis- 
advantage. These  repulsions  are  indeed  emphasised  by 
penalties  of  law,  acquiesced  in  by  the  people,  and  enforced 
by  commands  of  ethical  teachers  who  for  the  most  part 
speak  as  the  prophets  of  God ;  but  they  certainly  arise  in 
the  minds  of  men  of  the  higher  types  in  advance  of  any 
question  of  individualistic  disadvantage  to  be  indirectly 
resultant  if  one  succumb  to  the  individualistic  craving. 

\  It  is  clear,  then,  that  these  ethical  impulses  against  theft, 
lying,  murder,  and  adultery  are  of  an  instinctive  nature, 
although  they  are  evidently  of  a  late  type  and  have 
arisen  only  co-ordinately  with  the  advance  of  the  higher 
civilisation. 

It  is  equally  clear  that  those  in  whom  the  impulses  to 
theft,  lying,  murder,  and  adultery  become  irrepressible  are 
of  an  atavistic  type,  men  whose  organisation  has  reverted 
to  the  forms  found  in  their  ancestors  who  lived  before 
social  life  in  its  present  form  had  developed.  It  is  acknow- 
ledged by  all  that  it  is  a  clear  mark  of  atavistic  and 
morbid  tendencies  in  an  educated  man  in  our  time  if  he 
allow  suggestions  of  theft  and  murder  to  be  so  constantly 
recurrent  as  to  warp  his  thought  and  influence  his  standards. 
It  is  not  so  commonly  acknowledged,  but  it  seems  to  me 
that  we  must  hold  it  to  be  equally  true,  that  the  man  is  of 
atavistic  and  morbid  type  who  finds  his  thoughts  per- 
sistently turned  to  the  consideration  of  sexual  relations ; 
who    allows    his    individualistic    impulses    towards   sexual 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  151 

gratification  to  dominate  his  life  so  that  he  comes  to  con- 
sider adultery  a  minor  o£fence ;  who  finds  his  standards 
warped  hj  emphasis  of  the  individualistic  as  against  the 
social  impulses  in  this  direction. 

When  we  turn  to  the  study  of  the  psychic  coincidents 
of  those  instinct  actions  which  in  §  20  were  seen  to  relate 
to  mutual  aid,  we  at  once  recognise  within  us  the  wide- 
reaching  feelings  of  sympathy  and  pity.  Sympathy  and 
pity  are  certainly  not  induced  within  ourselves  because  we 
conceive  that  they  may  induce  like  feelings  in  others  who 
may  help  us  in  the  future  day  of  our  need :  they  arise 
spontaneously  and  in  advance  of  any  consideration  of  any 
possible  individualistic  advantage  to  be  obtained  in  con- 
nection with  them. 

Of  the  same  nature  are  those  benevolent  impulses  that 
lead  men  to  help  others  of  their  kind,  or  to  do  good  to  them. 

In  all  these  cases  these  ethical,  social,  impulses  tend  to 
bring  no  immediate  individualistic  gain,  but  usually  some 
disadvantage  or  even  distinct  loss.  In  fact  when  they  are 
morbidly  developed,  as  they  are  in  many  cases,  we  see  the 
fanatical  philanthropist  aiming  to  produce  in  others  what 
is  for  them  clearly  a  happiness  of  a  higher  order  than  that 
which  he  himself  possesses,  by  processes  through  which  he 
actually  subjects  himself  to  distinct  individualistic  privation. 

It  is  true  that  the  satisfaction  of  the  benevolent  im- 
pulses within  them  brings  pleasure  to  those  of  philanthropic 
temperament,  but  I  do  not  think  any  one  would  claim 
that  this  pleasure  is  the  basis  of  philanthropic  action  in 
the  mass  of  mankind :  we  are  surely  dealing  here  with 
impulses  which  are  of  instinctive,  organic,  origin. 

And  here  in  the  action  of  the  individual  elements  of 
the  higher  social  life  we  have  an  exceptionally  clear  corre- 
spondence with  the  action  of  the  parts  in  the  lower  indi- 


152  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

vidual  life.  As  in  the  body,  the  special  organ  becomes  so 
modified  in  its  development  that  its  elemental  action, 
which  brings  pleasure,  may  be  that  which  is  normally  of 
advantage  to  the  whole  individual  organism ;  so  here  in 
the  higher  social  organism,  the  individual  man  who  is  an 
element  in  the  social  aggregate,  comes  to  act  with  pleasure 
in  a  manner  which  under  ordinary  circumstances  will  be 
of  value  to  the  social  body. 

And  here  also  as  with  the  individual  body,  where  the 
conditions  surrounding  the  social  body  are  abnormal,  the 
individual's  actions,  which  normally  would  be  of  advantage 
to  the  social  organism,  become  a  source  of  danger  to  the 
social  organism  as  a  whole.  Sympathy  and  pity  and 
benevolence,  which  are  normally  of  value  to  our  race,  are 
thus  often  showered  upon  criminals  whose  thoughts  and 
impulses  are  recognisedly  opposed  to  social  consolidation 
and  social  advance. 

Before  passing  to  our  next  point,  I  must  mention  as 
especially  noteworthy  examples  of  the  impulses  we  are 
studying,  those  impulses  to  artistic  expression  which  corre- 
spond to  the  art  instincts  which,  as  we  have  seen,  function 
in  the  direction  of  social  consolidation.  Here  the  impulses, 
as  felt  by  the  true  artists,  are  notably  separated  from  any 
consciousness  of  individualistic  gain  to  be  reached,  are 
worked  out  evidently  for  their  own  sake  and  with  no 
notion  whatever  that  they  function,  as  they  do,  towards 
the  creation  of  sympathy  by  the  production  of  attractions 
which  directly  and  indirectly  go  with  pleasure -giving. 
That  they  often  work  themselves  out  in  connection  with 
distinct  individualistic  disadvantage  must  be  clear  to  any 
one  who  considers  the  hardship  so  generally  connected 
with  the  lives  of  those  devoted  to  the  worship  of  the  Muses. 


.  r  1 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  153 

§  25.  Enough  has  been  said  already  to  emphasise  the 
racial,  instinctive  character  of  the  higher  forms  of  impulses, 
patriotic,  ethical,  benevolent,  artistic,  which  we  have  been 
considering ;  but  it  will  be  well  perhaps  to  say  a  few 
words  more  concerning  the  prominence  of  these  impulses 
in  consciousness.  This  prominence  is  due,  I  think,  to 
their  indirect  application  to  the  ends  for  which  they  are 
formed,  and  to  the  complexity  of  the  organisms  in  which 
they  appear. 

The  lower  forms  of  instinct  we  find  normally  brought 
into  action  by  relatively  definite  stimuli,  and  reacting  in 
relatively  clear-cut  definite  ways  to  those  stimuli :  but  the 
instincts  we  have  just  been  considering  are  formed  to  act, 
not  for  the  benefit  of  the  cells  of  an  aggregate,  nor  for  the 
benefit  of  the  aggregate  itself;  not  for  the  benefit  of  the 
parts  of  an  organism,  nor  for  the  beneftt  of  the  organism 
itself;  not  even  for  the  benefit  of  the  individual  as  a  part 
of  a  tribal  aggregate,  but  for  the  advantage  of  the  tribal 
aggregate  itself.  Here  evidently  Nature  is  concerned  to 
deal  with  a  most  complicated  problem;  for  in  our  much 
differentiated  life  exactly  the  same  sets  of  circumstances  can 
seldom  recur,  and  the  reactions  to  the  ends  we  are  here 
considering  must  therefore  be  of  very  varied  kinds;  this 
difficulty  can  only  be  overcome  by  the  instinctive  persistence 
of  certain  tendencies  which  are  adaptable  to  the  varying 
circumstances. 

If,  for  instance,  some  specialised  form  of  effort  alone  were 
needed  to  perfect  the  tribal  co-operation  or  protective  re- 
action, we  may  easily  see  that  we  might  gain  little  more  in 
consciousness  from  the  feelings  of  benevolence  or  of 
patriotism,  for  instance,  than  we  gain  from  the  functioning 
of  the  stomach  when  food  -  supply  is  given  to  it.  But 
Nature's  end  is  here  subserved  only  by  the  persistence  of 
certain  trends  of  action  in  connection  with  a  great  variety 


154  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

of  subordinate  activities,  and  in  the  very  nature  of  our 
mental  life  the  psychic  counterpart  of  these  varied  activities 
is  likely  to  become  prominent  in  consciousness.  The  same 
is  true  of  all  the  other  complex  and  varied  instinctive 
activities  in  individuals,  which  we  have  above  discussed,  the 
trend  of  which  leads  to  tribal  advantage. 

But  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  general  trend  does  not 
come  directly  into  consciousness  except  in  contemplative 
reflection.  The  man  who  goes  to  war  fights  in  company 
with  his  comrades  to  win  his  cause,  and  finds  his  mind 
filled  with  thoughts  of  strategy,  of  means  of  defence,  of 
methods  of  attack ;  the  instinct  which  leads  him  to  take  up 
these  activities  does  not  often  appear  in  mind  whilst  he  is 
occupied  with  these  actions :  little  does  he  think  of  the 
value  of  his  actions  to  his  nation  as  he  fights.  So  it  is 
with  the  benevolent  instinct :  the  philanthropist  finds  his 
mind  filled  with  thoughts  of  ways  and  means,  not  with 
consideration  of  the  advantages  for  the  race  of  which  he 
is  a  member  that  are  involved  in  his  actions :  the  average 
philanthropist,  in  fact,  will  scorn  to  conceive  of  his  action  as 
having  any  such  end  at  all,  and  the  philosophic  phil- 
anthropist gains  sight  of  this  end  only  in  the  cool  hour  of 
study.  So  separated  indeed  are  the  two  series  in  conscious- 
ness that  the  man  who  thinks  sufficiently  of  the  trend  of 
his  instinctive  actions  is  liable  to  lose  the  force  of  the 
impulse  which  the  instinct  determines :  the  man  who  is  to 
do  the  most  effective  work  must,  during  the  time  of  urgent 
action  at  the  least,  abandon  himself  to  nature's  guidance, 
keeping  his  attention  upon  the  actions  immediately  before 
him :  and  this  is  true  of  the  warrior,  of  the  philanthropist, 
of  the  ethical  teacher,  and  of  the  artistic  master. 

§  26.  At  this  juncture  let  me  note  that  here  again  as 
in  the  cases  studied  in  the  preceding   sections  the  racial 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  155 

actions  are  brought  out  by  individual  activities  that  usually 
correspond  with  notably  emphatic  perceptions  in  conscious- 
ness :  and  that  here  also,  under  special  conditions  of  marked 
stimulation,  the  individualistic  ideas  at  times  become  pre- 
dominant and,  overcoming  the  tribal  impulses,  carry  the 
day. 

Excessive  anger  (of  individualistic  import)  may  lead 
to  murder,  notwithstanding  all  the  racial  safeguards  with 
which  the  law  and  the  teaching  of  the  Churches  endeavour 
to  enforce  the  instinct  that  commands  us  not  to  kill :  so 
persistent  is  the  killing  instinct  within  us,  indeed,  that  the 
average  man  does  not  hesitate  to  act  out  this  instinct  upon 
the  wild  animals ;  and,  as  is  the  case  with  the  exercise  of 
all  instincts  that  have  been  inhibited,  gains  immense 
pleasure  in  this  killing,  which  he  dignifies  by  the  name 
"  sport."  It  is  to  be  noted  also  that  exercise  of  the  instinct 
to  kill  leads  to  such  an  enforcement  of  the  instinct  itself 
that  the  opposition  to  the  murder  of  fellow-men  becomes  less 
emphatic  and  effective ;  this  is  exemplified  in  the  lives  of 
the  pioneer  in  savage  lands,  of  the  soldier  who  has  been  at 
war,  of  the  revolutionary  debauchee  after  the  public  exhibi- 
tion of  execution  by  the  guillotine. 

In  similar  manner  intense  personal  passion  may  lead  to 
exhibitions  of  licentiousness ;  and  habitual  licentiousness  in 
youth  leads  often  to  failures  of  marital  faithfulness  in  after- 
life. 

So  also  the  demands  of  excessive  hunger  may  lead  to 
theft :  and  self-interest  may  break  down  bonds  of  sympathy, 
may  harden  a  man's  heart,  may  render  him  altogether  care- 
less of  acting  for  others'  welfare  or  pleasure. 

Finally,  beyond  the  mere  overthrow  of  the  racial  instinct 
by  the  individualistic  one  under  the  stress  of  stimuli  that 
naturally  bring  the  latter  into  prominence,  with  these  in- 


156  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

stincts  that  are  not  expressed  by  thoroughly  fixed  reactions 
we  have  exemplified  most  fully  the  action  of  individualistic 
variation  through  the  effects  of  reasoning.  It  is  in  this 
region  of  mental  life  that  the  thought  of  ends  comes  into 
prominence,  that  hesitancy  is  most  fully  developed,  that 
choice  is  in  evidence :  it  is  here  that  reasoned  action  is 
most  marked  and  that  rationalistic  processes  have  full  effect 
upon  active  life. 

The  man  who  is  tempted  to  murder  may  argue  that  the 
world  will  be  better  without  his  enemy ;  that  he  himself  at 
all  events  will  probably  not  be  suspected,  or  will  escape ; 
that  on  the  whole  it  is  worth  while  for  him  to  give  way  to 
his  individualistic  wish.  The  seducer  may  sophisticate 
himself  until  he  believes  that  the  woman  for  whom  he  has 
conceived  a  passion  will  not  be  injured  by  his  act ;  that  at 
all  events  no  damage  to  the  social  fabric  will  occur  if 
reasonable  care  be  taken  by  him  in  his  action.  The  forger 
may  convince  himself  that  all  the  property  he  wishes  to 
take  has  in  the  past  been  gained  by  the  ancestors  of  the 
present  possessors  through  oppression  and  theft,  and  that 
he  has  as  much  right  to  it  as  his  richer  neighbour.  The 
man  who  would  harden  his  heart  against  poverty  and 
suffering  finds  it  all  too  easy  to  emphasise  the  dangers  of 
indiscriminate  charity,  and  tends  to  class  all  cases  that  are 
brought  to  his  notice  as  "  unworthy." 

But  beyond  such  cases  as  we  have  above  cited,  where 
self-sophistication  comes  clearly  into  play,  we  have  in  this 
region  of  the  less  well -organised  instincts  the  realm  in 
which  serious  hesitancy  and  sincere  doubt  are  felt,  and  are 
habitually  solved  by  what  to  him  who  hesitates  and  doubts 
seems  to  be  rational  argument  and  valid  conclusion.  Of 
this  tendency  to  variation  by  rational  process  we  shall 
make  an  especial  study  in  later  chapters,  and  as  we  shall 
there  find  it  needful  to  give  ample  illustration  I  do  not 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  157 

think  it  necessary  to  enlarge  upon  this  point  further  at 
this  moment. 

§  27.  In  preceding  sections  we  have  noted  that  in  the 
individual  life  the  primary  action  in  response  to  stimuli 
from  without  upon  the  cells  is  in  general  subordinated  to 
secondary  actions  tending  to  produce  efficiency  of  the  in- 
dividual, in  case  the  two  are  not  thoroughly  adjusted  to  the 
same  end;  that  in  a  like  manner  the  tendencies  to  in- 
dividualistic reaction  are  in  general  subordinated  to  actions 
tending  to  bring  about  the  persistence  of  the  species,  in 
case  the  two  sets  of  activities  are  not  thoroughly  adjusted 
to  the  same  end.  And  so  here  in  the  social  life  the 
primary  action  to  which  the  individual  would  tend  in 
response  to  the  complex  stimuli  from  without,  subordinated 
as  it  is  in  certain  relations  to  actions  tending  to  bring  about 
the  persistence  of  the  species,  is  in  its  turn  on  the  whole 
subordinated  to  actions  tending  to  produce  efficiency  of  the 
social  complex,  where  the  sets  of  actions  are  not  thoroughly 
adjusted  to  the  same  end.  Unless  this  were  true  we  can 
see  no  basis  for  the  establishment  of  the  instincts  of  these 
higher  orders.  Of  this  I  shall  speak  more  at  length  in 
the  next  chapter. 

§  28.  In  what  has  preceded,  I  have  studied  instincts 
in  three  groups  or  classes ;  and  the  reader  will  agree  with 
me,  I  think,  that  the  instincts  thus  treated  make  up  a  very 
large  proportion  of  those  which  we  observe  in  our  own 
lives  and  in  the  lives  of  animals. 

But  it  would  be  incorrect  to  suggest  that  these  great 
groups  include  all  the  instincts  developed  in  the  higher 
animals.  The  so  -  called  "  imitation  instinct "  may  be 
mentioned  as  an  example  of  an  instinct  which  is  not  thus 
classifiable.     Possibly  this   instinct   may   be   found  to   be 


V 


158  INSTINCT  AND  KEASON  part  ii 

merely  the  marked  and  complex  development  of  a  very 
fundamental  mental  and  neural  tendency,  as  Professor  J. 
Mark  Baldwin  appears  to  suggest :  but  it  seems  to  me  that 
the  complex  imitative  tendencies  which  we  recognise  in  our 
lives  are  of  complex  instinctive  type,^  and  are  emphasised 
by  Nature  because  she  is  able  to  use  them  for  purposes  of 
biological  experiment  in  her  vast  laboratories :  at  all  events 
they  do  not  appear  to  me  to  be  identical  in  their  essence 
with  that  "  circular  process "  which  Professor  Baldwin 
would  have  us  call  "  imitation,"  and  which  he  has  shown 
to  be  determined,  to  a  great  extent  at  least  in  its  be- 
ginnings, by  self-imitation. 

I  am  free  to  confess,  however,  that  I  fail  to  note  any 
large  number  of  important  instincts  which  cannot  be 
included  in  one  of  the  three  groups  we  have  studied.  I  do 
recognise,  nevertheless,  a  fourth  class  of  which,  however,  few 
examples  are  prominent.  This  fourth  class  is  made  up  of 
instincts  which  deal  with  the  regulation  of  relations  which 
it  is  advantageous  to  foster  between  the  instincts  already 
formed. 

Clear  examples  of  this  type  of  regulative  instinct  are 
found  in  the  imitative  instincts  above  considered  and 
in  the  "play  instinct."  Plays  are  occasioned  by  the 
diversion  into  certain  relatively  definite  channels  of  sur- 
plus, so  called  "  spontaneous,"  energies,  which  have  re- 
sulted from  hypernutrition,  but  which  have  been  given  no 
opportunity  to  express  themselves  in  actions.  Nature  has 
formed  within  us  tendencies  to  divert  these  energies  into 
channels  that  give  practice  in  directions  in  which  skill  is, 
or  will  presently  be,  of  value  to  us.  It  is  a  commonplace 
that  the  plays  of  children  make  them  ready  for  activities 

^  Professor  C.  Lloyd  Morgan  appears  to  be  in  agreement  with  me  on  this 
point  (cf.  Habit  and  Instinct,  p.  181),  so  also  Professor  William  James  (cf. 
Psychology,  vol.  ii.  408)  and  Karl  Gross  (cf.  Die  Spiele  der  Thiere,  72). 


CHAP.  V         THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  159 

of  after-life :  the  girl's  plays  with  dolls  tell  of  future 
maternal  activities,  the  boy's  plays  correspondingly  tell  of 
the  world's  battles  he  is  to  wage,  often  indeed  reflecting  the 
actual  physical  contests  in  which  he  would  take  part  were 
he  not  held  back  from  barbarism  by  the  civilisation  in 
which  he  lives.  In  like  manner  the  plays  of  mature  men 
and  women  lead  them  to  practice  in  directions  which  are 
likely  to  be  advantageous  to  them  in  every-day  life. 

The  above  paragraph  is  printed  as  it  was  written  early 
in  1896  and  published  in  October  of  that  year  in  Mind. 
I  might  have  considered  it  worth  while  to  develop  the 
thought  more  fully  here  had  not  Karl  Gross  in  his  excellent 
Die  Spiele  der  Thiere,  published  since  the  writing  of  this 
paragraph,  expressed  the  same  view  and  defended  at  length 
the  position  I  have  taken.  I  refer  the  reader  to  this  book 
if  he  wish  to  study  this  point  in  detail. 

I  mention  this  fourth  class  of  instincts  here  particularly 
because,  as  the  reader  will  discover  later,  I  shall  endeavour 
to  show  that  Nature  has  built  up  in  us  a  most  noble  instinct 
of  powerful  force  which  cannot  properly  be  placed  in  any 
of  the  first  three  classes  above  described,  but  which  I  shall 
endeavour  to  show  functions  solely  for  the  regulation  of 
those  relations  existing  between  the  instincts  of  these 
classes  which  it  is  of  the  greatest  advantage  to  emphasise. 


CHAPTEE  VI 

OF  CERTAIN  KELATIONS  BETWEEN  INSTINCT  GROUPS 

I. — The  Order  of  the  Rise  of  Instinct  Groups 

§  1.  In  the  chapter  preceding  this  we  have  noted  that 
a  large  proportion  of  the  instincts  found  in  the  higher 
animals,  and  in  man,  if  studied  objectively  seem  to  fall 
naturally  into  three  great  classes  :  viz. — first,  those  instincts 
that  tend  to  bring  about  the  persistence  of  individual  life ; 
second,  those  that  result  in  actions  favouring  the  persistence 
of  the  species  to  which  the  individual  belongs ;  and  third, 
those  that  tend  to  bring  about  the  persistence  of  certain 
aggregates  of  individuals  which  we  call  social  groups. 

I  have  also  referred  briefly  to  the  fact  that  the  instincts 
of  the  second  class  are  built  upon,  and  as  it  were  out  of, 
already  existing  instincts  of  the  first  class :  and  in  like 
manner  that  the  instincts  of  the  third  class  are  formed  later 
than  the  instincts  of  the  first  and  second  classes,  and  that 
their  forms  are  determined  to  a  great  extent  by  the  earlier 
existence  of  the  instincts  of  classes  1  and  2.  That  this  is 
true  is  indicated  by  certain  facts  to  some  of  which  I  have 
already  referred  incidentally,  but  to  which  I  would  here  ask 
the  reader's  more  careful  attention  for  a  moment. 

A 

§  2.  Let  us  consider  first  the  relation  existing  between 
classes    1    and    2,  between   the   instincts  which   relate   to 


CH.  VI     CERTAIN  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  INSTINCT  GROUPS     161 

individualistic  advantage  and  the  instincts  which  relate  to 
reproduction  of  individuals  of  a  given  type,  with  especial 
reference  to  the  view  that  the  individualistic  instincts  are 
primary,  and  those  relating  to  reproduction  secondary  in 
their  genesis. 

In  the  first  place  let  us  note  the  evidence  presented  in 
connection  with  the  fact,  now  generally  conceded,  that  the 
development  of  the  individual  man  from  birth  corresponds 
in  a  broad  way  with  the  development  of  the  race  to  which 
he  belongs,  so  that  in  general  the  rise  of  capacities  in  a 
definite  order  in  the  course  of  individual  life  indicates  that 
the  race  in  the  course  of  its  development  has  gained  these 
capacities  in  a  corresponding  definite  order. 

It  will  be  acknowledged  that  the  child  at  birth,  so  far  as 
we  can  judge  from  its  expressions,  is  a  purely  individualistic 
animal :  its  instincts  one  and  all  lead  to  the  attainment  of 
nourishment  and  to  such  functioning  as  is  necessary  for  mere 
existence.  Later  on  in  its  life  appear  the  general  excite- 
ments of  the  joyous  emotional  type,  and  the  shrinking  of 
dread  and  sorrow,  and  the  actions  indicative  of  fear  and 
love  and  anger,  all  of  which,  as  we  have  seen,  are  the 
expressions  of  self-protective  instincts.  Together  with  these 
appear  also  many  complex  self  -  protective  actions  which 
conserve  life  and  preserve  health.  All  of  these  are  instincts 
of  individualistic  import. 

It  is  not  until  years  have  passed  that  the  instincts 
which  relate  directly  or  indirectly  to  sexual  reproduction 
appear,  and  it  is  therefore  clear  that  in  the  life  of  the 
human  individual  at  least  these  sexual  instincts  are  secondary 
in  genesis  to  the  instincts  of  individualistic  import,  and  that 
consequently  they  must  involve  entirely  novel  activities,  or 
else  must  be  influenced  by,  or  must  themselves  determine 
modifications  of,  those  instincts  which  already  exist  at  the 
moment  of  their  first  appearance. 

M 


162      "-.::;:    instinct  and  reason  part.h 

The  love  of  parents  and  friends,  and  of  advantageous 
things  in  general,  develops  into  sexual  love,  but  not  until 
the  approach  of  puberty;  and  still  later  only  appear  the 
instincts  which  lead  less  directly  to  the  conception  of  new 
lives  and  more  directly  to  the  protection  of  these  new  lives 
through  their  years  of  weakness. 

From  a  biological  point  of  view  it  is  not  difficult  to 
interpret  these  facts.  In  the  individual  organism  we  find 
special  organised  parts,  each  of  which  through  the  processes 
of  evolution  has  come  to  function  under  normal  conditions, 
so  that  while  acting  to  its  own  best  advantage  as  a  part  of 
the  individual  organism,  it  at  the  same  time  acts  to  the  best 
advantage  of  the  individual  organisms  as  a  whole. 

These  functionings  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  organism 
mark  the  existence  of  the  individualistic  instincts ;  and,  as 
I  have  already  noted,  we  have  much  evidence  gained  from 
the  lower  forms  of  life,  that  in  the  earliest  types  of  organic 
aggregation  the  individualistic  instincts  were  alone  developed, 
the  organisms  being  of  such  nature  that  individual  existence 
was  all-important  to  them  in  a  biological  sense.  In  certain 
cases  the  presence  of  other  individuals  of  the  same  type 
would  even  be  a  disadvantage  to  any  special  individual  we 
may  choose  to  consider ;  for  instance,  in  cases  where  the 
supply  of  nutriment  in  the  environment  was  limited.  At 
all  events,  the  presence  of  other  individuals  of  the  same 
type  would  be  of  no  advantage  where  co-operation  was  not 
possible,  and  especially  where  it  was  not  of  necessity  to  the 
continuance  of  the  type ;  for,  as  we  have  seen,  these  low 
organic  forms  are  able  to  reproduce  their  kind  by  mere 
division  of  the  individual  parent  mass. 

It  is  true  that  very  early  in  the  development  of  animal 

life  we  find  rudimentary  reproductive   systems   and   rudi- 

,  mentary  sexual  processes  by  which  continuance  of  type  is 

determined,  and  this  through  actions  which  are  dependent 


CH.  VI    CERTAIN  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  INSTINCT  GROUPS      163 

upon  the  coexistence  of  separate  individuals ;  still  in  these 
low  organic  types  we  note  many  forms  of  reproduction 
without  sexual  differences  or  relations ;  and  many  which 
are  independent  of  conjugation  between  different  individuals; 
and  in  certain  types  where  sexual  reproduction  is  possible, 
and  sometimes  where  it  is  usual,  we  find  it  often  replaced 
rhythmically  or  irregularly  by  non- sexual  reproduction, 
which  latter  makes  the  individual  self-dependent  in  this 
propagation  of  its  kind. 

There  is  much  evidence  leading  us  to  conclude  that 
these  low-type  organisms  are  of  forms  which  date  back  to 
ages  beyond  our  clear  conception ;  and  if  this  be  true,  it 
appears  probable  that  individual  organic  life,  with  inherent 
power  of  reproducing  its  own  kind,  long  persisted  before  the 
slight  advantage  gained  by  sexual  differentiation  began  to 
make  the  existence  of  different  individuals  of  importance, 
and  dependence  of  one  individual  upon  another  necessary, 
if  the  type  were  to  persist.  And  during  this  long  period 
the  organisms  we  are  considering  must  have  been  self- 
dependent  individually ;  in  them  must  have  arisen  the 
germs  of  many  instincts  which  related  only  to  individual 
persistence. 

This  is  made  clear  when  we  note  certain  of  the  lowest 
types  of  organisms  that  can  be  examined  under  the 
microscope,  which  habitually  reproduce  their  kind  without 
conjugation  of  any  kind,  but  which  show  nevertheless  many 
differentiations  of  individualistic  instincts.  The  Acinetse, 
for  instance,  one  of  those  minute  forms  known  as  the 
Infusoria,  as  Huxley  tells  us,^  "multiply  by  simple  longitudinal 
fission,"  or  by  "  the  development  of  ciHated  embryos  in  the 
interior  of  the  body."  "  The  acinetse  have  frequently  been 
observed  to  conjugate "  indeed,  "  but  it  has  not  certainly 
been  made  out  whether  this  process  has,  or  has  not,  any- 

^  Anatomy  of  Invertebrate  Animals,  p.  94. 


164  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

thing  to  do  with  the  process  of  development  of  ciliated 
embryos  just  described."  Yet  these  animals,  capable  thus 
of  reproducing  their  kind  by  simple  fission,  have  developed 
most  complex  individualistic  instinct  actions. 

They  put  out  from  their  bodies  delicate  tube  -  like 
tentacles,  which  upon  occasion  are  stimulated  by  the 
movements  produced  by  an  individual  of  some  other  type 
of  infusoria  which  is  the  normal  prey  of  the  organism. 
The  cells  of  the  tentacles  first  react  as  is  best  suited  to 
their  mode  of  functioning ;  but  then,  secondly,  we  perceive 
a  general  activity  of  the  whole  organism,  and  this  with 
reference  to  the  organic  advantage  and  not  with  reference 
to  the  advantage  of  the  cells  that  are  first  stimulated. 
"  The  knob-like  ends  of  these  tentacles,  which  come  into 
immediate  contact  with  the  surface  of  the  entangled  prey, 
spread  out  into  disks,  and  adhere  fixedly  to  it.  When 
many  of  the  tentacles  have  thus  attached  themselves,  the 
imprisoned  animal  is  no  longer  able  to  escape,  its  move- 
ments become  slower,  and  at  length  cease.  Those  tentacles 
which  have  fixed  themselves  most  firmly,  shorten  and 
thicken,  and  draw  the  prey  nearer  to  the  body.  .  .  . 
Suddenly,  as  soon  as  the  sucking  disk  has  bored  through 
the  cuticula  of  the  prey,  a  very  rapid  stream,  indicated  by 
the  fatty  particles  which  it  carries,  sets  along  the  axis  of 
the  tentacle,  and,  at  its  base,  pours  into  the  neighbouring 
part  of  the  body  of  the  Acineta.  .  .  ."^  Thus  the  organism 
gains  its  nourishment  within  its  body  in  position  to  be 
acted  upon  by  those  cells  which  have  become  differentiated 
to  perform  the  assimilative  function,  and  to  distribute  the 
nourishment  to  the  other  cells  active  in  other  service  for 
the  general  benefit.^ 

^  Stein,  quoted  by  Huxley,  Anatomy  of  Invertebrate  Animals,  p.  93,  note. 

^  Some  reader  may  here  raise  the  objection  that  the  apparently  selective 
attraction  existing  between  the  cells  of  elemental  life,  what  is  known  as 
"erethism,"  and  which  exists  before  any  individualistic  instincts  are  formed, 


CH.  VI     CERTAIN  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  INSTINCT  GROUPS     165 

An  individual  organism,  then,  so  long  as  its  life  form 
may  continue  to  persist  without  aid  from  any  other 
individual  organisms  of  like  species  may,  and  as  we  have 
seen  does,  develop  many  complex  individualistic  instincts. 
But  in  a  complex  organism  which  is  in  process  of  attain- 
ing the  power  of  sexual  reproduction  these  individualistic 
instincts,  already  acquired,  must  be  so  modified  that  while 
under  normal  conditions  they  act  to  the  protection  and 
persistence  of  the  lives  of  the  individuals  in  which  they 
appear,  nevertheless  they  act  at  the  same  time  to  produce 
in  that  individual  efficiency  to  reproduce  its  kind ;  for  those 
individuals  in  which  these  individualistic  instincts  were  not 
thus  modified  would  suffer  in  the  contest  for  survival  when 
the  attainment  of  sexual  capacities  had  become  of  value. 

The  correctness  of  this  interpretation,  and  of  the  notion 
that  the  instincts  relating  to  reproduction  are  secondary  to 
the  individualistic  instincts  in  their  genesis,  is  evidenced 
furthermore  in  many  other  ways.  It  is  evidenced  by  the 
fact  that  the  purely  individualistic  instincts  deal  with  ends 
of  more  immediate  significance,  sustenance  from  day  to  day, 
protection  from  moment  to  moment ;  ends  which  the  higher 
animals  may  possibly  realise  and  which  must  have  been 
patent  to  the  primitive  man  at  a  very  early  period  in  his 
history ;  and  by  the  corresponding  fact  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  those  instincts  that  relate  to  the  reproduction  of  the 

is  the  very  basis  of  the  later  sexual  attraction.  But  it  is  to  be  noted  that 
this  attraction  exists  between  elemental  cells  and  is  fundamental  to  the 
formation  of  all  organisms  ;  that  after  such  formation  then  these  organisms 
acquire  traits  of  various  kinds,  among  them  instincts  tending  to  preserve  life 
in  the  individual,  and  also  (and  later)  instincts  tending  to  enable  these  per- 
sisting individuals  to  bring  into  condition  for  fecundation  the  cell  parts 
which  have  to  do  with  the  development  of  new  individuals.  Surely  the  most 
that  can  possibly  be  claimed  is  that  the  process  of  "erethism"  noted  in  low 
forms  of  organisms  may  be  identical  with  this  final  process  of  fecundation  in 
the  special  cells  buried  within  the  bodies  of  the  higher  forms  of  animal  life ; 
but  as  surely  it  would  be  stretching  an  argument  by  analogy  to  any  illicit 
extreme  to  claim  that  all  the  complex  accompaniments  of  the  sexual  act  are 
direct  and  peculiar  derivatives  from  this  special  process  of  "erethism." 


166  INSTINCT  AND  KEASON  pArt  ii 

species  deal  with  far-off  ends  which  at  the  time  of  sexual 
action  are  not  realised  by  the  average  human  individual 
even  to-day,  which  were  probably  not  at  all  realised  by  man 
until  a  late  period  in  the  history  of  his  development,  and 
which  are  almost  certainly  never  realised  by  the  animals. 
It  is  impossible  to  suppose  that  the  bitch  realises  that  there 
is  any  relation  between  the  birth  of  her  litter  of  puppies 
and  the  sexual  relations  with  a  dog  months  before,  of  which 
she  probably  has  at  most  but  the  dimmest  reminiscence 
at  the  time  the  puppies  are  born.  These  facts  surely 
indicate  that  the  actions  for  individualistic  benefit  are 
primary  and  the  actions  tending  toward  racial  persistence 
secondary.  For  the  first  formed  instincts  would  evidently 
be  those  which  functioned  in  answer  to  constantly  recurring 
needs;  only  secondarily  would  those  instincts  be  formed 
which  through  trends  of  action  guided  to  the  production  of 
other  results  than  those  to  which  the  instinctive  act  directly 
led. 

Our  contention  is  further  supported  by  the  fact  that 
the  sexual  instincts  differ  in  the  two  sexes,  a  fact  which 
indicates  that  they  are  differentiations  of  a  common  stock ; 
whilst  the  individualistic  instincts  on  the  contrary  are  in 
the  main  the  same  in  both  sexes,  which  indicates  that  they 
have  a  simpler,  earlier  origin.  Furthermore,  the  individual- 
istic instincts  appear  in  full  force  in  cases  where  the  sexual 
instincts  are  aborted,  as  with  sterile  hybrids  and  the  neuter 
individuals  of  many  insect  tribes;  this  again  surely 
indicates  that  individualistic  instincts  are  primary  and 
sexual  instincts  differential  and  secondary. 

We  note  furthermore  the  fact  that  the  individualistic 
instincts  are  more  persistent  than  those  that  relate  to  sexual 
reproduction.  The  demands  for  sustenance  and  for  the 
protection  of  the  individual's  own  life  are  more  urgent  than 
the  demands  for  sexual  activity ;  under  extreme  danger,  or 


CH.  VI     CERTAIN  RELATIONS  BET  WEEK!  NSTINCT  GROUPS     167 

extreme  hunger  or  thirst,  the  sexual  demand  disappears,  or 
is  inhibited  or  deferred,  until  the  demand  of  individualistic 
import  is  satisfied.  This  clearly  indicates  that  the  in- 
dividualistic instincts  are  of  primary,  fundamental,  im- 
portance. 

We  note,  moreover,  if  we  consider  man  alone,  that  the 
sexual  activities  are  much  more  vividly  effective  in  the 
alteration  of  our  conscious  life  than  are  the  activities  re- 
lating to  individualistic  efficiency.  These  individualistic 
instincts  are  in  large  part  carried  on  almost  reflexly  as  we 
say ;  in  other  words,  they  affect  the  complex  ego,  the  field  of 
inattention,  rather  than  the  field  of  attention  which  appears 
as  an  increment  to  the  fulness  of  this  ego.  The  sexual 
instincts  are  less  thoroughly  co-ordinated  in  our  lives, 
produce  distinct  disturbances  of  our  ego-hood,  and  of  the 
field  of  vivid  attention.  All  this  indicates  that  the  sexual 
instincts  are  of  later  formation  than  the  fundamental 
individualistic  instincts,  for  time  is  recognisedly  an  im- 
portant element  in  the  production  of  that  thorough  co- 
ordination which  leads  to  the  loss  of  effect  upon  conscious- 
ness above  mentioned. 

§  3.  At  this  juncture  let  us  recall  a  point  made  briefly 
in  the  last  chapter,  viz.  that  the  instincts  which  relate 
directly  to  conjugation  generally  appear  earlier  than  those 
more  complex  instincts  which  relate  to  pursuit  and  the 
attraction  of  mates ;  but  especially  that  still  later  than 
these  latter  appear  the  instincts  which  are  much  less  directly 
related  to  the  persistence  of  species,  viz.  those  instincts  which 
relate  to  permanent  mating  and  to  the  protection  of  the 
mother  and  her  young. 

These  last-mentioned  instincts  are  so  far  separated  in 
development  from  those  that  relate  directly  or  indirectly  to 
the   sexual   act   that  they  deserve  to   be   considered   as   a 


168  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

sub-class  under  the  main  group  of  instincts  that  relate  to 
the  persistence  of  species. 

Of  the  instincts  relating  to  the  persistence  of  species  we 
have  sub-classes. 


H: 


Instincts  relating  to  the  act  of  conjugation. 
Instincts  relating  to  pursuit  and  attraction  of  mates. 

B.  Instincts  relating  to  permanent  mating,  to  the  pro- 

tection of  young,  etc.  etc. 

The  instincts  of  this  last  class  B  have  to  do  with  a 
developed  race  which  persists  not  so  much  because  it  is  able 
to  reproduce  many  offspring,  but  because  it  is  able  to  protect 
and  preserve  the  lives  of  a  lesser  number  of  offspring  of  a 
higher  grade. 

The  instincts  relating  to  conjugation  are  universal  in  all 
organic  life  above  the  lowest  forms ;  but  only  in  these 
animals  which  have  gained  a  higher  place  in  the  ascending 
scale  of  complexity  do  we  find  the  instincts  relating  to  the 
germs  of  family  life. 

It  is  important  to  our  future  argument  to  make  this 
distinction  very  clear.  The  individualistic  instinct  which 
gives  us  love  in  its  widest  form  is,  as  we  have  seen,  specialised 
to  sexual  uses  and  gives  us  sexual  love,  with  its  passion  for 
mere  conjugation.  But  this  same  individualistic  love  as 
thus  specialised  is  further  transformed  into  what  we  call 
"  romantic  love  "  which  expresses  itself  in  the  demands  for 
a  special  mate,  and  leads  the  lover  to  devote  life  to  the 
service  of  this  mate  and  of  the  offspring  born  of  the  mating. 

These  latter  instincts  are  not  only  more  complex  in  form 
but  are  also  later  in  time  of  appearance.  To  be  sure,  they  are 
drawn  forward,  so  to  speak,  by  imitative  processes,  and  by 
the  aid  of  the  play  instinct ;  but  I  think  it  becomes  clear 
when  we  consider  our  own  experience,  that  they  are  naturally 
of  later  rise  than  the  instincts  which  lead  to  mere  conjuga- 


-'^■y^;:>^>y.. 


CH.  VI     CERTAIN  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  INSTINCT  GROUPS     169 

tion.  With  the  age  of  puberty  arise  desires  connected  with 
the  sexual  act;  but  it  is  generally  acknowledged  that  the 
love  of  this  time  of  life  is  liable  to  shift  from  individual  to 
individual  and  is  of  very  momentary  nature.  If  it  be 
listened  to  under  the  influence  of  passion,  it  is  not  in- 
frequently followed  by  hate  of  the  one  who  was  but  a 
moment  ago  beloved,  in  case  the  permanent  mating  appears 
disadvantageous.  If  passion  is  yielded  to  with  different 
lovers,  and  repeatedly,  there  may  result  an  inhibition  of  the 
development  of  the  later  instincts  for  permanent  mating,  as 
expressed  in  "  romantic  love  " ;  this  is  apparent  in  the  lives 
of  the  licentious  of  both  sexes. 

If  early  passion  be  yielded  to,  and  the  bond  of  union 
recognised  by  society  be  welded,  in  extreme  youth,  it  is  not 
at  all  improbable  that  the  love  will  be  lost  with  the  first 
obstruction  in  life's  pathway.  But  if  these  early  passions 
are  held  in  check,  then  later  in  life,  after  character  is 
formed,  there  comes  for  the  best  of  men  and  women  the 
dawn  of  a  deeper  affection,  of  a  nobler  devotion,  which 
involves  bonds  of  stronger  form  and  more  permanent  type 
than  any  that  mere  sexual  passion  can  arouse ;  this  is 
"  romantic  love." 

I  do  not  feel  altogether  certain  that  my  reader  may  not 
think  that  I  have  wasted  words  in  making  this  argument, 
but  I  have  thought  it  best  to  bring  into  clear  relief  the 
points  here  presented,  because  I  wish  to  consider  later  on 
certain  correspondences  that  are  observable  when  we  come 
to  study  the  much  more  complex  social  instincts. 

In  order  to  make  this  argument  clear  it  has  been 
necessary  to  emphasise  rather  strongly  the  difference  between 
the  individualistic  instincts  and  those  that  relate  to  repro- 
duction of  kind ;  and  we  have  in  this  process  exaggerated, 
to   some   extent  perhaps,  distinctions  which  are  not   very 


OF  TtTK 


170  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

evident  to  us  in  actual  life.  But  this  lack  of  recognised 
difference  does  not  argue  against  the  validity  of  the  dis- 
tinction itself;  what  it  does  indicate  is  that  in  becoming 
part  of  a  race  which  is  perpetuated  by  means  of  sexual 
processes,  we  have  gained  a  special  form  of  organisation 
which  involves  interrelation  and  interaction  between  these 
two  groups  of  instincts.  No  longer  can  we  act  as  individuals 
altogether,  in  no  sense  can  we  act  with  reference  to  repro- 
duction of  kind  altogether ;  could  we  do  so,  we  would  in 
that  very  fact  break  down  the  organisation  which  has  been 
formed  by  the  development  of  the  set  of  instincts  relating 
to  reproduction  out  of,  or  upon,  those  which  have  purely 
individualistic  significance — an  organisation  formed  without 
the  obliteration  and  destruction  of  these  latter  instincts 
which  are  so  very  important  for  the  preservation  of  individual 
life  upon  which  in  the  end  depends  the  preservation  of  our 
race. 

B 

§  4.  When  we  turn  to  the  study  of  the  relation  between 
the  two  classes  of  instincts  just  considered  and  the  social 
instincts,  we  find  our  problem  much  more  complex.  If  we 
consider  the  instinctive  activities  of  men  around  us  we  do 
not,  at  the  first  glance,  find  self-evident,  to  say  the  least, 
the  statement  made  in  the  opening  section  of  this  chapter; 
the  statement  that  the  instincts  which  relate  to  the  persist- 
ence of  social  groups  are  built  upon  and  out  of  the  individual- 
istic instincts,  as  these  have  been  modified  with  reference  to 
the  instincts  that  relate  to  the  persistence  of  type. 

Theoretically,  however,  there  seems  to  be  no  question  as 
to  the  correctness  of  the  position  taken  above.  It  is  certainly 
clear  that,  in  a  large  proportion  of  the  lower  animals  in 
which  are  developed  very  complex  individualistic  instincts, 
and  equally  complex  instincts  which  relate  to  the  propaga- 


CH.  VI     CERTAIN  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  INSTINCT  GROUPS     171 

tion  of  their  kind,  there  are  few,  if  any,  marks  of  the 
existence  of  those  instincts  which  relate  to  the  perfection 
and  persistence  of  social  life. 

It  is  impossible  then,  if  we  accept  the  doctrine  of  descent 
of  higher  from  lower  forms,  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that 
animals  exhibiting  these  instincts  of  non-social  import  must 
have  existed  long  before  the  social  instincts  were  formed, 
and  therefore  that  either  the  instincts  of  social  significance 
must  be  expressed  by  totally  new  co-ordinations  of  activities,- 
which  we  know  is  not  the  case ;  or  else  that  the  instincts' 
of  non-social  import  must  have  become  so  modified  that 
while  under  normal  conditions  they  act  indeed  to  the  pre- 
servation of  individual  life  and  to  that  of  the  species  in 
which  these  instincts  appear,  nevertheless  at  the  same  time 
they  act  to  produce  in  the  individuals  of  that  species 
efficiency  to  co-operate  with  other  individuals  to  the  format 
tion  of  social  aggregates — aggregates  which  come  to  be  more 
or  less  persistent,  inasmuch  as  this  persistence  indirectly 
favours  the  individual  and  his  species  in  the  struggle  for  • 
existence. 

The  correctness  of  this  view  is  vouched  for  by  the  very 
evident  complexity  of  the  higher  social  instincts  which  can' 
in  many  cases  be  traced  only  by  watching  the  trend  of 
many  series  of  activities  which,  from  an  objective  view; 
appear  on  their  face  at  the  first  glance  to  have  only 
individualistic  import,  and  which  from  a  subjective  view 
are  so  usually  thought  of  as  relating  to  individualistic  aims 
that  serious  attempt  has  been  made  by  philosophers,  as  we 
know,  to  explain  them  as  being  really  derived  from  habits 
which  were  originally  determined  by  choice  of  what  were 
recognised  to  be  purely  egoistic  benefits. 

It  does  not  seem  to  me  possible  to  deny  that  men  uphold 
automatically  customs  and  laws  which  aim  to  prevent  theft 
and  murder  and  adultery,  and  that  they  do  so,  in  the  main. 


172  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

with  no  knowledge  whatever  that  these  laws  subserve  social 
progress ;  and  yet  so  complex  are  these  activities  that  it  is 
very  easy,  as  not  a  few  writers  have  shown  us,  to  lead  these 
same  men,  when  we  turn  their  thoughts  to  such  considera- 
tion, to  the  belief  that  they  are,  or  have  originally  been, 
led  to  undertake  these  actions  for  purposes  of  individualistic 
benefit  direct  or  indirect ;  and  it  is  correspondingly  difficult 
to  show  them  that  the  laws  they  follow  would  not  exist 
did  they  not  fit  in  with  social  impulses  of  instinctive  origin. 

Favouring  our  contention,  we  have  the  fact  that  the 
social  instincts  are  less  universal  than  those  that  relate  to 
the  persistence  of  the  individual  or  the  species.  The  earlier 
formed  instincts,  those  that  have  become  most  deeply 
ingrained  in  our  structure,  are  the  ones  which  press  for 
recognition  when  circumstances  which  relate  to  social 
aggregation  alter,  or  where  relative  isolation  becomes 
habitual.  The  struggle  for  existence  continues ;  the  strife 
for  accumulation,  the  tendency  to  self  -  protection,  the 
demands  of  sex  drive  us  on;  and  this  whether  we  remain  with, 
or  disconnect  ourselves  from,  the  aggregations  which  we  call 
societies.  On  the  other  hand,  we  note  that  the  nomad, 
whether  by  voluntary  choice  or  by  birth,  the  Arab  of  the 
desert,  the  Gipsy,  the  "  tramp,"  each  one  of  these  unsocial 
beings,  has  an  unsavoury  reputation  for  violations  of  the 
moral  order,  which  is  determined  by  the  instincts  that  relate 
to  social  life ;  we  naturally  expect  the  non-social  wanderer 
to  be  an  adulterer,  a  thief,  and  upon  occasion  a  murderer. 

Then,  again,  we  find  these  social  instincts  influencing  more 
vividly  our  conscious  life ;  or  in  other  words,  showing  less 
complete  co-ordination  than  do  the  instincts  of  lower  orders 
of  complexity.  Self-protection,  the  demand  for  sustenance, 
sexual  tendencies,  carry  us  away,  are  worked  out  thought- 
lessly, seem  natural;  while  the  social  instincts  lead  to 
endless  controversies  and  oppositions  which  result  in  vivid 


CH.  VI     CERTAIN  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  INSTINCT  GROUPS     173 

effects  in  consciousness.  This  incompleteness  of  co-ordina- 
tion, as  we  have  already  remarked,  indicates  a  relative 
lateness  of  formation ;  for  time  is  recognisedly  an  important 
element  in  the  production  of  that  thorough  correlation  of 
action  which  leads  to  complete  or  approximate  loss  of  effect 
in  consciousness. 

§  5.  There  is  one  difficulty  about  this  conception  to 
which  I  must  refer  at  some  length.  If  all  that  we  have 
said  above  be  true,  and  if  it  be  true  also  that  the  develop- 
ment of  the  individual  follows  step  by  step  the  development 
of  the  life-history  of  the  race,  then  we  should  look  for  the 
appearance  of  the  distinctly  social  instincts  not  only  after 
the  appearance  of  the  individualistic  instincts,  but  also  after 
these  individualistic  instincts  have  become  modified  in 
reference  to  sexual  reproduction. 

In  the  main  I  think  there  is  no  doubt  of  the  truth  of 
this  statement.  The  child  develops  naturally  no  strong 
convictions  concerning  the  sins  of  untruth  and  of  stealing, 
until  after  the  age  of  puberty  ;  children  are  often  designated 
as  natural  liars.  The  instincts  which  lead  to  sexual 
restraint  and  purity  must  in  their  very  nature  be  subsequent 
in  appearance  to  the  rise  of  the  sexual  passion.  Patriotism 
is  generally  conceded  to  be  a  manly  trait.  Pity  and 
sympathy  are  most  markedly  effective  in  adult  life. 

But  many  a  reader  will  at  once  feel  inclined  to 
dissent  from  the  general  statement  for  the  reason  that 
certain  cases  which  seem  to  be  most  obvious  exceptions  to 
such  a  wide  rule  will  occur  to  his  mind.  What  I  claim 
is  the  truth  of  this  general  rule,  and  that  the  exceptions 
are  so  easily  explicable,  that  the  apparent  contradictions  do 
not  vitiate  the  argument  made  above,  which  we  have  seen 
to  be  corroborated  in  so  many  ways. 

These    exceptions    may    be    accounted    for    on    purely 


174  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

biological  grounds  if  we  consider  the  advantage  to  be  won 
by  a  race  in  which  the  individuals  gain,  early  in  life,  practice 
in  those  activities  which  are  later  on  to  be  of  advantage  to 
him  in  his  struggle  for  existence.  It  is  a  commonplace 
that  children's  "  play  instincts  "  have  become  connected  thus 
with  future  demands  which  are  to  come  upon  them  in  the 
adult  state.  Doll  plays  which  persist  so  long  with  girls 
who  are  to  become  mothers,  the  contentions  and  self- 
protective  plays  of  boys  who  are  to  become  the  world's 
fighters,  will  illustrate  this  point. 

But  evidently,  if  the  social  instincts  are  to  be  of  value 
to  adult  life,  artificial  cultivation  in  youth  of  the  activities 
which  will  be  involved  in  their  expression  will  be  of  great 
value  to  the  individual ;  and  thus  it  comes  about  that  we 
men  have  contracted  advantageous  habits  of  enforcing  the 
activities  expressive  of  social  instincts  upon  children  long 
before  they  feel  the  inborn  impulses  which  one  day  would 
lead  to  the  spontaneous  appearance  of  these  activities ;  and 
this  we  do  by  precept  and  practice,  laying  hold  of  the 
child's  inborn  tendency  to  imitate  those  who  surround  him, 
encouraging  him  to  copy  those  actions  which  we  deem 
right  towards  his  fellows,  and  leading  him  to  act  like  a 
member  of  a  complex  social  community  long  before  any 
social  instincts  guide  him  to  act  thus  spontaneously.  Thus 
he  is  taught  to  object  to  lying,  to  stealing,  and  to  hurting 
his  companions,  and  thus  he  learns  to  act  sympathetic- 
ally. 

§  6.  The  difficulty  of  recognising  the  fact  that  the 
social  instincts  appear  later  than  the  instincts  relating  to 
reproduction  is  largely  due  to  a  failure  to  recognise  the 
distinction  referred  to  at  length  in  the  third  section  between 
(A)  the  sexual  instincts  proper,  which  have  to  do  with 
conjugation,  and  the  pursuit  or  attraction  of  individuals  of 


CH.  VI     CERTAIN  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  INSTINCT  GROUPS     175 

the  opposite  sex ;  and  (B)  the  instincts  which  relate  to 
the  protection  of  the  mother  and  the  young. 

I  think  it  cannot  be  questioned  that  the  instincts  which 
lead  to  conjugation  in  general  rise  before  those  instincts 
that  are  of  social  import.  But  we  are  all  too  likely  to  think 
of  the  higher  class  of  instincts  which  relate  to  the  persistence 
of  species  as  of  one  grade  with  those  that  lead  to  conjuga- 
tion ;  and  when  we  find  the  social  instincts  growing  up 
together  with  those  of  the  later  reproductive  type  which 
lead  to  permanent  mating,  we  are  liable  to  be  led  to  deny 
the  temporal  distinction  I  am  making. 

But,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  instincts  of  that 
higher  class  relating  to  the  persistence  of  species  through 
protection  are  much  later  in  appearance  in  individual  and 
race  life  than  are  those  that  relate  to  conjugation  only ; 
and  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  less  complex  of  the  social 
instincts  may  not  improbably  have  had  their  rise  almost 
eoincidently  with  these  higher  grade  instincts  relating  to 
reproduction. 

It  seems  to  me  much  more  probable  that  these  latter 
instincts  of  higher  reproductive  type,  having  been  formed 
for  furtherance  of  the  life  of  the  species,  were  speedily 
transformed  to  other  uses  by  nature ;  in  other  words,  were 
made  to  do  valuable  service  in  the  building  up  of  social 
aggregates.  Thus  in  a  way  it  will  appear  to  be  true  that 
family  life  is  the  very  foundation-stone  of  social  life ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  a  large  part  of 
the  more  complex  social  impulses  are  much  later  in  forma- 
tion even  than  those  which  lead  to  permanent  mating  and 
family  protection. 

§  7.  What  was  said  at  the  close  of  §  3  concerning 
the  relation  between  individualistic  and  reproductive  in- 
stincts   holds    more   emphatically  in    connection  with    the 


176  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

social  instincts.  In  becoming  part  of  a  race,  which  is  aided 
in  its  struggle  for- persistence  by  instincts  which  lead  to  the 
aggregation  of  mutually  dependent  individuals,  we  have 
gained  a  new  and  special  form  of  organisation  which  involves 
interrelation  and  interaction  between  all  these  three  groups 
of  instincts. 

No  longer  can  we  act  as  individuals  altogether,  no  longer 
can  we  act  with  reference  to  reproduction  of  kind  altogether : 
but  furthermore  in  no  sense  can  we  act  only  and  altogether 
with  reference  to  the  welfare  and  persistence  of  the  social 
groups  to  which  we  belong ;  could  we  do  so,  we  would  in 
that  very  fact  break  down  the  organisation  which  has  been 
formed  by  the  development  of  the  social  instincts  out  of 
those  instincts  which  have  individualistic  significance  and 
which  have,  nevertheless,  been  moulded  into  new  shape  in 
order  that  they  may  subserve  the  needs  of  reproduction ; 
this  development  of  these  social  instincts  having  taken  place 
without  t*he  obliteration  or  destruction  either  of  the  in- 
dividualistic instincts  or  of  the  instincts  which  relate 
directly  or  indirectly  to  the  perpetuation  of  our  species. 

In  this  connection  let  me  quote  Mr.  Leslie  Stephen,  who, 
leaving  out  of  account  the  sexual  instincts,  is  concerned 
only  with  the  relation  of  social  to  individualistic  instincts. 
He  says  (Science  of  Ethics,  ch.  iv.  §  4)  "  the  distinction 
drawn  between  the  social  and  the  self-regarding  qualities, 
or,  again,  between  qualities  as  useful  to  the  race  and  useful 
to  the  individual,  cannot  possibly  be  ultimate  distinctions. 
Every  man  is  both  an  individual  and  a  social  product,  and 
every  instinct  both  social  and  self-regarding.  To  say  that  a 
man  is  an  organism  is  to  say  that  each  of  his  organs  is  so 
dependent  upon  all  the  others  that  it  cannot  be  removed 
without  altering  the  whole  organic  balance ;  or,  as  I  have 
said,  that  a  leg  is  not,  or  is  not  solely,  a  crutch.  If  we 
speak,  then,  of  one  instinct  as  referring  to  the  society,  and 


CH.  VI     CERTAIN  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  INSTINCT  GROUPS     177 

another  as  referring  to  the  individual,  we  must  always 
remember  that  each  of  necessity  implies  the  other.  In 
speaking  of  them  apart,  we  are  using  the  artifice  of  the 
mathematician  who  considers  one  set  of  symbols  to  be 
variable  and  another  as  constant,  not  as  meaning  that  the 
quantities  which  they  represent  are  really  fixed  or  in  reality 
independent,  but  simply  as  enabling  him  to  calculate  more 
easily  by  disentangling  separate  sets  of  consequences.  The 
social  qualities  are  developed  on  the  invariable  condition 
that  the  self-regarding  qualities  exist,  and  vice  versa,  and 
the  *  best '  qualities  mean  the  best  consistent  with  this 
condition." 

In  closing  this  special  discussion,  I  may  mention  that 
this  impossibility  of  separating  the  individualistic  from  the 
social  instincts  in  our  complex  lives  finds  a  parallel  in  the 
dependence  of  our  notions  of  individual  life  upon  our  notions 
of  the  social  life  of  which  we  individuals  form  a  part,  to 
which  Professors  Eoyce  and  Baldwin  have  lately  given  so 
much  prominence.  Just  as  our  individualistic  instincts 
become  marked  in  relation  to  the  social  instincts  which 
are  built  upon  and  out  of  them,  so  our  conception  of 
individuality  is  determined  by  the  existence  of  the  social 
ties  which  gives  us  our  conceptions  of  the  existence  of 
others  than  ourselves. 

We  may  now,  I  think,  lay  aside  our  doubts  engendered 
by  the  complexity  of  the  phenomena  with  which  we  have 
to  deal. 

That  there  is  a  marked  distinction,  nay  even  an  apparent 
opposition,  between  individualistic  instincts  and  both  the 
primary  and  secondary  sexual  instincts  on  the  one  hand, 
and  those  of  social  import  on  the  other  hand,  no  one  will 
question. 

When  we  take  the  next  step  I  think  we  may  hold  that 

N 


178  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  it 

the  decisive  reason  for  upholding  the  distinction  between 
the  higher  instincts  relating  to  persistence  of  species  and 
the  social  instincts  is  this,  that  the  latter  subserve  a  bio- 
logical end  quite  diverse  from  that  subserved  by  the  former, 
lead  to  the  formation  of  a  new  and  higher  grade  of  organic 
life  which  could  not  appear  were  there  no  higher  instincts 
than  those  which  protect  offspring  from  annihilation. 


CHAP.  VI  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  17& 

11. — The   Subokdination   of   Instinct   Groups,  and    of 
Instincts  within  these  Groups,  in  a  definite  order 

§  8.  I  wish  now  to  emphasise  one  point  made  rather 
incidentally  in  the  chapters  that  have  preceded  this,  viz. 
that  the  very  existence  of  these  groups  of  instincts  of 
several  orders  implies  the  subordination  of  certain  instincts 
to  other  instincts  in  relation  to  this  order :  implies  a 
hierarchy  of  the  instincts,  if  we  may  so  speak. 

If  it  be  true  that  the  instincts  relating  to  sexual 
reproduction  have  been  built  up  out  of,  or  upon,  already 
existing  individualistic  instincts,  then  it  seems  clear 
that  this  could  only  have  occurred  because  the  average 
individual  under  normal  circumstances  had  come  to  act 
instinctively  to  his  own  individual  advantage  indeed,  but 
also  in  such  manner  as  would  favour  advantageous  sexual 
reproduction.  If  in  the  end  sexual  reproduction  and  its 
attendant  protection  of  the  young  became  necessary  for  the 
continuance  of  the  species,  then  evidently  the  instincts  of 
individualistic  import  must  in  general  have  become  sub- 
ordinated to  those  of  the  higher  order,  so  that  divergence 
from  normal  individualistic  action  which  has  sexual  signi- 
ficance would  on  the  whole  be  prevented ;  for  otherwise 
these  individualistic  instincts  in  their  divergence  would 
interfere  with  the  essential  sexual  processes  and  their 
accompaniments,  and  the  race  dependent  upon  them  for  its 
persistence  would  fail  to  survive. 

In  like  manner,  if  it  be  true  that  the  instincts  of  social 
import  have  been  built  upon,  or  out  of,  already  existing 
individualistic  and  sexual  instincts,  the  latter  having  them- 
selves been  already  acquired  after  the  individualistic  instincts 
were  well  developed ;  then  it  seems  clear  that  the  social 
instincts  can  only  have  been  acquired  because  the  average 


180  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

individual  under  usual  conditions  has  come  to  act  as  an 
individual  indeed,  as  one  concerned  with  the  reproduction 
of  his  kind  indeed,  but  withal  also  with  distinct,  even 
though  unconscious,  reference  to  the  existence  of  the  social 
aggregate  of  which  he  is  a  constituent  part.  If  in  the  end 
the  struggle  for  existence  has  become  so  sharp  that  social 
combination  has  become  necessary  to  the  persistence  of  a 
species,  then  evidently  the  instincts  of  individualistic  im- 
port, as  subordinated  to  those  which  deal  with  reproduction 
and  protection  of  the  young,  must  on  the  whole  become  one 
and  all  subordinated  to  those  of  social  significance,  so  that 
divergence  from  normal  individualistic  and  sexual  action 
which  have  come  also  to  have  social  significance,  will  in 
general  tend  to  be  suppressed;  for  otherwise  these  non- 
social  instincts  in  their  divergence  would  interfere  with 
that  social  consolidation  upon  which  the  life  of  the  species 
depends,  and  the  species  would  fail  in  the  struggle  for 
persistence. 

In  other  words,  if  the  social  instincts  exist,  as  they 
do  exist,  it  is  almost  certainly  because  on  the  whole  the 
individualistic  instincts,  as  subordinated  to  those  instincts 
which  relate  to  reproduction,  have  been  in  their  turn  sub- 
ordinated to  those  instincts  which  have  social  significance. 
What  is  more,  it  is  equally  clear  that  this  subordination 
must  be  persistent  if  the  social  instincts  already  formed  are 
still  of  biological  value,  and  are  to  remain  persistent  in  the 
race  that  is  to  descend  from  ours. 

In  the  chapters  to  follow  this  I  shall  study  somewhat  in 
detail  this  subordination  of  the  instincts  of  lower  orders  to 
those  instincts  which  have  social  significance;  but  before 
doing  this  I  must  call  attention  to  some  special  facts  in 
relation  to  those  social  instincts. 

There  is  one  other  point  to  be  mentioned  before  closing 


CHAP.  VI  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  THE  INSTINCTS  181 

this  chapter,  viz.  that  we  have  been  speaking  here  of  three 
great  groups  of  instincts  only,  and  not  of  the  specific 
instincts  within  these  groups.  Between  the  groups  thus 
described  we  have  seen  reason  to  grant  the  existence  of 
a  hierarchal  order;  but  evidently  between  the  specific 
instincts  of  the  specific  groups  there  must  be  also  some- 
thing allied  to  a  hierarchal  order;  for  it  is  perfectly  clear 
that  these  instincts  within  the  great  groups  must  have  been 
formed  at  different  times  in  the  life-history  of  the  race,  and 
therefore  that  each  new  instinct  must  have  been  formed  by 
the  modification  of  previously  existing  instincts,  or  at  all 
events  with  reference  to  these  already  existing  instincts. 

It  will  thus  happen  that  the  instinct  actions  expressive 
of  the  instincts  within  a  given  group  will  necessarily  vary 
in  perfection  of  co-ordination  in  proportion  as  they  have 
existed  long,  and  have  been  often  brought  into  activity  in 
the  life-history  of  our  ancestors ;  it  will  thus  happen  that 
where  instincts  have  been  formed  approximately  at  the 
same  period  in  that  past,  the  frequency  with  which  they 
have  been  called  into  action  will  determine  the  thoroughness 
of  this  co-ordination,  and  thus  in  different  indi\dduals  we 
must  expect  to  discover  differences  in  quickness  of  response 
in  connection  with  instinctive  reactions  of  different  types. 

In  other  words,  the  hierarchy  of  efficiency  of  the  instincts 
within  the  great  groups,  and  to  a  less  extent  of  the  groups 
themselves,  will  necessarily  differ  in  different  races  and  in 
different  individuals  of  the  same  race.  We  shall  discover 
the  importance  of  this  point  in  the  chapters  relating  to 
Impulse. 


CHAPTEE    VII 

OF    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    THE    SOCIAL    ORGANISM 

§  1.  In  considering  the  subject  which  we  have  been  dis- 
cussing in  the  previous  chapters,  we  are  naturally  led  to 
note  that  an  argument  by  analogy  leads  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  social  aggregates  of  individuals  in  whom  social 
instincts  appear  must  be  themselves  organic  in  their  nature. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  the  adjustment  of  instinct 
actions  in  a  part  of  an  individual  {e.g.  the  heart)  to  the 
welfare  of  the  individual  as  a  whole,  is  a  mark  of  the 
existence  of  organic  unity  in  the  individual  to  which  this 
special  part  belongs  and  which  it  serves :  and  from  this  we 
naturally  reason,  to  use  Mr.  Leslie  Stephen's  words,^  that 
"  the  existence  of  any  specific  organ  implies  the  existence 
of  an  organism  provided  with  other  organs  discharging 
correlative  functions." 

If  then  we  note,  as  we  do,  that  individualistic  instincts 
and  those  resulting  in  the  reproduction  of  kind  are  adjusted 
to  the  welfare  or  persistence  of  social  aggregates,  we  may 
well  judge  that  this  signifies  almost  certainly  the  existence 
of  organic  unity  in  the  social  aggregates  "of  which  the 
individuals  are  elements,  and  which  these  individual 
elements  serve. 

We  raise  no  valid  objection  to  this  view  by  remarking 
upon  the  strong  sense  of  individuality  in  man,  nor  does  it 

^  Science  of  Ethics,  p.  118. 


CH.  VII        THE  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  SOCIAL  ORGANISM  183 

suffice  to  reiterate  that  social  aggregates  are  merely  fortuitous 
groups  of  individuals.  We  have  exactly  the  same  ground 
for  holding  that  all  organic  life  consists  in  naught  but  the 
fortuitous  grouping  of  elemental  cells  ;  for  it  is  evident  that, 
whatever  our  modern  doctrines  concerning  the  development 
of  organic  life  have  taught  us,  they  have  left  quite  untouched 
the  mystery  of  the  nature  of  that  bond  which  exists  between 
the  elemental  cells  in  an  organism  and  which  determines 
what  is  currently  spoken  of  as  the  "  integration  "  between 
the  several  cells  and  the  several  cell-made  parts. 

We  speak  very  glibly  of  this  "  integration,"  as  though  we 
understood  the  exact  nature  of  the  fact  in  nature  to  which 
it  refers,  whereas  the  word  is  merely  representative  of  this 
fact  and  too  often  serves  as  a  cloak  to  cover  from  our  own 
view  our  ignorance  of  the  nature  of  the  processes  involved. 
Until  we  understand  fully  the  significance  of  this  bond 
between  the  cells  of  organisms  we  are  surely  in  no  position 
to  hold  that  the  bond  differs  in  its  nature  from  that  which 
holds  together,  more  or  less  firmly,  the  individual  elements 
of  social  groups. 

Nor  does  it  seem  to  me  just  to  object,  as  Professor  J. 
Mark  Baldwin  does,^  that  "  the  true  analogy  is  not  that 
which  likens  society  to  a  physiological  organism,  but  rather 
that  which  likens  it  to  a  psychological  organisation."  For  I 
think  we  must  agree  that  the  psychological  organisation  is 
accurately  co-ordinate  with  the  physiological  organism,  the 
one  is  dependent  upon  the  other,  and  the  writer  who  likens 
society  to  a  psychological  organisation  is  therefore,  in  fact, 
likening  it  to  the  correspondent  physiological  organism  also. 
Furthermore,  there  is  in  my  opinion  greater  propriety  in 
the  latter  analogy,  because  physiological  organisms  and 
social  life  are  both  considered  on  the  same  objective  plane, 
and  are  therefore  more  justly  comparable. 

^  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  p.  544. 


184  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

§  2.  As  my  readers  well  know,  this  conception  of  the 
organic  nature  of  social  aggregates  has  been  suggested  to 
the  minds  of  many  thinkers  who  have  approached  the 
subject  from  very  diverse  points  of  view.  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer  has  laid  especial  stress  upon  the  conception,  and 
I  think  it  will  be  worth  our  while  to  examine  his  considera- 
tion of  this  subject  with  some  care,  for  so  far  as  the  notion 
is  justified  we  shall  find  it  useful  to  us  in  our  further  study. 

Mr.  Spencer  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  social 
aggregates  correspond  with  organic  forms  in  general — first, 
in  that  they  grow  ;  second,  in  that  they  increase  in  structure 
as  they  grow ;  third,  in  that  the  individuals  which  are 
supposed  to  be  elements  of  these  higher  social  organisms 
perform  different  functions ;  fourth,  in  that  the  so-called  life 
of  the  social  aggregate  may  be  destroyed  without  destruc- 
tion of  the  life  of  the  units ;  and  fifth,  in  that  the  units  may 
die  or  be  lost  to  the  aggregate  and  be  replaced  by  similarly 
functioning  units,  without  necessary  impairment  of  the 
integrity  of  the  social  aggregate  itself  Let  us  consider 
each  of  these  points  briefly. 

§  3.  1°  It  is  clearly  true  that  societies  grow :  but  it  is 
to  be  noted  that  they  grow  for  the  most  part  as  do  the  very 
low  forms  of  individual  organic  life,  by  the  aggregation  of 
like  elements  in  which  the  mass  of  the  functioning  is  the 
same  for  all ;  individual  is  added  to  individual  in  making 
up  the  social  body,  much  as  cell  is  added  to  cell  in  the 
formation  of  the  lower  organic  aggregates,  and  of  the 
elementary  parts  of  the  higher  organic  forms. 

In  the  organic  life  of  the  higher  animals,  on  the  other 
hand,  growth  is  accomplished  by  the  aggregation  of  parts 
which  function  very  differently,  and  which,  beyond  certain 
limits,  cannot  be  made  to  function  alike,  as  we  shall  see 
more  fully  below.     Intestines,  stomach,  heart,  lungs,  liver, 


CH.  VII       THE  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  SOCIAL  ORGANISM  185 

kidneys,  each  differ  in  form  and  function.  The  form  and 
functioning  of  individuals  in  their  relation  to  social 
aggregates  is  clearly  much  less  differentiated. 

§  4.  2°  That  social  aggregates,  like  organic  aggregates, 
increase  in  structure  as  they  grow  must  be  granted,  but  it 
seems  equally  clear  that  the  increase  corresponds  with  that 
found  in  the  lower  animal  life  rather  than  with  that  noted 
in  the  life  of  animals  of  the  higher  grades,  as  is  more  fully 
explained  in  the  next  paragraph. 

§  5.  3°  That  differentiation  of  functioning  is  marked  in 
social  bodies  is  of  course  agreed,  and  it  is  clear  that  the 
complex  division  of  labour  which  appears  so  prominently 
in  the  higher  civilisations  corresponds  more  or  less  accur- 
ately to  the  differential  functioning  of  parts  in  the 
individual  organism.  In  the  lower  forms  of  life  we  find 
cell-made  parts  active  in  grasping  the  prey,  others  con- 
cerned in  bringing  the  nutritive  substance  within  the  body, 
others  determining  its  absorption,  still  others  active  in 
propelling  the  organism,  and  others  in  warding  off  danger. 

So  in  the  complex  social  life  of  man,  to  take  an  extreme 
example  of  the  most  highly  elaborated  form,  we  find  the 
farmer  class  furnishing  us  with  our  food  supply,  other 
classes  dealing  with  its  distribution,  the  soldier  class  pro- 
tecting the  corporate  body,  others  giving  their  whole  time 
to  making  tools  by  which  their  fellows  may  work,  and 
others  influencing  their  companions  by  thought  and  by  the 
expression  of  thought. 

But  here  we  must  note  that  these  differences  of 
functioning  of  the  individual  elements  of  social  aggregates 
are  determined  to  a  great  extent  by  conditions  external  to 
the  individual,  just  as  in  the  lowest  forms  of  individual  life 
the  cell  elements  are  determined  to  differential  functioning 


186  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

by  differences  in  the  stimuli  from  without  which  reach 
them ;  their  varied  performance  being  due,  not  to  inherent 
differences  in  the  parts  themselves,  but  almost  altogether  to 
differentiation  of  these  external  stimuli. 

The  same  influence  of  external  circumstance  is  visible  in 
the  social  aggregates  even  where  they  are  of  the  highest 
type.  A  man,  for  example,  may  be  a  common  farmer  under 
certain  conditions,  but,  given  other  conditions,  may  find 
himself  leading  armies  to  victory:  in  other  words,  the 
elemental  individual  who,  under  certain  stimuli,  may  be  part 
of  the  apparatus  which  brings  nourishment  to  the  hypo- 
thetical social  body,  under  certain  other  stimuli  may  become 
part  of  the  protective  apparatus. 

But  in  the  higher  organic  individual  life  such  transfer  of 
function  takes  place  with  great  difficulty,  and  where  it  is 
possible  at  all  it  occurs  only  within  narrow  limits.  One 
kidney  may  indeed  learn  to  do  a  large  part  of  the  work  of 
two :  the  foot  may  learn  to  do  some  of  the  work  of  the 
hand ;  some  part  of  the  brain  cortex  even  may  learn  to  do 
the  work  of  a  part  that  has  become  extirpated  by  disease  or 
by  surgical  operation ;  but  the  change  must  take  place 
slowly,  and  the  accommodation  is  recognisedly  difficult,  even 
where  the  functioning  of  the  two  parts  involved  is  closely 
allied,  as  in  the  cases  just  mentioned :  where  the  function- 
ing is  very  diverse,  as  between  heart  and  lungs,  brain  and 
stomach,  transfer  of  function  is  known  to  be  impossible. 

In  the  life  of  the  very  highest  of  the  social  aggregates 
such  as  we  find  in  our  most  fixed  civilisations  there  is, 
as  already  indicated,  no  corresponding  difficulty  in  the 
transfer  of  function  from  individual  element  to  individual 
element. 

§  6.  4°  That  the  social  aggregate  may  be  destroyed 
without  death  of  the  individuals  of  the  aggregate  is  true. 


CH.  VII       THE  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  SOCIAL  ORGANISM  187 

and  the  same  is  true  of  the  cell  units  or  simpler  cell  parts 
of  the  lower  animals. 

But  as  animals  rise  in  the  scale  of  organisation  the  life 
of  the  parts  becomes  more  and  more  necessarily  dependent 
upon  life  in  the  whole  organism.  The  heart  of  the  frog 
will  indeed  beat  on  one's  hand  for  a  considerable  time  after 
it  is  removed  from  the  body,  but  it  cannot  live  long  apart 
from  the  body,  even  if  it  be  artificially  nourished.  Certain 
of  the  functions  which  are  determined  by  the  action  of  the 
spinal  nervous  system  will  be  carried  on  also  in  the  frog 
after  its  brain  has  been  extirpated ;  but  this  cannot 
continue  for  any  great  length  of  time ;  and  in  man,  and 
the  higher  animals  in  general,  death  of  the  organism 
involves  much  more  speedy  death  of  the  elementary  parts. 

In  the  social  aggregate,  on  the  other  hand,  what  is 
assumed  to  be  death  of  the  aggregate,  or  destruction  by 
disruption,  may  occur  without  the  production  of  any 
notable  effect  upon  the  duration  of  life  in  the  individual 
elements  of  the  aggregate.  A  tribe  of  troublesome  savages 
may  be  broken  up,  as  often  happens,  but  this  involves  no 
death  of  individuals.  In  the  higher  social  life,  Poland  and 
its  social  organisation  have  disappeared  without  loss  to  the 
world  of  those  who  would  but  for  its  disruption  make  a 
nation  to-day.  So  you  may  disrupt  cell  aggregates  without 
destroying  cell  life :  you  may  cut  certain  of  the  lower 
animal  forms  in  twain  and  you  will  speedily  find  that  you 
have  destroyed  neither  part  but  that  presently  you  have 
two  smaller  individuals,  each  complete  in  itself. 

§  7.  5°  In  the  lower  animals  we  find  that  parts  which 
have  been  lost  may  be  replaced  without  death  in  the 
organism ;  if  we  cut  off  the  claw  of  the  lobster  it  is  after  no 
long  time  replaced  and  the  animal  is  apparently  unharmed. 
It  is  correspondingly  true  that  in  social  aggregates,  social 


188  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  pakt  ii 

life  may  continue,  although  individual  elements  die ;  their 
work  being  taken  up  by  other  individuals. 

But  in  the  higher  animals  destruction  of  any  important 
part  involves  not  only  no  reproduction  of  the  part  but 
often  speedy  death  in  the  organism  as  a  whole  ;  and  in  this 
respect  there  is  no  correspondence  between  the  life  of  the 
higher  animals  and  what  is  claimed  to  be  the  life  of  the 
social  aggregate. 

§  8.  It  becomes  evident,  then,  from  each  of  the  points 
made  above  that  if  the  social  body  be  organic  it  cannot 
be  much  more  advanced  in  integration  than  those  lower 
forms  of  individual  organisms  which  are  little  more  than 
aggregations.^  This  becomes  especially  prominent  when  we 
consider,  as  we  have  above,  that  artificial  division  of  parts  of 
the  so-called  social  organism  does  not  destroy  its  life ;  great 
bodies  of  men  may  associate  themselves  together  and 
separate  themselves  in  new  colonies  without  destroying  or 
maiming  the  original  social  group :  only  in  certain  limited 
directions  do  we  see  anything  like  the  integration  of 
differently  functioning  parts  that  is  found  in  individual 
organisms  of  the  higher  types. 

Why  I  have  thought  it  necessary  to  lay  such  stress  upon 
this  point  will  appear  clear  in  the  sequel. 

§  9.  From  all  that  has  gone  before,  I  think  we  must 
see  that  we  cannot  lightly  cast  aside  the  notion  that  social 
life  is  organic  in  its  nature ;  it  seems  indeed  most  probable 
that  some  of  the  most  complex  of  developments  in  our 
fully  differentiated  life  may  have  relation  to  efficiency  in  a 
wide  social  organism. 

I  wish  here  in  passing,  however,  to  call  attention  to  the 
fact  that  we,  as  elemental  parts,  are  in  poor  position  to 

^  Cf.  Leslie  Stephen,  Science  of  Ethics. 


CH.  VII       THE  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  SOCIAL  ORGANISM  189 

judge  of  the  completeness  of  this  social  organisation,  if  it 
exist,  or  to  conceive  of  its  trend  so  far  as  it  is  effective. 

§  10.  Altogether  apart  from  the  considerations  presented 
in  the  closing  section  of  Chapter  II.,  many  of  those  who 
have  made  a  special  study  of  the  impulses  which  relate  dis- 
tinctly to  tribal  advantage  have  been  led  to  ask  whether  it 
may  not  possibly  be  true  that  tribal  life,  so  far  as  it  is 
organic,  may  have  as  its  coincident  a  "  social  consciousness  " 
correspondent  to  the  activities  of  the  hypothetical  social 
organism.  It  is  worth  while,  I  think,  to  stop  here  a  moment 
to  consider  this  question  from  our  present  point  of  view. 

As  we  have  just  seen,  the  social  organism,  so  far  as  it 
exists  at  all,  must  be  supposed  to  correspond  with  the  lower 
forms  of  animal  life  in  which  the  complexes  of  cells  are 
little  more  than  aggregated ;  rather  than  with  those  forms 
which  are  so  closely  integrated  that  they  may  be  spoken  of 
as  of  high  organic  type. 

It  is  surely  improper  to  speak  of  the  opinions  of  aggre- 
gates of  men  as  we  comprehend  them  as  a  "  social  con- 
sciousness," as  our  extreme  sociologists  oftentimes  do ;  -^  for 
the  conception  of  a  social  consciousness  implies  that  the 
thoughts  of  men  as  they  are  related  to  the  whole  pulse  of 
the  social  consciousness,  must  correspond  in  the  main  with 
particular  psychic  elements  in  us,  as  these  are  related  to 
the  whole  pulse  of  our  own  conscious  life. 

Were  the  psychic  elements  which  make  the  substance  of 
our  conscious  life  so  loosely  bound  together,  so  fortuitously 
unrelated,  as  are  the  thoughts  of  men,  we  could  certainly 
not  believe  that  out  of  these  more  or  less  isolated  psychic 
elements  anything  could  arise  correspondent  to  conscious- 
ness as  we  know  it.      Only  where  we  perceive  close  com- 

1  Cf.  the  late  French  Sociologists,  who  speak  of  imitation  as  social 
memory. 


190  INSTINCT  AND  REASON.  part  ii 

munity  of  impulse,  and  identity  of  thought  amongst  large 
masses  of  men,  can  we  imagine  the  existence  of  anything 
approaching  to  a  social  consciousness,  and  even  then  this 
social  consciousness  would  be  of  a  grade  much  lower  than 
human  consciousness  as  we  know  it. 

Furthermore,  even  if  we  suppose,  for  argument's  sake, 
that  a  social  consciousness  does  exist,  of  which  our  thoughts 
are  mere  elements,  and  the  possibility  of  such  existence  I 
agree  to,  what  reason,  I  would  ask,  have  we  to  believe  that 
our  elemental  thought  can  in  any  way  grasp  the  content  of 
this  hypothetical  social  consciousness  ?  As  well  might  we 
expect  the  elements  of  our  psychic  life,  say  our  sensations, 
to  grasp  the  complex  resultant  which  we  call  our  conscious- 
ness. He  would  be  a  bold  psychologist  who  would  suggest 
that  a  sensation  could  appreciate  our  higher  life  of  reflection, 
however  much  we  may  believe  in  the  effect  of  the  one  upon 
the  other. 

If  there  be  perchance,  correspondent  to  our  individual 
consciousness,  a  social  consciousness  of  sufficiently  high 
grade,  it  may  know  our  thoughts  as  elements,  much  as  we 
appreciate  the  existence  of  our  own  sensations  and  their 
elementary  qualities ;  and  it  may  have  means  of  expression 
that  are  effective  for  other  consciousnesses  of  its  own  order ; 
but  we  as  elements  of  this  wider  consciousness  can  surely 
not  be  able  to  grasp  even  dimly  the  nature  of  that  higher 
consciousness  which,  if  it  exist,  must  be  determined  by  the 
pulse  of  thought  of  many  interrelated  individual  conscious- 
nesses. What  sociologists  are  often  tempted  to  speak  of  as 
the  "  social  consciousness "  should  therefore  properly  be 
spoken  of  merely  as  the  related  consciousnesses  of  the 
individuals  composing  social  groups.  Of  the  possibility  of 
our  conscious  appreciation  of  this  social  consciousness  in  an 
indirect  manner  I  have  already  spoken  in  the  last  section  of 
Chapter  II. 


CH.  VII        THE  CONCEPTIOIT  OF  THE  SOCIAL  ORGANISM  191 

§  11.  One  more  point.  If  it  be  true  that  social  aggre- 
gates are  organic,  and  that  this  organic  nature  is  of  a  low 
order,  then  it  is  clearly  impossible  that  the  hypothetical 
social  body  can  be  able  to  perform  functions  correspondent 
to  those  which  in  individual  life  are  performed  only  in 
organic  forms  of  a  most  complex  order. 

The  hypothetical  social  body,  if  it  exist,  may  indeed  be 
counted  on  to  perform  the  differential  actions  that  relate  to 
the  lower  forms  of  assimilative  life,  and  those  which  relate  to 
simple  forms  of  self-protection.  Just  as  soon,  however,  as  we 
assume  that  this  hypothetical  social  organism  can  perform 
great  complex  work  correspondent  to  the  higher  grades  of 
work  done  by  a  highly-organised  individual,  with  all  his 
parts  thoroughly  integrated,  we  must  expect  to  find  our 
assumption  unverified :  we  must  expect  the  social  function- 
ing thus  attempted  to  fail,  because  the  aggregate  in  such 
directions  fails  to  act  as  an  integrated  unit,  because  it  easily 
loses  its  organic  structure  and  becomes  a  mere  cumbersome 
machine  with  parts  working  together  in  time,  but  under  no 
co-ordinated  and  integrated  system.  This  is  a  thought 
which  it  seems  to  me  our  thorough-going  Socialists  may 
well  take  into  serious  consideration  in  these  times. 

I  would  also  note  that  the  correspondence  between  the 
social  organisation  and  the  organisation  of  very  low  types  of 
individual  animal  life  indicates  rather  clearly  that  there  is 
little  likelihood  that  any  approach  to  a  very  high  grade  of 
social  organisation  will  ever  be  attained  in  the  human  race. 

We  note  in  our  study  of  the  lower  life  that  types  of 
very  low  organisation  still  exist  in  what  we  surmise  to  be 
the  very  earliest  forms  which  have  appeared.  Individual 
cells  of  this  type  have  never  bound  themselves  together 
into  complex  organisms  in  which  the  elements  subordinate 
themselves  to  the  welfare  of  the  aggregate.  The  conditions 
of  their  environment  are   such   that   they   are  capable   of 


192  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

existence,  and  of  reproduction  of  kind,  without  co-operation 
with  other  like  elements. 

There  are  other  types  in  which  co-operation  between 
elemental  cells  has  become  habitual,  but  in  which  it  is  not 
necessary ;  which  form  aggregates  indeed,  but  aggregates 
which  are  constantly  breaking  up  into  simpler  masses  when- 
ever disturbances  occur  in  their  environment. 

To  this  latter  type  our  social  organisms  are  to  my  mind 
closely  allied.  We  do  as  individuals  habitually  co-operate 
under  normal  conditions,  and  in  certain  cases  the  co-operation 
has  become  so  efficient  as  to  develop  specialised  individuals, 
cases  which  we  see  exemplified  in  the  caste  system,  against 
which,  in  its  extreme  forms,  our  whole  nature  revolts. 

But  there  is  no  evidence  that  future  civilisation  will  be 
dependent  upon  any  persistence  of  the  differentiations  of  a 
nature  allied  to  those  we  see  in  the  caste  systems.  As  a 
matter  of  fact  we  know  that  in  the  oldest  of  civilisations, 
like  that  of  India,  where  the  caste  systems  attract  attention, 
every  great  reform  in  philosophy  and  religion  has  had  for 
one  of  its  aims  the  attempt  to  break  down  the  caste  system 
of  differentiation  and  specialisation,  by  the  preaching  of  the 
brotherhood  and  the  equality  of  man. 

In  our  own  western  civilisation,  which  clearly  shows 
signs  of  being  of  an  advanced  type,  of  bringing  man  into 
better  relation  with  his  environment  than  any  of  the  older 
civilisations,  we  see  exemplified  most  notably  the  protest 
against  the  subordination  of  the  individual  to  the  higher 
organisation  of  the  social  whole.  Nothing  else  than  this 
does  the  strife  for  individual  liberty  mean ;  a  strife  which, 
for  the  most  part,  really  leads  to  the  adoption  of  current 
theoretical  socialistic  doctrines  themselves,  which  doctrines, 
however,  if  carried  into  practice  would  involve  most  cer- 
tainly the  overthrow  of  individual  liberty. 

That  I  believe  that  social  organisation  of  a  low  type 


CH.  VII        THE  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  SOCIAL  ORGANISM  193 

exists,  and  will  continue  to  exist,  the  reader  by  this  time 
realises :  this  is  shown  in  the  very  fact  that  we  note  social 
instincts  and  impulses  within  ourselves.  But  that  this 
social  organisation  will  not  become  of  a  high  order  in  any 
age  to  which  we  can  look  forward,  I  think  very  certain  ; 
and  that  it  will  ever  become  of  a  high  order  seems  to  me 
very  doubtful,  unless  the  surface  of  our  planet  in  some 
future  day  be  so  overcharged  with  mankind  that  contest  of 
races  for  survival  will  tend  to  bring  about  the  elimination  of 
all  races  but  those  which  can  act  thoroughly  as  units. 
Before  that  day  can  come  our  ideals  of  individual  liberty 
must  dissolve  away  and  vanish. 


CHAPTEK  VIII 
THE  GOVERNING  INSTINCT— THE  RELIGIOUS  INSTINCT 

I. — Of  the  EXCESSIVE  Tendency  to  Variation  in  Social 

Aggregates 

§  1.  The  argument  of  the  preceding  chapter  seems  to  me 
to  compel  us  to  agree  that  social  organisation  of  a  low 
grade  does  actually  exist ;  although  it  at  the  same  time 
emphasises  the  limits  which  necessarily  attach  to  the  con- 
ception of  the  social  organism.  Let  us  now  consider  in 
some  detail  one  of  the  necessary  implications  of  this  argu- 
ment. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  the  very  existence  of  the  social 
instincts  in  us  compels  us  to  the  conclusion  that  the  indi- 
vidualistic instincts,  as  subordinated  to  those  instincts  which 
relate  to  reproduction,  must  in  the  past  have  been  sub- 
ordinated in  their  turn  to  the  instincts  of  social  significance  ; 
and  this  leads  us  to  the  further  conclusion  that  this  sub- 
ordination must  be  conserved  if  the  social  instincts  already 
formed  are  still  of  biological  value,  and  are  to  remain 
ef&cient  in  our  descendants. 

In  making  this  concise  statement  I  of  course  assume 
that  the  reader  has  followed  my  previous  argument  with 
conviction ;  but  I  fear  that  I  may  speak  to  some  who  are 
not  satisfied  as  to  the  validity  of  the  whole  argument,  and 
who   hesitate   to    accept    the    suggestion    that    the    sexual 


CHAP.  VIII  VARIATION  IN  SOCIAL  AGGREGATES  195 

instincts  have  been  later  in  formation  than  those  of  indi- 
vidualistic import.  For  such  readers  it  is  perhaps  worth 
while  to  note  that,  even  if  they  do  not  grant  this  point,  at 
least  they  must  acknowledge  that  the  social  instincts  are  of 
later  acquisition  than  the  individualistic  ones,  and  if  they 
make  this  concession  they  will  find  that  the  general  argu- 
ment to  follow  will  not  be  invalidated  even  if  the  statement 
which  they  hesitate  to  accept  be  repudiated. 

It  must  be  granted,  then,  that  if  we  can  reason  from  past 
values  to  present  values,  then  it  must  be  of  biological  im- 
portance to-day  that  the  individualistic  instincts,  as  modified, 
be  subordinated  to  those  instincts  which  are  of  social  import ; 
and  if  this  be  true,  then  it  is  evident  that  on  the  whole 
radical  variation  from  what  we  have  seen  to  be  the  estab- 
lished order  of  subordination  must  be  repressed.  But  I 
think  it  is  not  at  all  difficult  to  show  that  variation  from 
this  established  order  is  very  likely  indeed  to  become  over- 
emphasised under  the  conditions  which  surround  man's 
complex  social  life. 

It  is  here  that  the  importance  of  the  analogy  between 
social  organisation  and  the  lower  forms  of  individual  organi- 
sation becomes  apparent.  We  have  noted  that  in  all 
organic  forms  the  parts  of  the  organism  are  so  formed  that 
they  act  for  the  welfare  of  themselves  and  of  the  organism 
also,  under  normal  conditions ;  but  that  if  conditions  be 
abnormal  then  the  parts  tend,  as  before,  to  act  for  them- 
selves, but  without  the  same  regard  to  the  welfare  of  the 
whole  organism. 

Anticipating  to  some  extent  what  will  presently  be 
more  fully  treated  we  may  here  call  attention  to  certain 
points  of  interest  in  this  connection :  first,  that  variation 
is  brought  about  by  the  forceful  stimulation  of  some  special 
part  which  is  thus  induced  to  act  for  itself  without  reference 
to   the  whole  organism :  but  second,  that  the  tendency  to 


196  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

variation  is  emphasised  whenever  the  integration  between 
the  several  parts  is  of  a  low  order  :  and  third,  that  increasing 
complexity  of  structure  in  the  mass  tends  to  reduce  the 
efficiency  of  integral  bonds ;  for  evidently  if  the  relations 
between  the  parts  of  individual  organisms  are  relatively 
simple,  the  influence  from  the  whole  aggregate  upon  certain 
parts  that  are  stimulated  is  likely  to  be  more  quickly  felt 
than  in  a  complex  organism  in  which  the  total  system  is 
built  up  of  many  subordinate  systems  variously  integrated 
and  differently  related. 

All  of  these  influences  tend  to  break  up  organic  indi- 
viduals of  low  type  into  unrelated  constituent  elements ; 
tend  to  destroy  the  low  grade  organic  individual  life ;  or 
even  if  this  destruction  be  not  affected,  tend  to  reduce  re- 
actions of  intimate  relation  which  lead  to  individual 
efficiency. 

Now  if  social  aggregates  are  very  complex  organisms 
analogous  to  the  lower  forms  of  individual  life,  then,  in 
consequence  of  their  very  loose  integration  and  of  their  very 
complexity,  we  should  expect  to  discover  existent  in  them 
the  second  and  third  tendencies  mentioned  above,  leading 
to  the  emphasis  of  variation  from  typical  actions  of  social 
significance ;  and  consequently  wherever  the  stimuli  to 
individualistic  instinct  actions  are  powerful  we  should 
expect  to  find  a  tendency  to  the  overthrow  of  that  order 
of  instinct  subordination  which  we  have  seen  to  be  so 
important  to  our  racial  life. 

§  2.  Let  us  see  how  far  the  view  above  expressed  is 
corroborated  by  experience ;  and  first  let  us  consider  again 
the  results  of  excessive  stimulation.  The  effect  of  the  force- 
ful action  of  an  element  in  an  individual  body,  as  it  appears 
even  in  animals  of  a  higher  type,  has  already  been  illus- 
trated by  the  action  of  heart  and  lungs  and  intestines,  which 


CHAP.  VIII  VARIATION  IN  SOCIAL  AGGREGATES  197 

at  times,  under  special  stimuli,  act  to  their  own  advantage 
but  to  the  destruction  of  the  individual  of  which  they  form 
a  part.  Such  forcefulness  of  reaction  will  of  course  follow 
where  the  stimulus  which  affects  a  given  element  is  unusually- 
powerful;  but  it  is  to  be  noted  that  we  obtain  what  is 
practically  an  excessive  stimulation  whenever  the  influences 
from  the  organism  are  not  habitually  called  into  play  with 
a  force  relatively  equivalent,  in  answer  to  the  stimulus  in 
question. 

When  we  turn  to  consider  the  low  grade  social  organism 
I  think  it  must  be  clear  to  the  reader  that  the  very  con- 
ditions that  are  essentially  bound  up  with  the  increase  in 
complication  of  our  life  as  individual  elements  of  a  social 
community  tend  to  bring  into  prominence  the  forceful 
presentation  of  unusual  conditions  which  seem  to  demand 
immediate  reactions,  but  reactions  on  lines  in  relation  to 
which  our  instincts  have  apparently  no  teaching  to  give. 

It  is  especially  to  be  noted  that  the  rdcUive  excess  of 
certain  stimuli  which  naturally  lead  to  individualistic  re- 
action becomes  of  marked  importance  here,  for  the  reason 
that  the  racial  influences  are  effective,  as  we  have  seen 
above,  rather  because  they  act  through  very  many  phases 
of  life,  than  because  they  act  forcefully  in  any  specific 
instance.  For  this  reason  clearly  these  racial  influences 
must  be  expected  to  be  slower  in  reaction  than  those  of  a 
lower  order,  and  less  powerful  unless  they  are  allowed  time 
in  which  to  develop :  hence  the  stimuli  to  individualistic 
reaction  must  be  often  liable  to  be  excessive,  relatively 
speaking,  in  comparison  with  the  stimuli  to  reactions  of 
social  significance. 

Thus  it  comes  about  that  under  special  stress  individuals 
tend  to  act  as  individuals  rather  than  as  members  of  a 
social  body,  and  thus  often  some  emphatic  presentation  to 
the  mind  of  the  opposition  which  individualism  is  making 


198  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  ii 

to  the  racial  demands  is  required,  or  perhaps  a  summation 
of  such  emphatic  presentations,  in  order  to  bring  the  racial 
impulses  into  play. 

A  man  may  sin  against  his  social  impulses  thoughtlessly 
where  he  acts  without  consideration  and  where  his  act  is 
not  of  marked  influence  upon  his  life.  But  finding  himself 
about  to  commit  some  flagrant  immorality  he  is  forced  upon 
occasion  to  attend  to  what  he  is  doing,  his  social  impulses 
are  brought  into  prominence,  his  proposed  act  appears 
distinctly  as  deliberative,  and  this  may  suddenly  "bring 
him  to  himself "  as  we  say ;  may  lead  him  to  realise  the 
existence  of  the  non- individualistic,  the  social  impulses 
within ;  may  lead  him  to  recognise  his  guilt  and  to  reform. 

So  also  do  we  often  without  protest  allow  our  neighbours 
to  act  in  opposition  to  our  social  impulses  where  the  acts 
are  not  distinct  enough  to  arouse  immediate  resentment ; 
but  the  summational  effect  of  the  repetition  of  such  sins 
will  finally  bring  about  a  reaction  which  leads  to  the 
condemnation  of  the  sinner.  How  often  does  the  un- 
scrupulous politician  come  to  believe  that  the  masses  have 
lost  all  moral  sense,  because  he  sees  no  opposition  to  his 
action ;  how  often  is  he  surprised  when,  after  many  repeti- 
tions of  crimes  against  their  every-day  morality,  he  finds 
them  suddenly  arising  in  revolt,  upon  what  seems  to  him 
to  be  a  most  trivial  indiscretion  on  his  part ;  finds  them, 
moved  by  a  deep-lying  moral  sense,  thrusting  him  aside  as 
an  unworthy  servant. 

§  3.  Again,  in  considering  the  action  of  parts  of  an 
individual  organism  we  have  seen  that  variance  caused  by 
excess  of  stimulation,  positive  or  relative,  will  be  emphasised 
if  the  integration  existing  between  the  parts  is  of  a  weak 
order ;  in  other  words,  elemental  variant  action  will  be 
more  likely  to  take  place  in  those  animals  in  which  the 


CHAP.  VIII  VARIATION  IN  SOCIAL  AGGREGATES  199 

elemental  parts  are  less  closely  inter-related,  than  in  those 
in  which  the  elemental  parts  are  more  closely  inter-related. 

If  now  we  turn  our  thought  to  the  social  analogue,  we 
note  clearly  that  in  the  racial  life  of  man,  in  very  many 
cases,  the  bond  of  interdependence  between  individuals  is 
a  very  weak  one  indeed :  the  ties  that  have  held  the  aggre- 
gate together  may  with  little  difficulty  be  broken,  and 
new  aggregates  with  changed  relations  may  be  formed. 
This  is  amply  illustrated  wherever  the  restraints  due  to 
social  instincts  are  removed :  we  find  a  marked  emphasis 
of  individualistic  traits  whenever  conditions  of  social  life 
are  radically  altered. 

The  Anglo-Saxon,  even  though  reared  under  the  valuable 
restraints  of  a  refined  life  in  a  highly  civilised  community, 
finds  it  all  too  easy  to  fall  into  the  habits  of  loose  morality 
of  the  semi,  or  wholly,  barbaric  races  with  which  he  may 
find  himself  domiciled  in  the  Colonies.  The  European  who 
revolts  against  slavery  at  home,  uses  what  is  practically 
slave  labour  in  Africa,  when  he  finds  himself  powerful  by 
its  means.  The  frontiersman  who  would  have  scorned  to 
murder  before  emigration,  scarcely  hesitates  to  kill  the 
poor  savage  who  happens  in  his  way. 

Now  it  seems  to  me  that,  even  if  we  do  not  assume  the 
validity  of  the  parallelism  with  the  lower  grades  of  animal 
life  which  is  so  naturally  suggested,  it  becomes  evident 
from  the  very  examples  just  given,  to  which  the  reader 
will  be  able  to  add  many  others,  that  this  lack  of  inter- 
relation, of  interdependence,  in  itself  involves  an  exaggera- 
tion of  the  tendency  within  us  to  act  individually  instead  of 
racially ;  and  this  emphasis  of  the  individualistic  influences 
will  be  likely  to  appear  whenever  the  weak  bonds  of  inter- 
dependence are  broken,  or  where  their  relations  of  efficiency 
are  altered ;  and  I  think  it  will  be  acknowledged  that  in 
the   very  nature   of  our   exceedingly  varied   and   complex 


200  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

civilisation  such  alterations  and  breaks  as  those  to  which  I 
have  just  referred  by  examples  are  exceedingly  likely  to  occur. 

§  4.  Again,  in  our  study  of  individual  life  we  noted 
that  increase  of  complexity  must  lead  to  the  emphasis  of 
variation ;  and  when  we  turn  to  the  consideration  of  social 
life  I  think  we  cannot  hesitate  to  agree  that  we  have  here 
a  most  potent  influence  favouring  this  emphasis.  The  very 
marked  complexity  of  our  social  life  is  indeed  self-evident, 
and  I  do  not  believe  my  reader  will  hesitate  to  agree  that 
this  complexity  of  influences  which  impress  us,  producing 
as  it  does  an  enormous  variety  of  positively  or  relatively 
forceful  stimulations,  itself  impHes  emphasis  of  variance ; 
and  the  more  complex  the  life  becomes,  the  more  distracting 
the  stimuli  to  action,  the  greater  will  appear  the  danger  of 
disadvantageous  subordination  of  the  social  impulses  to 
those  of  individualistic  import,  the  danger  of  a  reversal  of 
that  order  of  instinct  emphasis  which  Nature  impresses 
upon  us. 

§  5.  There  is  another  and  most  important  influence 
which  leads  us  to  emphasise  variation  from  that  order  of 
instinct  subordination  which  we  have  seen  Nature  would 
have  conserved  in  our  lives. 

"We  have  seen  in  the  fourth  chapter,  where  we  discussed 
at  length  the  nature  of  instinct,  that  instinct  actions  tend 
to  become  unconscious  as  we  say ;  and  that  this  movement 
towards  unconsciousness  occurs  in  certain  cases  where  these 
actions  have  become  thoroughly  co-ordinated,  so  that  their 
instinct  feelings  do  not  become  forceful  in  the  pre-eminent 
consciousness :  and  again  we  have  seen  that  this  happens 
also  where  these  instinct  feelings  become  disconnected  from 
the  brain  consciousness,  either  through  incommensurability 
of  rhythm  or  by  other  means. 


Li  I 


CHAP.  VIII  VARIATION  IN  SOCIAL  AGGREGATES  201 

But  demands  for  vigorous  reactions  of  distinctly  in- 
dividualistic significance  when  they  are  emphasised  by 
rationalistic  considerations  do  not  show  this  tendency  to 
become  unconscious ;  and  hence  these  demands,  not  being 
so  likely  to  lose  their  forcefulness  in  our  psychic  life,  are 
the  more  likely  to  be  influential  in  subverting  the  established 
order  of  instinct  emphasis. 

§  6.  This  movement  towards  unconsciousness  is  im- 
portant to  the  emphasis  of  variation  in  quite  another  way ; 
for  it  will  be  evident  to  the  reader,  as  soon  as  his  attention 
is  drawn  to  it,  that  individually  acquired  habits  of  action 
tend  to  become  unconscious  exactly  as  the  instincts  do ;  if 
persisted  in  they  gradually  become  more  and  more  fully 
co-ordinated,  and  less  and  less  forceful  on  their  conscious 
side ;  in  fact  they  seem  in  extreme  cases  to  become  entirely 
disconnected  in  their  action  from  the  active  working  con- 
sciousness. The  pianist  when  he  begins  to  learn  to  play 
upon  his  instrument  finds  his  practice  accompanied  by 
laborious  conscious  effort ;  but  when  he  becomes  a  virtuoso 
the  technique  becomes  less  and  less  prominent  in  his 
thought,  and  finally  we  find  him  thinking  solely  of  the 
expression,  considering  at  most  only  the  effect  upon  his 
audience  of  the  emotional  trains  that  arise  in  his  mind  and 
which  he  interprets  by  means  of  his  instrument. 

If  the  same  processes  are  at  work  in  the  building  up 
of  these  individually  acquired  habit  reflexes  and  of  the 
instincts,  then  evidently  the  same  or  very  similar  phases 
of  consciousness  will  be  attached  to  the  two  diverse  sets 
of  activities  at  corresponding  stages  of  their  development. 

It  becomes  clear,  then,  that  the  very  processes  which  in 
the  racial  life  of  the  past  have  tended  to  make  instincts 
less  and  less  conscious,  do  in  our  individual  lives  tend  to 
produce  unconsciousness   of  the  acquired  activities  which 


202  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

originally  result  from  ratiocination  entirely  within  conscious- 
ness :  and  hence  individually  acquired  habits  which  are 
clearly  conscious  in  their  inception  may  become  all  but 
pure  reflexes,  and  their  psychic  effects  throughout  this 
movement  towards  unconsciousness  will  then  be  so  closely 
allied  to  the  psychic  effects  produced  by  instincts  that  we 
will  be  very  liable  to  confound  the  true  instinct  with  the 
acquired  habit,  which  may  have  no  biological  significance 
whatever. 

Individually  acquired  traits  may  become  habitual  in 
certain  groups  of  men ;  and  habit,  and  custom,  may  lead 
to  their  enforcement  because  of  their  retention  from  one 
generation  to  another :  and  thus  what  are  no  more  than 
habits  gained  by  the  teaching  of  others  may  also  come  to 
be  mistaken  for  true  instincts. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  in  our  complex  life  we  should 
expect  it  often  to  be  most  easy  to  mistake  the  leadings  of 
the  individual  habit  reflexes  above  spoken  of  for  true 
instinctive  leadings ;  ^  and  this  tendency  to  fail  to 
differentiate  the  habits  acquired  by  deliberate  action  in  the 
life  of  the  individual,  from  the  instincts  proper  which  belong 
to  his  race,  will  evidently  lead  to  a  distinct  danger  of  over- 

1  It  is  evidently  most  important  that  we  should  learn  to  distinguish 
between  the  true  instincts  and  these  individual  habit  reflexes  which  grow 
upon  all  of  us  :  for  evidently  individual  habit  may  lead  to  distinct  racial  loss. 
The  habits  of  the  musical  virtuoso,  for  instance,  could  not  but  be  of  distinct 
disadvantage  if  adopted  by  the  average  man.  It  is  needless  to  speak  of  the 
acquired  habits  of  alcoholic  drinkers  and  opium  smokers  to  emphasise  what 
I  mean. 

The  importance  of  this  distinction  will  become  very  clear  when  we  note 
that  we  as  individuals  are  not  responsible  for  the  true  instincts,  while  we  are 
responsible  for  the  emphasis  of  the  habit  reflexes,  and  for  their  effects  upon 
ourselves,  upon  our  neighbours,  and  upon  our  descendants. 

The  differentiation  of  the  instincts  from  the  individually  acquired  habit 
reflexes  is  determined  by  the  fact  that  the  instincts  are  surer  to  be  produced 
by  widely  varying  individual  conditions  :  when  what  appears  to  be  an  instinct 
within  us  wavers,  and  fails  to  react  with  certainty,  or  is  not  felt  by  our 
companions  of  similar  ancestry,  then  we  may  at  once  suspect  that  it  is  not  a 
true  instinct  but  an  individual  habit  reflex. 


CHAP.  VIII  VARIATION  IN  SOCIAL  AGGREGATES  203 

emphasis  of  the  individual  variant  influence  where  it  may- 
come  in  conflict  with  the  racial  influence. 

§  7.  In  our  life  of  struggle  another  important  source  of 
the  over-emphasis  of  individualistic  impulses  is  to  be  found 
in  the  fact  that  in  not  a  few  cases  success  in  life  for  which 
we  all  strive,  as  that  success  is  usually  gauged,  is  attained 
most  fully  by  those  who  fail  to  appreciate  the  importance 
of  the  higher  racial  instincts. 

That  honesty  is  the  best  policy  has  become  a  proverb 
because  by  the  use  of  it  men  try  to  persuade  themselves 
that  those  who  win  success  through  disingenuousness  stand  on 
dangerous  ground.  But  it  must  be  confessed  that  the  mass 
of  fortunes,  by  the  attainment  of  which  in  our  day  success 
is  largely  gauged,  have  been  reached  by  skilful  dishonesty. 

I  think  it  cannot  be  questioned  that  autocratic  power 
has  in  the  past  been  gained  almost  entirely  by  what  the 
best  of  us  nowadays  would  call  immoral  methods,  and  that 
political  power  is  to-day  for  the  most  part  reached  by 
means  which  honourable  men  of  the  world  would  not 
condone  in  the  conduct  of  their  own  affairs.  Yet  to  rise  to 
eminence  as  conquerors  and  as  political  leaders  is  surely 
counted  as  success. 

That  licentiousness  and  other  immoralities  are  no  bar  to 
social  distinction  is  as  true  to-day  as  it  was  in  the  days 
of  old. 

Now  without  question  these  three  attainments  above 
mentioned,  wealth,  power,  and  social  distinction,  are  all 
counted  most  desirable ;  and  yet  they  are  all  gained  almost 
without  exception  by  the  emphasis  of  purely  individualistic 
traits :  self-love,  self-protection,  self-glorification,  dominance 
over  others  for  the  personal  gratification  gained,  theft  of 
others'  goods,  destruction  of  one's  enemies  and  of  what  belongs 
to  them  and  gives  them  power. 


204  INSTINCT  AND  KEASON  paet  ii 

What  wonder,  then,  that  these  individualistic  traits  have 
a  special  fascination  ;  a  fascination  that  does  not  and  cannot 
attach  to  those  habits  of  social  value  which  are  the  outcome 
of  impulses  that  give  no  individual  importance,  but  which 
tend  rather  to  bring  about  subordination  of  the  welfare  of 
the  individual  to  the  welfare  of  the  race  of  which  he  is  a 
mere  element :  what  wonder  that  this  fascination  leads  to  the 
alteration  of  that  relation  of  social  to  individualistic  instincts 
which  Nature  would  impress  upon  us. 

§  8.  In  a  future  chapter  I  shall  attempt  to  show  that 
reasoned  processes  are  the  latest  and  highest  development 
of  the  variant  principle  in  us.  The  power  of  this  later 
development  of  the  variant  principle  to  become  effective  is 
much  enhanced  by  the  co  -  ordinate  growth  of  habits  of 
reflection  in  connection  with  the  action  of  the  fundamental 
"  instinct  to  imitate  "  which  is  so  powerful  in  us  all. 

It  is  apparent  that  the  individual  variations  determined 
by  process  of  ratiocination,  if  this  process  stood  alone,  would 
in  many  cases  affect  the  lives  of  the  reasoners  too  lightly  to 
make  these  variations  determinants  in  any  part  of  life's 
struggle,  and  thus  to  fix  them  in  the  race  to  which  the 
individuals  belong.  There  is  no  conflict  of  opinion  and 
survival  of  opinion  in  a  sense  co-ordinate  with  the  conflict 
for  and  survival  of  life.  There  is  no  destruction  of  one 
conception  by  another.  Survival  of  an  opinion  must 
evidently  depend  largely  upon  the  survival  of  the  race 
holding  that  opinion,  and  this  survival  may  often  be  only 
incidentally  affected  by  the  opinion  itself.  In  tribal 
contests,  famine  or  the  sword  of  a  more  muscular  or 
numerous  neighbour  may  blot  out  a  race  in  which  subtlety 
of  thought  has  been  developed  to  a  much  higher  degree 
than  it  has  been  developed  in  the  race  that  conquers  and 
survives. 


CHAP.  VIII  VARIATION  IN  SOCIAL  AGGREGATES  205 

On  the  other  hand,  the  man  who  reflects  and  reasons 
pictures  the  life  of  his  fellow-man  as  it  differs  from  his  own, 
and  if  his  imagination  of  the  totality  of  results  of  certain 
habits  in  his  neighbour  is  on  the  whole  more  pleasant  than 
the  picture  of  the  results  of  his  own  differing  habits  there 
is  aroused  within  him  a  tendency,  not  necessarily  recognised 
as  such,  to  follow  his  inborn  "  imitative  instincts  "  and  to 
alter  his  mode  of  life  to  accord  with  that  of  his  fellow. 

This  process  would  be  effective  to  alter  moral  standards, 
and  in  ways  which  would  be  almost  entirely  indifferent  so 
far  as  the  laws  of  direct  struggle  for  existence  are  concerned. 
These  latter  laws  would  not  take  effect  in  connection  with 
these  differentiations  until  the  alteration  of  thought  had 
affected  belief,  and  the  action  connected  with  belief  had  been 
itself  influenced  in  some  direction  that  related  to  the  sur- 
vival contest.  So  long  as  these  changes  of  mode  of  life  and 
standards  were  indifferent,  so  far  as  the  general  welfare  was 
concerned,  they  might  continue  to  gain  in  strength :  when 
they  became  well  established  they  might  become  distinctly 
advantageous  or  disadvantageous  to  the  race,  and  then  indeed 
they  would  become  factors  of  importance  in  connection  with 
the  law  of  survival :  but  from  the  ethical  point  of  view  the 
law  of  imitation  after  reflection  is  the  more  important  law 
to  be  considered  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  formation  of  new 
standards ;  and  the  development  of  this  imitative  instinct 
in  the  higher  life  of  man,  which  is  acknowledged  by  all 
psychologists  to-day,  makes  it  a  most  potent  factor  in 
that  emphasis  of  variation  through  reason  which  we  are 
considering. 

§  9.  It  seems  to  me  that  enough  has  been  said  to 
establish  my  point :  I  think  it  will  be  acknowledged  that 
with  the  growth  in  complexity  of  life  in  communities,  as  we 
experience  it,  there  will  be  many  forces  at  work  leading  to 


206  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

a  repressal  of  racial  influences,  and  to  an  emphasis  of 
individual  variant  ones ;  and  this  will  necessarily  tend  to 
invert  the  established  supremacy  of  social  to  individualistic 
instincts ;  will  tend  to  break  up  the  life  of  the  low  grade 
social  organism  which,  lacking  in  integrative  force,  is  always 
ready  to  lose  its  organic  nature  through  that  emphasis  of  in- 
dividualism which  arises  in  connection  with  variation  from 
the  typical  social  form  of  action. 

But  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  development  of  the 
higher  social  life,  so  far  as  we  can  judge,  is  determined  by 
a  reverse  process,  viz.  by  the  subordination  of  the  individual 
variant  influences  to  the  racial  influences  :  by  the  subordina- 
tion of  individualistic  instincts,  as  modified  in  relation  to 
reproductive  efiiciency,  to  those  of  social  significance. 

For,  as  we  have  noted  above,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive 
how  any  instinct  can  have  been  fixed  in  a  race,  unless  we 
suppose  that  the  individual  of  the  species  acquiring  the 
instinct  has  been  better  adapted  to  existence  in  his  environ- 
ment as  the  result  of  following  this  instinct  than  he  would 
have  been  had  he  allowed  variations  to  prevail.  And  in 
reference  to  the  higher,  the  social,  instincts,  which  we  are 
here  especially  considering,  it  is  peculiarly  difficult  to 
conceive  how  they  can  have  been  fixed  in  the  race,  unless 
we  suppose  that  on  the  whole  the  individual  is  indirectly 
better  adapted  to  exist  in  his  environment,  and  to  perpetuate 
his  kind,  as  a  member  of  a  social  group,  than  would  have 
been  the  case  had  he  not  acted  as  a  part  of  a  social  group 
by  the  subordination  of  his  instincts  in  the  definite  order 
we  have  already  described. 

If  all  this  be  true,  if  on  the  whole  variation  from  the 
order  of  instinct  emphasis  which  Nature  has  impressed  upon 
us  must  of  necessity  be  repressed,  and  yet  if  under  the 
conditions  of  human  life  this  variation  tends  to  become 
emphatic,  then  it  seems  clear  that  perfection  of  racial  life 


CHAP.  VIII  VARIATION  IN  SOCIAL  AGGREGATES  207 

would  seem  to  demand  the  evolution  in  the  race  of  a 
Governing  Instinct ;  of  an  instinct  of  a  new  and  higher 
order,  which  would  be  regulative  of  reason  in  its  relation 
to  instinct;  which  would  tend  to  suppress  the  variant 
principle  and  to  emphasise  the  force  of  instinctive  appeal ; 
which  would  produce  emphasis  of  instincts  as  a  class,  and 
subordinate  processes  of  ratiocination  to  impulse ;  which 
would  lead  to  the  strengthening  of  the  social  instincts, 
and  to  the  subordination  to  them  of  the  instincts  of 
individualistic  import  as  modified  in  relation  to  re- 
productive efficiency. 

It  remains  for  us  to  enquire  whether  there  be  any 
evidence  of  the  formation  of  such  a  governing  instinct, 
and  to  this  enquiry  we  shall  now  turn. 


208  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  n 

11. — Of  the  means  ISTature  adopts  to  repeess  Excessive 
Variation  in  Social  Aggregates 

§  10.  In  the  previous  division  of  this  chapter  we  have 
seen  that  in  consequence  of  the  complexity  of  the  organic 
type,  to  which  we  as  social  beings  belong,  there  is  a  tend- 
ency within  us  to  individual  variance,  which  at  times  leads 
to  the  strengthening  of  our  non-ethical  impulses;  and  we 
have  seen  also  that  this  tendency  is  greatly  emphasised  as 
the  result  of  conditions  necessarily  connected  with  our 
complex  civilisation,  so  that  we  are  oftentimes  likely  to 
subvert  the  order  of  impulse  emphasis  which  we  have  come 
to  believe  to  be  on  the  whole  necessary  to  racial  advance. 

We  have  therefore  concluded  that,  as  the  result  of  the 
strife  for  racial  efficiency,  we  should  be  led  to  look  for  the 
appearance  in  man  of  a  governing  instinct  that  would  hold 
in  check  this  tendency  to  individualistic  variance ;  that 
would  bring  about  a  reinstatement  of  the  conditions  ad- 
vantageous to  racial  advance ;  that  would,  through  its 
expressive  action,  lead  to  the  emphasis  of  the  ethical 
impulses  which  are  of  so  much  importance  to  the  growth 
of  social  life. 

Our  task,  then,  in  this  division  of  this  chapter  is  to 
enquire  whether  there  be  any  evidence  of  the  existence  in 
our  race  of  such  a  governing  instinct. 

§  11.  At  the  start  we  may  well  note  that  from  our 
point  of  view  the  problem  now  to  be  studied  is  relatively 
more  simple  than  those  with  which  we  have  thus  far  con- 
cerned ourselves;  and  this  for  the  reason  that  in  the  search 
for  the  manifestations  of  this  governing  instinct  we  are  able 
to  limit  our  examination  to  the  life  of  the  human  species, — 
because  we  do  not  need  to  trouble  ourselves  to  consider  at 
all  the  expressions  of  instinct  in  animals. 


CHAP.  VIII      THE  REPRESSION  OF  SOCIAL  VARIATION  209 

That  this  limitation  of  our  consideration  is  proper  will, 
I  think,  be  granted  when  we  Aote  that  no  race  of  animals 
exhibits  signs  of  the  development  of  the  social  instincts  in 
any  degree  that  is  -  comparable  with  their  development  in 
the  human  race ;  and  if  this  be  so,  then  it  must  be  conceded 
that  the  ethical  impulses  correspondent  to  these  social 
instincts  must  for  the  most  part  be  lacking  in  animals ; 
and,  so  far  as  they  are  developed  at  all,  that  they  must  be 
of  far  less  importance  in  the  lives  of  the  animals  than  they 
are  in  ours.  Furthermore,  in  the  individual  and  tribal  life 
of  animals  there  is  almost  an  entire  absence  of  many  of  the 
conditions  which  in  ourselves  lead  to  the  strengthening  of 
the  tendency  to  those  injurious  variations  from  the  normal 
order  of  impulse  emphasis,  to  which  we  have  already  called 
attention  and  to  which  we  again  refer  below. 

If,  then,  the  ethical  impulses  are  little  developed  in  the 
lives  of  animals ;  and  if  their  tribal  life,  so  far  as  we  can  see, 
is  less  dependent  than  our  own  upon  the  subordination  of 
other  impulses  to  the  racial  impulses  so  far  as  these  latter 
exist  in  them,  then  in  the  animals  the  development  of  a 
governing  instinct  would  present  little  advantage,  and  we 
should  not  be  led  to  expect  it  to  be  distinctly  marked  in 
their  expressive  actions. 

§  12.  The  reader  will  remember  that  in  the  first  division 
of  this  chapter  we  noted  certain  influences  and  conditions 
which  are  likely  to  occasion  the  disadvantageous  subordina- 
tion of  the  social,  the  ethical,  impulses  to  those  of  lower 
orders,  notably  to  those  of  individualistic  significance ;  in- 
fluences and  conditions  which  we  find  appearing  in  our 
complex  civilisation.  It  seems  probable,  then,  that  if  we 
study  these  influences  with  a  view  to  the  discovery  of  some 
means  by  which  their  evil  effects  may  be  counteracted,  we 
are  not  unlikely  to  gain  some  notion  of  the  nature  of  the 

p 


210  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

governing  instinct  which,  if  it  exist,  would  function  in  this 
very  direction. 

In  our  discussion  in  the  first  division  of  the  chapter  we 
first  noted  that  this  tendency  to  the  emphasis  of  elemental 
variance,  and  to  the  subordination  of  the  ethical  impulses, 
was  necessarily  connected  with  the  fact  that  these  higher 
impulses  are  determined  by  the  existence  of  social  aggregates 
which  are  of  a  low  quasi-organic  form,  in  which  we  indi- 
viduals are  elements,  and  elements  which  are  very  lightly 
bound  together,  very  loosely  integrated.  For  in  our  earlier 
study  we  had  seen  that  in  the  lower  individual  organisms  in 
which  the  parts  are  very  loosely  bound  together,  and  with 
which  the  quasi-social  organism  is  to  be  compared,  a  tend- 
ency to  action  of  the  elements  for  themselves,  and  without 
regard  to  the  efficiency  of  the  organism  as  a  whole,  will 
appear  under  anything  but  the  most  ordinary  stimulation  of 
the  parts  affected  by  environmental  conditions. 

If  this  weak  integration  tends  to  emphasise  variation, 
tends  to  invert  the  established  order  of  instinct  emphasis ; 
if  it  be  a  cause  of  the  subordination  of  the  ethical  impulses 
to  those  of  earlier  formation,  to  the  individualistic  and  the 
sexual ;  then  our  hypothetical  governing  instinct  might  be 
expected  to  contend  against  the  results  of  this  lack  of  in- 
tegration. 

It  is  evident,  I  think,  that  this  tendency  to  disintegrative 
action,  this  tendency  to  the  separate  functioning  of  indi- 
viduals as  though  they  were  no  longer  elements  of  the  social 
aggregate,  may  be  overcome  in  one  of  two  ways — either  by 
the  acquisition  of  habits  which  will  concentrate  attention 
upon  the  social  bonds  which  do  exist,  upon  the  community 
of  interests,  and  upon  the  necessities  of  mutual  aid :  or  by 
the  reduction  of  the  stimuli  to  individualistic  action  through 
a  cutting   off  of   these  stimuli,  either  through  temporary 


CHAP.  Till      THE  REPRESSION  OF  SOCIAL  VARIATION  211 

separation  from  those  surroundings  in  which  non- ethical 
impulses  are  developed,  or  through  voluntary  restraint  of 
the  non-ethical  impulses  when  they  arise  within  us. 

§  13.  If  we  turn  to  the  consideration  of  the  next 
point  made  in  the  first  division  of  the  chapter,  we  recall 
that  we  there  argued  that  for  marfy  reasons  the  mere  com- 
plexity of  our  modern  civilisations  tends  to  bring  into 
existence  that  emphasis  of  the  variant  influences  within 
us  to  repress  which  the  governing  instinct  for  which  we 
are  searching  would  act. 

It  seems  very  clear  that  the  disadvantageous  emphasis 
of  the  variant  influences  thus  occasioned  may  be  overcome 
by  the  acquisition  of  habits  which  would  lead  men  to 
break  away  from  this  increasing  complication  of  life, 
by  a  return  to  a  simpler  life  in  which  there  would 
be  fewer  distractions  as  there  were  fewer  stimuli  to 
activity.  And  evidently  this  end  may  be  reached  by  in- 
voluntary or  voluntary  separation  of  men  from  the  active 
turmoil  of  life  through  more  or  less  limited  seclusion  in  one 
form  or  another ;  or  else  by  the  acquisition  of  habits  of 
voluntary  restraint  from  immediate  reaction  to  the  many 
varied  stimuli  which  reach  the  man  in  consequence  of  this 
growing  complexity  in  his  environment. 

§  14.  Again,  we  have  seen  that  processes  of  reasoning, 
which  are  coincident  with  the  processes  resulting  in  variation, 
tend  to  remain  emphatic  in  consciousness ;  while  instinct- 
feelings,  and  the  impulses  related  to  them,  tend  to  disappear 
into  that  mass  of  unnoticed  psychic  states  which  make  up 
the  field  of  inattention :  and  we  have  noted  that  this  fact 
is  often  likely  to  bring  about  the  disadvantageous  emphasis 
of  the  variant  influences  of  which  we  speak,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  oftentimes  a  long-continued  direction  of  atten- 


212  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

tion  to  the  instincts  of  broader  import  which  should  guide 
us  is  required  before  we  are  able  to  gain  any  cognisance  at 
all  of  their  existence  ;  and  because  we  are  liable,  therefore,  in 
cases  of  strong  or  sudden  stimulation,  to  act  under  the 
influence  of  forces  which  are  of  individualistic  moment 
only.  The  governing  instinct,  if  it  exist,  might  be  expected 
to  function  in  some  mS^nner  to  enable  us  to  avoid  this 
danger. 

This  difficulty  in  our  lives  may  evidently  be  overcome, 
if  in  no  other  way,  by  restraint  from  the  actions  dictated 
by  reason,  until  sufficient  time  has  elapsed  to  enable  the 
less  obvious  impulses  to  produce  upon  consciousness  the 
effects  which  are  peculiar  to  them ;  and  habits  of  such 
restraint  will  most  easily  be  attained  during  periods  of 
voluntary  or  involuntary  seclusion,  where  the  man  is  cut 
off  from  the  stimuli  to  action  which  normally  reach  one 
who  is  living  an  active  life  in  the  turmoil  of  a  busy 
community. 

§  15.  In  the  same  sections  of  the  first  division  of  the 
chapter  we  saw  that,  in  a  manner  not  dissimilar,  the  em- 
phasis of  the  variant  influences  within  us  is  often  occasioned 
by  our  mistaking  individually  acquired  habit-reflexes,  which 
have  only  individualistic  value,  for  true  instincts  which  are 
of  racial  import.  The  distinctive  marks  of  the  true  instincts, 
which  it  is  so  important  for  us  to  recognise,  are  found  in 
the  fact  that  they  guide  many  individuals,  and  that  in 
their  higher  forms  they  guide  a  given  individual  under 
many  varied  conditions. 

Now  evidently  the  important  distinction  thus  to  be 
noted,  and  in  which  process  the  functioning  of  our  hypo- 
thetical governing  instinct  might  be  expected  to  aid  us, 
can  only  be  discovered  by  thoughtful  reflection  upon  the  im- 
pulses which  have  guided  our  lives  in  the  past,  and  which  seem 


CHAP.  VIII      THE  REPRESSION  OF  SOCIAL  VARIATION  213 

to  guide  others  of  our  race ;  and  it  appears  that  one  way, 
at  least,  in  which  opportunity  for  such  reflection  may  best 
be  obtained  will  be  by  voluntary  or  involuntary  seclusion 
from  the  distracting  influences  which  bear  upon  us  in  our 
every-day  life. 

§  16.  We  have  seen  that  what  we  call  success  in  life  is 
determined  largely  by  the  emphasis  of  individualistic  im- 
pulses, and  that  the  desire  for  success  is  potent  in  suppress- 
ing the  dominance  of  social  forces ;  which  suppression  our 
sought-for  governing  instinct  should  tend  to  oppose.  Surely 
one  way  in  which  the  effects  of  this  wish  for  success,  and 
its  resultants,  may  best  be  regulated  is  by  seclusion  at 
times  from  the  rest  of  the  race,  without  whose  recognition 
success  is  an  empty  term. 

§  17.  Finally,  we  have  noted  that  the  tendency  to 
imitate  the  actions  of  others,  which  vary  from  what  is  typical 
in  directions  which  we  deem  advantageous,  is  a  powerful 
force  leading  to  the  obscuration  of  the  deep-lying  ethical 
impulses. 

But  clearly  the  best  means  of  overcoming  this  danger 
lies  in  the  separation  of  ourselves  from  the  influence  of 
those  who  thus  guide  our  actions,  of  those  whom  we  imitate, 
until  such  time  as  Nature's  impulses  within  us  are  able 
to  assert  themselves. 

§  18.  The  reader  cannot  fail  to  have  noticed  that  in 
each  of  the  six  preceding  sections  we  have  argued  with 
perhaps  tedious  repetition  that  each  and  all  of  the  im- 
portant forces  which  we  have  noted  leading  to  the  over- 
emphasis of  the  variant  influences  within  us  may  be  held 
in  check,  if  in  no  other  way,  by  the  acquisition  of  habits  of 
voluntary  seclusion  from  the  distracting  stimuli  by  which 


214  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

we  are  affected  in  our  normal  complex  life;  or  else  by 
voluntary  restraint  for  a  time  from  reaction  to  the  influences 
which  surround  us :  it  seems  natural  for  us  to  surmise, 
therefore,  that  at  least  some  considerable  part  of  the  expres- 
sions of  the  governing  instinct,  for  which  we  are  in  search, 
will  involve  such  restraint  and  such  seclusion. 

§  19.  This  thought  is  so  suggestive  that  it  seems  worth 
while  to  examine  our  experience  by  turning  once  more  to 
introspection,  and  asking  ourselves  whether  we  are  able 
to  note  in  our  own  lives  that  this  seclusion  and  this  restraint 
do  produce  within  us  such  an  emphasis  of  the  non-indi- 
vidualistic impulses  of  our  nature  as  our  theoretical  con- 
sideration from  an  objective  standpoint  has  led  us  to 
expect. 

Taking  up  first  the  effects  of  seclusion,  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  correctness  of  our  thought  is  brought  out  clearly 
when  we  consider  what  occurs  when  we  lay  aside  the  dis- 
tractions of  life  at  our  hearth-stone  perhaps ;  or  when  we 
He  wakeful  in  the  quiet  of  the  night ;  or  when,  perchance, 
we  find  ourselves  alone,  yet  without  disquietude,  in  some 
desolate  region  far  from  the  habitations  of  man :  then  it  is 
that  we  discover  our  thought  turning  away  from  the  indi- 
vidualistic demands  of  the  immediate  present,  and  reverting 
to  the  consideration  of  matters  of  deeper  than  individualistic 
interest. 

At  such  times  we  note  the  revival  of  longings  for  some 
loved  companion  whose  life,  perhaps  alas  in  the  days  gone 
by,  has  become  interwoven  with  our  own :  or  perchance  we 
find  our  minds  filled  with  thoughts  of  family  life,  with  plans 
for  the  advantage  of  wife  and  children,  with  schemes  which 
might  add  to  their  comfort.  He  is  a  sordid  being,  indeed, 
who  finds  his  own  individualistic  desires  persistently  engross- 
ing his  attention  upon  such  occasions. 


CHAP.  VIII      THE  REPRESSION  OF  SOCIAL  VARIATION  215 

At  such  times,  too,  we  find  ourselves  considering  our 
relations  to  our  fellow-men;  the  ethical  impulses  gaining 
force  and  urging  us  to  overthrow  mere  s.elfishness,  and  to 
resist  those  demands,  in  one  sense  of  a  lower  order,  which 
relate  merely  to  the  persistence  of  our  species.  We  find 
ourselves  deploring  our  past  failures  to  act  in  accordance 
with  the  ethical  impulses  which  now  assert  themselves ;  re- 
viewing our  actions  in  the  days  gone  by ;  bringing  ourselves 
to  a  recognition  of  the  sins  and  follies  of  youth  or  of  the 
past  days.  And  these  sins  and  these  follies,  as  we  shall 
presently  see,  are  actions  which  we  realise  in  these  moments 
of  reflection  to  be  opposed  by  the  persistent  ethical  impulses 
which  then  present  themselves  to  our  minds  with  startling 
distinctness;  impulses  which  tell  of  social  advantage  and 
consolidation ;  persistent  impulses  towards  unselfishness  and 
purity ;  impulses  against  theft  and  deception  and  covetous- 
ness ;  impulses  towards  benevolence  and  sympathy,  and 
against  injury  to  one's  neighbour.  Such,  I  am  con- 
fident, is  the  experience  of  each  of  my  serious,  thoughtful 
readers,  an  experience  which  becomes  more  and  more  clearly 
defined  as  the  habit  of  reflection  is  developed. 

If,  turning  from  the  consideration  of  the  effects  of  our 
separation  from  active  life,  we  study  for  a  moment  the  effects 
upon  ourselves  of  voluntary  restraint  from  response  to  the 
individualistic  demands  of  our  nature,  we  see  the  point  I 
would  make  still  more  clearly  defined. 

If  a  man  who  is  attacked  by  an  enemy  repress  the 
instinct  within  him  which  would  lead  him  to  strike  his 
opponent,  then  note  how  immediately  instincts  of  wider 
scope  engage  his  attention ;  how  immediately  the  general 
relation  of  himself  and  of  his  enemy  to  the  social  environ- 
ment presents  itself  to  his  mind.  Instead  of  busying  him- 
self with  thought  of  resentment  he  finds  himself  considering 


216  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

the  results,  not  only  to  himself,  but  also  to  those  whom  he 
loves,  which  might  follow  his  act ;  thinking,  perhaps,  indeed, 
of  the  punishment  which  will  directly  affect  him,  but,  if  he 
be  a  man  of  any  character,  finding  himself  still  more  con- 
cerned with  thoughts  of  the  indirect  sufferings  which  will 
be  likely  to  come  upon  those  dependent  upon  him. 

The  lover,  to  take  another  example,  represses  the  active 
manifestation  of  his  desire ;  and  at  once  appears  to  his 
mind  the  thought  of  the  many  indirect  results  to  himself  in 
relation  to  his  social  life,  and  to  the  one  whom  he  loves, 
which  would  follow  such  submission  to  passion  as  this  strong 
instinct,  which  he  has  resisted,  would  demand;  and  the 
recognition  of  these  results,  thus  emphasised,  will  serve  as  a 
check  upon  his  passion  ever  after. 

These  examples  are  sufficient  to  call  to  the  reader's  mind 
many  others,  which  will  lead  him  to  agree  without  hesita- 
tion, I  think,  that  seclusion,  removal  for  a  time  from  the 
turmoil  of  life,  which  involves  voluntary  reduction  of  the 
stimuli  to  individualistic  or  sexual  action ;  and  restraint, 
which  involves  voluntary  repression  of  our  tendencies  to  any 
immediate  reaction :  that  both  are  effective  in  bringing  us 
under  the  influence  of  thoughts  and  impulses  which  are  per- 
sistent within  us,  although  often  unemphatic  in  conscious- 
ness ;  which  are  always  of  wider  than  individualistic  import, 
and  in  many  cases  have  marked  racial  significance. 

§  20.  It  appears  quite  clear,  then,  it  seems  to  me,  that 
voluntary  seclusion  from  the  stimulations  of  our  complex 
and  active  life,  and  voluntary  restraint  from  individualistic 
reaction,  will  both  tend  to  be  effective  in  producing  the 
very  emphasis  of  the  ethical  impulses  in  opposition  to  indi- 
vidualistic demands  which  we  have  concluded  to  be  necessary 
if  a  higher  development  of  the  social  organism  is  to  be 
reached.     And,  as  we  have  already  said,  it  is  naturally  sug- 


CHAP.  VIII      THE  REPRESSION  OF  SOCIAL  VARIATION  217 

gested  that  if  there  exist  within  us  a  governing  instinct 
having  for  its  function  this  emphasis  of  the  ethical  impulses, 
and  the  enforcement  of  the  order  of  impulse  efficiency  which 
Nature  has  established  within  us,  then  in  all  probability 
such  voluntary  seclusion  from  the  world,  and  such  voluntary 
restraint  from  immediate  reaction  to  individualistic  demands, 
will  be  likely  to  appear  as  prominent  expressions  of  this 
governing  instinct  for  which  we  are  in  search. 

How  can  any  one  who  has  followed  our  train  of  thought 
fail  to  be  impressed  with  the  fact,  which  forces  itself  upon 
my  own  mind,  that  these  habits  of  occasional  seclusion  and 
of  hourly  restraint  are  the  most  emphatic  expressions  of  our 
religious  experience  ? 

The  leading  seems  so  clear  that  I  shall,  without  further 
introduction,  ask  the  reader  to  consider  with  me  the  evidence 
that  leads  me  to  believe  that  religious  activities  are  the 
expression  of  a  true  instinct,  which  we  may  properly  speak 
of  as  the  religious  instinct ;  and  that  the  function  of  this 
religious  instinct  in  the  development  of  our  race  is  to  bring 
about  the  subordination  of  the  individual  variant  influences, 
and  to  affect  the  emphasis  of  the  racial  influences ;  and  at 
the  same  time  to  emphasise  within  us  Nature's  established 
order  of  instinct  efficiency. 


TT-VrTTTTTiXi  r^Trn-ir- 


CHAPTEE   IX 

IS    RELIGION    INSTINCTIVE? 


§  1.  I  IMAGINE  that  some  reader  of  the  previous  chapter 
will  be  inclined  to  ask  what  warrant  we  have  for  the 
assumption  that  religion  is  instinctive ;  what  reason  there  is 
to  believe  that  our  religious  activities  are  the  expression  of 
a  true  instinct.  It  will  be  well,  I  think,  to  consider  this 
point  with  some  care  before  we  proceed  further  with  our 
argument. 

If  an  appeal  to  common-sense  be  of  any  value  we  do  not 
need  to  look  far  for  an  affirmation  of  the  instinctive  nature 
of  religion.  I  find,  by  questioning,  that  intelligent  people 
very  generally  reply  affirmatively  if  asked  whether  they 
consider  religion  to  be  instinctive,  and  philosophic  writers  ^ 
are  also  often  found  taking  the  same  position ;  indeed  the 
use  of  the  term  "  instinct "  in  relation  to  religious  activities 
in  common  speech  is  so  usual  that  there  can  be  no  doubt 
this  notion  is  generally  held,  even  though  the  implications 
involved  in  the  assertion  are  in  no  sense  realised.  But  we 
cannot  take  this  common-sense  view  without  question,  we 
must  examine  the  subject  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
psychologist. 

As   we   have   already  seen   in   our   fourth  chapter,  our 

^  Cf.  e.g.  Renan,  Dialogues  Philosopliiques,  p.  38  ff. 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  ?  219 

instincts  are  springs  of  action  which  exist  within  the 
organism :  our  instinct  actions  occur  because  we  are  or- 
ganisms, and  because  as  organisms  we  inherit  with  our 
organic  structure  habits  of  action  which  lead  to  the  attain- 
ment of  certain  ends  which  have  significance  for  the 
organism;  and  we  inherit  these  habits  in  general  because 
our  ancestors  have  become  better  adapted  to  their  environ- 
ment in  consequence  of  the  recurrence  of  these  tendencies 
to  act  in  certain  specific  ways  upon  the  appearance  of  the 
appropriate  stimuli. 

Instinct  actions  are  thus  determined  first  by  their  or- 
ganisation, and  especially  by  some  biological  end  which  this 
organisation  serves. 

I  shall  not  hope  in  this  chapter  to  estabhsh  the  point 
that  the  actions  expressive  of  religious  feeling  are  organic  in 
their  nature ;  the  proof  of  that  will  appear  as  we  proceed 
with  this  particular  discussion,  and  will  become  convincing, 
I  think,  before  we  conclude  this  consideration  in  the 
next  chapter :  nevertheless,  I  must  say  a  few  words  at  this 
juncture  in  relation  to  this  subject. 

As  we  have  already  seen  we  usually  take  as  examples 
of  typical  instincts  those  particular  instincts  which  express 
themselves  by  what  seem  to  us  to  be  invariable  actions 
occurring  in  definitely  co-ordinated  relation  to  one  another, 
so. that  the  actions  appear  to  be  always  the  same,  and  to  be 
aroused  always  by  the  same  stimuli. 

An  example  of  such  a  "typical  instinct"  we  find  in 
the  action  of  the  baby  alligator  which  rushes  with  open 
jaws  at  any  object  it  perceives  as  enemy  or  prey :  the 
actions  determining  this  rushing  and  attack  being  exhibited 
always  apparently  in  the  same  relation,  and  being  aroused 
always  by  the  same  classes  of  stimuli. 

But  as  we  have  also  seen,  the  definiteness  and  the  in- 
variability of  the  co-ordination  of  these  actions  are  relative 


220  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

definiteness  and  relative  invariability  only.  This  became 
evident  when  it  was  noted  that  the  efficiency  of  many 
instincts  even  of  the  lower  types  depends  upon  the  trend 
of  the  activities  they  induce  even  where  there  is  a  certain 
degree  of  variation  in  circumstances  of  stimulation,  or  in 
the  stimuli  themselves,  and  consequently  in  the  reactions 
to  these  stimuli.  The  reader  will  remember  that  we  illus- 
trated this  fact  by  recalling  to  his  mind  the  variations  of 
action  and  co-ordination  noted  in  the  young  chick  in  its 
instinctive  search  for  food-supply ;  the  general  end  being 
reached  through  slightly  varying  co-ordinations  of  action. 

It  will  also  be  remembered  that  as  we  studied  instincts 
of  a  higher  type  we  found  less  definiteness  and  invariability 
of  reaction,  and  a  marked  preponderance  of  cases  where  the 
guidance  of  our  actions  to  the  production  of  certain  ends  is 
attained  by  the  strengthening  of  trends  of  action  which 
come  to  persist  through  many  differences  of  stimulation  and 
through  many  variations  of  reaction. 

This  fact  was  illustrated  by  reference  to  the  instincts 
that  relate  to  the  foundation  of  the  family,  which  act 
indirectly  through  many  efforts  tending  to  the  accumulation 
of  food  or  property  by  the  man,  and  to  protective  care  of 
the  young  by  the  woman :  nobody  hesitates  to  speak  of  the 
paternal  instincts  nor  of  the  maternal  instincts.  It  was 
illustrated  again  by  reference  to  the  ethical  instincts  which 
tend  to  bring  about  social  co-operation  and  social  consolida- 
tion, and  this  through  the  most  varied  of  actions  that  are 
often  apparently  guided  by  the  most  varied  of  conscious 
aims  which  often  seem  to  the  actor  to  lead  in  any  direction 
rather  than  towards  the  racial  ends  we  believe  these  social 
instincts  subserve;  we  agreed  that  no  one  should  hesitate 
to  speak  of  the  patriotic  instincts,  or  of  the  benevolent 
instincts. 

N"ow  I  think  it  will  be  evident  to  the  reader  that  if  the 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  1  221 

governing  instinct  for  which  we  are  searching  exist  at  all 
it  is  likely  to  appear,  as  do  all  the  higher  instincts,  as  a 
most  general  trend  of  action  evidenced  in  many  diverse 
forms  of  activity ;  and  such  are  our  religious  expressions. 

It  is  evident  that  when  we  note  certain  activities  which 
we  surmise  may  relate  to  an  end  we  are  considering,  we 
need  not  conclude  that  they  are  not  of  an  instinctive  nature 
because  we  find  their  trend  difficult  to  trace  in  many  ways. 

I  am  in  complete  agreement  with  Professor  Morgan 
when  he  cautions  us  that  instinct  actions  must  be  carefully 
separated  from  those  actions  which  are  attached  to  them  by 
accumulated  experience,  or  by  imitation,  or  by  "  tradition  " ; 
nor  can  there  be  any  question  that  with  the  actions  we  are 
discussing  this  separation  is  exceedingly  difficult.  But  on 
the  other  hand  I  hold  that  even  in  cases  where  this  separa- 
tion is  impossible  in  many  directions,  we  are  nevertheless 
warranted  in  suspecting  the  existence  of  a  true  instinct, 
provided  we  are  able  to  discover  some  biological  end  which 
is  subserved  by  the  general  trend  of  a  series  of  varied 
activities: . 

That  we  are  able  to  discern  the  biological  end  which  is 
subserved  by  the  actions  expressive  of  the  religious  feelings 
I  have  already  suggested.  The  hypothesis  is  a  tentative 
one,  but  I  shall  hope  to  show  in  the  next  chapter  that  there 
is  much  to  be  said  in  favour  of  its  correctness ;  and  this  I 
shall  attempt  to  do  by  accumulation  of  evidence  which  will 
enable  us  to  sift  away  much  that  is  extraneous,  and  will 
place  in  relief  the  important,  relatively  stable,  elements 
which  appear  in  all  the  varied  religious  expressions. 

§  2.  It  seems  to  me  that  a  strong  argument  in  favour  of 
the  instinctive  nature  of  religious  expression  lies  in  its 
universality  in  man. 

Observers  of  the  deaf  and  dumb,  and  of  certain  savage 


222  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  ii 

tribes,  tell  us  that  those  thus  cut  off  from  the  influences  of 
civilisation  find  diiflculty  in  grasping  any  of  the  conceptions 
which  we  are  wont  to  think  are  inherently  attached  to 
religious  functioning.  But  even  if  we  grant  the  facts,  I 
would  beg  the  reader  to  note  that  these  conceptions,  these 
beliefs,  although  they  are  usually  attached  to  this  functioning, 
are  not  of  its  essence :  in  very  many  cases  they  have 
evidently  grown  up  after  the  functioning  has  become  well 
established,  and  as  a  means  of  explaining  the  actions  them- 
selves in  terms  of  other  experience ;  evidently  if  these  un- 
fortunates have  remained  uninfluenced  by  those  stimuli  which 
normally  call  the  religious  instinct  into  activity,  we  should 
not  expect  to  find  in  them  these  conceptions  which  we  find 
in  others  who  have  been  stimulated  to  these  activities  from 
early  childhood. 

It  may  indeed  be  true,  therefore,  as  some  observers  tell 
us,  that  there  are  certain  savages,  and  some  small  proportion 
of  the  degraded  or  unfortunate  of  our  own  race,  who  show 
no  tendencies  to  religious  expression,  and  who  can  formulate 
no  religious  thought :  but  so  far  as  this  is  true,^  it  is  prob- 
ably due  to  a  lack  of  the  conditions  which  usually  stimulate 
to  such  expression;  and  we  surely  should  not  be  led  by 
this  fact,  so  far  as  it  is  a  fact,  to  pronounce  in  general 
against  the  existence  of  a  true  religious  instinct  in  man  by 
which  we  may  account  for  his  religious  expression  and 
impulses.  As  well  might  we  deny  the  existence  of  the 
maternal  instinct  because  we  find  human  mothers  who  seem 
to  be  lacking  entirely  in  maternal  feeling ;  as  well  deny  the 
existence  of  patriotic  instincts,  or  of  benevolent  instincts, 

^  I  agree  with  Wundt  that  the  mass  of  evidence  for  the  existence  of  tribes 
that  have  no  religion,  collected  especially  by  Sir  John  Lubbock,  proves  only 
that  the  observers  upon  whose  statements  he  relies  partly  meant  very  different 
things  by  the  word  *  *  religion, "  but  partly  also  were  not  markedly  successful 
in  their  attempt  to  explore  the  unfamiliar  world  of  savage  ideas.  {Ethics,  vol. 
i.  p.  60,  English  translation,  Titchner,  et  al.) 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  1  223 

because  a  small  proportion  of  men  are  cowards,  or  utterly 
selfish  and  cruel. 

It  is  perfectly  true  of  course  that  the  masses  of  the 
people  are  influenced  to  religious  expression  from  their  early 
childhood  by  habits  enjoined  upon  them  by  those  who 
guide  their  young  lives,  or  by  imitation  of  the  actions  of 
those  whom  they  fear  or  admire.  In  the  same  way,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  many  of  the  deferred  instincts  are  fostered 
and  encouraged  by  the  inculcation  of  habits  of  action  which 
would  naturally  some  day  become  spontaneous.  The  plays 
of  childhood  tell  of  duties  of  mature  life,  and  ethical  habits 
which  are  not  natural  to  children  are  forced  upon  those  of 
tender  years. 

It  is  indeed  barely  possible  theoretically  that  if  a  child 
were  brought  up  without  any  religious  influences  whatever, 
it  might  show  none  of  the  characteristic  religious  expressions  ; 
although  satisfactory  experiment  in  this  direction  could 
scarcely  be  made,  for  the  simple  reason  that  religious  ex- 
pression direct  or  indirect  is  so  widespread  in  all  that  we 
see  and  hear  in  life,  that  it  would  be  all  but  impossible  to 
make  an  experiment  of  the  kind  mentioned  which  would 
be  conclusive.^ 

^  Evidence  in  this  matter  is  difficult  to  find,  but  the  cases  mentioned 
below  seem  to  corroborate  the  view  taken  above,  and  are  given  for  what  they 
are  worth. 

A  friend  of  mine  has  twin  daughters.  Impressed  with  the  importance  of 
avoiding  attempts  to  force  upon  undeveloped  children  conceptions  which 
they  are  not  prepared  to  apperceive,  the  mother  deliberately  aimed  to  avoid 
all  reference  to  religious  subjects  in  the  presence  of  her  girls,  whilst  she  felt 
that  they  were  too  young  to  appreciate  the  significance  of  religious  observance. 
They  were  not  taught  to  pray,  nor  did  they  know  the  word  God.  At  an  early 
age  they  were  placed  with  a  few  others  in  a  small  private  kindergarten  class, 
the  teacher  of  which  was  entirely  in  sympathy  with  the  mother  and  took 
pains  to  carry  out  her  wishes  in  reference  to  the  mention  of  religious  subjects. 
The  only  suggestion  of  religious  significance  which,  so  far  as  can  be  known, 
could  have  affected  them  was  in  connection  with  the  singing  of  a  prayer  soncf 
in  which  their  "Heavenly  Father"  was  mentioned.  After  they  had  been  in 
the  class  about  a  year  one  of  the  girls  upon  going  to  bed  asked  her  mother  if 
she  could  not  "  say  a  little  prayer  "  :  and  she  was  taught  to  pray.     The  other 


224  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

But  even  if  we  imagine  that  such  an  experiment  as  we 
have  above  spoken  of  were  successfully  made,  even  if  we 
suppose  that  a  child  were  brought  up  without  being  affected 
by  any  religious  influences  whatever,  and  that  it  showed  no 
evidence  of  the  rise  within  it  of  anything  resembling  a 
religious  instinct  by  the  exhibition  of  any  of  the  character- 
istic religious  expressions ;  even  then  we  should  certainly 
not  have  proved  that  religious  activities  are  not  instinctive : 
as  well  might  we  attempt  to  prove  that  the  little  alligator 
has  no  instinct  leading  it  to  snap  at  its  enemy,  by  experi- 
mentally eliminating  from  its  environment  the  stimuli  which 
bring  the  instinct  into  evidence. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  mark  of  the  existence  of  an 
instinct  within  us  is  not  the  appearance  in  all  men  of 
certain  activities,  but  rather  the  aptitude  for  the  production 
of  certain  co-ordinated  actions,  of  certain  trends  of  action, 
if  the  appropriate  stimulus  he  given.  And  if  we  accept  such 
a  view  the  instinctive  nature  of  the  religious  force  within 
us  must  surely  be  granted :  for  certainly  one  will  scarcely 
deny  that  civilised  man  has  a  natural  aptitude  towards 
religious  functioning,  which  is  brought  out  under  the  most 
unexpected  circumstances,  upon  the  occurrence  of  the  most 
subtle  of  stimuli. 

I  of  course   do   not   pretend   to   hold   that   all   of  the 

girl  expressed  no  desire  to  pray  until  some  months  later.  In  the  latter  case 
the  child  may  have  imitated  the  sister ;  but  this  sister's  first  request,  under 
the  circumstances,  indicates  the  existence  in  her  of  an  aptitude  for  the 
activities  connected  with  prayer  which  it  seems  to  me  can  only  be  accounted 
for  by  the  supposition  that  an  instinctive  force  within  her  called  for  expression 
in  this  manner  upon  the  presentation  of  a  very  delicate  stimulus. 

I  have  found  another  case  in  which  the  mother,  who  is  a  woman  of  marked 
intellectual  distinction,  has  adopted  the  same  course  in  the  bringing  up  of 
her  daughter,  who  is  a  very  bright  girl.  In  this  case  the  girl  has  shown  no 
such  marked  signs  of  religious  expression  as  were  noted  in  the  first  case  cited  : 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  mother  assures  me  that  the  readiness  with  which 
the  girl  assimilated  the  higher  religious  conceptions  when  they  were  brought 
to  her  attention,  has  convinced  her  that  the  capacity  for  religious  activity 
was  inborn  within  the  daughter,  was  truly  instinctive  in  its  nature. 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  ?  225 

elaborate  religious  expressions  of  which  we  shall  treat  in 
the  next  chapter  would  appear  in  the  lives  of  men  who  had 
no  tradition  and  no  example  given  them  by  those  around 
them :  but  I  do  think  that  the  existence  within  us  of  an 
inherited  organised  aptitude  for  the  production  of  these 
expressions  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that,  notwithstanding 
that  the  activities  involved  are  in  general  distasteful  and 
apparently  on  their  face  disadvantageous  in  themselves,  as 
I  shall  attempt  to  show  in  the  next  chapter  is  the  case, 
nevertheless  they  still  persist  in  the  race  and  seem  natural 
to  the  men  in  whom  they  appear. 

Given  the  stimulus  which  on  its  mental  side  involves 
the  perception  of  our  incapacity  to  cope  with  the  problems 
of  life,  the  recognition  of  our  weakness,  the  feeling  of  doubt 
as  to  our  course  of  procedure,  then  immediately  appears  the 
general  mental  attitude  of  submission  and  dependence  and 
restraint  coincidently  with  the  religious  expressions  which 
we  shall  presently  study  in  detail. 

Even  if  it  be  claimed  that  I  exaggerate  the  importance 
of  the  part  of  these  activities  which  is  due  to  instinct,  and 
understate  the  importance  of  the  part  which  is  acquired  as 
the  result  of  life  experience,  nevertheless  it  seems  to  me 
it  must  be  granted  that  some  inherited  instinctive  tendency 
must  exist  within  man  which  is  made  the  basis  of  this 
elaboration  by  continued  imitation  of  these  special  customs 
and  habits  of  our  forefathers,  for  otherwise  it  is  impossible 
to  comprehend  why  these  special  forms  of  activity  are  so 
persistently  imitated  by  rising  generations  when  other  forms 
of  activity  are  not  repeated. 

But  if  even  this  be  held  to  be  an  over-statement  I  think 
it  must  be  granted  at  least  that  we  probably  have  before 
us  in  the  religious  activities  the  marks  of  an  instinct  in  the 
making.  All  instincts  must  have  been  formed  as  the  result 
of  the  acquisition  by  a  race  of  valuable  habits  of  action, 


226  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  il 

and  if  we  can  show,  as  I  shall  attempt  to  show  in  the  next 
chapter,  that  these  religious  habits  and  activities  are  of 
value  in  our  racial  life,  then  a  strong  presumption  exists 
that  they  are  retained  in  the  race  because  of  this  value,  and 
that  they  will  in  all  probability  become  instinctive  in  the 
future  if  it  be  denied  that  they  are  instinctive  to-day :  if 
they  are  persistent  and  are  of  value  they  will  probably 
eventually  become  fixed  in  the  race,  for  those  of  us  in 
whom  the  essential  tendencies  arise  spontaneously  will  be 
likely  to  win  in  the  struggle  against  those  who  develop  the 
activities  only  as  the  result  of  imitation  of  others  whose 
influence  is  irregularly  felt. 

§  3.  Here  I  would  beg  the  reader  to  recall  the  fact 
already  referred  to  in  the  second  section  of  this  chapter,  viz. 
that  the  governing  instinct,  if  it  exists  at  all,  must  be  one 
which  would  be  appreciably  developed  in  riian  only ;  for 
we  know^  of  no  race  of  animals  in  which  the  ethical  impulses 
are  highly  developed,  and  none  in  which  the  tribal  life  is 
noticeably  dependent  upon  the  subordination  of  other 
instincts  to  social  instincts,  so  far  as  these  latter  do  exist 
in  them. 

It  is  an  interesting  corroboration  of  our  supposition, 
therefore,  to  find  that  the  religious  activities,  so  far  as  we 
know,  are  developed  in  man  only.  It  is  true  that  certain 
attempts  have  been  made  to  trace  evidence  of  fetich  worship 
in  the  higher  animals ;  ^  but  the  actions  observed  are  all 
explicable  in  terms  of  surprise  and  the  fear  which  follows 
surprise ;  and,  as  w^e  shall  presently  see,  although  the 
arousal  of  fear  may  possibly  have  led  in  the  beginning  to 
certain  primal  forms  of  religious  expression,  it  can  scarcely 
have  led  to  the  persistence  of  the  tendency  to  the  appear- 
ance  of  religious  expression  in  its  many  modified  forms ; 

1  Cf.  Romanes,  "  Fetichism  in  Animals,"  Nature,  xvii.  168. 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  1  227 

and  this  fact  of  persistence  is  after  all  the  matter  of  highest 
importance  in  our  consideration. 

But  furthermore,  not  only  do  we  find  that  religious 
expression  is  limited  to  man,  but  we  discover,  as  we  should 
expect  under  our  hypothesis,  that  it  varies  in  correspondence 
to  the  changes  in  man's  character ;  that  it  is  developed  in 
its  most  complex  forms  where  man's  tribal  life  is  most 
complex.  If  religious  activities  be  the  expression  of  an 
instinct  which  has  to  do  with  the  emphasis  of  impulses 
that  are  important  for  the  development  of  social  life,  then 
surely  we  should  expect  just  what  we  thus  find,  viz.  that 
its  highest  developments  appear  in  general  in  those  races 
in  which  social  consolidation  is  most  advanced ;  it  seems  to 
me  that  the  history  of  our  race  proves  this  fact. 

It  is  indeed  true  that  religious  inspiration,  so  called,  has 
often  been,  and  is  still,  gained  in  solitude ;  but  the  power 
of  a  religion  is  tested  by  its  influence  upon  the  social  life 
of  the  community  in  which  it  is  preached.  If  we  refer 
to  the  history  of  ancient  civilisations  we  find  the  complexity 
of  their  religious  conceptions  and  expressions  in  a  general 
way  co-ordinate  with  the  complexity  of  their  social  fabric. 

In  our  own  day  the  nearest  approach  that  we  find  to  a 
man  without  religion  is  the  barbarian  of  the  icy  plain,  the 
savage  negro  of  the  deep  forest,  the  cannibal  of  the  desert 
island ;  and  with  all  these  low  types  of  mankind  it  must  be 
agreed  that  social  life  and  the  social  instincts  are  at  most 
but  embryonic.  Among  all  the  civilised  races,  on  the  other 
hand,  religious  expression  is  found,  and  the  more  complex 
their  social  organisation,  the  more  prominent  become  the 
actions  of  religious  expression  in  the  history  of  the  people. 

§  4.  Eeligious  activities  like  the  expressions  of  all  true 
instincts  seem  often  to  be  spontaneously  developed  in  man. 
The  masses  of  mankind  do  not  have  to  be  argued  into  the 


228  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

expression  of  religious  feelings :  rather  is  it  true  that 
rationalistic  or  other  barriers  must  be  raised  if  we  are  to 
prevent  the  expression  of  the  religious  force  that  is  found 
in  men  in  varying  degree.  And  even  then,  however  fully 
we  may  acquiesce  in  the  dictates  of  others,  or  be  led  by 
argument ;  however  much  we  under  such  influences  repress 
our  religious  impulses,  they  still  exist  within  us,  calling 
upon  us  at  times  to  give  them  play,  and  forcing  themselves 
to  the  front  in  moments  of  weakness  or  despair.  The  most 
pronounced  of  atheists  seldom  fails  to  pray  in  the  face  of 
terrible  danger  or  deep  sorrow. 

§  5.  I  wish  now  to  lay  especial  stress  upon  a  fact  which 
has  been  incidentally  discussed  in  what  has  preceded  this, 
but  which  is  usually  little  appreciated;  upon  the  fact  that 
the  activities  involved  in  religious  expression  must  be  held 
to  have  some  import  to  the  race,  must  have  some  biological 
function ;  and  that  this  is  true  whether  we  agree  or  deny 
that  a  religious  instinct  exists  within  us. 

Let  us  assume  in  the  first  place  that  a  religious  instinct 
exists  which,  broadly  speaking,  is  developed  in  all  of  man- 
kind, then  evidently  we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  religious  instinct  must  subserve  some  valuable  function 
m  the  biological  development  of  the  human  race :  for,  as  we 
have  so  often  said  above,  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  for  us  to 
conceive  how  any  instinct  can  have  arisen,  how  it  can  have 
become  developed  and  elaborated,  and,  more  than  all,  how 
it  can  have  persisted  from  generation  to  generation,  as  has 
this  religious  instinct  so  far  back  as  we  are  able  to  look 
into  the  history  of  the  earliest  of  civilisations,^  unless  it  has 
fulfilled  some  function  of  value  in  the  development  of  the 
race. 

1  The  late  excavations  in  Mesopotamia  show  us  remains  of  temples  and 
altars  which  our  archaeologists  tell  us  probably  date  back  somewhere  from 
9000  to  10,000  years. 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  1  229 

It  is  of  course  always  possible,  as  we  have  seen  in  our 
previous  argument,  that  certain  habits  of  action  may  have 
become  fixed  in  our  race  which  have  no  bearing  whatever 
upon  the  persistence  of  the  race  ;  habits  which  are  inherited 
because  they  belong  to  a  race  which  has  come  to  persist  for 
reasons  entirely  unrelated  to  these  habits :  but,  as  I  have 
also  argued  in  preceding  chapters,  this  supposition  is  difficult 
to  sustain  in  relation  to  any  instinct  which  is  widespread 
and  persistent  in  a  race,  as  is  the  case  with  the  religious 
instinct  in  man.  And  on  the  whole  we  are  compelled  to 
assume  that  there  is  little  probability  that  the  religious 
instinct  is  one  of  the  few  exceptions  to  the  general  rule 
which  connects  instincts  with  functioning  advantageous  to 
the  race  in  which  they  appear. 

It  is  to  be  further  noted  that  it  is  quite  possible  that 
instincts  of  no  importance  may  be  retained  in  animal  life 
for  the  simple  reason  that  they  have  developed  co-ordinately 
with  some  functionings  which  are  of  importance  to  the  race, 
as  "  by-products,"  so  to  speak ;  that  they  may  be  of  no 
advantage  to  the  race,  and  in  fact  may  possibly  be  of  positive 
disadvantage,  and  may  be  retained  only  because  they  are 
necessarily  connected  with  the  existence  of  instincts  which 
are  of  very  great  advantage,  or  of  sufficient  advantage  at 
least  to  carry  the  burden  of  the  neutral  or  disadvantageous 
functioning  of  the  co-ordinate  instinct.  This  is  of  course  a 
possible  hypothesis  if  no  better  one  will  serve. 

It  has  been  suggested  to  me,  for  instance,  by  my  friend 
Professor  Hodder  that  it  would  be  quite  possible  for  an 
opponent  to  grant  that  religious  activities  are  instinctive, 
and  yet  to  hold  that  they  are  altogether  disadvantageous 
to  man ;  that  they  persist  only  because  they  have  grown  up 
in  necessary  connection  with  the  rise  of  man's  intellectual 
activity,  which  has  enabled  him  to  persist  notwithstanding 
the  drag  on  his  advance  determined  by  the  existence  of  the 


230  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

religious  instinct.  Although  I  think  this  a  possible  argu- 
ment, it  seems  to  me  to  be  one  which  strains  our  credulity. 
For  in  the  first  place  we  have  to  my  mind  little  evidence 
that  the  growth  of  religion  is  so  indissolubly  connected  with 
intellectual  activity  as  the  hypothesis  assumes.  There 
seem  to  be  no  apparent  reasons  why  the  beginnings  of 
intellectual  activity  should  have  failed  to  appear  in  those 
early  progenitors  of  man  in  whom  the  germ  of  the  religious 
instinct  had  not  appeared,  and  in  that  case  the  race  in 
which  the  two  appeared  in  conjunction  would  have  been 
eliminated  if  religious  activities  had  been  disadvantageous. 

Furthermore,  there  is  a  good  deal  of  evidence  that  the 
rise  of  the  religious  activities  was  anterior  to  the  rise  of 
speculative  intellectual  life ;  that  the  theories  of  the 
universe,  with  which  we  usually  associate  religion,  were 
adopted  in  great  measure  to  account  rationally  for  series  of 
religious  expressions  already  found  by  the  awakening  man 
as  part  of  his  habit  of  life. 

Furthermore,  unless  we  are  able  to  show  in  animal  life 
a  goodly  number  of  cases  of  similarly  complicated  activities 
which  are  distinctly  disadvantageous,  and  which  nevertheless 
have  persisted  in  the  race  in  which  they  appear  because 
they  are  necessarily  connected  with  the  existence  of  other 
habits  which  are  sufficiently  advantageous  to  bear  the  burden 
of  the  disadvantageous  by-product,  then  such  an  hypothesis 
as  that  which  Professor  Hodder  suggests  as  possible  is  ren- 
dered difficult  of  acceptance  in  consideration  of  the  very 
important  development  of  religious  activities.  Such  examples 
of  such  instincts  I  do  not  think  can  be  educed ;  at  all 
events  not  in  sufficient  number  to  weigh  in  favour  of  the 
hypothesis.  Furthermore,  the  hypothesis  is  rendered  far 
less  tenable  if  we  are  able  to  discover  any  signs  of  distinct 
racial  advantage  connected  with  the  functioning  of  the 
instinct   under   consideration ;  and  before  I  complete   this 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  ?  231 

part  of  the  book  I  think  I  shall  be  able  to  present  many 
reasons  for  the  belief  that  the  functioning  of  religious 
expression  tends  to  social  advance,  and  is  therefore  of 
biological  advantage  to  the  human  race. 

§  6.  But  even  if  we  assume  that  religious  activities  are 
not  instinctive,  but  are  entirely  due  to  tradition  and  to  the 
imitation  of  the  example  of  others,  even  then  it  seems  to 
me  that  we  are  compelled  to  assume  that  the  activities 
have  functional  import  in  the  development  of  the  race. 
The  argument  in  the  previous  paragraphs  applies  here  also 
to  show  that  these  very  complex  habitual  activities  can 
with  no  degree  of  probability  be  held  to  be  either  of  neutral 
effect  or  of  disadvantage  to  the  race  in  which  they  persist : 
constantly  recurrent  as  they  are,  it  is  almost  certain  that 
they  must  be  of  advantage  to  the  race. 

To  compare  them  with  certain  relatively  simple  activities, 
we  may  consider  the  activities  of  the  chick  in  relation  to 
drinking,  to  which  we  have  referred  above.  In  this  case 
Professor  Lloyd  Morgan  claims  that  while  the  action  of 
swallowing  is  instinctive,  the  actions  antecedent  to  the 
swallowing  are  not  instinctive,  but  are  the  result  of  imita- 
tion,— of  what  we  may  call  the  "  traditions  "  of  the  race :  the 
mother  hen  habitually  teaches  the  chick  to  dip  its  bill  in 
the  water.  But  the  biological  value  of  this  persistent 
"  tradition  "  is  self-evident ;  for  granting  the  correctness 
of  Professor  Morgan's  position,  but  for  this  habit  of  the 
mother  hen  and  the  imitation  by  the  chick  the  little  birds 
would  die  of  thirst;  and  this  value  is  shown  conclusively 
by  the  very  fact  that  in  one  species  of  birds  which  Professor 
Morgan  has  discovered,  where  the  mother  bird  has  acquired 
habits  which  lead  it  to  desert  its  nest  before  the  eggs  are 
hatched,  there  the  chicks  which  have  had  no  aptitude  to  dip 
the   bill  in  the  water  have,  as  he  surmises,  died   off*  and 


232  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

the  persisting  race  has  acquired  as  a  complete  instinct  the 
activities  which  necessarily  precede  those  of  swallowing. 

I  shall  assume  in  what  follows  that  religious  activities 
are  the  expression  of  an  instinct,  but  my  argument  as  to 
the  biological  end  subserved  will  hold,  I  think,  even  if  we 
assume  that  these  activities,  so  complex  and  so  persistent 
in  the  race,  are  wholly  due  to  "  tradition  "  and  imitation. 

Taking  it  for  granted,  then,  that  these  activities,  whether 
truly  instinctive  or  not,  have  functional  significance  in  the 
development  of  the  race,  I  shall  present  a  tentative 
hypothesis  as  to  the  nature  of  this  function.  This  hypothesis 
I  have  already  stated  briefly,  and  I  shall  devote  the  next 
chapter  to  an  attempt  to  show  in  detail  that  religious 
expressions,  of  ceremonial  or  of  other  kinds,  whilst  on  the 
whole  of  little  advantage  and  often  of  distinct  disadvantage 
to  individual  life,  are  on  the  other  hand  advantageous  on 
the  whole  to  the  tribal  life  of  the  social  organism,  which  we 
believe  to  be  beginning  to  develop.  I  shall  further  attempt 
to  show  that  this  advantage  accrues  through  the  sub- 
ordination of  the  individual  variant,  elemental,  influences 
within  us,  and  the  emphasis  of  the  racial  influences ;  this 
subordination  and  emphasis  being  brought  about  by,  or  in 
necessary  connection  with,  the  habits  of  action  which  form 
the  expression  of  this  religious  instinct ;  we  being  able  thus 
to  account  for  the  persistence  of  these  habits  of  action, 
although  we  recognise,  as  I  have  just  said,  that  to  us  as 
individuals  they  are  apparently  at  times  of  disadvantage 
and  ordinarily  of  no  appreciable  value. 

II 

§  7.  Before  making  the  attempt  to  verify  the  hypothesis 
which  I  have  above  outlined,  I  must  ask  the  reader  to  turn 
his  attention  for  a  moment  in  another  direction,  in  which 


Ulv. 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  1  233 

clear  conceptions  will  materially  aid  us  in  this  process  of 
verification. 

Notwithstanding  that  it  may  compel  me  to  assume 
certain  points  that  will  not  be  illustrated  fully  until  later,  I 
wish  here  to  make  some  attempt  to  account  for  the  prevalent 
notion  that  the  actions  expressive  of  the  religious  instinct, 
or  resultant  therefrom,  are  dictated  to  us  in  some  very 
special  and  peculiar  way  by  some  power  without  ourselves. 
For,  according  to  the  view  I  am  about  to  maintain,  the  value 
of  seclusion  from  the  stimulations  of  active  life,  and  of 
voluntary  restraint  from  reaction  in  connection  with  these 
stimulations  when  they  are  not  or  cannot  be  avoided,  and 
the  value  of  all  other  religious  expression  as  well,  lies  in 
the  opportunity  that  is  given  to  us  to  feel  the  force  of 
certain  persistent  impulses  within  oicr  veru^ves^  which  are 
of  little  individualistic  value,  but  which  have  great  racial 
significance.  If  this  be  true,  the  value  of  our  action 
evidently  cannot  be  due  to  our  obedience  to  a  commander 
without  ourselves.  It  is  desirable,  therefore,  to  endeavour 
to  gain  some  notion  of  the  basis  of  the  conception  that  these 
latent  impulses,  which  only  occasionally  become  prominent 
within  us,  are  forced  upon  us  from  without. 

It  will  serve  our  purpose  best  at  the  start  to  say  a 
few  words  concerning  the  form  in  which  this  emphasis  of 
the  later-formed  instincts  might  be  expected  to  present 
itself  to  consciousness. 

If  the  argument  which  has  preceded  this  be  correct,  if 
the  later-formed  instincts  relating  to  social  life  are  effective 
rather  through  the  wide  general  trend  of  the  activities  they 
induce  than  through  the  forcefulness  or  quickness  of  reaction 
to  the  stimuli  which  call  them  out,  then  it  seems  clear  that 
they  will  not  be  likely  to  force  themselves  upon  our  atten- 
tion as  the  impulses  of  individualistic  significance,  and  those 


234  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

relating  to  reproduction,  will  surely  do ;  for  these  latter  are 
called  into  existence  by  presentations  of  a  relatively  powerful 
nature,  and  must  in  most  cases  function  promptly  to  be  of 
service. 

But  where,  for  any  reason,  an  appropriate  stimulation 
and  individualistic  reaction  are  absent,  and  where  the 
instincts  relating  to  reproduction  are  not  called  out,  then 
the  tendency  to  act  in  accord  with  the  trend  determined  by 
the  social  instincts  must  necessarily  become  more  prominent, 
and  the  ethical  impulses  then  may  gain  strength  to  sway 
our  lives. 

N'ow  the  primitive  man  in  whom  these  social  instincts 
are  just  beginning  to  develop  would  with  difficulty  have 
his  attention  turned  to  the  existence  of  the  impulses  they 
determine,  except  under  conditions  of  individualistic  restraint 
which  are  foreign  to  the  habits  of  the  savage ;  he  would 
therefore  with  difficulty  recognise  them  as  definite  impulses, 
as  distinct  leadings ;  and  they  would  be  likely  first  to  gain 
marked  attention  if  they  happened  to  appear  in  the  form  of 
hallucinations  which  would  startle  the  one  who  saw  the 
hallucinatory  vision  or  heard  the  hallucinatory  voice,  and 
would  gain  power  with  him,  and  with  neighbours  to  whom 
he  told  his  tale,  because  of  the  mysterious  manner  of  their 
occurrence. 

I  wish  to  show  in  what  follows  that  in  all  probability 
we  gain  this  notion  of  the  exterior  origin  of  these  higher 
impulses  because,  under  the  influences  which  go  with 
religious  expression,  they  often  still  appear,  and  more  often 
in  the  past  have  appeared,  in  the  form  of  hallucinations,  or 
in  forms  closely  related  thereto. 

Hallucinations,  as  my  reader  well  knows,  are  those 
deceptive  perceptions  which  arise  in  our  minds  without  any 
such  stimulation  reaching  us  from  the  environment  as  is 
usually  necessary  in  order  to  bring  these  perceptions  into 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  ^  235 

existence.  The  one  experiencing  the  hallucination  sees 
clearly,  for  instance,  some  one  sitting  in  a  chair  near  him, 
although  many  other  witnesses  tell  him  that  the  chair  is 
empty ;  if  no  others  are  with  him  to  tell  him  of  his  decep- 
tion he  is  likely  to  believe  that  he  has  seen  a  "  ghost."  Or 
perhaps  he  hears  his  name  called  when  all  others  in  the 
room  with  him  have  noticed  no  sound.  These  are  instances 
of  hallucination  of  the  most  ordinary  type. 

Hallucinations  are  caused  by  the  abnormal  strengthening 
of  some  idea  within  the  man  to  so  great  an  extent  that  he 
is  forced  to  believe  that  the  stimulations  from  the  environ- 
ment which  in  his  experience  have  usually  produced  similar 
ideas  have  in  this  case  also  reached  his  sense  organs. 
Indeed  in  some  extreme  cases  expert  observers  are  led  to 
think  it  likely  that  a  stimulation  of  the  sense  organ  actually 
does  accompany  hallucinations  of  vivid  form,  although  in 
such  cases  the  mental  state  is  aroused  by  action  within 
the  subject  and  not  by  action  in  the  environment. 

We  know  that  hallucinations  are  indicative  of  morbid 
nervous  conditions,  that  they  are  symptomatic  of  mental 
derangement,  which  may  be  temporary  or  persistent;  but 
we  also  see  nowadays  that  they  are  easily  explicable  in 
terms  of  normal  mental  action  ;  and  they  are  no  longer 
looked  upon  as  mysterious  by  the  neurologist  nor  indeed  by 
the  average  highly  educated  layman. 

§  8.  There  is  a  special  consideration  which  also  leads 
us  to  see  why  these  hallucinations  must  have  been  excep- 
tionally impressive  among  primitive  men,  and  the  messages 
given  by  them  therefore  especially  effective ;  and  why  they 
must  naturally  have  been  referred  to  influences  from  without 
the  man  impressed. 

In  the  early  days  of  man's  self-consciousness  there  is  no 
reason  to  believe  that  these  hallucinations  would  be  thought 


236  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

of  as  arising  from  within  the  men  who  experienced  them ; 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  most  natural  to  suppose  that  they 
would  be  explained  as  being  due  to  the  action  of  "  spirits," 
such  an  explanation  conforming  with  the  belief  current  in 
those  early  times  that  the  air  and  the  objects  surrounding 
men  were  widely  populated  by  spirits^  which  to  the 
ordinary  man,  under  usual  circumstances,  were  invisible 
and  silent. 

I  do  not  wish  to  make  too  much  of  the  animistic  theory 
so  called,  the  theory  which  deals  with  man's  natural 
attribution  of  spiritual  life  to  inanimate  objects ;  but  I 
think  it  cannot  be  questioned  that  the  young  of  our  own 
kind  have  a  tendency  to  such  attribution  which  they  find 
it  necessary  to  out-grow.  My  own  daughter,  at  less  than 
five  years  of  age,  showed  very  clearly  to  me  by  certain 
remarks  of  hers  that  she  supposed  the  leaves  of  the  trees  to 
be  self-active,  and  that  she  thought  they  produced  the 
wind  which  blew  on  her  face.  If  such  a  tendency  be 
natural  to  the  young  to-day,  notwithstanding  the  many 
educational  influences  which  work  to  suppress  it,  it  is 
highly  probable  that  the  mind  of  the  savage  must  have 
found  it  difficult  to  avoid  attributing  to  objects  around  him 
some  spiritual  power  like  the  force  felt  within  himself, 
which  he  recognised  as  leading  him  to  self-guided  movement. 
In  fact  we  have  evidence  in  favour  of  this  contention  in  the 
existence  of  many  forms  of  superstition,  remnants  of  these 
time-honoured  beliefs,  among  our  own  educated  people,  in 
the  stories  of  fairy -land  and  in  the  superstitious  fear  of 
ghosts  and  of  spirits  that  are  supposed  to  appear  only  in 
the  hours  of  darkness. 

^  It  is  important  to  remember,  as  Dr.  H.  M.  Stanley  has  said  [Psycho- 
logical Review,  vol.  v.  No.  3],  that  what  we  call  "spirits"  were  inconceivable 
by  primitive  man,  and  are  equally  so  by  savages  to-day,  who  look  upon  what 
we  speak  of  as  the  spirit  world  as  made  up  of  real  physical  individuals  of  a 
different  form  from  themselves,  and  yet  in  some  respects  like  themselves. 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION-  INSTINCTIVE  1  237 

This  animistic  theory  had  doubtless  become  much  em- 
phasised in  the  mind  of  the  more  thoughtful  of  men  in 
early  days,  from  the  fact  that  it  furnished  a  very  simple 
explanation  of  the  dreams  that  occur  during  normal  sleep, 
and  of  the  speech  and  action  of  somnambulists,  and  finally, 
what  interests  us  especially  here,  of  the  actions  of  those 
who  passed  through  trance  states,  and  of  the  statements  of 
the  entranced  as  to  what  they  saw  and  heard  while  in  the 
trance.  For  these  phenomena  all  seemed  to  point  to  a 
temporary  displacement  from  the  body  of  the  spirit  that 
was  supposed  to  dwell  within  it  during  waking  life,  and 
told  at  the  same  time  of  strange  spirits  that  took  possession 
of  the  person  of  him  who  had  fallen  into  the  trance,  and 
of  mysterious  visions,  but  especially  of  voices,  that  spoke  to 
or  through  the  dreamer. 

Then  again  it  not  infrequently  happened,  as  it  occa- 
sionally happens  with  us  in  our  own  day,  that  the  occurrences 
depicted  in  the  dreams  really  came  to  pass  later ;  suggestions 
were  given  of  the  presence  of  diseases  which  really  existed 
although  they  had  been  unsuspected,  but  which  presently 
manifested  themselves  ;  notions  of  dangers  which  were  real 
and  avoidable,  suggestions  of  advantageous  actions  which 
were  followed  with  good  result,  came  to  the  dreamer 
merely  because  they  could  not  occur  distinctly  in  the  man's 
consciousness  during  the  distractions  and  vivid  conscious- 
ness of  waking  life. 

We  know  that  these  dreams,  and  the  hallucinations  that 
were  so  closely  related  to  them,  were  due  to  bodily  or  brain 
reactions  of  a  kind  that  corresponded  with  no  distinctive 
mental  states  that  could  be  attended  to  in  waking  life ; 
such  reactions  as  are  coincident  with  our  experience  in 
ordinary  dreams,  but  especially  in  the  states  allied  to  what 
we  call  nightmare, — states  which  have  in  later  days  found 
so  many  illustrations  in  the  phenomena  of  automatic  writing 


238  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  ii 

and  the  like,  and  in  those  thoughts  and  actions  which  are 
attributed  to  a  sub-liminal  consciousness. 

We  to-day  realise  that  the  voices  and  visions  of  dream 
life  are  closely  related  to  our  normal  waking  consciousness, 
being  but  elaborations  of  revivals  of  the  past,  and  of 
imaginations  of  the  future ;  and  that  they  develop  sometimes 
as  they  do  in  normal  consciousness  we  acknowledge  in  the 
fact  that  our  every-day  reverie  trains  of  waking  life  are 
often  spoken  of  as  "  day-dreams."  That  they  sometimes 
develop  in  such  form  as  would  not  naturally  appear  in 
normal  states  of  consciousness  does  not  prevent  our  recog- 
nition of  the  fact  that  they  are  closely  allied  to  the  images 
present  to  us  in  waking  life  ;  for  it  is  perfectly  easy  to  show 
that  these  phenomena  are  not  far  separated  from  the  occur- 
rences of  normal  psychic  existence. 

In  our  highly  elaborated  life  the  visions  and  voices  of 
the  dreamland  which  impress  the  less  developed  man  are 
less  emphasised  than  are  other  allied  results  of  active 
mental  life  which  arise  during  our  sleep.  We  awaken 
with  the  recognised  solution  of  a  problem  that  has  worried 
us  during  the  days  past ;  we  feel  that  the  solution  has  been 
due  to  nothing  that  we  can  connect  with  our  present  ego. 
In  olden  times  we  would  have  thought  we  had  been  given 
the  answer  by  the  God  whom  we  especially  worshipped,  or 
by  our  patron  saint :  nowadays  we  say  that  the  solution 
was  reached  by  what  is  called  "  unconscious  cerebra- 
tion." 

But  we  also  recognise  that  what  is  practically  the  same 
psychic  phenomenon  is  found  in  normal  waking  life  where 
we  discover  suddenly  the  hidden  meaning  of  some  set  of 
facts  over  which  we  have  been  pondering  for  years.-^     As  a 

^  A  well-known  example  of  this  action  in  waking  life  is  given  in  the  dis- 
covery by  Hamilton  of  the  principle  of  Quaternions,  whilst  one  day  he  was 
crossing  what  is  now  called  the  ''  Quaternion  Bridge." 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  ?  23& 

matter  of  fact  this  form  of  quasi-"  revelation,"  which  by 
most  people  is  regarded  as  extraordinary,  is  more  commonly 
experienced  than  it  is  generally  supposed  to  be,  as  will  appear 
if  we  will  but  look  for  it  in  our  lives,  although  it  is  seldom 
emphatic  enough  to  be  noted  by  the  common  mortal. 

But  granting  all  these  facts  so  famihar  to  us  in  these 
days,  it  certainly  is  not  surprising  that  these  dreams  came 
to  be  thought  of  as  due  to  influences  from  without,  and 
were  supposed  to  have  prophetic  significance ;  and  that  the 
hallucinations  of  voice  and  of  vision,  in  the  shape  of 
symbols  or  gods  or  ghosts,  that  occurred  from  one  cause  or 
another,  were  thought  to  have  a  common  origin  with  the 
voices  and  visions  of  dreamland,  and  to  have  especial 
prophetic  importance. 

§  9.  At  this  point  let  us  consider  more  fully  the  claim 
that  the  conditions  under  which  hallucinations  are  produced 
are  conditions  that  would  be  likely  to  bring  into  prominence 
the  impulses  of  wider  significance,  for  the  very  reason  that 
they  tend  to  preclude  response  to  stimuli  which  under 
normal  conditions  would  give  rise  to  individualistic  re- 
actions. 

In  extreme  states  of  hallucinatory  impression  the  one 
who  is  impressed  falls  into  what  we  know  as  a  trance  state. 
In  trance  states  some  or  all  of  the  senses  which  bring  to  us 
our  knowledge  of  the  outer  world  are  usually  benumbed  : 
the  person  "  stares  at  vacancy  "  perhaps,  or  pays  no  attention 
whatever  to  his  or  her  surroundings,  and  in  general  shows 
a  total  lack  of  that  power  to  concentrate  the  attention  upon 
the  outer  world  at  large  which  is  so  necessary  for  the  per- 
ception of  those  objective  conditions  in  the  environment 
which  lead  to  individualistic  reactions.  The  one  who  per- 
ceives the  hallucination  may  indeed  fall  into  a  state  which 
is  so  morbid  as  to  be  indistinguishable  from  catalepsy. 


240  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

Where  the  hallucination  is  not  accompanied  by  such 
morbid  conditions  we  nevertheless  have  of  necessity  a 
repression  of  reaction  to  environmental  stimuli,  a  concen- 
tration of  thought  upon  states  of  purely  subjective  origin  : 
hovi^  else  can  we  explain  the  higher  emphasis  of  those 
subjective  states,  the  deceptive  perceptions,  which  are  not 
stimulated  from  without  us,  and  which,  psychologically 
speaking,  make  the  essence  of  the  hallucinations  we  are 
considering  ? 

If  under  conditions  which  produce  hallucinations  the 
tendencies  to  individualistic  reaction  are  reduced,  then  it  is 
fairly  clear,  in  accordance  with  our  argument  in  the  previous 
chapter,  that  in  these  states  the  non-individualistic  but 
more  broadly  persistent  impulses  will  be  enforced,  and  will 
be  liable  to  be  emphasised.  And  it  is  most  natural  that 
these  hallucinations  should  in  large  measure  have  to  do 
either  with  (1)  those  instincts  which  relate  to  the  per- 
sistence of  the  species ;  or  more  especially  with  (2)  those 
tribal  instincts  which  produce  within  us  the  distinctly 
ethical  impulses  which  are  principally  emphasised  in 
religious  teaching ;  or  with  (3)  conceptions  of  duty  in 
reference  to  these  instincts,  or  religious  customs  that  have 
become  prominent  because  they  have  fostered  these 
instincts. 

We  find  this  suggestion  verified  if  we  study,  for  instance, 
the  visions  recorded  in  the  Old  Testament  Scriptures,  which 
are  especially  appropriate  here  because  they  are  generally 
supposed  to  have  religious  significance. 

We  note  (1)  abundant  instances  of  such  visions  which 
refer  to  the  instincts  that  relate  to  the  persistence  of  the 
species.  Abram  is  represented  as  having  many  visions 
which  taught  him  that  he  was  to  be  the  father  of  great 
nations,  whilst  yet  his  wife  was  childless,  and  he  an  old 
man,  she  an  old  woman.     Isaac  too  had  visions  in  which 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  ?  241 

he  was  told  that  his  seed  should  multiply  as  the  stars  of 
heaven.  Jacob  also  before  he  had  begotten  children  saw 
the  ladder  open  to  heaven,  and  heard  the  voice  telling  of 
the  great  race  of  which  he  was  to  be  the  father ;  and  again 
at  the  time  when  his  name  was  changed  to  Israel  did  he 
hear  the  same  message. 

Of  those  visions  or  voices  (2)  which  relate  directly  to 
the  strengthening  of  the  ethical  impulses,  which  we  have 
seen  to  have  special  social  import,  perhaps  the  most  notable 
is  the  vision  and  aural  command  which  we  are  taught  was 
vouchsafed  to  Moses  on  Mount  Sinai,  at  which  time  it  is 
generally  believed  he  had  given  to  him  the  famous  ten  com- 
mandments which  have  been  of  such  pre-eminent  importance 
in  the  ethical  regeneration  of  men.  Samuel  again  is  "  called  " 
to  protest  against  the  immorality  of  the  sons  of  Eli.  The 
visions  of  Jeremiah,  of  Ezekiel,  of  Daniel,  of  Zechariah, 
were  all  followed  by  commands,  coming  as  these  prophets 
thought  from  without  themselves,  urging  them  to  lay  aside 
individual  fear,  and  to  preach  of  the  ills  which  must  result 
from  the  sins  of  the  people  against  the  higher  code  of 
social  morality.  Jonah  in  his  first  vision  learns  the  same 
lesson ;  in  his  second  vision  he  is  taught  to  sink  his  indivi- 
dualistic disappointment  at  the  failure  of  his  prophecy,  and 
learns  a  social  lesson  of  pity  and  sympathy  with  those 
whom  he  had  cursed,  but  who  had  repented. 

Turning  now  (3)  to  the  consideration  of  those  hallu- 
cinations that  relate  to  conceptions  of  duty  having  indirect 
reference  to  the  non-individualistic  instincts,  we  find  the 
same  corroboration  of  our  hypothesis. 

The  legend  of  Abraham's  sacrifice  of  Isaac  evidently  tells 
of  barbaric  custom  that  led  to  the  sacrifice  of  the  first-born 
son.  But  in  the  message,  which  Abraham  felt  he  gained 
from  without,  we  find  record  of  the  forcible  breaking  upon 
his  mind  of  the  thought,  perhaps  only  dimly  grasped,  that 


242  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

the  sacrifice  of  his  beloved  son,  although  demanded  by  time- 
honoured  custom,  stood  in  opposition  to  wide  -  reaching 
impulses  which  guided  his  life ;  moreover  that  such  sacri- 
fice could  not  in  itself  be  of  value  to  God  as  he  conceived 
him ;  that  it  must  be  symbolic ;  that  all  the  value  of  this 
sacrifice  for  himself  at  least  could  be  obtained  without  the 
loss  of  his  cherished  heir,  by  the  substitution  of  the  ram 
from  the  flock. 

Elijah  listens  to  the  wind  and  to  the  earthquake,  and 
sees  the  blasting  fire,  and  then  hears  a  "  still  small  voice  " 
bidding  him  to  lay  aside  his  personal  fear,  to  forget  his 
chagrin  at  his  apparent  lack  of  success,  and  to  take  up  the 
duty  which  would  lead  to  the  overthrow  of  the  immorality 
encouraged  by  Ahab. 

In  the  New  Testament  we  find  recorded  a  vision  appear- 
ing to  St.  Peter  which  taught  him  to  call  nothing  common 
or  unclean.  This  gives  us  a  case,  quite  in  line  with  our 
argument,  where  an  accidental  variation  had  settled  into  a 
habit  of  a  people,  and  had  almost  suppressed  in  them  the 
deeper  instincts  which  should  have  led  them  to  a  recog- 
nition of  social  brotherhood.  It  required  a  startling  hallu- 
cinatory enforcement  of  the  innate  social  instincts  opposed 
to  this  custom  -  fixed  individualism  to  bring  St.  Peter  to 
see  the  error  which  had  crept  into  the  life  of  his  people. 

There  are  visions  recorded  in  the  same  scriptures  which 
relate  to  individual  effectiveness ;  but  these  are  relatively 
few  in  number. 

It  is  of  course  impossible  to  say  of  all  these  records  of 
supposed  visions  and  aural  messages,  that  they  are  correct 
descriptions  of  actual  occurrences  to  actual  men ;  but  even 
if  they  should  be  shown  to  be  purely  mythical,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  can  at  least  be  well  claimed  that  they  could  not 
have  persisted  in  the  folk-lore  of  the  people  from  which 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  1  243 

they  were  derived  unless  they  had  had  some  foundation  in 
fact,  and  especially  unless  they  had  been  in  accord  with  the 
repeated  experience  of  the  men  who  had  handed  them  down 
from  generation  to  generation. 

It  is  to  be  noted  also  that  it  cannot  be  claimed  that  all 
hallucinations  occasion  emphasis  of  the  later -formed  and 
higher  impulses  ;  for  hallucinations  are  morbid  phenomena 
and  naturally  appear  persistently  in  neurotic  patients. 
Still  all  these  examples,  to  which  many  more  might  be 
added,  even  though  they  be  shown  to  have  had  varying 
significance  other  than  that  emphasised  here,  nevertheless 
at  least  indicate  clearly  that  average  men,  considering  their 
own  experience  of  life,  have  found,  and  still  find,  themselves 
ready  to  accept  the  facts  which  we  express  when  we  say 
that  the  hallucinatory  command,  as  it  commonly  occurs, 
leads  in  general  to  the  suppression  of  individualistic  im- 
pulses, and  to  the  strengthening  of  those  that  have  broader 
racial  significance. 

It  may  be  noted  here  that  the  processes  above  considered 
are  not  far  removed  from  those  brought  to  our  attention  in 
many  of  the  trance  states  that  "  spiritualistic  "  and  hypnotic 
experiences  call  to  our  notice  to-day ;  and  it  is  to  be  re- 
marked that  the  so  -  called  "  spiritualistic "  messages,  as 
received  by  serious  people,  when  they  are  not  wholly 
frivolous,  most  often  relate  to  ethical  matters,  or  to 
religious  mysteries. 

§  10.  But  clearly  if  our  argument  be  valid,  it  is  to  be 
expected  also  that  these  hallucinatory  messages  may  relate 
not  only  to  those  special  instincts  of  social  significance 
which  we  have  been  considering,  and  which  are  usually 
connected  in  our  minds  with  religious  observance,  but  also 
to  all  of  the  instincts  which  have  social  import.  Not  only 
should  we  expect  them  to  speak  with  force  against  murder. 


244  INSTINCT  AND  EEASON  part  ii 

and  theft,  and  adultery,  and  in  favour  of  sympathy  and 
benevolence,  but  we  should  also  expect  upon  occasion  to 
find  the  voice  or  the  vision  dictating  patriotic  action,  and 
emphasising  the  art-impulses  which  relate  less  directly,  but 
none  the  less  surely,  to  social  consolidation. 

And  when  my  reader  considers  the  subject  he  will  at 
once  realise  the  fact,  which  is  not  in  general  sufficiently 
appreciated,  that  these  visions  and  voices  are  not  restricted 
to  the  realms  of  those  ethical  instincts  with  which  mainly 
religion  nowadays  is  very  generally  thought  to  deal ;  but 
that  they  are  also  vouchsafed  to  enthusiasts  in  whom  these 
other  social  traits  are  developed.  Seclusion,  fasting,  the 
emphasis  of  a  persistent  idea,  will  bring  the  voice  of  his 
God  to  the  religious  devotee ;  but  as  well  will  they  give  the 
vision  and  the  voice  to  Moses  at  the  burning  bush,  to 
Gideon  at  the  wine-press,  to  Joan  d'Arc,  leading  each  of 
them  to  patriotic  fervour ;  and  as  well  gain  the  guidance  of 
the  muse  for  the  poet,  the  painter,  the  sculptor,  leading  each 
to  artistic  accomplishment.  It  is  said  of  Puvis  de  Chavannes, 
who  has  given  to  the  world  the  decoration  of  the  large  hall 
in  the  Sorbonne  in  Paris,  that  before  he  began  his  work  he 
spent  days  amidst  the  scaffoldings,  merely  contemplating 
the  wall  surface  upon  which  he  was  to  work,  and  he  tells 
his  friends  that  before  he  touched  his  brush  he  saw  clearly 
before  him  the  decoration,  exactly  as  we  see  it  on  the  wall 
to-day.  This  vision  was  surely  not  far  from  what  a  specialist 
in  nervous  diseases  would  call  an  hallucination. 

§  11.  I  think:  few  will  deny  that  the  conditions  which 
religious  activities  imply,  in  their  extreme  forms,  are  conducive 
to  .the  production  of  hallucination ;  a  fact  which  will  be 
fully  illustrated  as  we  proceed.  The  involuntary  separation 
of  a  man  from  his  fellows,  which  was  common  in  nomadic 
life,  the  compulsory  fasting  which  often  accompanied  this 


CHAP.  IX  IS  RELIGION  INSTINCTIVE  1  245 

separation,  and  the  concentration  of  thought  upon  certain 
persistent  ideas  which  would  naturally  follow,  are  all  occur- 
rences which  we  now  recognise  as  liable  to  carry  a  naturally 
healthy  mental  life  over  into  the  realms  of  hallucination. 

We  are  thus  able,  therefore,  to  account  for  the  many 
persistent  beliefs  in  the  actual  visual  or  aural  guidance  of 
the  religious  leaders  who  have  arisen  amongst  the  wandering 
tribes  of  the  wilderness.  As  a  matter  of  fact  these  leaders 
doubtless  did  in  many  cases  hear  hallucinatory  voices,  and 
did  see  hallucinatory  visions,  and  they  themselves,  under- 
standing these  experiences  to  be  the  marks  of  guidance  from 
without  by  a  higher  power,  preached  quite  honestly  of  their 
own  prophetic  "  calling." 

Similar'^separations  from  the  world,  accompanied  with 
fasting  and  persistent  attention  to  some  one  idea,  separations 
not  the  result  of  chance  isolation  but  brought  about  by 
voluntary  action,  are  characteristic  marks  of  the  lives  of  the 
religious  hermits  and  ascetics  who  abounded  in  the  days  of 
old,  and  who  are  still  found  in  large  numbers  in  certain 
parts  of  the  world,  principally  in  the  East,  but  in  no  small 
number  even  in  the  midst  of  our  western  civilisation ;  men 
who  have  proclaimed  and  still  do  proclaim,  and  I  believe 
with  perfect  honesty,  that  leadership  is  guaranteed  to  them 
by  voices  and  visions  that  have  been  vouchsafed  to  them 
and  to  them  alone. 

The  close  relation  of  these  "  visions  "  and  "  voices  "  of 
religious  inspiration  to  morbid  mental  life  has  been  clearly 
grasped  by  a  thinker  so  far  separated  from  our  modern 
scientific  thought  as  was  Emerson. 

In  his  essay  "  The  Over-Soul "  he  teaches  us  that  "  A 
certain  tendency  to  insanity  has  always  attended  the  opening 
of  the  religious  sense  in  men,  as  if  they  had  been  '  blasted 
with  excess  of  light.'  The  trances  of  Socrates,  the  '  union ' 
of  Plotinus,  the  vision  of  Porphyry,  the  conversion  of  Paul, 


246  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

the  aurora  of  Behmen,  the  convulsions  of  George  Fox  and 
his  Quakers,  the  illumination  of  Swedenborg  are  of  this  kind. 
What  was  in  the  case  of  these  remarkable  persons  a  ravish- 
ment has,  in  innumerable  instances  in  common  life,  been 
exhibited  in  less  striking  manner.  Everywhere  the  history 
of  religion  betrays  a  tendency  to  enthusiasm.  The  rapture 
of  the  Moravian  and  Quietist :  the  opening  of  the  internal 
sense  of  the  Word,  in  the  language  of  the  New  Jerusalem 
Church ;  the  revival  of  the  Calvinistic  Churches ;  the 
experiences  of  the  Methodists,  are  the  varying  forms  of 
that  shudder  of  awe  and  delight  with  which  the  individual 
soul  always  mingles  with  the  universal  soul." 

It  is  surely  not  surprising  that,  when  this  illumination 
from  within  occurred  in  a  semi-hallucinatory  way,  the  person 
to  whom  the  vision  had  been  granted  should  attribute  it  to 
an  influence  from  without.  We  can  understand  whence 
arose  the  notions  of  the  muse  who  incites  the  poet,  of  the 
vision  that  is  given  to  the  sculptor,  of  the  demon  of  a  Socrates. 
Furthermore,  we  can  understand  how  it  happens  that  this 
thought  of  a  voice  coming  to  us  from  without  has  an  abiding 
significance  for  us  even  to  this  day ;  for  where  the  processes, 
which  when  carried  to  extremes  produce  hallucinations,  are 
not  carried  to  extremes,  mental  states  similar  to  those 
accompanying  hallucination  would  obtain ;  and  these  closely 
allied  mental  states  would  be  closely  related  by  the  one  who 
had  once  experienced  hallucination  to  the  more  startling 
occurrence.  It  thus  appears  not  at  all  obscure  why  it  has 
become  common  custom  to  speak  of  our  consciousness  of  the 
pressure  of  our  impulses  as  though  it  were  a  voice  from 
without  speaking  within  us  and  guiding  our  lives.  There  is 
no  more  general  and  beautiful  fiction  than  that  which  tells 
us  of  the  "  still  small  voice  of  conscience."  It  will  be  con- 
venient to  use  this  metaphor  from  time  to  time,  and  I  am 
sure  I  shall  not  be  misunderstood  in  so  doing. 


CHAPTEK    X 

THE    FUNCTION    OF    RELIGIOUS    EXPRESSION 


§  1.  In  the  chapters  that  have  preceded  this  the  reader 
will  remember  that  we  found  ourselves  led  to  note  that 
there  are  many  influences  in  our  complex  social  life  which, 
if  unrestrained,  tend  to  produce  an  over  -  emphasis  of 
variance  from  typical  forms  of  action,  and  to  subvert  the 
order  of  instinct  efficiency  which  has  been  formed  in 
us,  and  which  we  judge  must  be  of  value  to  our  race  in  its 
struggle  for  supremacy.  This  suggested  that  it  would  be 
of  advantage  to  our  race  if  there  should  develop  within  us 
a  governing  instinct  functioning  t'^  prevent  this  over- 
emphasis and  this  subversion,  and  led  us  to  look  for  some 
signs  of  the  existence  of  such  a  governing  instinct. 

In  the  very  beginning  of  this  search  the  fact  was  forced 
upon  us  that  some  of  the  most  characteristic  activities 
connected  with  the  expression  of  our  religious  feelings 
must  tend  to  produce  the  very  results  that  our  governing 
instinct  if  existent  would  itself  tend  to  produce.  This 
led  us  to  ask  whether  religious  activities  are  to  be  classed 
as  instinctive ;  and,  finding  evidence  that  they  must 
probably  be  so  classed,  the  hypothesis  already  stated  was 
naturally  suggested — viz.  that  the  function  of  the  activities 
expressive  of  the  religious  instinct  is  to  emphasise  within 


248  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

us  instinct  in  general  and  to  subordinate  variance ;  to 
strengthen  the  instincts  of  social  influence  and  to  subor- 
dinate those  that  are  less  broad  in  their  influence  although 
occasionally  more  powerfully  developed ;  to  establish  a 
certain  order  of  impulse  efi&ciency  which  would  tend  to 
bring  those  instincts  that  are  of  individualistic  import  into 
subjection,  under  certain  conditions,  to  those  that  function 
in  relation  to  the  persistence  of  the  species ;  and  to  bring 
both  of  these  classes  of  instincts,  in  general,  into  subjection 
to  the  instincts  that  have  social  import. 

This  hypothesis,  which  I  present  tentatively,  must  be 
judged  by  a  study  of  the  effects  produced  by  the  very 
varied  expressions  of  religious  feeling ;  a  study  which  I 
could  not  attempt  to  make  even  in  outline  were  it  not 
that  the  many  forms  of  religious  expression  naturally  fall 
into  a  few  groups  which  we  may  find  space  to  consider 
briefly. 

I  shall  attempt  in  the  case  of  each  group  to  show  that 
the  persistence  of  these  special  activities  cannot  be  ex- 
plained on  the  ground  that  they  are  pleasing  to  the 
individual,  or  that  they  are  of  unrecognised  or  of  recog- 
nised individualistic  advantage ;  nor  on  the  ground  that 
they  tend  to  advantage  in  relation  to  the  processes 
governing  the  reproduction  of  kind.  On  the  other  hand, 
I  think  it  will  appear  that  they  do  serve  to  emphasise  the 
order  of  impulse  efficiency  already  referred  to,  bringing 
into  prominence  the  social  impulses  and  tending  thus  to 
produce  persistence  of  the  higher  social  types. 

If  this  view  be  sustained,  then  we  are  able  to  account 
for  the  persistence  of  these  activities  in  our  race,  it  being 
clearly  advantageous  to  us  to  emphasise  the  social  instincts 
which  make  possible  the  existence  of  these  social  types ; 
for  these  social  instincts  could  scarcely  have  arisen  in  us 
unless   the   actions   they   induce    had    been   of   advantage 


<3HAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  249 

indirectly  at  least  in  the  maintenance  of  the  life  of  the 
individuals  and  species  in  which  they  appear. 

§  2.  I  do  not  here  attempt  to  define  the  nature  of 
religion  as  we  know  it  on  its  conscious  side,  although  the 
essential  mental  characteristics  connected  with  religious 
expressions  will  be  from  time  to  time  referred  to.  I  am 
concerned  here  not  with  questions  of  belief  with  which  we 
usually  associate  religious  expression,  and  I  shall  avoid 
discussing  such  questions  as  far  as  may  be,  for  I  wish  here 
to  study  only  the  active  expressions  which  are  usually 
recognised  as  connected  with  our  religious  feelings. 

If  objection  be  made  to  the  attempt  to  make  such  a 
separation,  I  think  I  may  answer  that  it  is  altogether 
proper  from  the  biological  point  of  view  to  endeavour  to 
imagine  ourselves  beings  far  removed  from  men  and  watch- 
ing their  activities,  much  as  we  ourselves  consider  the 
activities  of  the  flying  bird  whose  experience  we  can  but 
dimly  appreciate :  were  we  such  beings  we  should  notice  in 
man  the  exceptional  activities  which  we  call  religious,, 
iind  would  strive  to  classify  them  and  determine  their 
biological  significance. 

I  shall  endeavour  to  take  such  a  point  of  view  in  what 
follows,  although  from  time  to  time  I  shall  not  hesitate  to 
refer  to  the  psychic  experiences  which  we  connect  with 
religious  functioning  as  they  serve  to  corroborate  the 
hypothesis  I  present. 

§  3.  Before  beginning  our  study  in  detail,  I  must  speak 
of  a  few  points  which  will  apply  to  all  the  religious  expres- 
sions to  be  examined. 

The  first  point  that  I  would  mention  is  this :  that 
although  I  am  concerned  to  consider  the  basis  of  the  per- 
sistence of  religious  expressions  only,  still  I  am  compelled 


^*^        OF  THE 


250  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

from  time  to  time  to  refer  to  their  probable  origins.  I 
therefore  ask  the  reader  to  note  in  general  that  even  if  the 
origins  prove  to  be  very  different  from  those  suggested, 
nevertheless  the  argument  concerning  the  persistence  of 
the  habits  is  not  affected,  and  it  is  with  this  argument  that 
we  have  the  most  concern. 

In  passing  I  may  also  remark  that  the  questions  relating 
to  the  origin  of  religious  expressions  are  rendered  in  all 
casee  very  obscure  because  these  expressions  have  come 
down  to  us  from  a  period  so  far  back  of  the  very  begin- 
nings of  historical  record ;  and  especially  because  special 
parts  of  these  expressions  have  been  developed  and  modified 
artificially  |^by  the  priestly  classes,  and  this  sometimes 
perhaps  deliberately  for  their  own  benefit,  but  for  the  most 
part  I  think  naturally  and  for  no  selfish  reasons.  More- 
over in  the  course  of  this  process  of  modification  new 
notions  of  the  original  significance  of  the  expressions  have 
been  attached  to  them,  by  those  who  began  the  attempt  to 
explain  the  existence  of  these  customs,  long  after  the 
significance  attached  to  them  in  earlier  days,  closer  to  the 
time  of  their  origin,  had  been  entirely  forgotten. 

This  leads  me  to  say  one  other  word,  and  that  concern- 
ing the  relation  of  religion  to  beliefs  to  which  a  special 
book  might  well  be  devoted.  Writers  on  the  subjects  we 
are  treating  have  a  way  of  assuming  that  beliefs  have  led 
to  the  formation  of  habits,  when  in  reality  they  are  much 
more  likely  to  have  been  merely  discovered  to  exist  in 
connection  with  habits  already  well  established. 

Beliefs  become  known  to  us  first  in  connection  with 
the  disturbance  of  our  conceptions  by  doubts ;  but  for 
the  doubts,  strictly  speaking,  they  would  never  have  existed, 
the  trends  of  our  thought  would  not  have  attracted  atten- 
tion :  yet  they  have  grown  up  with  the  established  habits 
of  action  which  are  co-ordinate  with  them.      New  modifica- 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  251 

tions  of  belief  do  indeed  involve  modifications  of  systems  of 
action,  but  it  is  not  at  all  true  that  when  we  have  dis- 
covered the  origin  of  a  settled  belief  we  have  also  discovered 
the  function  of  the  habitual  action  which  is  co-ordinate 
with  the  belief. 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  in  the  opening  sentence  of  his 
Ecclesiastical  Institutions  says,  "  There  can  be  no  true  con- 
ception of  a  structure  without  a  true  conception  of  its 
function.  .  .  .  Eightly  to  trace  the  evolution  of  Ecclesiastical 
Institutions,  therefore,  we  must  know  whence  came  the  ideas 
and  sentiments  implied  by  them."  This  may  be  taken  to 
mean  that  in  having  discovered  "  whence  came  their  ideas 
and  sentiments  "  we  have  discovered  their  function.  It  is 
clear  that  we  can  make  no  such  assumption,  rather  must  we 
agree  that  in  very  few  cases  do  the  beliefs  connected  with 
elaborate  instinctive  reactions  point  at  all  to  the  function 
of  the  expressive  instinct  actions.  The  beliefs  connected 
with  benevolence,  for  instance,  clearly  have  no  relation  to 
that  closer  welding  of  the  social  bond  which  the  benevolent 
instincts  foster.  We  must  look  beyond  the  beliefs  to  the 
trend  of  the  instinct  actions  which  are  co-ordinate  with 
these  beliefs  if  we  are  to  discover  the  biological  function  of 
these  instinct  actions. 

It  is  because  we  still  cling  to  the  notion  that  the  mind 
acts  upon  the  body  that  we  look  upon  beliefs  as  determining 
actions ;  rather  must  we  say  that  beliefs  are  the  psychic 
side  of  part  of  that  which  determines  action :  they  are 
relatively  stable  trends  of  thought  and  conception,  and  as 
such  are  very  influential  in  the  movement  of  thought 
which  corresponds  with  the  processes  that  lead  to  action, 
but  they  are  not  the  cause  of  the  activities.  Furthermore, 
inasmuch  as  in  case  of  action  they  are  the  psychic  repre- 
sentatives of  only  part  of  that  which  determines  action,  the 
elements  in  them  which   correspond  with   the   important 


252  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

trends  of  activity  are  very  liable  to  be  entirely  subordinated 
in  consciousness  to  those  elements  which  are  superficial, 
and  subject  to  change  without  affecting  the  general  body 
of  the  belief.  The  essential  elements  of  the  belief  often 
scarcely  arise  in  clear  consciousness  at  all,  although  they 
correspond  with  the  general  trend  of  action  that  is  service- 
able to  the  race. 

The  reader  will  now  see  why  it  is  that  I  shall  pass 
lightly  over  many  points  in  relation  to  the  beliefs  accom- 
panying religious  expression,  which  might  seem  to  him 
to  require  treatment  did  I  not  make  this  explanation. 

Notwithstanding  all  that  has  been  said,  there  is  still 
likely  to  be  a  confirmed  impression  in  the  minds  of  some 
readers  that  religious  habits  are  forced  upon  the  race 
altogether  by  tradition  and  custom ;  that  we  undertake 
them  purely  as  the  result  of  our  imitative  tendencies. 

I  have  already  stated  why  I  believe  this  notion  to  be 
without  foundation.  Although  it  is  doubtless  true  that 
many  of  our  religious  habits  are  thus  acquired  by  one 
generation  from  the  preceding  generation,  still  it  is  to  be 
noted  that  where  certain  fixed  habits  appear  in  wide 
masses  of  people,  and  where  they  persist  for  long  historic 
periods,  then  we  are  warranted  in  the  assumption  that  the 
tendency  to  follow  the  actions  of  the  preceding  generation 
is  due  to  an  inborn  trend  and  organised  capacity,  which 
we  have  agreed  under  our  usage  indicates  the  existence  of 
instinct ;  especially  is  this  true  if  the  actions  "  imitated  " 
appear  to  the  individual  to  be  disadvantageous  to  him  or  to 
his  race,  or  are  distasteful  to  him  in  any  degree,  directly  or 
indirectly.  In  the  case  of  the  actions  which  we  are  about 
to  study,  not  only  do  we  find  this  persistence  in  wide 
groups  of  men,  but  we  find  a  common  source  acknowledged 
as  the  basis  of  the  most  varied  types  of  actions ;  and  we 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  253 

find  also,  as  I  hope  to  show,  a  common  trend  of  all  to  one 
special  biological  benefit,  notwithstanding  that  they  are 
unattractive  and  that  marked  disadvantage  appears  at  the 
first  glance  to  be  connected  with  them  all. 

And  at  this  point  let  me  say  that  as  I  am  concerned 
here  to  attempt  an  explanation  of  the  function  in  man's 
development  of  the  expression  of  the  religious  instinct,  I 
am  not  concerned  to  present  rationalistic  explanations  of 
beliefs  which  accompany  these  expressions. 

I  indeed  appreciate  thoroughly  that  there  is  great 
weakness  in  many  such  explanations  that  are  current,  a 
weakness  determined  principally  by  the  fact  that  they  are 
dependent  upon  unwarranted  hypotheses  involving  the 
assumption  of  the  existence  of  a  higher  type  of  intellectual 
power  in  the  barbarous  progenitors  of  our  race  than  we  have 
any  warrant  for  believing  they  could  have  possessed.  So  far 
as  we  are  able  to  judge  from  the  record  of  the  past  and  from 
the  studies  of  those  remnants  of  uncivilised  races  that  still 
exist,  the  beliefs  of  man  in  an  early  stage  of  intellectual 
development  are,  like  those  of  the  child,  obtained  to  a  great 
extent  fortuitously,  if  we  may  so  speak,  or  through  imita- 
tion of  those  around  him,  or  through  haphazard  associa- 
tions ;  and  they  are  similarly  shifting  and  unstable. 

The  evidence  is  often  very  weak  which  leads  students 
to  the  assumption  that  the  complex  beliefs  held  by  civilised 
people  of  to-day  have  been  resultant  from  the  building  up 
of  elaborate  intellectual  structures  in  the  child-like  minds 
of  their  savage  ancestors  by  intricate  processes  of  reasoning  ; 
structures  which  are  indeed  often  most  unstable,  founded 
upon  early  misconceptions  due  to  imperfect  observation  of 
phenomena  or  to  inaccuracy  of  knowledge.  Such  un- 
warranted assumptions  I  shall  hope  to  avoid  in  what 
follows ;  and  I  shall  refer  to  explanations  of  the  rise  of 
belief  only  so  far  as  they  seem  to  me  to  throw  light  upon 


254  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

the  connection  of  belief  with  certain  persistent  habits  of 
action  which  are  of  importance  in  connection  with  religious 
expression. 

II 

§  4.  Let  us  now  turn  for  corroboration  of  our  hypothesis 
to  an  examination  of  religious  expression  as  it  is  known  to 
us  in  the  lives  of  men  around  us,  and  of  those  of  whom 
history  leaves  to  us  a  satisfactory  record. 

At  the  start  let  us  note  that  if  the  religious  instinct 
has  persisted  because  it  has  the  function  in  the  regulation 
of  life  which  I  suggest,  then  we  should  expect  to  find  in 
the  development  of  its  expression,  first  of  all,  the  growth  of 
habits  which  would  aid  in  the  hearing  of  the  "voice." 
These  we  shall  study  in  this  division  of  this  chapter. 

Secondly  (Division  III.  below),  we  should  expect  to  find 
the  growth  of  habits  that  would  lead  to  the  enforcement 
of  the  admonitions  of  the  "  voice "  by  those  who  have 
recognised  its  commands,  upon  those  who  do  not  hear 
them  well :  and  we  should  expect  this  to  lead  to  an 
effective  impulse  towards  the  working  out  of  these  relatively 
obscure  social  ends ;  to  the  production  of  an  enthusiasm  in 
following  the  commands  of  the  "  voice  "  among  those  who 
themselves  hear  distinctly,  or  who  are  taught  to  hear  more 
indirectly.     Let  us  consider  these  points  in  their  order. 

§  5.  In  this  division  of  this  chapter  I  shall  study 
certain  religious  expressions  which  seem  to  me  to  have 
their  value  for  the  race  in  the  fact  that  they  tend  to  aid 
in  the  hearing  of  the  voice  of  conscience,  in  listening  for 
and  attending  to  the  higher  impulses  given  to  us ;  and  I 
think  it  will  appear  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  most 
characteristic  religious  expressions  have  this  special 
function. 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  255 

In  what  I  have  already  written  I  have  given  so  much 
prominence  to  the  religious  habits  connected  with  voluntary 
seclusion  from  the  stimuli  of  our  complex  life,  that  it  is 
natural  to  begin  our  study  with  an  examination  of  this 
form  of  religious  expression. 

On  the  basis  of  the  considerations  already  brought  for- 
ward in  previous  chapters,  it  is  not  at  all  difficult  for  us 
to  understand  how  habits  of  voluntary  seclusion  may  have 
originated  now  and  again  among  men  in  whom  the  higher 
capacities  were  dawning.  The^experience  of  men  must  have 
led  to  the  early  observation  that  what  we  call  hallucinatory 
voices  or  visions,  but  which  they  took  to  be  commands  from 
higher  powers,  occurred  at  times  during  involuntary  seclusion : 
the  voice  had  spoken,  the  vision  had  appeared,  again  and 
again  to  those  who  were  alone  in  the  desert,  far  removed 
from  the  distractions  of  normal  life.  And  to  the  man  of 
undeveloped  type  these  voices  and  visions  must  have  been 
very  impressive.  In  times  of  great  danger  or  perplexity  the 
guidance  of  these  higher  powers  as  they  were  conceived 
might  be  wished  for ;  and  this  might  lead  some  individual 
to  seclude  himself  voluntarily,  entertaining  the  hope,  which 
would  be  discovered  in  some  cases  to  be  well  founded, 
that  this  mysterious  guidance  might  thus  be  obtained. 

But  here  we  must  note  an  important  point ;  namely, 
that  while  we  may  thus  account  for  the  appearance  of  this 
habit  of  seclusion  in  individuals,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
not  easy  on  any  such  basis  to  account  for  the  long  persistence 
of  this  habit  in  the  race,  persistence  which  is  implied  in 
the  fact  that  the  habitual  actions  have  at  length  become 
instinctive.  For  the  occasions  when  such  guidance  would 
be  wished  for  must  surely  have  been  relatively  very  in- 
frequent ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  such 
occasions  could  occur  with  sufficient  frequency  to  develop 
the  habits,  or   to  cause   such  repetition  of  them  as   must 


256  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

have    been     necessary    before    they    could    have    become 
instinctive. 

It  would  be  possible  to  explain  the  acquisition  of  such 
habits,  indeed,  if  there  having  been  some  exceptional 
recurrence  of  fear  or  perplexity  to  foster  them,  the  habits 
themselves,  or  their  accompaniments,  had  been  intrinsically 
attractive ;  but  such  they  very  clearly  could  not  have  been. 
For  evidently  the  painfulness,  the  danger,  the  hardship, 
connected  with  the  life  of  the  man  who  thus  secluded 
himself  from  his  fellows  must  have  been  apparent  to  all. 

What  is  more,  the  very  guidance  in  hallucinatory  form 
which  he  might  occasionally  gain  in  seclusion  must  naturally 
have  been  conjoined  in  his  mind  with  a  very  decided  re- 
pulsion ;  for  men  as  we  know  them  surely  display  no 
special  wish  to  be  startled  by  hallucinations,  rather  are 
they  wont  to  dread  ghostly  forms  and  voices ;  and  we  have 
every  reason  to  believe  that  our  savage  ancestors  were  still 
more  averse  to  these  mysterious  sights  and  sounds  than  the 
average  man  is  to-day.  This  being  true,  evidently  any 
habits  which  tended  to  produce  these  hallucinations  would 
naturally  be  avoided,  if  in  any  case  the  connection  between 
habit  and  result  were  recognised.  This  fear  of  hallucinations 
would  therefore  act  in  the  beginning  to  prevent  the 
acquisition  by  intelligent  process  of  such  habits  of  seclusion. 

Nor  can  we  suggest  any  imagined  benefit  that  could 
offset  this  repugnance.  There  is,  to  be  sure,  satisfaction  to 
a  certain  type  of  mind  in  the  notion  of  being  led  and 
guided  by  another  power  upon  whom  responsibility  for  one's 
personal  acts  may  be  shifted.  Moreover,  there  must  always 
be  a  fascination  to  a  man  in  listening  to  secret  messages 
given  to  himself  alone,  and  such  messages  these  hallucina- 
tions appeared  to  bring ;  where  therefore  these  voices  or 
visions  gained  by  seclusion  were  of  less  than  hallucinatory, 
or  of  a  very  mild  hallucinatory  form  they  might  thus  be 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  257 

sought  for,  for  their  own  sake.  But  it  is  difficult  to  be- 
lieve that  men  of  such  unenergetic  type  of  mind  as  those 
must  have  been  who  could  have  been  led  by  such  motives, 
could  have  been  sturdy  enough  to  beget  a  persistent  race 
in  which  the  habits  which  might  thus  arise  could  be 
established  in  the  shape  of  an  instinct. 

There  is  much  evidence  again  in  the  world  around  us 
that  many  men  find  satisfaction  in  the  relief  from  strain 
that  goes  with  the  mendicancy  which  usually  accompanies 
the  developed  forms  of  hermit  life.  But  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  the  advantages  thus  gained  are  due  to  the 
notion  of  the  sanctity  of  the  hermit;  and  that  as  this 
notion  of  sanctity  could  not  have  become  current  until  the 
hermit  habit  was  widespread  among  men,  the  fact  just 
mentioned  cannot  be  used  to  explain  the  establishment  of 
the  habit  itself. 

It  might  be  possible  to  claim  that  the  primitive  man 
to  whom  in  his  seclusion  the  hallucinatory  message  was 
given  would  gain  power  and  influence,  and  to  hold  that  on 
that  account  his  actions  would  be  imitated  from  purely 
individualistic  motives  by  those  who  envied  him  this  power 
or  influence.  In  making  such  an  argument,  however,  we 
would  have  to  overlook  the  fact  that  the  power  and 
influence  would  not  accrue  in  any  degree  until  after  the 
firm  establishment  of  the  customs  under  consideration  ;  and 
we  would  also  fail  to  consider  what  an  inconsiderable  pro- 
portion of  the  "  inspirations  "  that  have  come  thus  forcibly 
to  men  have  brought  to  them  power  or  honour,  comfort  or 
benefit  in  life.  .  Think  for  a  moment  of  the  natural  revolt 
that  the  savage  man  must  have  felt,  if  his  own  personal 
welfare  in  this  world  were  alone  considered,  if  once  he 
realised  the  hardship,  with  little  compensation,  in  the  life 
of  the  average  hermit  who  has  felt  and  proclaimed  himself 
to   be   an   inspired   prophet.       Moreover,   it   must   be   re- 

s 


258  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

membered  that  the  man  who,  under  the  hypothesis  we  are 
considering,  is  supposed  to  choose  this  life  for  the  emolu- 
ments of  one  kind  or  another  connected  with  it,  must  be 
supposed  also  to  be  fairly  intelligent,  and  intelligent  enough 
surely  to  note  that  relatively  few  of  those  who  seek  to 
gain  the  hallucinatory  guidance  by  this  means  ever  really 
gain  it  at  all ;  and  this  fact  is  so  evident  that  it  would 
certainly  act  as  a  distinct  bar  to  the  intelligent  and 
voluntary  acquisition  of  painful  habits  though  they  were 
seen  in  some  few  cases  to  lead  to  the  gain  of  this  guidance 
even  were  it  desired. 

On  the  whole,  then,  I  think  we  must  grant  that  it  is 
impossible  to  explain  the  acquisition  and  persistence  of  the 
habits  of  seclusion  which  we  are  considering,  under  the 
hypothesis  that  they  are  due  to  intelligent  recognition  of 
personal  benefits  to  be  obtained  from  such  seclusion.  I 
speak  below  of  the  enforcement  of  such  a  life  upon  others 
by  the  teaching  that  it  will  bring  indirect  benefit :  this 
enforcement,  however,  does  not  concern  us  at  this  moment ; 
we  are  speaking  here  only  of  the  possible  explanation  of 
the  primary  voluntary  acquisition  of  these  habits  without 
pressure  from  without.  The  enforcement  upon  others  im- 
plies the  establishment  of  the  habit  among  those  of  influence 
or  power. 

But  if  we  are  compelled  to  grant  that  the  habit  of 
seclusion  is  on  the  whole  a  repulsive  one,  and  that  it  would 
therefore  be  naturally  avoided  by  the  man  seeking  self- 
satisfaction,  we  are  also  compelled  to  grant  that  if  it  did 
appear  in  the  race  it  would  in  its  direct  results  be  dis- 
advantageous to  the  individual,  and  furthermore  would  be 
opposed  to  the  persistence  of  the  species. 

Persistent  or  even  temporary  seclusion  must,  on  the 
whole,  be  dangerous  to  the  individual,  who  thus  loses  the 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  259 

advantages  that  go  with  co-operation  and  mutual  help  in 
moments  of  emergency :  and  in  the  early  days  of  man's 
development,  when  these  habits  were  becoming  ingrained 
in  the  race,  the  dangers  connected  with  attack  by  enemies 
and  beasts  of  prey  would  certainly  be  greatly  increased  if 
the  man  were  unable  to  avail  himself  of  protection  by 
others  of  his  own  kind. 

I  need  not  say  a  word  to  convince  any  one  that  the 
same  persistent  seclusion  from  the  world,  if  honestly  carried 
out,  must  necessarily  prevent  reproductive  functioning ; 
and  this,  in  itself,  would  tend  to  eliminate  the  portion  of 
the  race  which  had  acquired  these  habits  of  seclusion.  Nor 
can  it  be  held  that  temporary  seclusion  could  act  to  increase 
the  number,  or  the  strength,  or  the  perfection  of  offspring. 

It  is  apparent,  then,  that  in  connection  with  the  actions 
leading  to  seclusion,  we  must  look  for  some  other  significance 
than  the  advantage  of  the  individual,  or  the  persistence  of 
the  race  through  reproduction ;  for  without  such  other 
significance,  these  habits,  even  if  once  acquired,  would 
speedily  have  been  eliminated  by  natural  processes  through 
the  failure  in  the  struggle  for  existence  of  those  in  whom 
they  became  predominant. 

But  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  know  that  the  habits  of 
seclusion  which  we  have  under  discussion  have  not  been 
eliminated,  and  I  hope  I  shall  not  weary  my  reader  by 
repetitious  illustration,  if  I  beg  him  to  consider  how  firmly 
fixed  in  the  race  they  have  become :  at  the  same  time  I 
shall  ask  him  to  note  how  constantly  it  appears  that  the 
far-reaching  social  forces  within  us  are  emphasised  by  these 
habits. 

Moses  fiying  from  the  Court  of  Egypt  to  the  land  of 
Midian  "  led  his  flock  to  the  back  of  the  wilderness,"  and 
it  was  there,  as  says  the  legend,  that  he  saw  the  bush 
which  burned  but  which  was  not  consumed ;  there  he  heard 


260  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  ii 

the  voice  of  his  God  commanding  him  to  actions  which  had 
clearly  no  individualistic  significance  at  all,  but  which  as 
clearly  did  have  social  import. 

Buddha,  who  had  himself  been  impressed  by  the  life  of 
an  ascetic  subject  (for  already  the  habits  we  are  considering 
were  deep-seated  in  the  race)  gives  up  a  life  of  power  and 
luxury,  departs  into  the  wilderness  a  homeless  wanderer, 
and  there,  if  legend  be  true,  sees  visions  of  Mara  the 
tempter,  and  of  the  angels  of  darkness  and  light.  Whether 
or  no  they  seemed  to  give  him  direct  guidance,  it  is  clear 
that  the  outcome  of  his  experience  led  to  the  promulgation 
of  a  doctrine  which  as  Max  Mtiller  says  "  appeals  only  to 
inner  light " ;  which  taught  the  importance  of  the  suppres- 
sion of  personal  desires  and  passion,  and  the  emphasis  of 
universal  charity ;  teachings  which  are  surely  not  in- 
dividualistic, nor  relative  to  the  persistence  of  the  human 
species,  but  which  as  surely  have  significance  in  relation  to 
the  social  fabric. 

John  the  Baptist  lived  in  the  desert,  and  in  the  desert 
taught  as  "  a  voice  crying  in  the  wilderness  "  in  preparation 
for  his  Master  the  Christ. 

Christ  Himself,  who  apart  from  all  claims  as  to  His 
divinity  must  be  looked  upon  as  the  greatest  of  all  ethical 
teachers,  according  to  the  Gospel  story,  passed  forty  days 
and  forty  nights  in  the  wilderness,  and  there  saw  visions 
of  devils  and  angels ;  and  the  "  inspiration "  He  thus 
gained  led  to  the  teaching  of  a  new  Gospel  which,  socially 
speaking,  has  its  great  significance  in  the  suppression  of 
the  individualistic  demands  of  our  nature  and  the  emphasis 
of  the  ethical  impulses,  especially  of  those  that  relate  to 
co-operative  sympathy  in  its  widest  bearings. 

It  is  not  worth  while  to  mention  other  examples  of  this 
type.  A  volume  might  be  filled  with  the  names  of  saints 
who  have  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  these  and  other  ethical 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  261 

masters,  and  of  hermits  who  have  found  messages  of  inspir- 
ation in  their  lives  of  separation  from  the  world.  I  need 
but  to  mention  the  monastic  orders  in  the  Christian  Church, 
and  in  other  religious  bodies,  as  examples  of  the  wide- 
spread tendency  to  separation  from  active  life  as  an  expres- 
sion of  religious  thought ;  a  separation  which  has  varied  in 
rigidity  amongst  different  races  and  sects,  but  which  has 
always  retained  the  same  general  characteristics. 

But  let  me  ask  my  reader  to  note  again  how  few  of 
those  who  have  thus  separated  themselves  from  the  world 
have  really  had  distinct  messages  given  to  them ;  how  vast 
a  number  have  failed  to  gain  these  visions.  Can  it  be 
doubted  that  the  habits  referred  to  would  long  since 
have  been  lost  to  the  race  had  the  occurrence  of  hallu- 
cinations, voluntarily  attained,  been  the  effective  instrument 
in  the  establishment  of  the  instinctive  actions  we  are  dis- 
cussing ? 

We  must  remember,  moreover,  that  hallucination  does 
not  occur  often  in  cases  of  voluntary  seclusion  unless  the 
seclusion  is  prolonged,  and  that  the  cases  in  which  separa- 
tion from  the  active  world  has  been  realised  for  practically 
the  whole  of  life,  or  for  long  periods  of  time,  are  relatively 
few  in  number  in  the  race  of  man.  Therefore  were  our 
argument  based  only  on  those  cases  where  hallucination  has 
occurred  it  would  certainly  lack  cogency. 

But  we  find  that  amongst  large  bodies  of  religious  men 
habits  of  temporary  seclusion  have  been  established ;  habits 
which  do  not  often  result  in  the  production  of  guiding 
hallucinations,  and  yet  which  differ  from  prolonged  seclusion 
in  their  repulsiveness  and  disadvantage  only  in  degree. 
Such  habits  may  often  have  been,  and  not  improbably  were, 
derived  from  spasmodic  attempts  to  imitate  the  actions  of 
recognised  prophets,  and  in  certain  cases  as  we  know  have 


262  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

been  forced  upon  the  people  by  religious  teaching ;  still  it 
seems  to  me  impossible,  highly  improbable  at  all  events  my 
reader  will  agree,  that  they  would  have  become  so  thoroughly 
insjrained  in  the  race  had  there  not  been  some  advantage 
connected  with  them  which  was  unrecognised  by  those  who 
acquired  or  encouraged  them. 

At  this  juncture  I  would  ask  the  reader  to  take  note  of 
one  special  point :  although  such  partial  separation  from  the 
world  as  we  find  amongst  a  large  proportion  of  the  members 
of  the  monastic  orders,  and  such  more  rigid  but  temporary 
seclusion  as  we  find  more  generally  habitual,  would  not  in 
any  large  proportion  of  cases  be  likely  to  result  in  vivid, 
distinct,  hallucinatory  leadings ;  nevertheless  it  would  carry 
with  it  a  state  of  mind  closely  allied  to  that  of  the  man 
who  did  reach  the  state  of  hallucination  ;  it  would,  and  still 
does,  bring  to  men  a  more  or  less  clear  impression  of  an 
impulsion,  of  a  leading  from  without.  Men  under  such 
conditions  seem  to  have  clear  "  callings  "  as  we  say,  which 
appear  to  be  commands  revealed  to  them ;  and  these,  while 
in  no  sense  hallucinatory,  but  far  more  closely  allied  to  our 
sane,  normal,  mental  life,  are  on  that  very  account  much 
more  likely  to  teach  lessons  that  will  be  intelligible  to  the 
average  man  after  the  "  voice  "  has  ceased  to  call. 

Finally,  when  we  come  to  the  consideration  of  the 
perfectly  normal  religious  habits  of  perfectly  well-balanced 
people,  of  men  and  women  of  the  very  highest  and  noblest 
type,  we  find  them  withdrawing  themselves  upon  occasion 
from  the  distracting  stimuli  of  the  world  and  giving 
themselves  up  to  higher  reflection  and  thoughtful  self- 
examination. 

In  cases  where  men  removed  from  the  normal  environ- 
ment receive  thus  what  they  feel  to  be  "  inspirations,"  these 
"  messages  from  without "  are  evidently  not  likely  to  be 
related  to  individualistic  actions,  which  in  seclusion  are  not 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  263 

often  called  for;  but  are. much  more  likely  to  be  related  to 
those  impulses  of  a  social  nature  which  cannot  become 
forcible  so  long  as  immediate  response  to  stimuli  from  the 
environment  is  demanded. 

If  this  be  granted,  and  if  we  agree,  as  I  think  we  must, 
that  Nature  finds  it  important  to  emphasise  these  non- 
individualistic  impulses,  then  it  seems  to  me  not  at  all 
difficult  to  comprehend  the  emphasis  in  the  race  of  the 
habits  we  are  considering ;  most  natural  to  find,  as  we  do, 
that  voluntary  seclusion  from  the  world  has  been  emphasised 
in  the  habits  of  religious  teachers  from  the  earliest  days  of 
history. 

But  perhaps  some  reader  may  suggest  that  I  am  here 
confusing  effect  with  cause.  If  it  be  true,  on  the  one  hand, 
I  hear  him  say,  that  voluntary  or  involuntary  separation 
from  the  distracting  stimuli  of  the  world  calls  to  our  atten- 
tion our  deeper -seated  impulses,  forces  upon  us  the  fact 
that  our  actions  under  individualistic  stimulation  have  been 
opposed  to  the  wider  instincts  within  us ;  if,  in  other  words, 
this  separation  enables  us  to  hear  the  voice  of  conscience 
upbraiding  us  and  bringing  to  us  regret  and  remorse :  still 
it  is  equally  true,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  demands  of 
conscience  heard  in  the  midst  of  active  life  often  lead  men 
to  voluntary  flight  from  that  life  of  temptation  that  has 
led  to  the  individualistic  oppositions. 

This  we  must  acknowledge.  The  sinner  who  is  over- 
come with  remorse  flies  to  the  desert,  or  in  our  day  more 
often  enters  the  monastery.  Or  often  this  seclusion  from 
the  world  is  determined  by  an  attempt  to  escape  from  the 
disappointments,  the  weariness,  and  other  pains  of  life. 
Few  of  us  there  are,  indeed,  who  do  not  at  times  cry  with 
the  poet : — 


264  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

"  Oh  !  for  the  wings  of  a  dove, 
Far  away  would  I  rove  ; 
In  the  wilderness  build  me  a  nest, 
And  remain  there  for  ever  at  rest." 


This  wished-for  rest  and  loss  of  pain  does  not  come  with 
separation  from  the  world,  however,  unless  the  hermit  gains 
in  his  seclusion  the  submission  of  his  individualism  in  the 
willingness  to  subordinate  his  will  that  it  may  conform 
with  the  forces  which  guide  the  Universe  in  which  he 
lives. 

But  certainly  there  is  no  reason  why  this  submission, 
this  hearing  of  the  "  voice,"  should  itself  lead  to  separation 
from  the  world  ;  and  we  can  only  account  for  the  separation, 
even  under  such  circumstances,  as  due  to  an  instinctive 
tendency,  and  this  tendency  it  seems  to  me  must  have 
developed  because  in  such  separation  the  voice  of  conscience 
has  been  most  clearly  heard.  Thus  by  this  very  flight 
from  pain  and  temptation  is  the  man  who  has  just  caught 
the  sound  of  this  voice  led  to  place  himself  in  the  position 
in  which,  as  we  have  seen,  he  is  best  able  to  strengthen 
within  himself  his  impulses  towards  the  good.  It  seems  to 
me  highly  probable  that  it  is  because  of  this  valuable 
result  that  the  habit  of  seclusion  under  such  circumstances 
has  become  established. 

On  the  whole,  then,  I  think  we  may  well  claim  that  as 
these  efforts  towards  separation  from  the  activities  of  life 
have  no  advantageous  influence  upon  the  persistence  of  the 
individual  or  the  species,  they  would  not  have  become 
instinctive,  or  let  us  say  merely  persistently  habitual,  unless 
they  had  had  in  some  way  a  racial  value  of  special  type : 
a  value  which  I  think  we  may  hold  to  consist  in  the 
emphasis  of  the  deeper  impulses  which  is  thus  brought 
about,  so  that  these  impulses  come  to  guide  life  in  a  way 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  265 

that   would   have   been   impossible   without    this   artificial 
emphasis. 

Were  this  seclusion  absolute  in  the  majority  of  those 
in  whom  the  habit  was  established,  it  could,  of  course,  not 
conduce  to  social  advantage.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact 
habits  of  temporary  seclusion  only  are  natural.  The 
permanent  hermit  life  is  a  distinctly  morbid  development. 
With  the  hearing  of  the  voice  the  mass  of  those  who  retire 
from  the  world  are  led  to  return  to  their  fellow-men,  and 
with  new  ideals  of  action,  new  hopes,  new  courage  to  enable 
them  to  preach  their  ethical  doctrines. 

§  6.  Fasting  as  an  expression  of  religious  feeling  natur- 
ally comes  before  us  for  consideration  at  this  point,  because 
it  has  been,  and  is  still,  so  closely  connected  with  the 
habits  of  seclusion  we  have  just  been  studying.  Indeed, 
fasting  was  almost  necessarily  connected  with  involuntary 
separation  from  the  world  in  the  desert :  and  quite  naturally 
accompanied  that  seclusion  which  was  undertaken  voluntarily. 

It  does  not  seem  improbable  indeed  that  we  may  thus 
account  for  the  origin  of  habits  of  fasting  in  certain  cases ; 
and  we  are  able  to  conceive  also  that  these  habits,  although 
arising  in  connection  with  seclusion,  may  occasionally  have 
come  to  be  followed  apart  from  seclusion.  But  given  the 
origin  it  is  very  difficult  to  understand  the  persistence  of 
these  habits  .under  any  theory  which  implies  that  fasting 
was  afterwards  undertaken  to  satisfy  individual  longings ; 
and  yet  such  persistence  in  the  past  through  many  ages  is 
implied  in  the  very  existence  of  an  instinct  the  expression 
of  which  tends  to  develop  naturally  in  a  large  part  of  the 
race,  as  we  shall  presently  see  is  the  case  with  fasting. 

Surely  the  painfulness  directly  or  indirectly  connected 
with  starvation  could  not  in  itself  have  been  attractive. 

Nor  are  the  hallucinations  which  arise  so  often  as  the 


266  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

result  of  lack  of  food  attractive  in  themselves,  as  we  have 
already  seen  in  an  earlier  section ;  nor  do  they  appear  to 
ordinary  men  to  be  connected  to  any  great  extent  with 
individualistic  advantage ;  consequently,  we  are  unable  to 
agree  with  Tyler  ^  that  habits  of  fasting  could  have  had  their 
origin  in  the  desire  of  the  primitive  man  to  produce 
voluntarily  the  exceptional  nervous  states,  favourable  to  the 
seeing  of  those  visions  that  are  supposed  to  give  to  the 
seer  access  to  the  realities  of  the  spiritual  world. 

But  even  if  we  could  agree  that  fasting  had  this  origin, 
it  would  surely  not  seem  possible  thus  to  account  for  its 
persistence  in  the  race  for  a  sufficient  time  to  have  permitted 
it  to  become  established  as  an  organic  tendency. 

Nor  can  we  account  for  the  persistence  of  the  fasting 
habit  by  reference  to  Mr.  Spencer's  imaginative  hypothesis 
that  fasting  had  its  origin  in  the  starving  connected  with 
the  custom  of  providing  refreshment  for  the  dead :  even  if 
this  hypothesis  be  well  grounded  it  can  at  most  account 
for  the  genesis,  and  not  for  the  continuance  of  the  habit. 

For  very  clearly  the  habit  is  in  its  direct  results  not 
only  of  no  advantage,  but  of  very  great  disadvantage  to  the 
individual,  and  hence  indirectly  to  the  race  of  which  he  is 
a  member ;  for  the  ascetic  who  indulges  himself  thus  is 
liable  to  become  weakened  to  such  a  degree  that  he  may 
find  himself  incapable  of  self-protection  against  the  adverse 
forces  in  his  environment ;  a  fact,  indeed,  which  the  most 
stupid  of  savages  would  be  quick  to  recognise. 

But  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  custom  of  fasting 
altogether  fails  in  attraction,  and  although  it  is  easily  seen 
to  be  opposed  to  individual  welfare,  still  note  how  surpris- 
ingly persistent  the  habit  is.  Not  only  do  we  hear  of  the 
fasting  of  those  great  leaders  who,  in  the  past,  have  seen 

1  Primitive  Culture,  i.  277,  402  ;  ii.  372. 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  267 

visions  and  heard  voices  guiding  them  to  actions  they  would 
not  have  conceived  of  under  normal  conditions ;  but 
voluntary  fasting  is  taught  as  a  duty  by  many  religious 
bodies  in  our  day  in  alf  parts  of  the  world,  usually  indeed 
in  connection  with  seclusion  more  or  less  rigid.  Nor  is  the 
habit  limited  to  people  of  this  type,  for  we  find  fasting 
undertaken  voluntarily  by  many  pious  people  who  do  not 
at  all  believe  in  the  hermit-like  life  of  separation  from 
one's  kind. 

Fasting  in  excess  is  a  well-recognised  means  of  producing 
hallucinations,  and  if  undertaken  in  connection  with 
religious  service  must  tend,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  last 
chapter,  to  produce  voices  and  visions  relating  to  our 
ethical  life  which  we  are  considering :  but  quite  apart 
from  such  excesses,  fasting  in  moderation  would  tend  to 
produce  states  of  mind  closely  allied  to  those  produced 
during  hallucination ;  and  furthermore,  reducing  as  it  does 
the  vitality  sufficiently  to  overcome  any  natural  demand  for 
spontaneous  activities,  it  must  clearly  aid  one  very  materially 
to  gain  that  racial  inspiration  which  most  easily  arises  when 
reactions  of  individualistic  significance  are  not  called  for. 

It  seems  to  me,  then,  that  in  this  fact  we  have  an 
adequate  explanation  of  the  persistence  in  the  race  of  this 
custom,  not  only  in  its  extreme  forms  but  also  in  moderate 
degree,  and  at  more  or  less  widely  separated  intervals  of 
time.  Disadvantageous  as  the  fasting  habit  might  be  from  a 
purely  individualistic  point  of  view,  it  thus  appears  to  be  of 
advantage  to  the  race  in  that  it  tends  to  conserve  and  foster 
that  highly  serviceable  social  grouping  of  which  individual 
men  are  elements ;  and  this  suffices  to  account  for  its  con- 
tinued appearance  amongst  the  individual  elements  of  those 
social  groups  which  are  now  in  process  of  evolution. 

§  7.  In  connection  with  the  consideration  of  the  habit 


268  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

of  fasting  our  thought  is  naturally  turned  to  a  class  of 
customs  expressive  of  religious  fervour  which  vary  greatly 
in  form,  and  which  in  any  one  form  are  noted  amongst 
only  a  relatively  small  number  of  *the  race ;  all  of  which, 
however,  have  the  one  characteristic  that  they  involve  the 
voluntary  assumption  of  bodily  pain. 

The  tortures  of  various  kinds  which  have  been  under- 
taken for  their  own  sake,  and  endured  willingly  and  with 
joy  by  the  saints  of  the  past,  need  not  be  enumerated,  and 
I  do  not  think  it  worth  while  to  treat  of  any  of  them 
in  detail. 

What  they  have  been  in  the  past,  that  they  are  sub- 
stantially to-day  amongst  men  of  the  less  civilised  types.  In 
the  midst  of  the  Indian  civilisation,  so  complete  in  many 
respects,  we  find  in  our  own  time  the  Fakir  who  afflicts 
himself  with  self-tortures  of  various  and  revolting  kinds, 
much  as  we  know  the  ascetics  did  amongst  the  early 
Christians  who  failed  to  throw  off  the  habits  which  had 
been  prevalent  during  ages  in  the  past.  The  sufferings  of 
the  penance  have  not  yet  disappeared  from  the  Christian 
Churches,  although  nowadays  they  are  much  mitigated  in 
degree.  The  barbarian  living  at  the  present  day  submits 
himself  to  the  weakening  effects  of  the  sweating-bath,  to 
excessively  exhausting  muscular  strain,  to  mutilation,  to 
cuttings,  to  flagellation,  all  in  connection  with,  and  as 
part  of,  religious  service. 

It  would  be  almost  hopeless  to  attempt  to  account  for 
these  habits  so  complex  in  form,  limited  in  each  form  to 
such  small  numbers,  were  it  not  that  they  are  so  closely 
related  to  the  much  more  uniform  habits  of  religious 
expression  which  we  have  already  studied.  As  we  know 
them  in  historic  times,  among  the  people  whom  we  think 
of  as  civilised,  they  have  become  closely  connected  with  the 
widespread  notion  that  the  hope  of  salvation  of  the  soul  lies 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  269 

in  the  assumption  of  an  attitude  of  contempt  for  tlie  mere 
physical  man.  But  it  is  apparent  that  this  conception 
implies  a  high  degree  of  intellectual  development  in  the 
people  adopting  it,  and  its  adoption  must  therefore  have 
been  late  in  the  history  of  our  race  ;  hence  it  is  most  probable 
that  this  notion  was  suggested  as  a  rational  excuse  for  the 
continuance  of  religious  habits  already  well  established,  but 
which  seemed  to  require  some  explanation  in  accord  with 
reasonable  conceptions. 

If  we  examine  the  habits  of  savages,  amongst  whom 
these  customs  are  practised  to-day,  we  are  able  to  gain  an 
inkling  of  their  mode  of  origin,  for  they  are  there  very 
generally  found  in  connection  with  the  means  adopted  to 
bring  on  the  trance  states.  It  seems  not  improbable  hence 
that  we  have  here  really  a  case  where  habits,  originally 
connected  with  the  occasional  attempt  to  gain  the  guidance 
from  without  which  hallucination  seemed  to  give,  have 
been  forced  upon  a  tribe  by  their  religious  leaders.  We 
shall  return  to  this  subject  in  a  later  section. 

This  supposition  seems  the  more  probable  because  as 
such  demand  for  hallucinatory  guidance  would  be  only 
occasional,  so  correspondingly  we  find  these  habits  much 
less  general  than  the  habits  of  seclusion  and  fasting  already 
alluded  to.  That  these  practices  of  self  -  torture  when 
carried  to  extremes  do  tend  to  bring  hallucinatory  voices 
and  visions  is  well  known ;  and  especially  is  this  true  when 
they  are  aided  by  the  use  of  drugs,  opium,  hashish,  and 
strong  tobacco,  as  they  are  by  the  customs  of  many 
savage  tribes. 

Here  again  we  are  dealing  with  habits  which  are  in 
themselves  intrinsically  unattractive  to  the  individual,  and 
which,  therefore,  would  not  have  persisted  in  the  race  on 
account  of  their  individualistic  desirability.     Moreover,  they 


270  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

are  habits  which  are  evidently  disadvantageous  to  individuals, 
and  which  would  be  seen  to  be  so  by  any  set  of  men  of 
very  moderate  intelligence.  Furthermore  it  is  evident  that 
in  themselves  they  might  not  infrequently  bring  serious 
disadvantage  to  the  tribal  group. 

It  seems  clear,  therefore,  that  there  must  have  attached 
to  these  general  practices  in  the  past  some  important  ad- 
vantage to  the  race  which  has  overbalanced  the  ever- 
present  individualistic,  and  the  occasional  racial,  disadvan- 
tage connected  with  them.  But  in  the  light  of  our 
previous  studies  of  the  habits  of  seclusion  and  fasting,  so 
closely  connected  with  these  more  variable  customs,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  conceive  that  this  advantage  may  be  found  in 
the  aid  obtained  in  connection  with  these  practices  in  the 
strengthening  of  the  social  instincts. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe 
that  in  the  states  of  hallucination  which  these  practices 
often  entailed  the  deeper-lying  impulses  tend  to  come  to  the 
mind :  at  all  events  the  tendency  to  spontaneous  individual- 
istic action  would  be  largely  reduced  by  the  very  weakening 
processes  which  induced  the  hallucinations ;  and  for  those 
who  gained  these  hallucinations  the  important  fact,  so  far 
as  their  persistence  is  concerned,  may  not  improbably  have 
been  the  emphasis  within  the  hearers,  or  the  seers,  of  their 
tendency  to  listen  for  this  guidance  within  themselves,  which 
they  thought  to  be  commands  to  them  from  without. 

But  again  we  must  not  forget  that  the  hallucinatory 
images  occur  to  relatively  few  even  of  those  who  aim  to 
gain  them  by  undergoing  these  weakening  processes,  or  who 
are  forced  to  undertake  them  with  that  end  in  view;  and 
yet  the  reader  will  perceive  that  if  my  hypothesis  be  correct 
the  one  who  strives  but  fails  will  be  benefited  as  well  as  he 
who  finds  the  more  impressive  guidance :  for  he  too  will 
gain  that  suspension  of  the  individualistic  tendencies  which 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  271 

results  from  the  processes  of  weakening,  and  therefore  will 
indirectly  gain  the  emphasis  of  the  slower  acting,  broader, 
impulses  of  social  import. 

So  much  for  the  voluntary  submission  to  these  tortures 
which  is  undertaken  by  relatively  few  of  the  race :  of  the 
general  submission  to  such  tortures  under  compulsion,  at 
certain  times,  we  speak  later  under  Division  III. 

§  8.  I  shall  now  ask  my  reader  to  turn  from  the  study 
of  modes  of  religious  expression  which  in  large  measure, 
when  carried  to  excess,  lead  to  the  production  of  hallucina- 
tions, to  the  consideration  of  a  special  habit  which  of  all 
religious  habits  is  the  most  widely  prevailing  and  the  most 
persistent,  and  yet  which  nevertheless  in  itself  seldom  if 
ever  leads  to  the  production  of  hallucinatory  states.  I 
refer  to  the  habits  of  Prayer. 

In  studying  the  habits  of  seclusion,  of  fasting,  and  of 
self-torture  we  have  had  to  deal  with  the  theory  that  they 
originated  in  the  race  because  of  the  impressive  hallucina- 
tions which  they  not  infrequently  occasion,  and  that  they 
have  persisted  because  of  indirect  results  dependent  upon 
the  attainment  of  closely  allied  states  when  the  hallucina- 
tions themselves  were  not  actually  gained :  but  in  relation 
to  the  habit  of  prayer  such  a  theory  can  scarcely  be  up- 
held. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  many  indications  that 
prayer  in  its  inception  must  have  arisen  in  connection  with 
efforts  to  obtain  mercy  from  human  conquerors  in  the  bloody 
contests  which  must  have  been  common  amongst  the  early 
ancestors  of  our  race.  The  expressive  attitudes  of  prayer 
themselves  tell  this  story.  He  who  prays  is  found  prostrate 
on  the  ground ;  or  kneeling,  with  hands  clasped,  with  head 
bowed,  with  eyes  closed :  and  all  these  attitudes  are  sug- 
gestive of  powerlessness  to  attack,  of  absence  of  aggressive 


272  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  n 

tendencies,  and  of  willingness  to  become  the  slave  of  a 
conqueror  and  to  listen  to  and  obey  his  command. 

Habits  thus  acquired  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  savage 
life  might  be  called  into  action  during  those  greater  emer- 
gencies which  from  time  to  time  come  upon  man  apart  from 
human  agency,  because  of  the  notion  that  the  perils  in 
which  the  savage  found  himself  placed  were  the  expression 
of  the  hostility  of  higher  beings,  of  a  God  who  was  an 
avenging  power,  and  whom  the  savage  believed  he  must 
have  offended. 

But  even  if  we  suppose  these  habits  of  action  to  have 
thus  originated  they  very  clearly  could  not  have  persisted 
in  the  race  because  of  the  advantage  that  was  thus  supposed 
to  attend  them.  They  certainly  could  not  have  had  the 
value  to  the  individual  in  relation  to  his  God  that  their 
prototypes  originally  had  in  relation  to  the  conquering 
warrior :  we  recognise  full  well  that  the  anthropomorphic 
conception  of  an  avenging  Deity  fails  under  rigid  examina- 
tion. 

But  beyond  the  fact  that  these  habits  of  action  had  not 
the  particular  individualistic  advantage  which  may  not  un- 
naturally have  been  attributed  to  them  by  uncivilised  men, 
they  clearly  must  have  been  in  themselves  far  from  beneficial 
to  the  individual  exhibiting  them ;  for  there  being  no  all- 
powerful  mysterious  enemy  ready  to  attack  man,  actions 
which  in  moments  of  danger,  or  perplexity,  blinded  the 
savage  to  real  dangers,  and  which  induced  him  to  assume 
attitudes  in  which  alertness  was  altogether  precluded,  might 
often  lead  to  his  great  individual  disadvantage.  And 
evidently  they  might  thus  frequently  also  bring  indirect 
disadvantage  to  the  race  of  which  he  formed  a  part.  Even 
where  direct  danger  were  not  incurred,  it  surely  could 
be  of  no  direct  service  to  an  individual  to  assume  attitudes 
which  preclude  reaction  to  the  forces  in  his  environment. 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  273 

while  still  remaining  in  a  state  of  mental  stress  which  would 
preclude  his  gaining  any  of  the  recuperative  force  which 
comes  with  the  inactivity  of  rest. 

It  seems  to  me  clear,  then,  that  the  tribes  in  which  these 
habits  became  markedly  developed  would  have  suffered  in  the 
contest  for  survival  unless  connected  with  these  habits  there 
had  been  some  indirect,  unrecognised,  advantage  of  sufficient 
force  to  overbalance  the  disadvantages  above  spoken  of ;  and 
if  it  appear  that  these  habits  have  persisted,  then  we  are 
surely  warranted  in  assuming  that  they  have  had  some 
special  racial  values  quite  different  from  those  originally 
attributed  to  them. 

It  is  unnecessary  for  me  to  say  even  one  word  to  show 
that  the  habit  of  prayer  is  an  exceedingly  persistent  one  in 
the  human  race,  having  been  characteristic  of  religious  ex- 
pression from  the  very  earliest  times  of  which  we  have 
record,  and  being  in  our  own  time  one  of  the  most  wide- 
spread of  all  habits  of  action  with  which  we  are  acquainted. 

"When  we  ask  ourselves  what  this  indirect  racial  advan- 
tage could  have  been  that  has  led  to  the  persistence  of 
habits  of  prayer,  our  attention  is  again  directed  to  the 
fact  that  all  the  bodily  attitudes  connected  with  prayer 
amongst  devotees  in  the  past,  and  amongst  religious  peoples 
of  our  own  day,  imply  restraint  and  the  listening  for 
command,  the  calling  for  help  and  the  awaiting  for  answer 
and  direction :  and  we  perceive  that  the  mental  attitude 
which  these  expressions  involves  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
very  one  that  would  tend  to  subordinate  the  individual 
variant  tendencies  to  the  racial  tendencies ;  that  would  lead 
to  the  suppression  of  individualistic  reaction,  and  thus  give 
opportunity  for  the  slower-acting  racial  impulses  of  broader 
scope  to  make  themselves  felt. 

Just  notice  once  more  in  this  connection  some  of  these 

T 


274  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

bodily  attitudes.  Prostration  was  once  more  common  than 
it  is  to-day :  amongst  races  of  the  higher  types  it  has  given 
place  to  kneeling  with  bowed  head  and  closed  eyes;  but 
the  essential  feature  that  has  been  retained  through  all 
changes  of  form  is  the  assumption  of  positions  in  which 
bodily  activity  is  impossible.  Silence,  seclusion  in  one's 
"  closet " ;  fixation  of  attention  upon  some  special  object 
which  has  no  tendency  to  produce  reaction,  as  upon  the 
rising  sun,  or  upon  smoking  clouds  of  incense  smoke ;  and 
even  the  ideal  fixation  of  the  mind  upon  God  or  upon  some 
supposedly  holy  city  or  mountain,  a  habit  that  appears  in 
the  religious  thought  of  exiles  and  of  migratory  races. 
Evidently  all  these  habits  tend  to  repress  individualistic  re- 
action and  therefore  tend  to  emphasise  suggestions  from 
man's  deeper  nature. 

Now  although  these  actions  do  not  ordinarily  lead  to  the 
production  of  hallucinations,  they  are  clearly  likely  to  lead 
to  the  emphasis  of  the  promptings  from  within  of  especial 
forcefulness,  to  the  hearing  of  the  "  voice "  of  conscience ; 
and  these  promptings,  these  "voices,"  are,  as  I  have  re- 
marked before,  all  the  more  likely  to  produce  effective  result 
in  the  higher  type  of  men  than  the  terror-giving  hallucina- 
tions, for  the  very  reason  that  they  are  saner,  less  morbid, 
and  that  they  are  recognised  to  be  so. 

I  think,  then,  that  it  may  be  held  to  be  in  the  highest 
degree  probable  that  the  advantage  connected  with  the 
hearing  of  the  "  voice  "  of  conscience  with  the  accompanying 
emphasis  of  racial  impulses  within  us,  must  have  led  to  the 
persistence  of  habits  of  prayer,  whatever  may  have  been  the 
origin  of  these  habits. 

But  here  again  some  reader  may  accuse  me  of  mistaking 
cause  for  effect.  It  may  be  true,  I  hear  him  say,  that 
prayer  has  value  in  that  it  calls  to  our  attention  the  de- 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  275 

mands  of  our  deeper-seated  impulses,  that  it  enables  us  to 
hear  clearly  the  voice  of  conscience ;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  equally  true  that  the  demands  of  conscience  felt  by  us 
in  the  midst  of  active  life,  and  bringing  to  us  a  sense  of  sin, 
themselves  lead  us  to  pray. 

This  fact  must' of  course  be  acknowledged,  and  yet  the 
habit  itself,  it  seems  to  me,  must  first  have  arisen  as  the 
expression  of  submission  to  an  avenging  God,  who  was 
thought  of  as  omniscient,  and  therefore  well  acquainted  with 
the  sinful  act.  I  cannot  see  how,  without  some  such  exist- 
ing notion  and  some  such  previous  experience,  man  could 
have  been  led  to  undertake  the  activities  involved  in  prayer 
as  a  result  of  the  call  of  conscience  within  him. 

But  the  real  difiiculty  in  accepting  any  such  explanation 
as  I  assume  my  opponent  to  make,  lies  in  the  fact  that  no 
theory  that  makes  the  consciousness  of  sin  the  basis  of  prayer 
can  give  us  any  account  of  the  racial  values  inherent  in  these 
habits  of  action  ;  which  values,  however,  must  have  existed  if 
the  habits  were  to  persist,  the  habits  being  in  themselves  to 
a  great  extent  of  disadvantage  directly  to  the  individual  and 
hence  indirectly  to  his  race.  We  have  an  explanation  of 
them  at  once,  however,  if  we  suppose  their  value  to  lie  in  the 
emphasis  of  the  slower-acting  impulses  brought  about  in 
connection  with  these  actions,  so  that  these  impulses  come 
to  guide  our  lives  as  they  could  not  otherwise  have  done. 

It  is  to  be  acknowledged  indeed  that  prayer  is  effective 
for  another  reason,  in  that  it  gives  us  courage  to  reform 
our  lives :  in  that  it  shows  us  not  only  that  we  have  sinned, 
or  in  other  words  that  our  individualistic  actions  have  been 
opposed  to  our  more  permanent  impulses,  but  also  at  the 
same  time  in  that  it  shows  us  that  there  are  forces  within 
us  which  will  help  us  to  restrain  these  individualistic 
actions,  forces  which  may  enable  us  to  resist  temptation. 
The  restraint,  the  suppression  of  our  own  wills,  carries  with 


276  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

it  the  thought  of  a  higher,  an  omnipotent  Will,  that  may 
guide  our  lives ;  and  this  gives  us  courage  to  strive  to  do 
what  appears  to  us  to  be  the  right,  and  adds  comfort  to  our 
lives  in  the  knowledge  that  we  have  for  the  time  at  least 
renewed  our  allegiance  to  the  forces  that  work  for  good. 

But  here  again  we  must  agree  that  this  courage  to  act  in 
directions  which  relate  only  most  indirectly  to  individual 
welfare,  could  in  itself  have  had  little  to  do  with  individual 
advantage  and  therefore  cannot  be  held  to  account  for  the 
persistence  of  the  prayer  habit ;  this  habit  must  have  had 
some  other  and  deeper  biological  significance,  such  as  I  have 
suggested. 

I  cannot  close  this  brief  and  very  inadequate  study  of 
the  religious  habit  of  prayer  without  asking  my  reader  to 
note  that  the  value  of  prayer  is  to  the  individual,  and  con- 
sists in  the  emphasis  it  occasions  of  the  best  that  is  in  the 
individual.  A  large  part  of  the  polemic  against  the  efficacy 
of  prayer,  and  much  of  the  factitious  defence  of  its  value, 
would  have  disappeared  from  our  literature  if  this  point 
had  but  been  kept  in  mind. 

Beyond  the  value  in  connection  with  the  physical  ex- 
pression of  the  instinct  in  the  enforcement  given  to  the 
social  impulses  of  which  I  have  said  so  much,  there  is  a 
great  and  distinct  value  in  the  prayer  itself;  a  value,  how- 
ever, that  is  not  objective  but  altogether  subjective; 
altogether  within  and  for  the  man  who  prays. 

The  crying  out  for  help  to  aid  in  the  exercise  of  our 
powers  in  some  special  direction  is  a  means  of  accentuating 
these  powers,  is  a  mark  of  capacity  within  us,  is  indicative 
of  a  growing  courage  to  make  effort  to  the  attainment  of 
the  desired  end.  "  God  helps  them  that  help  them- 
selves." 

The  asking  for  help  for  others  whom  we  can  influence 


CHAt.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  277 

also  acts  to  emphasise  a  determination  within  us  to  use  our 
influence  upon  them. 

Thus  is  prayer  effective,  and  this  efficacy  is  overlooked 
by  those  extremists  who  would  cast  prayer  aside  as  a  value- 
less relic  of  ancient  superstition. 

On  the  other  hand,  prayers  that  express  desires  to  change 
the  order  of  the  Universe  must  in  their  very  nature  be 
inefficient,  and  those  who  thus  pray  mistake  altogether  the 
function  of  prayer;  they  transfer  a  value  which  attaches 
only  to  the  individual's  action  upon  his  own  character,  to  a 
supposititious  action  by  him  upon  the  forces  in  his  environ- 
ment. Were  this  but  remembered,  much  of  the  weakness 
would  be  eliminated  from  the  argument  of  the  apologists 
for  this  religious  habit  so  widespread  in  our  race. 

Prayer  must  surely  be  held  to  be  valuable,  not  only  for 
the  untutored  man,  with  his  superstitions,  his  misconceptions, 
his  errors,  but  also  for  the  man  of  the  highest  intellectual 
attainments,  who,  it  seems  to  me,  may  often  in  prayer  gain 
insight  concerning  the  forces  within  him  that  will  come  to 
him  through  no  other  agency.  For  it  must  be  remembered 
that,  because  of  lack  of  psychological  bent,  relatively  few  of 
the  most  intellectual  people  realise,  or  can  even  understand, 
that  the  efficacy  of  prayer  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  aids  us  in 
learning  to  subordinate  our  personal  wishes  to  the  Power 
that  guides  the  Universe.  For  those  who  cannot  clearly 
grasp  this  thought  the  loss  of  the  habit  of  prayer  is  likely 
to  result  in  loss  to  a  great  degree  of  this  capacity  for  sub- 
ordination. 

But  even  if  the  man  does  grasp  the  thought  that  the 
value  of  prayer  is  subjective,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
the  mental  habits  of  a  race  cannot  be  captiously  over- 
thrown ;  the  emphasis  of  impulses  which  has  become  bound 
up  with  certain  habits  of  action  that  are  natural  to  our 
physical   man   must   best   be   renewed    by  allowing    these 


278  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

habits  to  have  full  sway.  We  can  no  more  expect  to 
govern  our  lives  as  well  without  as  with  prayer,  thus 
departing  from  the  habits  of  our  race,  than  we  can  expect 
to  nourish  our  bodies  completely  by  means  of  injections 
into  the  blood  without  action  of  the  digestive  system  through 
which  the  nourishment  is  normally  assimilated. 

§  9.  Sacrifice  is  a  religious  custom  which  I  do  not  need 
to  tell  my  reader  has  been  fixed  in  the  race  from  the  earliest 
days  of  which  history  and  archaeology  tell  us.  The  human 
sacrifice,  the  sacrifice  of  bull,  of  ram,  of  lamb,  of  precious 
goods,  involving  destruction,  or  at  least  loss  to  the  owner, 
in  all  cases  of  what  is  valuable  and  useful ;  these  and  closely 
allied  sacrificial  customs  have  indeed  tended  gradually  to 
disappear  with  the  advance  of  civilisation.  But  the  sacri- 
ficial custom  remains  with  us  in  its  essentials,  expressed  in 
the  actions  connected  with  the  belief  that  the  giving  up  of 
valued  goods,  and  the  voluntary  relinquishment  of  that  in 
life  which  we  value  most  highly,  are  acts  of  worship  that 
please  our  God  and  that  are  efficacious  to  our  salvation. 

Hypotheses  in  relation  to  the  origin  of  racial  habits  are 
always  interesting,  but  in  the  case  of  sacrifice  the  facts  are 
so  very  much  obscured  by  the  rise  of  superstitions  which 
have  modified  the  customs  in  many  details  that  it  seems  all 
but  impossible  to  determine  definitely  the  earliest  forms  of 
the  customs  we  are  considering.  Nevertheless  I  may  be 
allowed  to  remind  the  reader  of  the  theory  emphasised  by 
Mr.  Spencer,  viz.  that  the  original  establishment  of  the 
habits  of  sacrifice  was  due  to  the  custom  of  laying  upon  the 
funeral  pyre  gifts  of  articles  of  food  or  adornment  which 
during  life  had  pleased  the  man  whose  body  was  to  be  con- 
sumed ;  these  habits  being  fostered  through  belief  that  the 
spirit  would  need  these  worldly  goods  in  its  new  abode, 
or  else  through  fear  lest  the  spirit  of  the  dead  might  do 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  279 

injury  to  the  living  man  if  it  were  not  placated  by 
such  gifts. 

It  seems  to  me  very  much  more  probable  that  the  custom 
may  have  originated  from  a  pure  attempt  to  gain  individual- 
istic advantage ;  from  a  desire  to  express  willingness  to  give 
up  one's  best  possessions  to  a  human  conqueror  in 
consideration  of  the  relief  from  fear  of  death  which  might 
follow  this  sign  of  submission  :  for  these  habits,  we  perceive, 
might  easily  have  been  extended  to  apply  where  God  was 
conceived  of  as  an  invisible  and  irate  power,  or  even  as  a 
friendly  power  with  whom  it  was  wise  and  pleasant  to  keep 
on  friendly  terms,  and  thus  our  early  ancestors  might  have 
gained  the  sacrifice  habits  with  which  we  are  so  well  ac- 
quainted through  historic  record. 

Possibly  both  of  these  conceptions,  and  perhaps  others 
which  we  have  not  divined,  may  have  worked  together  to 
originate  and  foster  these  habits.  But,  fascinating  as  these 
or  kindred  hypotheses  may  be,  they  really  do  not  concern 
us  here ;  for  we  are  dealing  not  with  questions  of  origin ; 
what  we  wish  to  discover  is  how  it  has  come  about  that 
the  habits  in  question  have  'persisted  in  the  race  after  they 
have  appeared. 

For  even  if  we  assume  that  these  habits  had  their  origin 
in  attempts  by  men  to  gain  individualistic  advantage  by  the 
maintenance  of  amicable  relations  with  powerful  friends,  or 
through  attempts  to  appease  the  wrath  of  enemies  and  to 
ward  off  danger  that  appeared  in  connection  with  the  action 
of  their  neighbours,  nevertheless  it  is  very  clear  that  when 
these  actions  were  undertaken  in  order  to  gain  the  friend- 
ship, not  of  a  powerful  fellow -man,  but  of  an  invisible 
spirit,  or  to  satisfy  the  wrath,  not  of  a  conquering  foe,  but 
of  a  supposedly  irate  Deity,  as  we  know  them  to  have  been, 
they  could  not  have  had  the  same  direct  individualistic,  or 
less    direct    racial,  advantage :    those   who    performed    the 


280  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

sacrificial  rite  could  not  have  gained  for  themselves  or 
for  their  children  the  benefits  they  imagined  they  were 
thus  to  obtain. 

It  is  probable,  then,  that  these  habits  would  not  have 
tended  to  be  impressed  upon  the  race  by  Nature  unless 
they  had  been  in  themselves  essentially  attractive,  or  unless 
they  brought  to  those  who  practised  them  other  advantages 
than  any  that  were  realised. 

But  as  to  the  first  point,  we  do  not  have  to  say  a  word 
to  show  that  sacrifice  must  have  been  essentially  unattrac- 
tive to  the  primitive  man,  involving  as  it  did  much  loss  of 
precious  things  gathered  together  with  much  labour  which 
itself  was  abhorrent  to  his  soul.  Moreover,  sacrifice  evidently 
involved  reduction  of  the  individual's  resources  and  capacities, 
and  danger  therefore  not  only  to  the  individual,  but  to  his 
tribe,  from  those  enemies  who  had  not  thus  reduced  their 
resources. 

We  must  look,  then,  for  other  advantages  than  any  that 
appear  on  the  surface  in  order  to  account  for  the  persistence 
of  these  customs.  After  the  argument  that  has  preceded 
this,  I  scarcely  need  to  tell  my  reader  that  my  thesis  in 
reference  to  these,  as  in  reference  to  the  other  religious 
customs  already  discussed,  is  that  they  have  been  enforced 
by  Nature  because  of  their  value  in  establishing  the  mental 
attitude  of  the  submission  of  the  human  will  to  the  commands 
of  God,  as  men  have  expressed  it ;  or  in  other  words  in  estab- 
lishing the  habit  of  restraint  of  individualistic  tendencies, 
and  of  appeal  to  the  guidance  of  the  racial  impulses  of 
social  import. 

The  truth  of  this  is  evidenced,  it  seems  to  me,  in  the  very 
fact  that  the  term  "  sacrifice  "  has  been  directly  transferred  in 
common  language  to  apply  to  the  voluntary  renunciation  or 
repression  of  individualistic  tendencies :  the  term  "  self-sacri- 
fice "  in  our  everyday  speech  has  come  to  mean  self-restraint. 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  281 

Moreover,  the  very  attitudes  assumed  in  connection  with 
sacrifice  are  ones  which  are  most  valuable  in  the  production 
of  a  full  measure  of  reverential  awe,  which  would  prepare 
those  who  watched  the  ceremonial  to  give  attention  to  what 
came  to  them  as  commands  from  those  conducting  the 
sacrifice. 

The  mere  process  of  looking  up  withdraws  our  attention 
from  the  distracting  objects  around  us,  and  arouses  in  us 
the  powerful  feelings  accompanying  the  recognition  of  our 
own  littleness,  of  the  sublimity  of  what  is  not  of  ourselves, 
as  all  must  realise  w^ho  from  some  deep  valley  have  lifted 
up  their  eyes  to  the  mountain  peaks,  or  who  have  wor- 
shipped in  the  noble  naves  of  the  Gothic  cathedrals.  The 
smoke  arising  from  the  altar  naturally  led  the  worshipper 
to  follow  with  his  eyes  its  upward  curves,  as  does  the  incense 
burning  in  the  ceremonial  of  to-day;  led  him  naturally, 
therefore,  to  assume  a  reverential  attitude  of  mind. 

But  beyond  this,  these  physical  attitudes  tended  to 
induce  in  him  conditions  distinctly  opposed  to  the  pro- 
duction of  individualistic  activities,  and  were  therefore  well 
calculated  to  bring  him  into,  and  keep  him  in,  the  frame  of 
mind  in  which  the  voice  of  conscience  could  most  easily  be 
attended  to. 

But  above  all  we  must  remember  that  the  sacrifice  in 
all  religious  ceremonial  led  to  prayer;  and  the  value  of 
prayer  in  bringing  about  the  advantageous  subordination  of 
individualism  we  have  already  spoken  of  at  length  in  pre- 
ceding sections. 

We  must  not  forget,  however,  that  in  relation  to  sacrifice 
we  have  a  marked  instance  of  the  disturbance  of  what 
seems  to  me  to  be  an  inborn  trend  by  very  complex 
sacerdotal  systems  which  grew  up  as  man  advanced,  and 
which  led  to  the  enforcement  of  customs  carried  forward 
by  tradition  which  were  not  at  all  of  the  essence  of  the 


282  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  ii 

instinct's  expression,  nor  necessarily  connected  with  the 
original  forms  of  this  expression.  All  of  these  dominant 
systems,  to  which  we  shall  refer  more  fully  in  the  next 
division  of  this  chapter,  did  valuable  service  in  man's  social 
advance  through  the  consolidation  of  the  social  bond  under 
powerful  leadership,  and  thus  worked  in  conjunction  with 
the  original  instinctive  expressions  to  the  same  end.  The 
sacrifice  itself  indeed  led  to  like  action  by  masses  of  people 
gathered  together,  so  that  the  custom  tended  to  emphasise 
the  existence  of  social  bonds  and  to  bring  men  to  realise 
the  existence  of  social  unity,  a  realisation  which,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  is  most  important  in  the  emphasis  of  the  social 
impulses  in  relation  to  those  of  individualistic  trend. 

§  10.  Celibacy,  or  the  voluntary  renunciation  of  the 
pleasures  of  sexual  and  family  life,  may  be  looked  upon  as 
a  form  of  self-sacrifice,  and  it  is  one  that  is  widespread  as 
a  custom  connected  with  religious  devotion.  It  is  without 
doubt  true  that  not  a  small  number  of  professed  celibates 
do  not  altogether  refrain  from  the  gratification  of  their 
sexual  passions;  and  yet  if  we  eliminate  this  class  of 
pretenders  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  an  important 
proportion  of  men  and  women  in  all  historic  ages  have 
voluntarily  quenched  their  sexual  appetites  in  assuming  the 
celibate's  vow. 

That  this  voluntary  assumption  carries  with  it  individual 
distress  of  marked  type  will  not  be  disputed,  and  it  is  not 
possible  to  believe  that  it  has  been  or  is  undertaken  because 
of  the  intrinsic  attractions  connected  with  it. 

It  is  true  that  the  monastic  life  is  nowadays  attractive 
to  many  because  it  brings  with  it  freedom  from  the  worries 
of  life,  and  a  loss  of  individual  responsibility  which  satisfies 
many  a  soul  burdened  with  doubt  and  harassed  by  trial. 
But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  although  such  individual- 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  283 

istic  motives  may  thus  add  to  the  numbers  of  those  who 
join  the  monastic  orders  to-day,  no  such  motives  could 
have  been  powerful  until  these  monastic  orders  were  already 
well  estabKshed,  and  were  appreciated  and  honoured ; 
evidently,  then,  the  individualistic  motives  to  which  we 
have  just  referred,  cannot  have  been  of  moment  either  in 
the  origin  and  production  of  these  habits,  or  in  the  main- 
tenance of  these  habits  after  they  had.  first  been  formed. 

That  celibacy,  apart  from  its  unattractiveness,  is  also  on 
its  face  very  often  distinctly  disadvantageous  to  the  indi- 
vidual, and  that  it  acts  in  opposition  to  the  persistence  of 
the  species,  is  also  clear.  That  it  cannot  directly  conduce 
to  the  persistence  of  the  race  is  evident,  when  we  consider 
that  if  it  were  carried  beyond  narrow  limits  it  would  lead 
to  tribal  extinction.  That  it  is  disastrous  to  many  an 
individual  life  is  also  certain ;  for  all  who  have  knowledge 
of  the  subject  will  agree  that  the  life  of  the  celibate  is 
beset  with  many  dangers,  in  that  it  conduces  to  the  ex- 
cessive practice  of  private  vices  of  one  kind  or  another; 
and  in  that  it  is  very  liable,  as  alienists  tell  us,  to  bring 
into  existence  extremely  morbid  mental  conditions. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  but  realise  that  the 
morbid  mental  conditions  above  referred  to  are  just  the 
ones  that  are  liable  to  result  in  the  production  of  hallucina- 
tions, and  that  in  adopting  the  celibate's  life,  therefore, 
one  takes  a  step  which  is  not  unlikely  to  bring  to  him 
hallucinatory  messages,  which  themselves  might  be  thought 
to  be  desirable  as  guides  from  another  world.  This  might, 
in  certain  cases,  lead  individuals  to  voluntary  assumption 
of  this  form  of  self-sacrifice.  But  in  a  previous  section  we 
have  seen  reason  to  agree  that  no  such  individualistic  desire 
can  account  for  the  persistence  of  habits  inducing  these 
hallucinatory  states ;  for,  to  the  mass  of  men,  hallucinations 
are  far  from  attractive ;  moreover,  we  do  not  forget  that  to 


284  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

the  mass  of  celibates  no  such  hallucinatory  messages  are 
given. 

But  here  again,  as  with  all  other  customs  which  are 
likely  to  produce  hallucination,  we  realise  that  those  who 
acquire  the  habit,  but  fail  to  receive  the  message,  never- 
theless do  gain  in  some  measure  an  emphasis  of  those  im- 
pulses which  are  of  broader  than  individualistic  significance. 
In  this  case  the  influences  which  are  of  a  sexual  nature 
being  curbed,  there  is  greater  opportunity  for  the  "  higher  " 
instincts  of  later  development,  for  the  ethical  instincts  of 
social  import,  to  become  prominent  in  mind.  The  very 
fact  that  the  sexual  nature  is  kept  in  check  forces  its  de- 
mands upon  the  individual  upon  occasion  while  youth  and 
health  remain,  and  thus  the  celibate's  attention  is  necessarily 
turned  to  those  voices  within  him  which  can  only  be  heard 
when  one  gives  himself  up  to  introspective  examination. 

This  habit  of  introspective  consideration,  as  thus  aided, 
being  once  acquired,  will  certainly  bring  about  an  enforce- 
ment throughout  all  of  life  of  those  impulses  of  an  ethical 
nature  which,  as  we  have  seen,  require  time  for  their 
development  because  they  relate  to  general  trends  of  action 
which  appear  only  when  we  study  long  series  of  subordinate 
activities ;  impulses  which  cannot  appear  clear  if  our  atten- 
tion is  fixed  upon  the  individualistic  demands  of  the 
moment,  from  which  the  celibate  deliberately  cuts  him- 
self off. 

§  11.  In  closing  this  division  of  my  chapter,  I  shall 
speak  briefly  concerning  the  custom  of  making  pilgrimages, 
which  being  to-day  of  widespread  occurrence,  and  having 
in  the  past  been  of  still  wider  occurrence  among  many 
religious  people,  must  not  be  passed  over  in  our  study. 

This    custom    evidently    involves    individual    hardship, 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  285 

personal  loss,  and  tribal  weakening ;  nor  does  it  show  on 
its  face  the  distinct  advantages  in  the  direction  of  social 
advancement  that  I  have  been  aiming  to  show  exist  in  the 
case  of  all  other  notable  religious  exercises. 

But  the  reader  will  recall  that  in  a  previous  chapter 
I  made  mention  of  the  fact  that  we  should  expect  to  find 
that  the  social  impulses  would  tend  to  be  emphasised  by 
actions  which  brought  into  strong  relief  the  outlines  of  the 
social  fabric,  which  emphasised  the  fact  that  there  are  social 
bonds,  that  there  exists  community  of  interests  which  must 
be  dominant  even  where  individual  likings  are  occasionally 
crushed  out,  that  mutual  aid  is  necessary  to  our  welfare  as 
individual  elements  in  social  life. 

The  efficacy  of  pilgrimages  in  this  direction  cannot  be 
questioned ;  and  it  seems  to  me  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  their  value  has  been  quite  in  line  with  that  attached 
to  the  other  religious  habits  that  we  have  been  studying, 
when  we  consider  that  they  ended  in  sacrifice,  in  prayer, 
and  in  other  acts  of  devotion,  these  acts  indeed  being 
carried  on  with  less  emphasis  during  the  journey,  and  being 
looked  forward  to  in  their  culmination  from  day  to  day. 

This  value  of  action  in  common  with  others  of  our  race, 
in  the  enforcement  of  the  ethical  impulses,  is  clearly  seen 
in  the  development  of  worship  in  community  of  which  we 
speak  more  at  length  in  the  next  division  of  this  chapter ; 
and  I  may  add  that  the  same  value  attaches  to  the  de- 
velopment of  religious  societies,  and  to  the  conventions  and 
councils,  the  conferences  and  congresses,  of  religious  people, 
which  are  so  marked  a  feature  of  our  later  civilisation. 

Ill 

§  12.  In  the  earlier  part  of  this  chapter,  as  the  reader 
will  recall,  we  noted  that  if  the  contention  we  make  as  to 


286  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

the  function  of  the  religious  instinct  be  correct,  then  not 
only  should  we  expect  to  find  the  appearance  in  our  race 
of  habits  of  action  that  would  emphasise  the  social,  the 
ethical  impulses ;  but  we  should  also  be  led  to  look  for  the 
development  of  certain  habits  of  action  that  would  lead 
those  few  who  hear  these  guiding  voices  clearly  to  en- 
deavour to  enforce  the  admonitions  of  these  important 
impulses  upon  those  who  do  not  hear  them  well. 

If  this  position  be  correct,  then  it  seems  to  me  we 
should  expect  to  find,  in  the  first  place,  an  emphasis  of  the 
natural  eftbrts  made  by  the  man  who  had  heard  his  "  voice," 
or  who  had  seen  his  vision  in  hallucinatory  form,  who, 
filled  with  fear  himself,  would  be  likely  to  endeavour  to 
teach  his  neighbour  to  fear  the  God  whose  message  he 
believed  he  had  received.  His  efforts  to  convince  the 
common  mortal  of  the  importance  of  the  teaching  from 
without,  as  he  understood  it,  would  be  likely  to  formulate 
themselves  in  many  combinations  of  actions  that  would 
emphasise  the  notion  of  the  all-powerfulness  of  the  God 
from  whom  the  hallucinatory  visions  and  voices  were  sup- 
posed to  come. 

This  expectation  we  find  to  be  fully  realised.  The 
ethical  prophets,  and  the  members  of  the  priesthoods  that 
were  set  up  amongst  the  most  ardent  followers  of  these 
prophets,  have  always  since  the  earliest  days  of  religious 
development  preached  the  all  -  powerfulness  and  the 
mysterious  omniscience  of  the  gods  whom  they  worshipped, 
whether  these  gods  were  conceived  of  as  evil  spirits  or  as 
devoted  to  holiness. 

As  the  power  of  priesthoods  increased,  and  the  import- 
ance of  keeping  in  favour  with  the  gods  came  to  be  generally 
acknowledged,  temples  were  reared  to  give  to  these  gods 
homes  of  magnificence ;  and  the  approach  to  these  temples 
for  worship  was  demanded,  with  gifts  and  sacrifices,  which 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  287 

were  supposed  to  appease  the  wrathful  or  rejoice  the  friendly 
deities,  this  worship  being  made  full  of  mysteries  which 
could  not  fail  to  be  awe-inspiring  to  the  common  mortal. 

It  must  be  agreed,  of  course,  that  morbid  developments 
of  these  mysteries  were  started  in  many  cases  by  members 
of  ruling  priesthoods  who  had  discovered  in  them  a  source 
of  power  which  was  of  great  advantage  to  themselves.  But 
the  number  of  those  initiated  into  the  secret  processes  by 
which  the  mysteries  of  ceremonial  were  carried  on  was  too 
large  to  permit  deception  to  rule  in  the  long  run ;  and 
unless  the  value  of  the  ceremonial  had  been  sincerely  be- 
lieved in,  not  only  by  the  people,  but  also  by  the  mass  of 
the  priesthood,  it  would  not  have  stood  the  test  of  time. 
On  general  grounds,  therefore,  it  seems  to  me  we  must  ac- 
knowledge that  these  mysterious  ceremonials,  to  a  great 
extent  at  least,  must  in  their  inception  and  continuance 
have  been  the  outcome  of  thoroughly  honest  efforts  to 
impress  upon  the  unthinking  crowd  the  awful  majesty  of 
the  gods  who  had  apparently  revealed  themselves  to  their 
chosen  servants. 

We  must  agree  also  that  these  ceremonials  must  have 
had  other  values  than  this  fear  of,  and  sacrifice  to,  an 
avenging  god,  or  a  god  whom  it  was  thought  wise  to 
placate.  This  becomes  more  clear,  I  think,  when  we  con- 
sider how  unlikely  it  is  that  any  direct  advantage  would 
have  accrued  to  the  individual  or  race,  in  consequence  of 
the  wasteful  expenditure  upon  extravagant  ceremonial,  and 
costly  sacrifice  of  what  could  only  be  obtained  as  the  result 
of  arduous  human  effort ;  and  we  are  therefore  led  to  judge 
that  only  by  some  indirect  racial  advantage  connected  with 
this  wasteful  ceremonial,  and  with  the  worship  of  the  god, 
can  we  explain  the  persistence  of  these  manifestations  in  the 
race.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  advantage  looked  for  can  be 
explained  in  the  fact  that  the  fear  which  these  mysterious 


288  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

ceremonials  inculcated,  leading  to  worship  and  to  prayer  as 
it  surely  did,  gained  for  the  people  at  large,  at  certain  times 
in  their  lives  at  least,  the  habit  of  suppression  of  in- 
dividualistic tendencies  in  favour  of  social  impulses. 

It  may  be  claimed  that  we  do  not  need  to  look  for  so 
occult  a  basis  for  the  persistence  of  these  mysterious  cere- 
monials, for,  as  is  no  doubt  perfectly  true,  the  emphasis  of 
the  fear  of  a  powerful  god,  who  would  enforce  the  commands 
of  the  human  ruler,  would  have  a  distinctly  advantageous 
effect  in  the  beginnings  of  man's  higher  social  life.  For 
such  enforcement  would  make  possible  community  of  action, 
under  the  guidance  of  one  mind  to  one  end ;  and  although 
this  might  lead  to  tyranny  and  despotic  cruelties  in  many 
cases,  it  also  would  lead,  on  the  whole,  to  a  strengthening 
of  social  bonds.  And  it  is  to  be  noted  in  this  connection 
that  in  most  of  the  ancient  civilisations  the  king  was  held 
to  be  the  high  priest  of  God :  this  doctrine  having  in  fact 
come  down  to  our  time  in  the  theory  of  the  "  divine  right 
of  kings,"  which  still  persists,  notwithstanding  the  evident 
ungodlikeness  of  a  large  part  of  those  of  royal  blood. 

On  the  whole,  however,  it  does  not  seem  to  me  probable 
that  the  racial  advantage  obtained  by  the  emphasis  of 
leadership  through  fear  of  the  god  whose  appointee  the 
leader  was  held  to  be,  can  be  considered  to  have  been  great 
enough  to  account  for  the  growth  of  priestly  hierarchies 
and  for  the  persistence  of  ceremonial  customs  that  have 
prevailed.  In  fact,  changes  of  leadership  must  have  been 
frequent  in  the  early  days  of  tribal  life,  and  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  notion  of  the  divinity  of  dead  leaders,  and  of 
divine  rights  attached  to  rulership,  must  therefore  have 
become  fixed  in  the  race  with  much  difficulty :  and,  so  far 
as  I  can  see,  the  persistence  of  worship  of  a  divinely 
appointed  temporal  master  can  therefore  only  be  accounted 
for  by  some  indirect  advantages,  connected  with  the  habits 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  289 

emphasised  by  this  belief,  other  than  those  related  to 
leadership  ;  advantage  which  must  also  have  been  connected 
with  the  worship  of  the  god  upon  whom  the  changing 
rulers  depended  for  their  authority.  What  I  believe  this 
advantage  to  have  been,  I  have  so  often  stated  above  that 
it  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  myself  here. 

Those  developments  of  ceremonial  which  emphasised  the 
purity  of  God  and  the  demand  for  purity  in  the  worshipper 
are  clearly  an  advance  over  the  first  ceremonials  dictated 
by  the  wish  to  produce  fear. 

The  general  type  of  ceremonial  designated  by  the  term 
lustration  appears  in  the  widest  variety  of  forms,  from  the 
exhaustive  vapour-baths  still  in  vogue  among  savage  races, 
to  the  simple  washing  of  hands  and  feet  and  head ;  cere- 
monials which  were  oftentimes  very  elaborate  in  the  older 
religious  services,  and  which  leave  their  mark  in  certain 
customs  inculcated  by  the  Churches  of  latest  development, 
in  the  form  of  baptism,  and  in  the  use  of  holy  water,  for 
purposes  of  symbolic  purification. 

All  of  these  customs  were  in  the  line  of  the  production 
of  reverence  for  the  God  who  spoke  to  His  people  through 
His  chosen  servants :  they  enforced  the  notion  of  sinfulness 
in  the  presence  of  a  purity  almost  beyond  conception,  and 
had  their  direct  effect  in  bringing  men  to  believe  in  their 
own  helplessness  and  in  the  power  of  the  Deity  to  aid  them. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  laws  relating  to  uncleanness 
had  in  many  cases  sanitary  significance,  and  thus  may  have 
given  some  advantage  of  a  very  indirect  kind  to  a  tribe  in 
which  these  laws  were  enforced :  lustration,  in  fact,  may 
not  infrequently  have  been  of  individual  curative  advantage. 
But  I  cannot  bring  myself  to  believe  that  this  purity,  real 
or  symbolised,  can  have  had  in  itself  any  sufficient  advantage 
to  account  for  the   persistence  of  the   customs   connected 

u 


290  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  il 

with  its  enforcement ;  for  in  many  cases  it  is  very  clear 
that  the  actions  connected  with  the  ceremonials  of  lustration 
were  exceedingly  exhaustive  and  hence  of  distinct  indi- 
vidualistic disadvantage.  It  can  only  be  surmised,  I  think, 
that  some  indirect  advantage  was  attained  by  those  in  the 
race  who  assumed  the  mental  attitude  connected  with  these 
ceremonials :  and  that  attitude  of  mind  I  have  already 
spoken  of  as  connected  with  awe,  with  reverence,  bringing 
that  suppression  of  self-will  that  leads  one  to  listen  to 
impulses  that  are  not  of  individualistic  import, 

§  13.  At  this  juncture  I  shall  ask  my  reader  to  consider 
again  the  habits  spoken  of  above  which  are  connected  with 
the  initiation  into  the  mysterious  brotherhood  of  the  re- 
ligious body ;  ceremonies  which  are  evidently  in  themselves 
unattractive,  and  clearly  disadvantageous  from  a  purely 
individualistic  point  of  view,  but  which  nevertheless  have 
persisted  in  the  race  in  a  most  extraordinary  manner.  I 
think  we  shall  find  that  they  also  are  explicable  in  the  fact 
that  they  are  advantageous  in  enforcing  the  habit  of  re- 
straint from  acts  of  purely  individualistic  import  until  im- 
pulses of  deeper  significance^  can  prevail. 

As  we  have  already  argued,  the  habit  of  restraint  from 
individualistic  reaction,  fixed  in  the  race  because  of  its 
advantage  to  the  social  life  in  which  the  individual  is  an 
element,  has  been  enforced  often  by  the  emphasis  of  the 
non-individualistic  impulses  in  their  most  emphatic  form 
under  the  abnormal  conditions  of  hallucination.  This  being 
so,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  how  it  might  have  come  to  be 
considered  most  important  by  the  leaders  who  had  once 
listened  to  these  voices,  or  who  had  once  seen  these  visions, 
to  obtain  recurrently  what  were  thought  to  be  "inspir- 
ations "  in  this  hallucinatory  form ;  and,  as  we  have  seen 
above,  men  were  doubtless  in  some  cases  thus  led  to  make 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  291 

voluntary  efforts  to  produce  these  hallucinations,  through 
extreme  fasting,  continuing  tortures,  unnatural  deprivations. 
More  than  this,  those  who  were  convinced  of  the  value  of 
these  hallucinatory  states  would  be  naturally  led  to  attempt 
to  induce  or  even  to  compel  others  to  gain  these  experiences. 

But  a  large  proportion  of  these  rites  involve  extreme 
suffering  and  great  physical  weakening,  which  in  themselves 
must  be  repulsive  to  the  barbarous  man,  and  which  evidently 
are  an  immediate  source  of  weakness  to  him  and  to  the 
tribe  at  large.  In  many  cases,  indeed,  among  these  savages 
it  is  not  until  the  participants  in  these  ceremonies  fall  in 
fainting  fits  or  go  into  comatose  states  that  they  are  con- 
sidered fitted  to  enter  the  religious  brotherhood.  Still  we 
recall  that  in  many  cases  it  is  not  until  one  reaches  the 
verge  of  unconsciousness  that  hallucinations  appear,  and  if 
our  hypothesis  be  valid  we  are  thus  able  to  account  for  the 
extremity  to  which  these  ceremonies  are  carried. 

But  it  must  be  remembered  that  a  very  small  proportion 
of  those  who  submit  themselves  to  these  initiatory  tortures 
do  in  fact  gain  these  "  messages  "  ;  consequently,  even  if  the 
origin  of  these  customs  can  be  traced  to  the  desire  to  gain 
states  of  hallucination  or  to  force  them  upon  others,  the 
persistence  of  these  customs  cannot  be  thus  explained. 

Yet,  although  this  be  true,  on  the  other  hand  it  is 
equally  true  that  those  who  participate  in  these  rites  place 
themselves  under  conditions  which  lead  naturally  to  the 
same  advantageous  emphasis  of  the  non-individualistic  im- 
pulses that  is  given  when  the  trance  state  is  really  reached ; 
and  it  would  appear,  therefore,  that  if  the  habits  connected 
with  attempts  to  produce  these  hallucinatory  states  by 
compulsion  persisted,  as  they  have  persisted,  it  would  be 
not  at  all  because  the  hallucinations,  gained  in  relatively 
few  cases,  could  be  of  value  to  the  average  man,  but  because 
the  habits  of  restraint  and  of  listening,  which  are  of  so 


292  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

much  advantage  to  the  race,  would  thus  in  the  main  be 
enforced. 

We  have  here  then,  it  seems  to  me,  an  adequate  explana- 
tion of  the  persistence  of  the  barbarous  initiatory  rites 
which  were  found  as  we  know  amongst  savage  peoples  of 
olden  time,  and  which  in  somewhat  less  cruel  form  have 
come  down  to  our  time  in  crude  forms  of  religious  worship. 

§  14.  Here  we  may  note  another  fact  which  appears  to 
be  of  no  small  value  as  corroborative  of  the  position  above 
taken,  viz.  the  fact  that  the  performance  of  these  initiatory 
rites  is  very  closely  related  to  the  approach  of  the  age  of 
puberty  in  the  active  participants.-^ 

That  this  relation  between  the  time  of  the  enforcement 
of  these  initiatory  rites  and  the  growth  of  sexual  capacity 
is  one  to  be  expected,  seems  to  me  clear ;  for  in  the  most 
ancient  times  when  phallic  worship  was  prevalent,  the 
greatest  interest  must  have  centred  upon  this  period,  and 
the  customs  of  those  days  would  naturally  come  down  to  us 
in  modified  form  because  they  would  be  found  to  be  valu- 
able ;  for  it  is  most  natural  to  take  advantage  of  this 
moment  of  life  to  turn  the  attention  to  non-individualistic 
impulses. 

At  the  age  of  puberty  the  boy  and  the  girl  have  suddenly 
forced  upon  them  racial  leadings  that  have  never  before 
been  felt ;  at  this  period  of  their  lives  they  are  compelled 
to  attend  to  cravings  of  an  organic  nature  which  demand 
satisfaction  and  yet  which  are  based  upon  no  personal  ex- 
perience of  previous  satisfactions.  Boys  and  girls  then 
become  perforce  introspective;  and  it  is  at  this  moment 
that  the  general  teaching  to  listen  to  the  "  voices  "  within 
them  would  be  most  likely  to  prove  effective. 

^  Cf.  "The  New  Life,"  A.  H.  Daniels,  American  Journal  of  Psychology, 
vi.  1  :  also  two  articles  by  Mr.  Starbuck  in  the  same  journal  for  January  and 
October  1897. 


CHAP,  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  295 

For  a  large  body  of  fact  regarding  the  initiatory  rites 
among  savage  tribes,  and  their  relation  to  the  approach  of 
puberty,  I  would  refer  the  reader  to  Mr.  Daniels'  article 
mentioned  in  the  footnote.  In  our  own  race,  and  in  our 
own  day  and  civilisation,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  it  is  at  this 
time  of  the  awakening  of  the  sexual  life  that  the  Eoman 
Catholic  Church  would  compel  her  followers  to  partake  of 
their  first  communion,  as  a  symbol  of  their  submission  to 
her  religious  guidance ;  and  even  amongst  those  who  are 
allowed  much  more  choice  in  such  matters  we  find  that  it 
is  at  this  epoch  in  their  lives,  at  this  moment  of  entrance 
into  manhood  and  womanhood,  that  the  most  vivid  im- 
pression of  the  value  of  religion  is  usually  gained. 

In  my  opinion  it  is  indeed  of  the  greatest  importance 
that  this  impressionable  moment  should  be  seized,  as  it  very 
commonly  is,  for  the  establishment  through  religious 
ceremonial,  and  other  like  influences,  of  habits  of  renuncia- 
tion and  of  attending  to  the  influences  of  the  deeper 
impulses  within  us.  The  boy  or  girl  who  passes  this  time 
of  life  without  gaining  these  most  valuable  habits  is  very 
liable  to  find  it  difficult  to  gain  them  in  after-life. 

§  15.  In  what  has  preceded  this  we  have  been  con- 
sidering the  advantages  that  would  accrue  to  the  race  by 
the  enforcement  of  religious  habits  principally  by  means  of 
appeals  to  man's  deep-seated  fears. 

But  there  is  another  direction  in  which  religious 
ceremonial  might  bring,  although  still  more  indirectly,  the 
same  advantage.  There  will  always  be  in  every  race  many 
who  cannot  often  be  led  to  worship  by  fear,  and  who  will 
not  wish  to  be  "  cleansed  " ;  yet  many  such  people  may  be 
attracted  by  stimulations  of  their  aesthetic  sense,  if  we  may 
so  speak :  thus  we  should  expect  to  find,  as  we  do  find,  a 
tendency    to    give    aesthetic    significance    to    the    religious 


294  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

ceremonial.  Not  only  do  we  recognise  this  in  the  magnifi^ 
cence  of  the  pageants  arranged  in  connection  with  pagan 
religious  services,  but  we  realise  that  in  all  religious  services 
of  our  own  day  there  is  some  remnant  of  this  effort  to 
attract  by  producing  effects  of  beauty ;  and  furthermore  I 
think  we  are  compelled  to  agree  that  such  ceremonial  will 
remain  perfectly  legitimate  so  long  as  the  body  of  the  people 
fail  to  realise  the  true  basis  of  religious  life  and  need  to  be 
drawn  by  some  extraneous  influence  into  the  company  of 
worshippers  if  they  are  to  obtain  religious  benefit. 

It  must  be  remembered  also  that  the  attitude  of  mind 
which  one  must  gain  if  he  is  to  appreciate  aesthetic  work 
is  an  attitude  of  receptivity,  and  almost  altogether  of  passive 
receptivity,  an  attitude  of  watching  for  effects  from  without, 
of  absorbed  attention  to  these  effects.  In  the  thorough 
enjoyment  of  powerful  aesthetic  effects  we  stand  "entranced," 
as  the  saying  goes,  and  this  mental  condition  the  reader 
will  at  once  see  is  the  very  one  in  which  religious  im- 
pressions are  most  readily  gained. 

There  is  still  another  close  alliance  between  the  aesthetic 
and  the  religious  mental  attitudes.  For,  as  the  reader  will 
remember,  we  have  seen  that  religious  service  gains  its 
effects  in  many  cases  by  the  powerful,  although  often  un- 
recognised, emphasis  of  the  social  bonds  which  exist  within 
us,  of  the  community  of  interests,  and  of  the  necessities  of 
unified  action.  But  as  I  have  attempted  to  show  elsewhere,^ 
the  function  of  Art  in  the  development  of  man  is  itself  the 
consolidation  of  our  social  life. 

If  all  that  I  have  said  in  this  section  be  true,  the 
aesthetic  and  the  religious  activities  are  bound  together  in 
a  close  communion,  so  that  aesthetic  interests  must  in  their 
very  nature  tend  to  produce  the  conditions  under  which 
our  religious  impulses  are  most  readily  unfolded. 
^  uEsthetic  Principles,  p.  82. 


CHAP.  X       THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  295 

§  16.  In  looking  back  at  the  habits  of  religious  people 
in  the  past,  as  a  whole,  I  think  we  cannot  fail  to  realise 
that  the  most  important  of  all  religious  activities  have 
been,  a^hey  still  are,  the  customs  which  bring  the  common 
man  to  gain  the  attitude  of  prayer  in  companionship  with 
his  fellow-man ;  and  this  because  when  men  gather  in 
great  masses  they  unwittingly  learn  of  their  social  depend- 
ence, this  impression  adding  to  the  force  of  religious  cere- 
monial in  tending  to  repress  the  emphasis  of  individualistic 
impulses. 

In  what  has  been  written  above,  we  have  perhaps  laid 
too  little  emphasis  upon  the  guidance  of  the  masses  by  men 
of  ethical  genius,  we  have,  in  order  to  avoid  digression, 
purposely  overlooked  the  fact  that  the  ordinary  man  is  not 
able,  unassisted,  to  note  the  dimmer  impulses  within  him, 
although  he  will  readily  recognise  their  existence  when  his 
attention  is  attracted  to  them. 

Among  the  lower  races  some  individual  gains  in  one 
way  or  another  the  habit  of  restraint ;  he  sees  a  vision, 
notices  a  voice  commanding  him,  or  perhaps  merely  hears 
what  we  call  the  "  still  small  voice "  of  conscience.  He 
interprets  this  as  an  inspiration,  as  a  revelation,  as  a 
message  from  his  God.  He  tells  this  to  his  people,  and  if 
he  be  a  man  of  force  they,  dimly  feeling  the  influences 
which  he  feels  powerfully,  obey  his  call  which  answers  to 
some  extent  the  vague  impulses  within  themselves.  They 
call  him  their  prophet :  his  God  becomes  their  God,  and 
with  their  prophet  they  learn  to  pray.  He  teaches  them 
to  assume  the  attitudes  of  prayer,  or  to  join  in  other 
religious  ceremonials  which  have  been  effective  for  himself, 
and  which  in  turn  also  become  effective  in  enabling  them, 
his  followers,  to  hear  the  "  voice  "  that  is  leading  him. 

§  17.  But   there  must   be  those  who  cannot  hear  the 


296  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

voice  even  thus,  and  to  such  we  should  expect  to  find 
teaching  given  by  the  ethical  leaders :  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
this  habit  of  teaching  is  universal  with  all  higher  develop- 
ments of  religion.  Having  through  fear  or  other  means 
produced  in  his  hearers  the  attitude  of  mind  in  which  they 
are  best  able  to  hear  the  "  voice,"  the  prophet  teaches  them 
what  this  "  voice "  has  said  to  himself,  and  if  he  be  an 
ethical  genius  he  blows  into  flame  a  fire  that  was  ready  to 
kindle  within  the  souls  of  his  hearers ;  he  calls  to  their 
attention  impulses  which  they  recognise  as  their  own  when 
he  tells  of  them ;  impulses,  however,  which  they  would  not 
have  perceived  had  he  not  spoken  to  them. 

This  teaching  is  often  followed  by  compulsory  treatment 
of  those  who  refuse  to  act  out  the  "voice's"  commands; 
and  this  has  often  led  to  a  morbid  development  of  the 
power  of  the  priesthood  of  which  we  have  above  spoken 
This  power  being  of  advantage  to  the  priesthood  as  a  body^ 
it  has  often  been  magnified  by  subtleties  and  trickery. 
But  this  morbid  development  of  what  must  have  been 
inherently  advantageous  tends  gradually  to  disappear  with 
increase  of  intelligence  in  the  race,  leaving  still  with  us  the 
custom  of  teaching  to  others  the  importance  of  listening  to 
the  "voice,"  and  the  habit  of  imparting  to  those  who  are 
dull  of  hearing  the  precepts  which  have  been  grasped  by 
those  who  have  been  able  to  hear  clearly  its  commands. 
In  the  later  developments  of  religious  ceremonial  which 
persist  amongst  the  most  intelligent  of  our  race,  although 
the  priest  or  preacher  seldom  claims  direct  inspiration  from 
his  God,  he  still  claims  to  be  specially  authorised  by  some 
body  which  directly  or  indirectly  claims  Divine  authority. 

The  custom  of  teaching  in  the  house  of  worship  the 
precepts  that  have  been  given  to  the  prophets  of  old,  or  to 
those  who  have  taken  their  place  in  more  modern  times, 
has  as  years  roll  by  become  more  and  more  important  in 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  297 

relation  to  the  rest  of  the  ceremonial.  The  teacher  still 
emphasises  to  a  great  extent  the  majesty  of  God,  still  stirs 
within  his  hearers  the  reverence  which  goes  with  fear ;  but 
in  the  religious  life  of  those  of  highest  intelligence  the 
emphasis  of  fear  has  been  replaced  by  an  emphasis  of  a 
reverence  connected  with  love  for  an  all-powerful  yet 
merciful  Creator,  who  is  looked  upon  as  a  Father  rather 
than  as  a  haughty  ruler. 

And  with  all  this  emphasis  of  love  as  a  characteristic  of 
the  Divine  life,  and  of  sympathetic  action  with  our  God  as 
his  humble  followers,  everywhere  does  the  teaching  of  religion 
emphasise  the  necessity  of  a  curbing  of  our  own  individual- 
istic tendencies  and  of  the  encouragement  of  habits  of 
listening  for  and  obeying  the  voice  of  conscience. 

It  seems  to  me  natural  that  the  teacher  should  emphasise 
the  value  of  the  special  habits  of  action  which  he  has  found 
effective  in  producing  what  he  feels  to  be  the  inspiration 
within  himself;  and  it  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  we 
find  the  religious  habits  we  have  been  describing  looked 
upon  and  enforced  as  matters  of  duty ;  and  to  find  special 
extreme  indulgence  in  them  encouraged,  the  habits  being 
looked  upon  as  virtues  in  themselves. 

The  monastic  life,  fasting,  penance,  prayer,  the  sacrifice 
of  what  is  dearest  to  us,  celibacy,  pilgrimages,  have  all  been 
encouraged  as  of  significance  in  themselves,  and  oftentimes 
have  been  proclaimed  as  the  only  means  of  salvation :  and 
where  no  such  extreme  teaching  has  been  given  there 
has  always  been  a  tendency  to  emphasise  the  importance  of 
these  habits  by  ceremonial  means. 

§  18.  If  the  preceding  argument  has  appealed  to  my 
reader  he  will  agree  that  the  function  of  religion  which 
lies    back    of   its    ceremonial    is    the    suppression    of   the 


298  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

tendency  to  individualistic,  elemental  impulses,  in  favour  of 
those  which  have  higher  significance. 

But,  as  we  have  stated  in  what  has  preceded  this,  and 
will  bring  into  prominence  in  the  fourth  division  of  this 
book,  the  latest  elaboration  of  the  tendency  to  elemental 
variance  is  what  we  know  as  Eeason.  It  is  equally  clear,  I 
think,  that  in  self-restraint  and  the  suppression  of  individual- 
ism, in  the  cry  for  aid  and  guidance,  we  gain  that  complex 
psychic  state  which  we  know  under  the  name  of  Faith. 

It  would  appear,  then,  that  in  relation  to  our  modern 
complex  and  self-conscious  intellectual  life  the  function  of 
religion  will  lie  to  a  great  extent  in  the  restraint  of  reason 
and  in  its  subordination  to  faith. 

It  is  most  natural,  then,  to  find  that  religious  leaders  in 
all  later  times  have  emphasised  this  teaching.  Especially 
in  the  doctrines  of  the  Christian  Church  do  we  find  ever 
recurrent  this  dictum  that  reason  must  be  subordinated  to 
faith.  At  times,  indeed,  the  insistence  upon  faith  in  the 
unseen  giver  of  inspiration  has  been  replaced  by  the  demand 
for  faith  in  some  special  human  authorities  who  have  set 
themselves  up  as  dictators.  But  apart  from  these  cases,  it 
seems  clear  that  the  teaching  of  the  subordination  of  reason 
to  faith  which  is  so  characteristic  of  modern  religious 
systems,  captious  as  it  often  appears,  is  nevertheless  on  the 
whole  fundamentally  in  accord  with  the  permanent  and 
valuable  elements  that  have  persisted  through  all  changes 
of  religious  habit :  for,  as  I  have  said  above,  what  is  called 
reason  is  the  latest  development  of  the  tendency  to 
variance  within  us,  while  the  faith  which  we  are  called 
upon  to  substitute  for  reason  implies  a  dependence  upon 
guidance  in  the  ways  our  ancestors  have  trod,  by  those 
voices  that  speak  to  us  from  within  or  that  have  spoken  to 
those  religious  teachers  upon  whom  we  most  rely. 

It  is  to  be  noted,  also,  that  in  the  later  developments  of 


CHAP.  X      THE  FUNCTION  OF  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  299 

religious  teaching  there  is  a  growing  emphasis  of  the  im- 
portance of  personal  effort  to  attain  the  leadings  of  the 
voice  within  ourselves,  to  be  guided  by  influences  that  are 
all  our  own  rather  than  by  authoritative  statements  of  the 
faith  taught  by  others.  How  far  this  is  a  valuable  tendency 
we  cannot  stop  to  consider :  we  are  concerned  here  merely 
to  note  that  even  in  this  latest  of  developments  the 
teaching  of  religion  leads  to  the  emphasis  of  racial  impulses 
within  us,  and  to  a  suppression  of  what  is  of  strictly  indi- 
vidualistic import ;  to  the  emphasis  of  the  established  order 
of  impulse  efficiency  which  has  been  implanted  within  us 
by  Nature. 

§  19.  Before  closing  this  discussion,  let  me  say  a  few 
words  in  reference  to  the  point  made  in  §  4,  above,  viz.  that 
if  the  function  of  the  religious  instinct  be  the  enforcement 
of  racial  demands,  then  we  should  expect  to  find  in  the 
most  effective  of  religions  the  production  of  an  enthusiasm 
in  the  working  out  of  the  impulses  that  are  brought  to 
man's  notice  as  the  result  of  religious  practice. 

The  attitude  of  the  listener  is  not  the  attitude  of  one 
who  acts,  and  if  religious  custom  brought  to  the  devotee 
nothing  more  than  the  hearing  of  the  voice  we  could 
expect  it  to  be  of  slight  efficiency  in  racial  development. 
But  the  religion  that  teaches  action  after  conversion ;  that 
says  to  the  praying  man,  as  the  voice  of  his  God  said  to 
the  scriptural  prophet  of  old,  "  Son  of  man,  stand  upon  thy 
feet " ;  and  that  urges  him  to  act  out  the  dictates  of  the 
"  voice "  aggressively  and  with  enthusiasm ;  that  religion 
will  tend  to  prevail,  as  against  one  that  leaves  the 
worshipper  in  a  state  of  contemplation. 

That  this  expectation  is  fulfilled,  that  effective  religions 
produce  this  enthusiasm,  becomes  clear  when  we  look  back 
to  the  history  of  the  past..     Eeligious  enthusiasm  has  led  to 


300  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

the  destruction  of  those  who  were  thought  to  worship  false 
gods ;  as  the  Israelites  again  and  again  attempted  to  crush 
out  the  prophets  and  followers  of  Baal.  In  later  days  it 
has  led  to  attempts  to  force  at  the  point  of  the  sword  the 
religious  tenets  of  one  race  upon  all  other  races  that  have 
come  in  contact  with  the  one  affected  with  religious  fervour, 
an  acknowledgment  of  conversion  being  all -sufficient  to 
save  the  conquered  from  physical  death.  Instances  of  such 
action  we  have  in  the  religious  wars  waged  by  the  Moham- 
medans, by  the  Crusaders,  and  by  Charlemagne  against  the 
Saxons.  In  "other  and  more  highly  developed  races  we 
find  the  enthusiasm  limiting  itself  to  attempts  at  real  con- 
version of  spirit :  such  movements  being  exemplified  in  the 
missionary  work  which  has  given  so  great  efficiency  to  the 
Christian  Churches. 

As  intellectual  rather  than  physical  forces  have  become 
more  prominent,  and  as  the  religions  that  emphasise  love 
displace,  in  our  modern  life,  those  that  emphasise  fear  as 
the  basis  of  devotion  to  the  cause  dictated  by  the  voices  of 
conscience,  the  value  of  the  acts  of  worship,  with  their 
accompaniments  of  praise  and  thanksgiving,  show  in  greater 
clearness,  in  the  fact  that  they  tend  to  raise  the  worshipper 
into  a  condition  of  joyous  activity,  giving  him  an  enthusiasm 
to  work  for  social  advancement  in  the  direction  in  which 
his  newly  recognised  impulses  would  lead  him. 

This  tendency  to  undertake  social  work,  and  to  study 
social  problems,  is  a  marked  characteristic  of  modern 
ecclesiastical  developments. 


CHAPTER  XI 

CERTAIN    CORROBORATIONS 

I. — Of  Conversion 

§  1.  We  have  now  passed  in  review  the  most  marked  types 
of  religious  expression,  and  to  my  mind  have  found  that 
the  persistence  of  these  religious  activities  in  the  race  can 
in  the  main  be  explained  in  accordance  with  the  tentative 
hypothesis  as  to  their  biological  function  which  I  have 
presented.  It  may  be  well  for  us  here  to  note  certain 
corroborative  testimony  of  an  indirect  kind  which  presents 
itself. 

Let  us  consider  for  a  moment  certain  facts  in  relation  to 
the  time  of  the  manifestation  of  the  religious  instinct  in  the 
life  of  man. 

Instincts,  as  we  have  seen,  may  in  a  broad  way  be 
divided  into  two  classes  :  First,  we  have  those  that  show 
themselves  at  birth,  which  we  agree  to  call  "  connate  "  in- 
stincts ;  and  second,  those  that  do  not  appear  until  some  time 
after  birth,  which  we  call  "  deferred  "  instincts.  It  is  to  be 
noted,  moreover,  that  as  instincts  are  determined  by,  and 
have  significance  in  relation  to,  development,  they  must 
necessarily  appear  in  the  life  of  an  individual  in  an  order  in 
general  correspondent  with  the  order  of  this  development ; 
we   are    warranted    in    believing    that   the  order  of   their 


802  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

appearance  in  the  life  of  the  individual  man  indicates  in  a 
general  way  their  temporal  position  in  the  order  of  racial 
development,  or,  in  other  words,  indicates  the  time  at  which 
they  appeared  in  the  organic  series  from  which  our  higher 
forms  are  descended. 

It  is  thus  that  the  child  at  birth  shows  at  first  only 
individualistic  tendencies  :  that  indeed  the  individualistic 
instincts  at  first  evidenced  relate  simply  to  the  sustenance 
of  the  body,  and  only  those  appearing  later  relate  to  more 
complex  protective  reactions.  It  is  thus  that  the  instincts 
which  relate  to  sexual  reproduction  are  deferred,  i.e.  fail  to 
appear  until  that  time  of  life  which  we  designate  as  the  age  of 
puberty.  It  is  thus  that  the  emphasis  of  the  ethical  instincts 
is  on  the  whole  brought  into  prominence  still  later  than  the  age 
of  puberty,  although,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is  often  projected 
forward  in  our  lives  by  processes  of  an  educational  nature. 

From  these  facts  we  would  be  led  to  argue,  even  were 
there  no  other  evidence,  that  our  earliest  progenitors  first 
acquired  those  instincts  which  relate  to  the  obtaining  of 
sustenance ;  that  their  descendants  acquired  more  complex 
instincts  relating  to  individualistic  needs  ;  that  later  still  the 
ancestors  of  our  race  acquired  the  original  simple  sexual 
instincts  which  we  are  able  to  examine  only  in  their  ela- 
boration ;  and  that  not  until  a  comparatively  late  period, 
>  biologically  speaking,  did  our  prehistoric  human  forefathers 
gain  the  germs  of  the  ethical  instincts  which,  as  elaborated, 
produce  in  us  our  "higher"  impulses. 

If  all  this  be  true,  and  if  it  also  be  true  that  the  religious 
i  instinct  has  been  formed,  as  I  surmise,  for  the  regulation  of 
'  the  relation  existing  between  these  "  higher  "  and  later,  and 
these  "  lower  "  and  earlier,  instincts ;  then  we  are  warranted 
in  assuming  that  the  religious  instinct  will  be  one  of  the 
deferred  type,  that  its  expressive  actions  will  not  appear  in 
man  at  birth,  nor  until  he  is  fairly  mature ;  although  it  is 


CHAP.  XI  OF  CONVERSION  303 

quite  possible  that  the  manifestations  of  its  expression  may 
be  found  to  be  transferred  artificially  to  an  earlier  period  of 
life  in  the  same  manner  observed  with  what  are  usually 
called  the  ethical  instincts. 

If  man  were  without  educational  tendencies,  if  there 
were  no  machinery  for  the  teaching  to  the  young  habits 
of  action  which  are  to  be  of  value  later  in  life,  if  indi- 
viduals of  our  race  were  not  "  born  to  learn  "  and  "  born  to 
learn  the  same  things,"  ^  it  appears  to  me  that  the  tend- 
ency to  religious  expression  would  be  much  deferred,  and 
that  it  would  appear  much  later  in  life  than  the  tendency 
to  what  we  usually  call  the  ethical  reactions.  That  it  is  so 
deferred,  as  we  shall  presently  see  is  the  case  in  the  lives  of 
many  men  who  are  not  affected  by  these  educational  in- 
fluences, is  sufficient  evidence  to  lead  us  to  believe  that  the 
suggestion  to  which  theory  forces  us  is  probably  correct. 
For  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  reKgious  instinct  has  come  to  be 
of  such  inestimable  value  to  man  that  it  has  become  a 
habit  of  the  race  to  encourage  its  expression  by  command, 
and  by  the  enforcement  of  imitative  education,  so  that  the 
forms  of  religious  expression  become  normal  to  very  small 
children. 

It  is  acknowledged,  however,  that  these  artificially 
acquired  habits  of  action  are  not  instinctive  at  a  very  early 
age  in  the  very  fact  that  it  is  also  acknowledged  that  there 
comes  a  time  of  life  for  a  large  proportion  of  men  and 
women  when  they,  more  or  less  suddenly,  discover  that 
within  themselves  have  developed  impulses  which  guide  them 
to  undertake  spontaneously  these  religious  expressions  which 
before  had  been  but  imitative  or  compulsory. 

In  a  large  proportion  of  normally  educated  people  the 
process  is  that  which  I  have  just  sketched  out.  From  the 
earliest  childhood  the  average  youth  sees  those  around  him 

^  Professor  J.  Mark  Baldwin,  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  p.  71. 


304  ,  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

whom  he  loves  and  respects  engaged  in  practices  which 
have  religious  significance.  The  imitation  of  these  practices 
is  most  natural,  and  the  tendency  to  copy  the  action  of  his 
elders  is  fostered  by  the  encouragement  of  those  who  look 
upon  religious  service  as  essential  to  salvation.  But  some 
day  after  the  child  is  grown  to  mature  years  he  notes,  or 
has  his  attention  directed  to,  the  call  within  him  which 
convinces  him  of  sin.  He  then  feels  the  need  of  these  very 
practices  which  he  has  performed  hitherto  in  a  perfunc- 
tory manner ;  and  in  the  acknowledgment  of  this  need  of 
guidance  from  the  impulses  which  become  powerful  when 
he  gains  the  religious  attitude  of  mind  he  becomes  a  new 
person,  gains  a  new  light,  finds  himself  guided  by  a  new 
power  which  leads  him  to  a  suppression  of  individualistic 
desire  in  favour  of  the  higher  impulses  within  him.  This  is 
the  mon^ent  of  "  conversion,"  as  it  is  commonly  named. 

As  I  have  already  noted,  there  is  a  tendency  for  this^ 
impressive  change  to  occur  about  the  age  of  puberty,  for 
then  the  child  has  forced  upon  him  the  voices  of  newly 
appearing  sexual  instincts  which  are  connected  with  none 
of  his  previous  experiences ;  then  he  is  compelled  to  become 
introspective,  to  listen  to  the  voices  within  his  soul;  and 
then  most  naturally  does  this  tendency  to  listen,  to  know 
of  himself,  lead  to  the  recognition  of  the  still  higher  voices 
which  are  beginning  to  demand  attention,  and  which  lead 
him  to  curb  his  immediate  reaction  until  the  deeper-lying 
impulses  can  gain  force  and  proclaim  their  rightful  priority. 

The  reader  will  realise  from  what  has  already  been  said 
that  the  religious  instinct,  even  at  this  time  of  life,  is 
only  incipient,  and  is  probably  transferred  forward  some- 
what from  its  natural  temporal  position  by  the  educative 
processes  already  dwelt  upon.  That  this  is  true  is  evidenced 
by  the  ordinary  ease  of  conversion  when  artificially  stimu- 
lated at  this  time,  as  contrasted  with  the  violence  of  con- 


CHAP.  XI  OF  CONVERSION  305 

version  when  it  occurs  later  in  life,  when  the  fully-developed 
instinct  is  suddenly  called  into  action. 

It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  for  very  many  indi- 
viduals the  growth  of  this  religious  tendency  is  even  more 
gradual  than  is  above  described,  and  the  transition  point 
from  non-religious  to  religious  guidance  scarcely  recognisable  : 
so  gradual  indeed  is  this  change  that  many  of  those  who 
have  been  brought  up  in  a  religious  atmosphere  are  unable 
to  recall,  as  they  look  back  at  life's  experience,  any  moment 
at  which  the  change  from  non-religious  to  religious  guidance 
occurred. 

In  fact  the  notion  that  the  religious  attitude  is  gained 
suddenly,  and  often  with  shock,  would  not  generally  obtain 
were  it  not  that  a  goodly  number  of  people  do  not  gradually 
acquire  the  religious  attitude,  for  the  reason  that  they*do  not 
in  practice  learn  by  precept  to  subordinate  their  individual- 
istic impulses,  but  on  the  other  hand  do  live  a  life  in  which 
the  distinctly  individualistic  instincts  and  those  relative  to 
reproduction  are  fostered,  so  that  they  give  themselves  no 
opportunity  to  note  the  rise  of  the  inner  guidance  which 
religion  gives. 

To  such  individuals  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of 
the  higher  instinct  is  altogether  lacking  until  some  day  it 
forces  itself  upon  them  in  a  startling  manner,  usually  as  the 
result  of  some  shock  which  leads  them  to  note  the  weak- 
ness of  their  individualism,  which  turns  them  to  call  for 
guidance  in  time  of  perplexity.  And  in  such  cases  the  rise 
of  the  religious  instinct  usually  occurs  some  time  after 
what  are  usually  called  the  ethical  instincts  have  become 
prominent  in  the  man's  mind.  Such  is  the  conversion 
which  makes  a  mark  in  the  memory  of  the  self-convicted 
sinner,  which  leads  him  to  signalise  some  moment  in  his 
life  as  the  turning-point  at  which  he  gained  the  new  im- 
pulse from  religion. 

X 


306  ^  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

It  is  because  of  the  startling  nature  of  -such  experiences 
that  they  have  come  to  be  considered  normal  in  the  attain- 
ment of  the  religious  attitude  of  mind ;  and  this  principally 
because  startling  conversions  have  often  turned  men  of  marked 
immorality  to  lead  lives  of  marked  purity ;  have  often  led 
men  of  force  to  devote  their  lives,  from  the  moment  of  con- 
version, to  religious  service  and  to  religious  teaching,  and 
this  with  many  a  noble  sacrifice ;  have  led  them,  impressed 
by  the  value  of  the  crisis  in  their  own  lives,  to  aim  to  pro- 
duce a  corresponding  crisis  in  the  lives  of  those  around 
them  by  whom  the  voice  of  religion  has  not  been  heard. 

§  2.  It  is  well  to  note  here  an  interesting  and  instructive 
parallel  between  the  nature  of  the  experience  accompanying 
the  rise  of  the  religious  instinct,  and  the  nature  of  that 
accompanying  the  rise  of  the  sexual  instinct. 

The  average  individual  in  our  life  of  social  pressures 
grows  up  surrounded  by  others  of  the  opposite  sex,  and 
unexcited  by  the  difference  of  sex  until  the  age  of  puberty 
approaches,  when  some  day  the  boy  or  girl  finds  arising 
within  an  incipient  impulse  which  naturally,  were  there  no 
restraints,  would  lead  him  or  her  to  exercise  his  or  her 
sexual  powers  in  the  sexual  act. 

But  this  instinct,  which  if  uncurbed  would  lead  to  sexual 
activity,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  a  very  different  thing  from  that 
instinct  of  more  complex  form,  and  broader  range,  which 
leads  the  individual  to  wish,  not  for  momentary  excitement, 
but  for  a  permanent  mating,  for  a  home,  for  a  family. 
This  latter  instinct  which  we  have  described  under  the 
name  of  "romantic  love"  appears  later  than,  and  is  not 
necessarily  involved  in  the  appearance  of,  the  former- 
mentioned  instinct  which  would  lead  to  sexual  action;  in 
fact,  unrestrained  submission  to  the  earlier  rising  instinct  is 
not  unlikely  to  dwarf,  and  even  to  crush  out  of  existence,  the 


CHAP.  XI  OF  CONVERSION  307 

later  instincts  of  higher  type;  a  fact  that  is  sufficiently 
evidenced  in  the  lives  of  the  licentious  of  both  sexes. 

In  the  average  individual  of  the  civilised  races  the  demand 
for  a  permanent  mate  follows  not  long  after  the  appear- 
ance of  puberty.  If  upon  its  appearance  it  were  at  once 
gratified  there  would  be  no  striking  element  to  signalise  the 
appearance  of  the  instinct.  In  fact  in  many  cases  this  is 
doubtless  the  experience  of  mankind ;  and  this  even  among 
the  members  of  the  higher  grades  of  society,  where,  not- 
withstanding social  restrictions,  companionship  begets  friend- 
ship, and  friendship  merely  seems  to  ripen  into  love. 

But  in  the  nature  of  our  complex  civilisation  there  are 
many  artificial  restrictions  to  the  manifestations  of  the 
higher  forms  of  the  instincts  relating  to  reproduction,  of 
which  we  are  speaking.  The  artificial  demands  of  custom 
which  require  a  man  to  gain  a  certain  fortune  before  he 
may  marry,  and  many  special  pursuits  which  artificially 
separate  the  sexes,  work  to  bring  about  avoidance  of  the 
stimuli  to  the  rise  of  these  higher  instincts.  They  thus 
fail  of  expression  until  the  time  of  incipiency  is  past,  until 
they  have  gained  full  power  of  reaction ;  and  then  we  have 
the  phenomenon  of  "  falling  in  love,"  which  sweeps  away  the 
barriers  between  the  lovers  with  a  startling  force  quite 
comparable  with  the  force  with  which  the  religious  instinct 
presses  itself  upon  the  sinner  in  the  moment  of  conversion. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  average  individual  of  the 
higher  classes  does  "  fall  in  love "  lightly,  if  we  may  so 
speak,  rather  early  in  life ;  has  his  or  her  "  first  love." 
But  amongst  civilised  people  the  restraints  of  modern  life 
usually  repress  these  early  manifestations  of  the  higher 
forms  of  the  instincts  relating  to  reproduction,  and  wisely 
so.  But  in  this  very  repression  they  prepare  the  way  for  a 
later  manifestation  of  the  same  instinct  which  will  carry 
all  before  it  with  overwhelming  power,  and  which  appears 


308  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

in  that  permanent  love-mating  which  is  willing  to  sacrifice 
much,  and  to  accept  the  most  binding  assumption  of  possible 
burdens,  for  the  sake  of  the  joys  and  happiness  which  go 
with  the  gratification  of  this  mating  instinct. 

§  3.  There  is  another  corroboration  to  which  I  would 
here  very  briefly  call  the  reader's  attention.  He  will  realise 
as  soon  as  his  attention  is  called  to  it  that  the  expressions 
of  deep  sorrow,  and  of  sadness  and  depression  of  spirit,  are 
closely  allied  with  the  expressions  of  our  religious  instinct. 
It  is  most  natural,  therefore,  to  suppose  that  in  times  of 
sorrow  and  depression,  when  vigour  of  initiative  is  gone, 
and  individualistic  reactions  are  reduced  in  power, — that 
then  our  religious  impulses  will  be  likely  to  become 
prominent  in  mind.  The  mere  mention  of  this  suggestion, 
I  am  sure,  will  at  once  command  the  assent  of  the  reader 
who  realises  in  his  own  experience  how  often  sorrow  brings 
religious  conversion  to  the  man  who,  hitherto  unalSected  by 
sorrow,  has  lived  a  life  of  pure  self-interest. 

It  is  to  be  noted  also  that  in  the  very  nature  of  sexual 
life,  as  we  find  it  in  ourselves,  men  are  on  the  average  more 
aggressive  and  women  more  passive ;  men  naturally  more 
given  to  vigorous  initiative,  women  to  obedience  and  gentle 
service.  But  the  characteristic  of  individualistic  initiative, 
if  we  are  correct,  stands  in  opposition  to  religious  dominance, 
while  the  characteristics  of  passivity,  and  readiness  to  obey, 
must  be  specially  conducive  to  the  emphasis  of  religion.  It 
is  to  be  expected,  therefore,  that  we  should  find,  as  we  surely 
do  find,  men  as  a  class  less  ready,  and  women  as  a  class 
more  ready,  to  give  themselves  up  to  religious  influences,  to 
devote  themselves  to  the  truest  of  religious  lives. 

Could  we  but  transport  ourselves  to  some  far-distant 
planet,  where  the  influences  which  would  make  the  "  new 


CHAP.  XI  OF  CONVERSION  309 

woman  "  in  our  day,  which  would  invert  ^Nature's  established 
initiative  and  passivity  in  the  sexes,  where  these  influences 
had  prevailed  for  an  aeon  or  two,  and  had  actually  reversed 
the  position  of  the  sexes  in  the  direction  above  indicated ; 
then  in  the  Londons  of  that  unhappy  planet,  on  the  Sundays 
of  their  weeks,  and  on  their  holy  days,  we  should  surely 
find  the  churches  occupied  in  large  proportion  by  the  men, 
and  the  club-houses  filled  with  women. 


II. — Of  Phallic  Eeligions 

§  4.  Let  us  now  look  back  into  the  dim  past  and 
imagine  the  conditions  which  must  have  existed  amongst 
the  ancestors  of  the  human  race  who  were  just  emerging 
from  the  animal  forms  from  which  we  believe  man  to  have 
been  descended. 

If  the  religious  instinct  was  contrived  by  Nature  to 
emphasise  the  importance  of  subordinating  our  instincts  in 
relation  to  the  [order  of  their  formation,  then  we  might 
possibly  surmise  that  it,  or  some  instinct  corresponding 
with  it,  might  have  arisen  in  its  germ  in  connection  with 
the  effort  to  subordinate  the  purely  individualistic  instincts 
to  those  which  function  in  the  reproduction  of  the 
species. 

That  the  instincts  having  directly  to  do  with  sexual 
relation,  and  the  instincts  connected  with  pursuit  of  and 
the  attraction  of  mates,  were  acquired  very  early  in  the 
history  of  animal  life  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  they  are 
firmly  entrenched  in  all  types  of  animal  life  above  the  very 
lowest.  "We  cannot  expect,  therefore,  to  find  in  them  or  in 
ourselves  any  indication  of  the  struggles  which  may  have 
been  necessary,  of  the  pressure  Nature  may  have  brought 
to  bear,  before  the  purely  individualistic  instincts  could 
have  been  so  held  in  check  that  the  instincts  directly  re- 


310  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

lating  to  reproduction  could  have  become  firmly  established 
as  dominant  over  the  purely  individualistic  instincts. 

But,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  a  set  of  instincts  found 
in  man  which  relate,  indirectly,  to  be  sure,  but  for  all  that 
solely,  to  reproduction,  and  which  have  been  relatively  very 
late  in  acquisition  by  our  ancestors.  I  refer  of  course  to 
those  instincts  which  function  to  the  perfection  of  our  race 
through  the  protection  to  the  young  which  can  only  be 
effected  by  permanent  mating  of  the  father  and  mother. 
Temporary  mating  we  discover  in  many  of  the  higher 
animals,  but  in  man  only  do  we  find  firmly  established  the 
instincts  which  tend  to  fix  permanently  the  bond  between 
man  and  woman.  As  we  have  seen,  there  is  much  reason  to 
believe  that  these  instincts  were  acquired  contemporaneously 
with  some  of  the  lower  grade  of  the  social  instincts. 

There  is  much  evidence  at  hand  also,  in  the  condition  of 
certain  barbarous  races  to-day,  and  in  the  frequent  and  easy 
lapses  from  normal  marital  relations  by  both  men  and  women 
of  our  own  time,  that  the  genus  homo  was  originally  as  pro- 
miscuous in  its  sexual  relations  as  any  tribe  of  apes  that 
roam  the  forests.  But  just  as  certain  is  it  that  the 
establishment  of  the  instincts  determining  permanent 
mating  have  marked  the  rise  of  the  human  race  above 
its  fellow-animals.  The  responsibility  of  parents  for  the 
sustenance  and  protection  of  their  offspring  is  the  very 
foundation  of  the  efficiency  of  man  in  the  struggle  for 
adaptation  to  his  environment. 

As  we  all  will  agree  after  study  of  our  own  experience, 
the  force  of  the  sexual  instincts  which  would  lead  to  pro- 
miscuous sexual  relations  must  have  been  enormous,  and 
Nature  may  not  impossibly  have  needed  to  use  some  special 
means  to  force  upon  man  the  repression  of  these  powerful 
sexual  instincts  in  favour  of  those  which  lead  to  permanent 
mating.       As    this    last    set    of    instincts    were    probably 


CHAP.  XI  OF  PHALLIC  RELIGIONS  311 

established  coincidently  with  certain  of  the  social  instincts 
of  low  grade,  as  we  have  already  noted,  it  seems  not  im- 
probable that  means  for  the  establishment  of  these  instincts 
may  have  been  adopted  by  Nature  of  a  character  similar  to 
the  means  adopted  later  on  to  repress,  in  favour  of  the 
social  instincts,  the  demands  of  the  individualistic  instincts, 
as  modified  with  relation  to  those  functioning  in  con- 
nection with  sexual  union  and  the  pursuit  and  attraction 
of  temporary  mates. 

This  thought  seems  to  me  to  throw  some  little  light  upon 
a  very  ancient  and  obscure  page  of  human  history,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  give  us  a  strong  piece  of  corroborative  evidence 
in  favour  of  the  theory  I  am  here  suggesting. 

In  our  records  of  the  dimmest  past  we  find  evidence  of 
religious  customs  which  related  to  what  seem  to  us  the 
grossest  of  sexual  immoralities,  and  in  the  habits  of  certain 
uncivilised  races  to-day  we  find  still  persisting  certain 
rudimentary  forms  of  this  religious  service,  whilst  in  our 
own  religious  customs  and,  ceremonials  there  are  not  a  few 
reminiscences  of  what  could  only  have  originally  had 
significance  in  connection  with  such  religious  service. 
This  prehistoric  form  of  religion  we  call  phallic  worship :  I 
shall  say  here  the  few  words  in  reference  to  this  subject 
which  seem  necessary  to  the  argument. 

The  treatment  of  distinctly  sexual  acts  as  of  definite 
religious  significance  has  indeed  almost  disappeared  from 
the  life  and  thought  of  modern  times.  It  is  true,  as  I  have 
just  stated,  that  a  few  of  our  modern  religious  customs  and 
symbols  appear  as  the  remnants  of  late  transformations  of 
customs  and  symbols  which  were  used  in  ancient  phallic 
worship ;  but  I  think  it  will  be  granted  that  even  the 
modern  "  worship  of  the  goddess  lubricity,"  of  which 
Matthew  Arnold  speaks,  can  only  by  a  figure  of  speech 
be  allied  to  what  we  here  consider  true  reliofious  service. 


312  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  pakt  ii 

In  fact,  were  not  our  attention  attracted  to  the  subject 
by  the  considerations  which  have'  just  been  stated,  the 
ahnost  total  disappearance  of  these  forms  of  worship  would 
perhaps  warrant  us  in  passing  over  the  matter  entirely,  not- 
withstanding the  fact  that  historical  remains  convince  us 
that  in  the  olden  days  these  customs  were  exceedingly  per- 
sistent in  the  race.  A  large  proportion  of  the  religious 
contests  of  which  we  read  in  the  Old  Testament  scriptures 
were,  in  fact,  according  to  the  judgment  of  certain 
authorities,  a  warfare  against  the  last  remnants  of  these 
customs,  which  we  have  come  to  regard  as  of  most  vicious 
character,  and  absurdly  remote  from  all  that  we  think  of  as 
religious. 

But  it  seems  to  me  that  if  we  look  back  far  enough  in 
the  history  of  our  race  we  must  take  a  very  different  view. 
If  the  positions  I  have  taken  are  defensible  there  must  have 
been  a  time,  long  before  any  of  the  higher  social,  ethical, 
instincts  had  begun  to  be  formed,  when  the  function  of  the 
restraint  which  we  now  see  embodied  in  religious  expression 
must  have  been  of  inestimable  service  in  its  enforcement  of 
those  instincts  which  have  special  relation  to  the  emphasis 
of  perfection  of  individual  life  rather  than  of  its  mere  per- 
sistence. 

The  quasi-religious  ceremonies  and  forms  of  worship  in 
which,  in  those  pre-ethical  days,  restraint  from  pure  in- 
dividualism was  developed,  must  doubtless  have  been  very 
different  from  those  with  which  we  are  acquainted ;  but  it 
is  highly  probable  that  they  led  the  worshipper  to  listen 
to  the  promptings  of  what  were  for  him  then  his  higher 
instincts ;  instincts  which  in  us  have  become  almost  entirely 
spontaneous,  and  indeed  subordinate  to  nobler  instincts  of 
social  import. 

If  we  consider  those  early  times  when  man's  typical  life 
must  have  been  very  close  to   that  of  the  animals  with 


CHAP.  XI  OF  PHALLIC  RELIGIONS  313 

which  we  are  acquainted,  when  the  gratification  of  sexual 
passion  must  have  been  utterly  unrestrained  and  promiscuous, 
as  it  is  with  most  of  the  animals,  then  my  reader  will  per- 
ceive how  tremendous  must  have  been  the  pressure  which 
must  have  been  brought  to  bear  upon  our  race  in  one  way 
or  another  before  our  ancestors  in  those  far-off  days  could 
have  acquired  the  habits  which  have  become  instinctive 
with  us,  and  which  bring  with  them  the  sense  of 
responsibility  for  the  care  and  sustenance  of  our  off- 
spring. 

Animal  life  of  low  type  persists  because  of  the  vast 
number  of  new  individuals  that  are  born,  a  number  so 
vast  that  notwithstanding  adverse  conditions  and  hostile 
surroundings  some  small  proportion  are  likely  to  be  pre- 
served from  the  slaughter  which  overtakes  the  majority  of 
their  myriad  brothers  before  they  can  reproduce  their  kind. 
Only  in  animal  life  of  higher  types  do  we  find  this  per- 
sistence attained  by  the  protection  of  the  young  from 
danger  and  starvation. 

In  the  race  of  man  this  protective  action  has  developed 
far  beyond  anything  of  the  kind  which  is  to  be  found 
amongst  the  animals,  and  has  produced  in  ourselves  a 
sense  of  responsibility  for  those  whom  we  beget,  which  can 
only  have  become  fixed  in  our  race  through  the  pressure  of 
efficient  forces  through  many  ages. 

We  must  note  that,  in  all  probability,  the  animal  can 
have  no  conception  of  the  relation  between  the  sexual  act 
and  the  birth  of  offspring ;  the  knowledge  of  the  connection 
between  the  momentary  act  and  the  far-off  result  implies 
the  growth  of  a  high  degree  of  intelligence  in  the  developing 
man ;  and  we  must  consider  that,  even  if  after  the  early 
man  began  to  realise  the  connection  between  his  act 
and  the  production  of  offspring,  the  thought  of  responsibility 
for  the  life  of  the  child  could  only  have  been  fixed  in  the 


314  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  ii 

/  race  with  difficulty;  yet  this  thought  of  responsibihty  is 
I  certainly  the  very  foundation  of  man's  supremacy  over  the 
'    animals  below  him  in  the  scale. 

That  rehgious  service  in  its  earliest  forms  should  have 
tended  to  bring  into  prominence  this  sense  of  responsibility 
in  the  fact  that  it  restrained  individual  passion,  that  the 
prophets  of  those  early  religions  should  have  preached  the 
solemnity  and  holiness  of  the  sexual  act,  seems  to  me  to  be 
most  natural.  The  preaching  of  the  sanctity  of  the  act 
which  led  to  the  production  of  offspring  will  indeed  be  seen 
to  have  been  a  natural  development  of  that  religious  life 
■  which  functioned  to  the  emphasis  of  the  importance  and 
responsibility  of  procreation. 

Most  natural  must  it  have  been  for  the  fathers  and 
mothers  of  those  days  to  devote  their  sons  and  daughters 
to  the  phallic  gods ;  ^  most  natural  in  ruder  times  to 
sacrifice  the  first-born  to  the  phallic  god,  and  in  less 
barbaric  times  to  give  the  first-born  to  the  service  of  the 
god ;  most  natural  to  make  the  first  sexual  act  also  an  act 
of  consecration ;  most  natural  that  men  of  serious  mind 
should  have  treated  sexual  acts  as  matters  with  which  re- 
ligion had  to  do  ;  most  natural  that  the  very  temple  of  their 
gods  should  have  been  chosen  for  acts  of  a  sexual  nature. 

If  it  is  not  difficult  to  understand  how  all-important 
such  religious  service  must  have  been  in  the  prehistoric 
race,  in  which  Nature  was  aiming  to  break  down  promiscuous 
sexual  relations  and  to  produce  the  germs  of  family  life ; 

^  It  seems  probable  to  me  that  the  practice  of  circumcision  may  be 
I  traceable  to  the  days  of  the  dominance  of  phallic  worship,  when  no  more 
fitting  mark  of  honour  to  the  gods  could  be  conceived  than  the  offering  to 
them  of  a  part  of  the  very  flesh  of  the  organ  which  was  to  be  sanctified.  I 
surmise  that  the  act  of  circumcision  may  have  been  at  first  performed  at  the 
age  of  puberty,  as  it  is  now  among  savage  races  ;  but  later  on,  for  reasons  of 
convenience,  and  to  avoid  danger  of  death  before  consecration,  that  it  was 
probably  performed  in  childhood,  very  much  as  adult  baptism  has  been 
displaced  by  infant  baptism. 


CHAP.  XI  OF  PHALLIC  RELIGIONS  315 

on  the  other  hand,  it  is  easy  also  to  see  how,  later  on, 
those  of  growing  intelligence,  in  whom  the  higher  ethical 
instincts  were  beginning  to  form,  must  have  found  their 
religious  life  gradually  leading  them  away  from  the  phallic 
religion  of  their  fathers.  Mighty  indeed  must  have  been 
the  ethical  battles  waged  in  the  name  of  phallicism  against 
the  heretics  of  that  day  who  had  learned  to  see  that  religion 
embodied  higher  truths  than  those  that  were  taught  by  the 
established  phallic  church.  The  last  shadows  of  these 
contests  are  just  to  be  seen  in  the  mists  of  the  historic 
horizon. 

If  this  be  true,  it  is  not  difficult  to  account  for  the 
persistence  of  habits  of  religious  action  which  at  one  time 
in  the  life  -  history  of  our  race  must  have  been  of  such 
fundamental  moment :  habits  which  must  have  aided  in  the 
formation  of  those  instincts  within  us  which  mark  us  as 
distinctive  by  many  grades  from  the  animal  life  that 
surrounds  us;  habits  which,  misinterpreted  by  some,  and 
without  any  doubt  used  for  vicious  purposes  by  others, 
must  still,  on  the  whole,  have  had  their  valuable  function 
in  the  repression  of  sexual  excess  and  in  the  building  up  of 
that  interest  in  the  race  that  is  to  follow  us,  which  is  so 
evident  a  characteristic  of  our  higher  civilisation. 


CHAPTEK    XII 

I. — A  Summary 

Before  we  proceed  further  it  will  be  well  to  review  briefly 
the  course  of  thought  in  the  chapters  that  have  preceded 
this,  as  it  will  aid  us,  I  think,  in  the  development  of  the 
remainder  of  our  discussion  to  recall  the  steps  already 
taken. 

Having  devoted  our  first  chapter  to  an  introduction,  and 
the  second  chapter  to  a  consideration  of  the  method  to  be 
employed,  the  reader  will  recall  that  in  the  third  chapter 
we  took  a  general  view  of  the  nature  of  those  activities  of 
animal  life  that  are  commonly  considered  to  be  determined 
by  instinct,  and  of  those  that  are  commonly  considered  to 
be  determined  by  reason,  which  latter  are  often  placed  in 
opposition  to  the  instinctive. 

After  certain  definitions  and  a  general  statement,  we 
turned  to  a  somewhat  more  technical  treatment  of  the 
subject. 

At  the  start  we  took  up  the  study  of  living  matter  in  its 
simplest  forms,  and  we  saw  (§  4)  that  growth  in  these  cases 
implies  fission ;  and  further  that,  if  growth  is  to  continue, 
this  fission  must  be  followed  either  by  separation  of  the 
parts  thus  divided  off,  or  else  by  the  formation  of  aggregates 
of  a  type  in  which  there  must  necessarily  arise  differentia- 
tion   of   functioning    amongst    the    units   thus  aggregated. 


CHAP.  XII  A  SUMMARY  317 

These  aggregates  having  come  to  exist,  it  appeared  (§5) 
that  any  change  in  any  cell  in  the  aggregated  mass  will 
tend  to  bring  about  some  alteration  in  the  other  cells  that 
are  contiguous  to  the  one  altered.  Thus  the  action  to 
which  a  superficial  cell  would  be  prompted  by  a  stimulus 
from  without  the  aggregate,  would  be  modified  by  the  action 
to  which  it  would  be  prompted  by  the  stimuli  coming  from 
the  cells  contiguous  to  it  within  the  aggregate. 

Here  in  the  very  beginnings  of  life  we  noted  the  workings 
of  two  influences  :  First,  the  elemental  variant  influence 
leading  the  cell  to  accommodate  itself  to  the  environmental 
stimulus  without  reference  to  its  neighbours  in  the  aggregate  ; 
and  second,  and  coming  later  into  play,  the  influence  from 
the  aggregated  mass. 

But  it  seems  (§6)  most  probable  that  the  formation 
of  aggregates  of  differently  functioning  units  must  have 
been  brought  about  because  cells  which  are  parts  of  an 
aggregate  have  an  advantage  over  cells  which  act  separately ; 
and  if  this  be  true  it  must  be  of  advantage  to  the  cells  of 
the  aggregate  that  they  subordinate  their  tendencies  to 
elemental  action  to  the  tendencies  within  them  to  act  as 
parts  of  an  aggregate.  In  other  words,  we  should  be  led  to 
expect  to  find  the  elemental  variant  influence  above  spoken 
of  subordinated,  on  the  whole,  to  the  influence  from  the 
aggregate. 

Turning  then  (§  7)  to  the  consideration  of  higher 
forms  of  life,  we  saw  that  in  the  process  of  evolution  the 
aggregation  of  cells  has  led  not  only  to  differentiation  of 
functioning,  but  also  to  inter-relation  between  the  differenti- 
ated cells,  and  that  thus  what  we  call  organisms  appear 
in  nature. 

With  the  growth  of  organisms  in  complexity  and  integra- 
tion each  influence  from  the  environment  upon  one  cell  will 
indeed  tend  to  be  more  or  less  effective  upon  all  cells,  but 


318  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

at  the  same  time  pari  passu  with  the  growth  in  complexity, 
and  notwithstanding  the  increase  in  integration  of  the  cell 
parts,  the  secondary  influence  from  the  other  cells  of  the 
organism  will  become  more  and  more  complex,  and  less 
immediately  effective.  But  for  all  that,  notwithstanding 
the  uncertainty  and  delay  which  is  involved  with  complexity, 
it  seems  fairly  clear  that  under  the  stress  of  conflict  those 
cells,  or  cell-made  parts,  will  still  have  the  best  chance  of 
survival  which  subordinate  their  tendency  to  immediate 
reaction  as  individual  cells,  or  cell  -  made  parts,  to  the 
tendency  to  react  as  mere  elements  of  the  whole  organism. 
For  the  persistence  of  the  organisms  shows  that  they  are 
better  adapted  to  accommodate  themselves  to  environmental 
conditions  (with  incidental  protection  to  their  elemental 
cells)  than  any  of  the  elemental  cells,  or  cell-made  parts, 
themselves  would  be  if  they  acted  as  though  isolated.  It 
thus  appeared  that  in  organisms  of  a  higher  type  we  should 
be  led  to  expect  to  find  what  we  had  already  noted  in  the 
lower  forms  of  mere  aggregation,  viz.  that  the  elemental 
variant  influences  are  on  the  whole  subordinated  to  the 
influences  from  the  organism. 

We  saw  thus  that  in  the  subordination  of  elemental  to 
organic  tendencies  we  have  the  explanation  of  the  elaboration 
of  what  we  have  learned  to  call  instinctive  activities,  i.e. 
activities  which  tend  to  the  advantage  of  the  organism  as  a 
whole  and  not  especially  to  the  advantage  of  those  special 
elements  of  the  organism  which  are  directly  affected  by  the 
environmental  change. 

Eeserving  all  strictly  technical  discussion  for  later 
chapters  we  contented  ourselves  with  the  statement,  which 
seemed  to  result  from  our  study,  that  while  on  the  one 
hand  the  activities  that  are  determined  by  influences  from 
the  organism  are  what  we  know  as  instinctive  actions,  those 
on   the   other   hand   which    are    determined   by   elemental 


CHAP.  XII  A  SUMMARY  319 

variant    influences   are   the   ones    that   we    call   "reasoned 
actions  "  or,  more  commonly,  "  intelligent  actions." 

In  the  second  division  of  the  book  we  undertook  the 
special  study  of  Instinct,  i.e.  the  study  of  the  organic 
influence  upon  action. 

In  the  fourth  chapter  we  entered  into  a  technical  defence 
of  the  definition  of  Instinct  we  had  adopted. 

In  the  fifth  chapter  we  attempted  to  classify  the  principal 
instincts,  considering  them  from  both  the  objective  and  the 
subjective  points  of  view.  We  studied  first  (§§  4  to 
11)  the  instincts  which  relate  to  the  persistence  of  the 
individual  organism :  this  class  we  found  to  include  a  large 
proportion  of  the  instincts  which  are  familiar  to  us  in  our 
every-day  life.  In  the  second  place  (§§  12  to  18)  we 
studied  the  instincts  relating  to  the  persistence  of  the 
species  to  which  the  individual  belongs;  instincts  which 
have  a  biological  significance  quite  different  from  that  of  the 
class  of  instincts  first  considered.  In  the  third  place 
(§  19  to  end)  we  studied  those  instincts  which  relate 
to  the  persistence  of  social  groups  of  individual  organisms ; 
a  class  of  instincts  which  is  of  great  interest,  because  the 
impulses  which  relate  to  these  instincts,  the  ethical  impulses, 
are  constantly  brought  into  prominence  in  our  conscious  life. 
These  instincts,  we  perceived,  have  a  biological  significance 
quite  diverse  from  that  of  the  individualistic  instincts  first 
studied,  and  from  that  of  the  instincts  of  the  second  class 
which  relate  to  persistence  of  species. 

In  the  sixth  chapter  we  made  an  attempt  to  discover 
the  relation  between  these  three  groups  into  which  we  had 
found  our  instincts  could  naturally  be  separated. 

We  noted  the  evidence  (§  2  ff.)  which  leads  us  to 
believe  that  the  instincts  of  the  second  class,  viz.  those  that 


320  INSTINCT  AND  EEASON  part  ii 

relate  to  the  persistence  of  the  species,  have  been  built 
upon,  or  formed  out  of,  the  instincts  of  purely  individualistic 
significance  which  make  up  the  first  class ;  the  instincts  of 
this  second  class  having  been  developed  after  many  of  those 
of  the  first  class  were  already  well  established  in  the 
low-grade  organisms  from  which  later  organisms  of  higher 
type  are  descended. 

We  noted  further  that  these  instincts  of  the  second 
class  tend  to  be  subordinated  to  the  individualistic  instincts 
of  the  first  class  wherever  the  conditions  of  life  are  in  the 
least  abnormal.  And  yet  it  appeared  clear  that  on  the 
whole  the  process  must  have  been  reversed,  i.e.  these 
instincts  of  the  second  class  relating  to  reproduction  would 
not  have  been  formed,  and  after  formation  would  not  have 
persisted,  unless  they  had  on  the  whole  subordinated  to 
themselves  the  instincts  of  the  first  class  which  have 
individualistic  significance  ;  and  we  argued  therefore  that 
this  subordination  of  class  1  to  class  2  must  have  been 
important  in  the  past,  and  is  in  all  probability  of  importance 
to-day. 

In  like  manner  (§  4  ff.)  we  noted  the  evidence  that 
the  instincts  of  the  third  class,  viz.  those  that  relate  to  the 
persistence  of  social  groups,  have  been  built  upon,  or  formed 
out  of,  the  individualistic  instincts,  as  modified  in  relation 
to  reproduction ;  the  instincts  of  this  third  class  having 
been  developed  after  those  of  the  first  and  second  classes 
were  well  established  in  the  organisms  from  which  the 
highest  forms  of  life  are  descended. 

We  noted  further,  however,  that  these  individualistic 
instincts  of  the  first  class,  as  modified  in  relation  to  the 
instincts  of  the  second  class  which  relate  to  reproduction, 
tend  to  subordinate  those  of  the  third  class  which  relate  to 
social  groups,  wherever  the  conditions  of  life  are  at  all 
abnormal.     And  yet  here  again  it  appeared  clear  that  on 


CHAP.  XII  A  SUMMARY  321 

the  whole  this  tendency  must  have  been  suppressed,  that 
on  the  whole  the  process  must  have  been  reversed,  i.e.  these 
instincts  of  the  third  class  would  not  have  been  formed,  and 
if  formed  would  not  have  persisted,  unless  they  had  on  the 
whole  subordinated  to  themselves  the  individualistic  instincts 
of  the  first  class  as  modified  by  those  of  the  second  class 
relating  to  reproduction ;  and  we  argued,  therefore,  that  this 
subordination  of  classes  1  and  2  to  class  3  must  have 
been  important  in  the  past,  and  is  in  all  probability  of 
importance  to-day. 

Thus  we  saw  in  the  second  division  of  the  chapter  that 
the  very  existence  of  these  groups  of  instincts  of  several 
orders  implies  as  a  fact  the  subordination  of  certain  instincts 
to  other  instincts  in  relation  to  this  order ;  or,  in  other  words, 
implies  a  hierarchy  of  the  instincts. 

In  the  seventh  chapter  we  examined  the  notion  that 
social  life  is  organic,  and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  this 
conception  is  probably  a  valid  one;  but  that  the  social 
organism  is  an  organism  of  very  low  type  indeed,  weakly 
integrated,  ever  subject  to  disintegration  and  to  radical 
variation. 

With  this  thought  in  mind  we  considered  in  Chapter 
VIII.  the  nature  of  the  social  instincts  upon  which  the 
higher  morality  depends,  and  concluded  that  variation  from 
the  typical  order  of  subordination  would  appear,  i.e.  the 
subordination  of  the  higher  instincts  to  those  of  lower 
grades  would  be  likely  to  occur,  wherever  the  stimuli 
leading  to  a  reversal  of  this  order  were  forceful,  and 
especially  where  the  bonds  of  integration  were  weak  and 
the  complexity  of  the  organism  great.  Both  of  these  latter 
conditions  we  had  already  found  to  be  inherent  in  the  form 
of  the  social  organism  in  relation  to  which  our  ethical 
instincts  have  been  developed;  and  in  the  nature  of  our 
civilisation   we   noted   that    forcefulness  of   stimulation  to 

Y 


322  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

activities  of  a  lower  order  would  tend  to  be  greatly  emphasised 
in  our  life. 

This  emphasis  we  saw,  (§  5)  would  be  increased :  first, 
by  the  fact  that  instincts  tend  to  lose  force  in  our  conscious 
life,  whilst  rationalistic  considerations,  which  might  lead  us 
to  vary  from  higher  instinctive  leadings,  do  not  show  this 
tendency,  and  hence  are  not  so  likely  to  lose  their  efficiency 
in  relation  to  our  action;  second  (§  6),  by  the  fact  that  in- 
dividually acquired  habits,  or  customs  of  momentary  import 
handed  down  from  one  generation  to  another,  tend  to  gain  the 
external  marks  of  instincts  and  to  be  mistaken  for  them ; 
third  (§  7),  by  the  fact  that  what  most  men  consider  to  be 
success  in  life  is  to  a  great  extent  gained  by  a  reversal 
of  the  hierarchal  order ;  fourth  (§  8),  by  the  fact  that  the 
imitative  instinct,  so  greatly  developed  in  us,  tends  to 
strengthen  variations  that  happen  to  occur. 

It  appeared  thus  that  the  conditions  of  our  civilisation 
tend  on  the  whole  to  reverse  nature's  process  ;  tend,  in  other 
words,  to  subordinate  the  social  instincts  to  those  of  in- 
dividualistic import  as  modified  in  relation  to  reproduction ; 
and  we  concluded,  inasmuch  as  the  reverse  process  is 
apparently  one  which  is  necessary  to  the  advance  of  the 
race  over  the  lines  in  which  Nature  has  thus  far  guided  us, 
that  therefore  we  might  expect  to  find  developed  in  us  an 
influence  which  would  result  in  the  counteraction  of  this 
tendency ;  might  expect  to  find  a  governing  instinct  of  a  new 
and  higher  order,  which  would  be  regulative  of  reason  in 
its  relation  to  instinct ;  which  would  tend  to  suppress  the 
variant  principle  and  to  emphasise  the  force  of  instinctive 
appeal ;  which  would  produce  emphasis  of  instincts  as  a  class, 
and  subordinate  processes  of  ratiocination  to  impulse  ;  which 
would  lead  to  the  strengthening  of  the  social  instincts,  and  to 
the  subordination  to  them  of  these  instincts  of  individualistic 
import  as  modified  in  relation  to  reproductive  efficiency. 


CHAP.  XII  A  SUMMARY  323 

In  the  second  division  of  the  chapter  we  made  search 
for  the  existence  of  such  a  Governing  Instinct. 

Reviewing  the  causes  of  the  tendency  to  the  subordination 
of  the  ethical  impulses  which  we  discussed  in  the  first 
division  of  the  chapter,  we  concluded  (§§  12  to  17)  that  all 
of  the  influences  which  lead  to  this  subordination  may  be 
held  in  check,  if  in  no  other  way,  by  the  acquisition  of  habits 
of  seclusion  from  the  active  world,  or  of  voluntary  temporary 
restraint  from  immediate  reaction  to  the  stimuli  which 
affect  us  in  this  active  world.  We  at  once  perceived  that 
seclusion  from  the  world  and  voluntary  restraint  from 
individualistic  reaction  are  the  very  characteristics  that  we 
find  dominant  in  the  habits  connected  with  the  expression 
of  the  religious  feelings ;  and  this  in  turn  suggested  to  us 
that  in  EeKgion  we  might  find  the  Governing  Instinct 
sought  for. 

In  the  ninth  chapter  we  inquired  whether  religion  can 
properly  be  considered  to  be  an  instinct,  and  noted  that  it 
has  the  general  characteristics  appearing  in  the  higher 
instincts.  We  recalled  further  that  iL  religion  be  _  an_ 
instinct,  it  like  all  the  other  instincts  must_.  have  some 
special  function  to  perform  in  the  development  of  individual 
or  racial  life.  That  this  function  is  the  subordination  of 
the  sexual,  the  individualistic,  and  other  elemental  variant 
influences  within  us  to  the  influences  of  social  import,  is 
the  thesis  which  was  naturally  brought  to  mind,  and  which 
was  reserved  for  special  examination  in  Chapter  X. 

In  §  7  to  the  end  of  the  chapter  we  made  an  examina- 
tion of  the  notion  that  the  influences  favouring  this  sub- 
ordination come  to  us  from  without  ourselves.  We  saw 
that  the  influences  of  the  more  fundamental  impulses  would 
probably  be  first  attended  to  when  they  were  forcible,  and 
especially  if  they  appeared  in  the  form  of  what  we  now 


324  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

know  as  hallucinations.  We  saw  that  the  religious  experi- 
ence of  religious  leaders  in  the  past  has  been  widely 
connected  with  the  occurrence  of  such  hallucinations ;  and 
that  when  the  hallucinations  have  not  actually  occurred, 
approximately  the  same  mental  conditions  that  accompany 
hallucination  must  have  been  experienced  by  the  religious 
devotee.  We  noted  furthermore  that  the  conditions  which 
favour  the  occurrence  of  hallucinations  are  just  such  con- 
ditions as  would  be  likely  to  bring  into  prominence  the 
more  persistent  impulses,  i,e.  those  later-formed  instincts  of 
social  import  which  are  efficient  because  they  influence  us 
to  trends  of  action  rather  than  to  forcible  and  immediate 
reactions  only  occasionally  recurrent. 

We  noted  that  these  hallucinations  would  be  the  more 
impressive  because  of  the  animistic  notions  which  are 
natural  to  primitive  people,  and  that  hallucinatory  voices 
and  visions  would  naturally  be  attributed  to  influences  from 
the  spirit  land  without,  and  not  to  any  power  within  the 
man  who  was  affected  by  them. 

The  argument  of  Chapter  X.  should  be  fresh  in  the 
reader's  mind,  and  we  may  therefore  pass  it  over  lightly  in 
this  present  review.  It  will  suffice  to  remind  him  that  we 
there  studied  with  some  care  the  principal  forms  of  religious 
expression,  and  that  we  noted  in  all  cases  that  the  actions 
expressive  of  this  highest  of  all  instincts  cannot  have 
persisted  because  of  their  inherent  attractiveness  ;  moreover, 
that  they  cannot  have  persisted  because  they  have  been  of 
direct  advantage  to  the  masses  of  the  race,  for  they  must 
on  the  whole  have  been  of  disadvantage,  directly  to 
individuals,  and  hence  indirectly  to  the  race:  it  became 
evident,  therefore,  that  they  would  not  have  persisted  unless 
some  special  indirect  benefits  had  been  connected  with 
them.     But  as  we  have  seen  that  all  persistent  instincts 


CHAP.  XII  A  SUMMARY  325 

must  in  all  probability  serve  some  useful  function  in  refer- 
ence to  development,  we  are  compelled  to  assume  the 
existence  of  such  an  indirect  advantage  in  connection  with 
the  expression  of  this  religious  instinct,  and  after  full 
illustration  we  came  to  the  conclusion  that  our  hypothesis 
was  justified ;  that  the  function  of  the  religious  instinct  in 
the  highly  developed  racial  life  of  man  is  the  subordination 
of  the  individual  variant  principle,  which  appears  in  its 
latest  elaboration  in  reason,  to  the  racial  principle,  which  in 
its  latest  elaboration  gives  us  the  ethical  instincts ; — the 
emphasis  of  a  hierarchal  order  of  instinct  efficiency  which 
Nature  is  endeavouring  to  impress  upon  our  race. 

II. — The  Essential  Characteristic  of  Eeligion 

In  what  has  preceded  this,  I  have  written  with  no  desire 
to  make  thoroughgoing  explanations,  in  conformity  with 
the  notions  of  modern  science,  of  the  religious  experiences 
of  the  past  and  of  those  that  influence  us  in  our  day.  So 
far  as  such  explanations  are  possible  and  desirable  they 
have  been  presented  more  fully  and  more  ably  than  I  could 
hope  to  perform  any  similar  work  even  if  I  wished  to 
attempt  it.  I  have  referred  to  such  explanations  illustra- 
tively so  far  as  they  have  seemed  to  aid  us  in  answering 
the  important  questions  which  at  once  force  themselves  upon 
our  notice,  if  we  grant  the  instinctive  nature  of  religion. 

As  the  reader  knows,  I  hold  that  the  common-sense  view 
which  agrees  to  call  religion  instinctive  is  fundamentally 
correct.  But  common-sense  does  not  grasp  the  implication 
that  instincts  of  fundamental  nature  must  almost  certainly 
have  some  biological  function  of  importance  in  the  develop- 
ment of  organic  life:  yet  the  biologist  must  insist  upon 
this  implication ;  for,  as  I  have  noted  more  than  once,  we 
are  compelled  to  assume  that  with  few  exceptions  instinct 


326  mSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

must  have  a  valuable  function,  and  this  for  the  reason  that 
we  cannot  well  conceive  how  any  instinct  can  have  arisen, 
can  have  become  developed  and  elaborated,  and  can  have 
persisted,  unless  it  has  such  a  special  function. 

Moreover,  as  we  have  already  seen,  even  if  we  deny  that 
religious  activities  are  entitled  to  be  called  instinctive, 
nevertheless  so  persistent  are  religious  habits  in  the  race 
that  they  must  almost  surely  be  of  biological  advantage 
even  if  it  be  true  that  they  would  not  occur  without  the 
influence  of  imitation  and  "  tradition."  They  must  almost 
certainly  have  some  biological  function :  and  surely  the 
function  above  suggested  as  that  connected  with  religious 
expression  must  be  acknowledged  to  be  of  fundamental 
importance  to  our  race. 

In  our  complex  life  it  is  very  unlikely  that  development 
to  the  attainment  of  a  given  end  will  appear  clear,  so 
obscured  will  it  be  by  the  co-ordinate  development  of  other 
attainments  to  other  ends.  The  development  of  the  instinct 
for  which  we  are  looking  is  thus  obscured,  but  not  to  my 
mind  in  any  sense  obliterated.  Although  Nature  in  forming 
this  religious  instinct  may  have  built  it  up,  so  to  speak, 
out  of  habits  formed  for  other  purposes,  using  them  as  they 
served  her  higher  ends  ;  still  it  may  well  be  claimed,  I 
think,  that  these  habits  have  to  a  great  extent  persisted  not 
because  of  the  original  values,  but  on  account  of  their 
worth  to  the  race  as  means  of  emphasising  the  subordination 
of  the  variant  individual  principle  to  the  racial ;  of  repressing 
the  immediate  response  of  instincts  which  are  only  of  indi- 
vidualistic or  sexual  moment  and  compelling  delay  until  those 
of  more  far-reaching  importance  can  present  themselves  ;  of 
establishing  within  us  that  order  of  instinct  emphasis  which 
has  proved  most  serviceable  to  our  race  in  the  past;  of 
forcing  upon  us  the  habit  of  waiting  for  and  subordinating 
ourselves  to  what  is  usually  conceived  of  as  the  command 


CHAP.  XII  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  RELIGION  327 

from  a  power  higher  than  any  recognised  in  our  immediate 
natural  surroundings ;  of  enforcing  the  habit  of  listening  to 
the  "  still  small  voice  of  conscience  "  ;  of  subduing  not  only 
these  distinctly  recognised  individualistic  instincts,  but  also 
individual  habits  which  may  have  become  fastened  in  a 
people  by  imitation,  or  custom,  or  teaching,  through  a  number 
of  generations,  yet  temporarily  in  a  biological  sense. 

Although  such  a  governing  instinct  would  doubtless 
appear  early  in  germ,  it  would  become  most  marked  in  a 
developed  form  in  which  it  would  include  opposition  to  the 
higher  elaborations  of  the  variant  principle  when  this  latter 
appeared  in  ratiocination,  which  so  insidiously  works  to 
subordinate  racial  leadings.  And  so,  as  we  have  seen,  we 
find  this  religious  instinct  in  its  most  developed  form  teaching 
us  to  subordinate  Eeason  to  Faith ;  this  last  term,  as  here 
used,  surely  meaning  the  dependence  upon  other  forces  than 
those  we  recognise  as  arising  from  our  own  reasoning  person- 
ality ;  this  dependence  again  involving  reliance  upon  the 
instinctive  forces  within  us. 

Let  us  now  recur  once  more  to  the  thought  so  often 
reiterated  that  the  religious  customs  we  have  been  con- 
sidering are  under  this  hypothesis  all  tools,  so  to  speak, 
which  Nature  has  used  to  enforce  restraint ;  for  I  wish  to 
emphasise  the  fact  that  this  restraint  is  of  the  very  core 
and  essence  of  religious  functioning.^ 

The  very  word  "  religion  "  was  held  by  Cicero  and  others 

1  The  reader  will  perceive  that  the  habit  of  restraint  from  individualistic 
action  in  the  region  of  instinct  has  its  counterpart  in  purely  intellectual  fields 
in  the  habit  of  reflection,  in  which  we  hold  rationalistic  processes  in  check, 
suspending  our  judgment  until  we  catch  the  force  of  thought  elements  which 
are  the  outcome  of  deep  racial  experience.  These  thought  elements  we  call 
"intuitions,"  and  they  demand  recognition,  and  guide  the  thought  of  the 
reflective  man  just  as  his  conscience  guides  his  action.  Upon  this  point, 
however,  which  does  not  relate  to  the  subject  in  hand,  I  cannot  ask  the 
reader  to  dwell. 


328  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  ii 

to  have  come  into  use  because  of  its  relation  to  reflection 
and  restraint,  and  although  it  is  not  probable  that  we  can 
correctly  trace  the  word  to  so  direct  an  origin  (for  it  was 
probably  used  in  less  developed  form  before  men  realised 
the  meaning  of  this  restraint),  still  Cicero's  derivation  is 
important  as  showing  how  long  ago  the  connection  between 
religious  expression  and  restraint  was  noted. 

The  ^vmOl  aeavTov,  which  was  the  foundation  of  religion 
as  Socrates  conceived  it,  had  been  long  before  his  day 
taught  as  a  precept  by  his  religious  predecessors.  A  late 
investigator  tells  us^  that  over  the  temple  entrance  at  Delphi 
"this  piece  of  counsel,  know  thyself,  stood  conspicuously 
engraven " ;  and  it  was  at  the  first  interpreted  ethically. 
"  Heraclitus,  the  earliest  Greek  philosopher  whose  remains 
contain  any  allusion  to  it,"  gave  it  this  interpretation :  "  It 
behoves  all  men  to  know  themselves  and  (?  thereby)  to 
exercise  self-control." 

The  same  author  calls  our  attention  to  the  fact  that 
Plato,  in  the  Charmides,  makes  Critias  insist  upon  "  the 
urgent  necessity  of  self-knowledge  as  the  essential  feature 
or  factor  of  self-control.  '  This,'  he  says,  '  is  what  the  God 
at  Delphi  enjoins  upon  his  worshippers  in  the  words  "  know 
thyself ;  .  .  .  different  in  form  as  the  expressions — "  have 
self-knowledge  "  and  "  have  self-control " — are,  still  in  sub- 
stance they  are  identical.' " 

Turning  to  modern  times  in  which  the  nature  of  religion 
has  received  its  fullest  consideration,  we  note  in  this  respect 
substantial  agreement. 

Following  Wundt's  ^  classification  of  theories  we  find  the 
"autonomous  theory,"  as  expressed  by  Schleiermacher,  making 
"  a  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  "  the  fundamental  fact  in 
religion ;  we  find  the  "  metaphysical  theory,"  as  expressed 

^  Jolm  I.  Beare,  MiTid,  N.S.  xviii.  p.  229. 
■^  Mhics,  vol.  i.  chap.  ii. 


CHAP.  XII  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  RELIGION  329 

by  Hegel,  defining  religion  as  "  the  knowledge  possessed  by 
the  finite  mind  of  its  nature  as  absolute  mind";  we  find 
the  "ethical  theory/'  as  expressed  by  Kant,  describing 
religion  as  "  a  knowledge  of  all  our  duties  as  divine  com- 
mands." In  all  these  definitions  we  find  this  common 
thought,  viz.  that  religion  consists  in  the  suppression  of 
our  falHble  wills  to  what  we  conceive  of  as  a  higher  will. 
Much  the  same  thing  is  signified  by  Martineau's  definition : 
"  Keligion  is  belieT^in-  an  everlasting  God ;  that  is,  a  Divine 
Mind  and  Will  ruling  the  Universe,  and  holding  moral 
relations  with  mankind." 

Under  my  view  what  is  here  called  the  suppression  of 
our  will  to  a  higher  will,  may  be  expressed  in  psychological 
terms  as  the  restraint  of  individualistic  impulses  to  racial 
ones ;  that  such  restraint  has  effect  upon  the  moral  character 
being  of  course  granted.  This  restraint  seems  to  me  to  be 
of  the  very  essence  of  religion :  the  belief  in  the  Deity  as 
usually  found  being  from  the  psychological  point  of  view 
an  attachment  to,  rather  than  of  the  essence  of,  the  religious 
feeling;  and  this  whether  as  metaphysicians  we  may  be 
or  may  not  be  compelled  to  the  belief  in  this  Absolute 
Deity. 

Professor  Seeley  tells  us  that  "  Eeligion  in  its  elementary 
state  is  habitual  and  permanent  admiration " ;  which  is 
true  so  far  as  admiration  implies,  as  it  almost  always  does, 
a  willingness  to  follow  the  wishes  of  the  one  admired. 
The  God  whose  "  voice "  is  felt  to  be  heard  in  conscience, 
and  who  is  conceived  of  as  omnipotent,  is  obeyed,  as  He 
is  admired,  with  awe. 

Matthew  Arnold  tells  us  that  "  Eeligion  is  morality 
touched  with  Emotion."  The  word  "emotion"  is  here 
evidently  vaguely  used  to  refer  to  the  impulsive  side  of  our 
nature,  and  Mr.  Arnold's  words  when  interpreted  seem  to 
me  to  express  the  truth  that  when  our  tendencies  to  the 


330  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  ii 

right,  to  the  moral  life  in  its  entirety,  become  impulsive,  are 
guided  by  an  instinct  which  governs  all  our  various  instincts, 
then,  and  not  till  then,  have  we  felt  the  force  of  religion. 

Professor  Eoyce,  in  his  Religious  Aspects  of  Philosophy, 
tells  us  that  "religious  feeling"  has  to  do  (1)  with  an 
alteration  of  the  moral  code ;  which  in  terms  of  our  conten- 
tion means  the  birth  within  us,  as  the  result  of  restraint,  of 
a  new  ethical  impulse,  or  the  discovery  of  one  that  was 
hidden  from  our  view ;  or,  in  the  words  of  everyday  life,  the 
"conversion"  of  the  man.  It  has  to  do  (2)  with  an 
enthusiasm  in  action ;  and  we  have  just  seen  how  important 
under  our  hypothesis  this  is  in  the  development  of  the 
higher  social  life.  That  it  has  to  do  finally  (3)  with  a 
firmness  of  belief  in  the  worth  of  the  end  in  view  is  clearly 
implied  in  our  conviction  that  the  "  voice  "  is  a  guide  that 
we  ought  to  follow. 

If  we  agree  to  lay  aside  all  matters  open  to  debate,  it 
seems  to  me  that  we  are  at  least  able  to  see  pretty  clearly 
through  all  the  various  and  varying  habits  of  religious 
expression  this  one  characteristic,  that  those  special  activities 
which  imply  restraint  of  individualism  are  always  the  ones 
emphasised  in  the  religious  life. 

In  the  earlier  life  of  man  this  restraint  was  most 
effectively  attained  by  voluntary  temporary  seclusion  from 
companionship,  by  living  apart  for  a  time  from  the  stimula- 
tions of  the  world.  But  we  realise  nowadays  that  the 
hermit  life  is  full  of  peril,  and  that  the  hermit  is  subject 
to  very  special  and  very  dangerous  temptations;  and 
furthermore,  we  notice  that  only  very  indirectly  by  his 
teaching  can  he  aid  in  the  remoulding  of  the  world  from 
whose  activities  he  so  separates  himself.  It  is,  indeed, 
evident  that  a  much  nobler  result  will  be  attained  if, 
living  in  the  midst  of  this  stimulating  environment,  taldng 


CHAP.  XII  THE  ESSENTIALS  OF  RELIGION  331 

part  in  the  activities  of  his  race,  the  habit  of  restraint  can 
be  so  fostered  that  the  happy  possessor  of  this  power  of 
self-control  may  live  a  life  of  effective  functioning  amongst 
his  fellows,  and  yet  withal  be  guided  constantly  by  the 
deeper  impulses  which  speak  to  him  from  within ;  and  it 
must  be  evident,  indeed,  to  the  reader  who  has  followed  the 
argument  I  have  above  made,  that  the  great  trend  of  religious 
activity  has  been  in  the  direction  of  an  emphasis  of  this 
restraint  among  the  masses  who  form  the  active  workers 
in  the  life  of  our  race. 

Finally,  I  would  ask  my  reader  to  note  a  conclusion  to 
which  we  are  led  by  this  trend  of  thought.  It  certainly 
appears  that  a  man  who  thus  lives  a  life  of  restraint,  of 
listening  for  the  voices  within  him,  must  be  called  a 
religious  man  in  the  very  fullest  meaning  of  the  term, 
whether  or  not  he  belong  to  a  recognised  body  in  which 
religious  customs  are  honoured;  whether  or  not  he  be  a 
member  of  any  religious  sect  or  church ;  whether  or  not  he 
there  gain  habits  of  restraint  through  the  direct  absorption 
of  dogmatic  tenets.  And  equally  true  does  it  appear  that 
the  man  who  has  not  gained  these  habits  of  restraint  of 
individualism,  of  listening  for  the  voices  of  the  higher 
instincts  within  him,  of  making  righteousness  as  he  con- 
ceives it  the  moving  impulse  of  his  nature, — that  such  a 
man  has  failed  altogether  to  become  religious,  however 
much  of  profession  he  may  make. 

!N"ow  some  reader  may  be  led  by  this  conclusion  from 
our  study  to  argue  that  religious  customs  as  a  whole  are 
worthless ;  for  he  may  hold  that  inasmuch  as  Nature  often 
works  in  most  indirect  fashion,  she  has  here  allowed  the 
formation  of  many  habits  of  action  that  are  really  of  no 
moment,  or  are  even  in  a  certain  sense  vicious,  in  connec- 
tion with  those  of  essential  importance  which  would  lead 


832  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  ii 

to  this  restraint ;  and  this  apparently  because  she  has  been 
able  to  use  them  as  the  best,  although  indirect,  means  of 
gaining  her  ends ;  or  it  may  be  that  she  has  allowed  to 
remain  in  existence  habits  that  can  exert  no  harmful 
influence  in  connection  with  a  development  guided  by  other 
forces. 

But  I  cannot  agree  that  on  this  account  we  can  properly 
hold  religious  habits  to  be  valueless ;  for  when  the  acknow- 
ledgment is  made  that  Nature  often  does  work  by  indirect 
means,  we  find  ourselves  unable  to  be  over-confident  in 
assertion  as  to  the  habits  that  may  be  without  value  in 
these  higher  processes ;  we  discover  ourselves  uncertain 
which  of  those  minor  habits,  which  to  us  with  our  vaunted 
insight  seem  at  times  to  be  worthless,  may  without  loss  be 
cast  off;  we  find  it  difficult  to  state  what  customs  must 
necessarily  be  retained  because  their  loss  would  involve 
danger. 

For  myself  I  think  that  there  is  seldom  a  man  who  is 
so  strong  in  character  that  he  can  afford  to  disdain  the  aids 
to  the  enforcement  of  this  restraint  of  life  that  are  offered 
to  him  in  the  higher  forms  of  worship.  I  believe  there  are 
few  of  us,  if  any,  who  will  not  be  better  men  for  sympathetic 
action  with  others  like-minded  with  ourselves  under  the 
gentle  yoke  of  the  Christian  Church. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  think  there  is  a  great  body  of 
deeply  conscientious  men  outside  of  the  Churches  who  are 
fundamentally  religious — men  who  refuse  to  think  and  to 
call  themselves  religious  because  they  object  to  specific 
dogmas  taught  by  the  Churches ;  calling  themselves  non- 
religious,  as  they  would  not  do  did  they  not  fail  to  recognise 
that  the  true  function  of  the  religious  instinct  is  the  restraint 
of  individualistic  tendencies  and  the  emphasis  of  broader 
racial  activities. 


CHAP.  XII  A  CRITICISM  •  333 

III. — A  Criticism 

As  I  have  said  in  the  preface,  I  had  originally  intended  to 
devote  a  separate  division  of  this  book  to  a  study  of  the  relation 
of  religion  to  belief;  but  this  I  decided  to  abandon  because  I 
found  it  unnecessary  to  the  completeness  of  the  argument.  I  am 
the  more  ready  to  make  this  omission  because  I  thus  bring  out 
very  clearly  the  difference  between  my  view  and  that  of  Mr. 
Benjamin  Kidd,  as  expressed  in  his  Social  Evolution^  a  book 
which  deals  with  some  of  the  special  problems  we  here  discuss. 
Mr.  Kidd's  argument  I  believe  to  be  weakened  by  many 
psychological  and  logical  errors,  while  in  the  directions  in 
which  he  and  I  agree  I  think  little  claim  to  originality  could 
properly  be  made  by  either  of  us  ;  the  importance  of  the  religious 
forces  in  the  social  life  of  man  has  been  acknowledged  long  since 
by  all  scientific  and  philosophical  writers  of  weight. 

His  presentation  of  the  subject,  however,  has  led  some  of 
those  who  have  read  the  Mind  articles,  in  which  I  have  briefly 
presented  this  subject,  to  think  that  the  views  expressed  by  him 
are  in  line  with  those  presented  above ;  I  therefore  think  it  best 
to  note  here  the  differences  between  my  conceptions  and  his. 
In  stating  his  position  I  shall  quote  from  his  digest  of  his  theory 
as  published  in  the  Nineteenth,  Century  for  7th  February  1895. 

"  In  human  evolution"  he  says,  " we  are  amcefrned  with  a  creature 
which  possesses  two  associated  characteristics  not  encountered  anywhere 
else  in  life.  The  first  characteristic  is  human  reason  ;  the  other  is  the 
capacity  of  acting  under  its  influence  in  concert  with  his  fellows  in 
social  groups^ 

This  statement  seems  to  me  to  be  inaccurate.  What  is  funda- 
mental  in  reason  is  found  in  all  higher  animal  life  ;  alL^he  higher 
animals  are  surely  in  some  measure  capable  of  judgment,  and  it 
is^exceedingly  probable,  as  I  have  striven  to  show  in  what  has 
preceded  and  shall  explain  more  fully  in  later  chapters,  that  the 
^erm  of  reason  is  present  wh^f^ver  consciousness  exists.  Th^t 
human  reason  is  a  very  specially  elaborated  form  of  reason^and. 
'  that  Its  development  has  been  very  marked  since  the  capacity  of 
speech  has  been  attained,  cannot  be  questioned ;  but  this  fact 
does  not  warrant  us  in  holding  that  reason,  of  a  type  that  shows 
all  the  main  essentials  of  human  reason,  is  not  encountered  any- 
where else  amongst  living  beings  than  in  man. 

It  is  of  course  impossible  to  defend  the  thesis  that  "the 
capacity  of  acting  in  concert  in  social  groups  "  is  one  that  is 
possessed  by  man  alone  j  our  knowledge,  e.g.,  of  the  habits  of 


334  '  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

ants,  of  bees,  of  the  herding  of  cattle  and  deer,  and  of  the 
collection  of  wolves  in  packs,  all  effectively  controvert  such  a 
view;  it  must  therefore  be  that  the  claim  is  meant  to  refer 
to  the  capacity  to  act  in  concert  in  social  groups  under  the 
influence  of  reason.  But  it  seems  to  me  that  if  it  be  true  that 
human  reason  is  no  more  than  an  elaboration  of  a  capacity 
possessed  by  all  the  higher  animals,  then  it  is  also  true  that 
man's  capacity  for  acting  rationally  in  social  groups,  whilst  it 
may  differ  in  degree,  does  not  differ  in  kind  from  the  capacity 
as  seen  in  the  higher  animals. 

Mr.  Kidd  holds  further  that  rrmn  is  "  subservient  to  a  funda- 
mental physiological  law,  which  may  be  briefly  defined  as  the  law  of 
retrogression " ;  hence  to  progress  he,  like  all  other  living  creatures, 
must  do  so  by  a  process  ^^  of  continuous  rivalry,  effort,  and  self- 
sacrifice.''^ 

"  Man^s  reason  has  given  him  power  to  outwit,  and  therefore  to 
suspend  this  onerous  cosmic  process  to  which  his  progress  is  due,  and 
which  consists  in  continually  resisting  the  law  of  retrogression." 

It  must  be  apparent  that  if,  as  our  author  holds,  there  be 
racial  advantage  in  acting  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  progress 
through  conflict,  and  if  some  special  group  of  men  decided  "  to 
suspend  this  onerous  cosmic  process,"  then  evidently  this  special 
group  would  be  at  a  disadvantage  in  the  racial  struggle,  as  com- 
pared with  those  who  had  not  gained  the  "  power  to  outwit " 
nature ;  and  we  should  thus  have  a  continuation  of  the  "  onerous 
cosmic  process,"  under  the  well-recognised  law  of  the  survival  of 
the  fittest,  through  the  persistence  of  the  race  that  submitted 
itself  to  the  laws  which  appear  to  be  of  racial  advantage,  and 
the  suppression  of  the  race  that  used  its  reason  to  outwit  the 
"onerous  process." 

This  argument  of  Mr.  Kidd's  implies  that  reason  is  distinctly 
antagonistic  to  progress ;  but,  as  has  been  already  pointed  out  by 
more  than  one  reviewer,  this  is  not  true ;  and  indeed,  as  I  shall 
presently  argue,  all  of  the  advance  of  our  race  can  be  distinctly 
traced  to  reasoned  effort.  The  most  that  can  be  said  on  this 
point  I  think  is  that  what  we  know  as  reasoned  out,  and  as 
instinctive  actions,  tend  to  exclude  one  another  where  they  might 
appear  in  consciousness,  at  the  same  time,  in  relation  to  the  same 
set  of  external  stimuli.  Eeason,  indeed,  is  itself  racial,  and  must 
itself  be  emphasised  by  the  very  contest  that  progress  implies ; 
it  surely,  then,  cannot  be  held  that  it  stands  in  the  opposition  to 
instinct  suggested  by  Mr.  Kidd's  argument,  nor  to  the  "progress" 
that  has  created  instinct. 

Mr.  Kidd  then  proceeds  to  say  that  ''  The  central  feature  of 


CHAP.  XII  A  CRITICISM  335 

human  history^'  is  ^Hhe  resulting  conflict  of  two  great  natural 
tendencies,  which  has  hitherto  been  without  any  satisfactory  explanation 
either  in  science  m^  philosophy.^'  We  may  pass  over  this  statement, 
in  which  the  author  seems  to  me  to  make  an  error  of  fact  and  to 
claim  overmuch,  and  proceed  to  the  next  point  which  he  makes 
thus  :  If  man  "holds  this  world  to  be  a  mere  sequence  of  materialistic 
cause  and  effect,  and  if  he  possesses  the  power  to  suspend  the  process  or 
to  escape  its  effects,  it  follows  with  almost  the  cogency  of  mathematical 
demonstration  that  his  own  reason  can  never  supply  him  with  any 
effective  sanction  for  submitting  to  it." 

Passing  over  the  questions  involved  in  the  first  and  second 
phrases  of  this  proposition,  I  wish  to  consider  the  statement  that 
man's  "own  reason  can  never  supply  him  with  an  effective 
sanction  for  submitting  to"  the  process  by  which  progress  is 
brought  about. 

Mr.  Kidd's  position,  under  a  strict  interpretation  of  his 
words,  implies  that  the  religious  teaching  concerning  a  super- 
natural power  gives  us  a  sanction  that  is  not  rational.  If  this 
be  taken  as  the  correct  interpretation  of  his  view,  then  I  consider 
that  we  have  -here  to  deal  with  a  somewhat  subtle,  yet  important, 
psychological  confusion  which  altogether  vitiates  his  argument. 
The  question  raised  is  whether  we  can  have  any  such  thing  as  a 
sanction  which  is  not  rational  ?  I  do  not  think  it  can  be  shown 
that  such  a  thing  is  possible.  The  very  notion  of  a  sanction 
which  is  felt  to  be  adequate  involves  a  belief  that  this  sanction 
itself  makes  reasonable  that  action  of  ours  which  is  in  accord 
with  the  promptings  accompanying  the  sanction.  The  religious 
man  will  defend  his  action  on  the  ground  that  he  believes  his 
God  to  have  commanded  him  to  do  as  he  has  done,  either  by 
direct  promptings,  or  through  inspiration  of  his  prophets  ;  and  he 
will  assure  you  that  he  considers  this  belief  a  sufficient  reason 
for  his  action,  and  that  he  has  not  in  any  respect  acted 
irrationally.  In  fact,  the  notion  of  an  irrational  sanction  in  this 
sense  is  evidently  a  contradiction  in  terms. 

But  there  is  another  sense  in  which  we  may  read  Mr.  Kidd's 
phrases.  He  may  mean  merely  that  in  the  case  under  considera- 
tion men  act  under  a  belief  in  supernatural  command  that  they 
cannot  now,  and  indeed  will  never  be  able  to,  bring  into  harmony 
with  the  results  of  reasoning  processes,  as  applied  to  the  data 
with  which  science  and  philosophy  deal,  and  which,  he  assumes, 
necessarily  force  us  to  the  tenets  of  egoistic  hedonism. 

Why  it  should  be  a  matter  of  wonder  that  men  in  this  case 
act  in  accord  with  a  belief  they  cannot  reason  out,  I  do  not 
see ;  for  surely  with  most  men  this  is  the  almost  normal  mode 


336  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ir 

of  action.  I  know  of  no  man  indeed,  however  intelligent  he 
may  be,  who  can  claim  to  be  able  to  justify  any  very  large 
proportion  of  his  actions  by  rational  deductions  from  the  axioms 
or  postulates  of  science;  I  think  it  impossible,  however,  to 
predict  that  we  shall  never  be  in  position  to  make  such 
justification  of  our  acts,  or  of  the  beliefs  that  go  with  those 
acts. 

This  statement,  moreover,  involves  the  assumption  that  actions 
which  have  self-satisfaction  as  an  end  are  alone  rational,  that  all 
disinterested  actions  are  inherently  irrational;  but  this  cannot 
be  granted.  As  we  shall  presently  see,  we  look  upon  those  acts 
of  ourselves  or  others  as  rational  which,  when  viewed  in  retro- 
spect, harmonise  with  the  desire-impulse  efficiency  of  the  moment 
of  retrospect;  and  if  we  hold,  as  I  hold,  that  this  desire-im- 
pulse efficiency  in  most  cases  is  not  determined  by  the  notion 
of  the  self-satisfaction  to  be  connected  with  the  desired  end,  we 
cannot  agree  that  the  assumption  above  considered  is  a  valid 
one. 

Furthermore,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  it  is  an  exceedingly  small 
proportion  of  the  race  who  believe  that  egoistic  hedonism  is 
reasonable ;  moreover,  this  very  general  opposition  of  the  race  to 
egoistic  hedonism,  and  the  very  view,  supported  by  Mr.  Kidd, 
that  the  law  of  survival  precludes  the  continued  persistence  of 
such  a  doctrine  in  our  race  for  any  long  period  ;  both  these  facts, 
I  say,  should  lead  us  without  hesitation  to  acknowledge  that 
there  is  probably  some  invalidity  involved  in  the  form  of 
argument  that  leads  these  relatively  few  thinkers  to  consider 
the  struggle  of  life  irrational,  or  else  that  there  is  some  hidden 
error  in  the  premises  upon  which  their  conclusion  is  founded. 
I  endeavour  below  to  indicate  the  psychological  grounds  which 
in  my  opinion  make  it  entirely  impossible  to  accept  the  doctrine 
of  egoistic  hedonism. 

It  does  not  seem  to  me  true  that  we  keep  up  the  struggle 
because  of  any  sanction  at  all ;  we  persist  in  it  because  we  are 
so  impelled  by  racial  impulses.  It  is  only  when  we  question  the 
rationality  of  our  action  that  the  beliefs  to  which  Mr,  Kidd  refers 
are  presented  to  mind  as  a  sufficient  warrant  for  the  action  we 
have  taken. 

The  first  point  made  by  Mr.  Kidd  under  the  sixth  heading  of 
his  argument  is  this.  Religious  systems  "  constitute  the  subordinat- 
ing factor  in  human  evolution."  I  have  argued,  on  the  contrary, 
that  religious  systems  are  the  outcome  of  the  expression  of  an 
instinct  which  leads  to  restraint  of  the  individualistic  instincts, 
and  which  therefore  tends  to  effect  the  subordination  of  individual 


CHAP.  XII  A  CRITICISM  337 

variant  to  racial  processes.  The  importance  of  this  subordina- 
tion Mr.  Kidd  has  not  overstated.  But  I  hold  that  although 
the  religious  instinct  tends  to  subordinate  reason  to  instinct,  it 
does  not  tend  to  suppress  reason  in  any  way.  As  I  have  shown 
in  my  argument  above,  the  religious  instinct  tends  to  suppress 
reason  only  until  the  force  of  racial  impulses  can  be  felt ;  but  as 
we  shall  presently  see,  when  all  these  impulses  have  been  finally 
given  their  full  weight,  no  longer  is  reason  to  be  considered  sub- 
servient, it  then  becomes  the  noblest  instrument  at  our  command 
in  our  effort  to  place  ourselves  in  harmony  with  the  development 
of  the  Universe  in  which  we  exist,  and  this  by  enabling  us  to 
make  those  individual  variations  which  Nature  may  use  in  build- 
ing up  a  race  better  fitted  than  ours  to  live  in  harmony  with  our 
environment. 

Mr.  Kidd  holds  further  that  it  is  the  function  of  religious  systems 
"  to  supply  the  ultimate  sanction  for  that  effort  and  sacrifice  necessary 
to  the  continuance  of  the  process  of  evolution  pivceeding  in  society." 

I,  on  the  other  hand,  hold  that  the  function  of  the  religious 
instinct  is  the  subordination  of  the  individual  to  the  racial  pro- 
cesses by  means  of  restraint  of  the  former ;  that  the  supplying 
of  a  sanction  is  only  an  associated  incident,  so  to  speak ;  that 
indeed  no  sanction  at  all  is  needed  for  the  effort  and  sacrifice, 
for  a  society  that  did  not  follow  these  restraining  impulses  would 
certainly  suffer  loss  in  the  struggle  for  supremacy ;  that  this 
sanction  is  not  the  cause  of,  although  it  is  the  very  usual  accom- 
paniment of,  the  expressions  of  this  religious  instinct.  That 
this  is  true  becomes  evident  when  we  consider  how  radically  the 
conception  of  the  nature  of  this  supernatural  sanction  has  altered 
during  historic  times,  and  how  greatly  it  differs  amongst  peoples 
in  our  own  day ;  and  this  without  marked  change  in  the  influence 
of  religion. 

Mr.  Kidd's  conclusion  is  this  :  "  In  the  first  place  we  have  found 
in  religion  the  characteristic  feature  of  human  evolution.  In  the  second 
place  we  have  found  in  religion  its  essential  element,  namely,  the  ultra- 
rational  sanction  it  prescribes  for  conduct." 

I  have  said  so  much  concerning  the  importance  of  the  religious 
instinct  in  the  development  of  our  race  that  the  reader  will 
realise  that  I  do  not  differ  materially  from  Mr.  Kidd  in  reference 
to  the  former  of  these  two  statements ;  but  the  latter  is  opposed 
to  my  view.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  essential  element  in 
religion  is  the  sanction  it  prescribes  for  conduct;  that  sanction 
I  believe  indeed  to  be  often  co-ordinate  with  its  occurrence,  but 
not  to  be  the  cause  of  the  conduct,  nor  indeed  to  be  of  the 
essence  of  the  religious  experience.     It  has  become  part  of  our 


338  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  ii 

religious  life  because  the  actions  to  which  it  has  become  attached 
in  the  course  of  development  do  themselves  involve  restraint. 

The  essence  of  religious  activities,  as  I  have  argued  at  length, 
seems  to  me  to  consist  in  their  emphasis  of  restraint  of  the  force- 
ful individualistic,  and  other  less  persistent  tendencies  within 
us,  until  such  time  as  the  more  persistent  though  less  forceful 
tendencies  can  become  effective. 

I  have  endeavoured  in  what  I  have  said  above  to  make  clear 
the  differences  between  Mr.  Kidd's  conceptions  and  my  own. 
He  has  emphasised  the  racial  nature  of  the  religious  activities, 
and  the  suppression  of  the  individualistic  to  the  racial  instincts 
which  religion  enforces ;  but  it  seems  to  me  that  he  has  missed 
the  significance  of  religious  expression,  and  has  mistaken  a  cir- 
cumstance for  the  essential  nature  of  that  force  in  our  lives 
which  we  both  agree  to  be  a  most  important  factor  in  the  develop- 
ment of  our  race. 


PAET   III 

CONCERNING  IMPULSE 


CHAPTEE  XIII 

THE   NATURE    OF   IMPULSE 

§  1.  "Every  instinct  is  an  impulse."  With  these  words 
Professor  James  ^  opens  his  serious  consideration  of  the 
nature  of  instinct,  to  which  the  twenty-fourth  chapter  of 
his  valuable  Psychology  is  devoted. 

This  statement  was  exactly  adapted  to  the  readers  to 
whom  he  appealed  in  the  magazine  article  in  which  it 
originally  appeared.  Professor  James  has  been  able,  as  no 
other  English  writer  has,  to  present  exceedingly  complex 
psychological  problems  in  so  intelligible  a  manner  that  even 
those  who  are  not  initiated  into  the  mysteries  of  his  science 
find  little  difficulty  in  grasping  the  main  drift  of  his  argu- 
ment. But  it  is  perhaps  necessary  in  connection  with  such 
presentation  that  accuracy  should  occasionally  be  sacrificed 
to  terseness  of  phrase — to  expressions  which  will  remain  in 
the  mind  of  the  reader.  However  this  may  be,  it  surely 
cannot  be  held  to  be  strictly  accurate  to  say  that  "  every 
instinct  is  an  impulse  " ;  although  it  may  be  said  in  favour 
of  this  statement  that  it  serves  well  to  impress  emphatic- 
ally upon  the  reader  the  indissoluble  connection  between 
instinct  and  impulse,  even  if  it  does  not  explain  this  rela- 
tion in  an  adequate  manner. 

The  inaccuracy  of  the  statement  above  alluded  to 
becomes  clear  at  once  when  we  consider  that  "instincts," 

^  Psychology^  vol.  ii.  385. 


V 


342  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

correctly  speaking,  refer  to  capacities  in  ourselves,  or  in 
the  animals  we  observe  when  we  consider  them  objectively ; 
while  "impulses,"  psychologically  speaking,  refer  to  certain 
mental  states  which  we  experience,  or  judge  from  analogy 
that  other  i^en  or  animals  experience.  We  agree  that  the 
animal  has  an  instinct  which  leads  it  to  swallow  liquids 
which  in  one  way  or  another  get  into  its  mouth ;  and  we 
judge  this  from  objective  evidence,  whether  we  see  the 
animal  swallow  or  not.  So  we  speak  of  our  own 
instincts. 

But  judging  also  from  our  own  experience,  the  question 
whether  the  animal  has  an  impulse  to  swallow  is  quite 
another  matter,  one  which  is  determined  by  the  presence 
in  its  mouth  of  the  liquid  which  it  has  not  yet  swallowed ; 
in  other  words,  by  the  presence  of  stimuli  to  the  actions 
expressive  of  the  instinct,  which  actions  have  not  yet  been 
carried  out. 

Thus  we  speak  of  ourselves  as  having  self- protective 
instincts,  and  when  we  see  a  man  aim  a  quick  blow  at  an 
enemy  suddenly  appearing  before  him  we  say  that  the 
actions  involved  express  the  instinct  or  capacity  within 
him ;  but  it  is  when  we  see  him  restrain  this  action  under 
temptation  that  we  properly  say  he  must  have  had  an 
impulse  which  would  have  led  him  to  strike  his  enemy 
had  it  not  been  restrained  in  one  way  or  another ;  and 
this  we  judge  from  our  own  psychic  experience. 

The  truth  is  that  every  instinct  is  not  an  impulse.  On 
the  other  hand,  every  impulse  does  involve  the  existence  of 
an  instinct  pure  and  simple,  or  one  which  has  been  more 
or  less  modified  by  life  experience.  Every  instinct  also 
implies  the  possibility  of  the  appearance  of  an  impulse, 
provided  the  conditions  of  stimulation  appropriate  to  the 
expression  of  the  instinct  are  realised,  yet  under  certain 
forms  which  restrict  this  expression. 


1/ 


CHAP.  XIII  THE  NATURE  OF  IMPULSE  343 

§  2.  Impulses,  then,  in  a  psychological  sense,  are  mental 
phases  which,  when  we  take  an  objective  view,  we  always 
find  to  be  determined  by  the  inhibition  of  instinct  actions, 
as  these  are  more  or  less  modified  by  experience ;  which 
instinct  actions  have  been  stimulated  by  the  presence  of  the 
conditions  that  might  normally  call  them  out,  conditions 
however  which,  for  one  reason  or  another,  are  not  at  once 
realised.  We  act  instinctively  in  a  thousand  different  ways  ^ ' 
during  all  our  life  without  paying  any  attention  to  the  acts ; 
but  some  day,  when  something  inhibits  our  instinct  actions, 
then  we  have  a  disturbance  of  our  mental  life,  which  in 
complex  cases  produces  what  we  designate  as  an  impulse 
which  we  feel  tends  to  compel  us  to  act  in  accord  with  our 
instinct. 

It  seems  to  me  that  this  cannot  be  questioned.  We  all 
agree  that  when  we  say  we  act  "impulsively,"  using  the 
word  without  accuracy,  we  refer  to  the  fact  that  we  act 
without  forethought,  without  consideration  of  the  end  which 
will  be  reached ;  that  we  so  act  for  the  reason  that  we  have 
received  certain  stimuli  to  action  which  work  themselves 
out  because  there  exist  within  us  certain  co-ordinated. — -^ 
neural  structures  which  have  been  inherited  and  to  some 
extent  modified  during  our  life  experience ;  but  it  is  the 
existence  within  us  of  these  inherited  neural  structures  that 
determines  the  existence  of  instincts  in  us,  and  it  is  apparent 
that  the  word  "  impulsively "  is  used  inaccurately  in  such 
cases  as  the  equivalent  of  the  word  "  instinctively." 

We  say  that  we  act  "  impulsively  "  usually  when  we  are 
speaking  after  the  fact,  whilst  in  truth  we  would  much 
better  say  that  we  acted  instinctively ;  for  in  a  great  mass 
of  such  cases  the  effect  upon  consciousness  consists  solely  in 
the  "  instinct  feelings  "  coincident  with  the  "  instinct  actions." 
But  we  do  have  a  distinct  disturbance  of  consciousness,  quite 
different  from  these  "  instinct  feelings,"  when  the  tendency 


344  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iii 

to  realise  the  instinct  action  is  inhibited,  and  it  is  that 
disturbance  to  which  we  refer  when  in  psychology  we  speak 
of  impulse. 

Professor  Lloyd  Morgan  ^  says,  in  objection  to  this  usage 
of  mine,  "the  impulsive  tendency  is  indeed  emphasised  and 
augmented ;  but  to  say  that  it  is  produced  by  the  inhibition 
appears  to  be  an  overstatement  of  the  case."  But  if  I 
understand  him  aright,  Professor  Morgan  is  here  speaking, 
not  of  the  subjective  fact  of  the  disturbance  of  consciousness 
to  which  psychologists  refer  as  impulse,  and  which  I  am 
discussing,  but  to  the  tendency  to  reaction  which  is  an 
objective  fact,  pure  and  simple ;  consequently  his  objection 
appears  to  me  to  be  irrelevant. 

The  inhibition  which  produces  the  impulse  may  be 
simple,  or  it  may  be  of  a  very  complex  nature  and  difficult 
to  appreciate  as  such ;  it  may  be  caused  by  positive  opposi- 
tion, or  by  the  fact  that  "  the  stimulus  must  generate  a 
certain  amount  of  organic  instability  before  the  organic 
mechanism  will  fall  to  the  response,"  a  condition  to  which 
Professor  Morgan  refers  in  Halit  and  Instinct,  p.  139  ;  but 
in  no  case  does  the  impulse  appear  in  consciousness  except 
as  the  result  of  an  obstruction  to  the  realisation  of  certain 
activities  which  are  determined  by  the  existence  within  us 
of  co-ordinated  neural  structures. 

§  3.  I  think  the  true  nature  of  impulse  may  be  made 
clearer  if  we  study  the  matter  from  another  point  of  view, 
making  a  plunge  into  the  depths  of  psychology,  and  to  this 
study  the  remainder  of  this  chapter  will  be  given.  I  shall 
here  rehearse,  and  amplify,  much  that  I  have  already  said 
in  an  appendix  to  Chapter  V.  of  my  Pain,  Pleasure  and 
u^sthetics,  where  the  subject  was  discussed  in  its  algedonic 
aspects. 

1  Halit  and  Instinct,  p.  142.     Cf.  Chap.  IV.  §  4  above. 


Ul^iv  ^i:t;5lTY 

CHAP.  XIII  THE  NATURE  OF  IMPULSE  345 

It  often  happens  that  we  gain  a  better  view  of  an 
obscure  mental  state  by  the  study  of  some  simple  state  to 
which  it  is  evidently  related.  Cravings,  desires,  impulses 
are  all  mental  states  which  are  bound  together  most  closely, 
cravings  being  apparently  the  simplest  of  the  three  states. 
I  think  if  we  study  the  nature  of  desire  and  of  impulse  in 
connection  with  the  nature  of  craving  that  we  find  a  distinct 
corroboration  of  our  view  in  relation  to  impulse. 

Physiological  consideration  has  taught  us  that  cravings, 
in  most  cases,  may  be  produced  by  the  mere  deprivation  of 
a  stimulus  to  activity  which  is  usually  somewhat  rhythmic- 
ally recurrent.  The  stimulation  to  activity  in  the  digestive 
organs  and  their  related  parts  which  is  given  as  the  result 
of  the  process  of  eating,  if  not  recurrent  in  its  normal 
rhythm,  gives  us  the  craving  of  hunger.  The  healthy  man 
must  have  his  meals  with  some  regularity  or  he  is  thoroughly 
uncomfortable.  The  psychic  elements  distinguishable  in 
these  cravings  consist  of  broad  systemic  pains,  coupled  with 
what  is  known  as  a  sense  of  uneasiness :  this  sense  of 
uneasiness  may  be  supposed  to  be  the  psychic  counterpart 
of  the  tendencies  of  accumulated  yet  restricted  energy  to 
work  itself  off  in  channels  adjacent  to  those  which,  but  for 
the  failure  of  stimulus,  would  normally  come  into  action ; 
for  such  accumulation  of  energy  is  necessitated  by  the  fact 
that  rhythmical  processes  of  organic  nutrition  come  to 
correspond  with  rhythmical  organic  activities. 

That  the  physiological  basis  of  the  cravings  and  their 
psychic  elements  are  correctly  described  above  becomes 
clearer  when  we  consider  the  peculiar  nature  of  certain 
special  cravings  which  appear  without  unusually  recurrent 
but  restricted  stimulus,  such  cravings,  for  example,  as  those 
which  arise  with  the  approach  of  the  age  of  puberty.  In 
such  cases  it  is  apparent  that  systemic  development,  deter- 
mined by  heredity,  brings  capacity  in  combinations  of  organs 


346  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

which  fail  to  act  only  because  they  await  an  unexperienced 
stimulus.  Physically  we  have  here  the  same  conditions  of 
accumulation  of  energy  and  of  restriction  as  in  the  cases 
described  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  and  psychically  we 
have  the  same  broad  systemic  pain  and  the  same  uneasiness. 

§  4.  Desire  contains  the  craving  elements  in  all  cases ;  that 
is,  it  contains  broad  systemic  pain  and  the  uneasiness  which 
always  goes  with  it.  That  it  contains  more  than  this  also 
seems  clear  to  me.  Nevertheless,  it  must  be  agreed  that 
usage  brings  the  two  states  very  close  together.  Although  I 
know  of  no  theoretical  writer  who  would  use  the  word 
"  desire  "  to  designate  the  sexual  cravings  as  above  described, 
still  no  less  well  known  an  author  than  Herbert  Spencer 
defines  desire  in  terms  which  could  be  employed  to  indicate 
the  more  usual  forms  of  craving  which,  objectively  viewed, 
are  traceable  to  a  stimulus  that  for  a  time  has  not  appeared 
in  its  normal  rhythm.  In  his  Principles  of  Psychology 
(vol.  i.  p.  125)  he  says:  "Desires  are  ideal  feelings  which 
arise  when  the  real  feelings  to  which  they  correspond  have 
not  been  experienced  for  some  time."  I  think  we  shall 
find  ample  reason  below  for  the  rejection  of  this  definition 
as  a  description  of  desire.  To  the  cravings,  to  which  his 
definition  applies  well,  must  be  added  something  more  before 
we  obtain  the  desires. 

That  desires  and  cravings  are  not  very  distinctly  differen- 
tiated by  those  unaccustomed  to  introspection  is  explicable 
when  we  consider  that  mental  states  in  which  the  pain  of 
restriction  is  predominant,  and  which  oftenest  arise  as,  and 
are  known  as,  mere  blind  cravings,  at  times  arise  also  as 
the  result  of  the  appearance  in  the  mind  of  the  image  of  an 
unrealised  object  which  would,  if  realised,  result  in  relief  of 
the  painful  uneasiness ;  they  are  then  in  my  view  real 
desires,   as   will  presently   appear.      Thus   the   craving   of 


CHAP.  XIII  THE  NATURE  OF  IMPULSE  347 

hunger  may,  and  usually  does,  arise  without  any  thought  of 
food,  but  it  may  also  arise  as  the  result  of  seeing  others 
taking  a  meal.  That  the  craving  may  appear  without  the 
existence  of  the  more  complex  conditions  last  referred  to 
shows  that  these  latter  are  not  of  its  essence.  No  clear 
thought  of  an  object  is  necessary  to  the  production  of  a 
craving. 

Again,  desires  in  a  large  proportion  of  cases  arise  upon 
the  presentation  to  sense  perception  of  objects  to  which  the 
activities  which  are  restricted  normally  relate,  and  the  same 
is  also  in  not  a  few  cases  true  of  cravings ;  but  while  both 
desires  and  cravings  are  thus  frequently  initiated  by  the 
perception  of  objects,  this  objective  stimulation  gives  us  no 
reason  for  failing  to  distinguish  between  them ;  for  cravings 
are  not  determined  by  such  presentation  of  objects. 

Hunger  may  be  initiated  by  the  sight  of  food,  but 
hunger  also  arises  often  without  antecedent  suggestion  of 
edibles :  the  sexual  cravings  in  their  very  beginning  in 
the  human  race  at  least  are  clearly  not  initiated  by  any 
antecedent  presentation  of  an  appropriate  objective  stimulus. 

The  presentation  of  an  object,  on  the  other  hand,  does 
often  produce  a  clear  craving,  which  is  differentiated  from  a 
desire  by  the  lack  of  any  idea  of  an  object  to  be  realised, 
in  reflection  this  craving  being  also  a  state  distinctly  separ- 
ated from  the  presentation  of  the  object.  With  my  mind 
on  other  things  my  attention  is  called  to  a  beautiful  horse : 
I  see  the  horse  and  feel  a  craving — an  indefinite  painful 
uneasiness  which  is  separated  from  the  notion  of  the  horse : 
but  it  is  not  a  desire,  nor  does  it  become  one,  until  to  the 
craving  is  added  the  notion  of  the  unrealised  ownership  of 
the  horse,  which,  if  realised,  would  result  in  the  relief  of  the 
pain. 

Enough  has  been  said,  I  think,  to  bring  out  the  distinc- 
tion between  craving  and  desire,  and  at  the  same  time  to 


348  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

show  why  the  words  in  common  -  speech  usage  occur  not 
infrequently  as  interchangeable  terms. 

A  craving,  then,  may  be  defined  as  the  psychosis  of 
painfid  systemic  obstruction,  which  we  learn  hy  experiment 
would  he  relieved  hy  systemic  a/^tivities,  for  which  the 
organism  is  prepared. 

§  5.  There  is  another  psychosis  of  painful  obstruction 
which  is  closely  allied  with  craving,  but  which  is  differen- 
tiated by  the  fact  that  reflection  teaches  us  that  relief  lies 
in  the  direction  of  what  we  differentiate  in  consciousness  as 
co-ordinated  motor  activities,  for  which  the  proper  organs 
are  prepared.  The  mere  cravings  are  so  usually  at  once 
connected  in  the  mind  with  the  image  of  the  motor  activities 
that  it  requires  some  introspective  discrimination  to  note 
the  distinction,  and  we  in  English  have  no  word  which  has 
not  the  active  motor  connotation.  Trieh  in  German  more 
nearly  indicates  the  simple  state.  "  Blind  impulse  "  seems 
the  best  combination  of  terms  to  convey  our  meaning. 

A  "  blind  impulse "  therefore  may  be  defined  as  the 
psychosis  of  painful  obstruction  of  systemic  activities,  which 
we  learn  hy  reflection  would  be  relieved  by  motor  functioning 
the  stimulus  to  which  is  existent.  Of  impulse  proper  we 
speak  below  after  a  further  discussion  of  desire  which  may 
be  helpful. 

§  6.  Desire  appears  to  be  a  complex  which  contains  two 
elements,  as  follows  : — 

A.  The  painful  psychosis  of  systemic  obstruction,  of 
effort  by  the  system  to  force  channels  for  the  "  pent-up 
stream  of  action  "  (Ward),  i.e.  to  get  round  the  restriction 
to  the  realisation ;  in  other  words,  a  craving ;  and 

B.  The   persistent  image  of  the  realisation  of    an   un- 


CHAP.  XIII  THE  NATURE  OF  IMPULSE  349 

realised  objective  idea.  We  learn  by  reflection  that  if  this 
idea  were  realised  the  result  would  be  relief  of  the  desire 
pain,  but  neither  this  act  of  reflection  nor  its  outcome  is 
necessary  to  the  desire. 

A.  That  the  psychosis  of  obstruction  of  activities  is 
present  in  desire  will  probably  not  be  questioned ;  it  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  desires  tend  to  "  arise  when  the  real 
feelings  to  which  they  correspond  have  not  been  experienced 
for  some  time"  (to  quote  Mr.  Spencer  again),  and  that  in 
other  cases  they  arise  after  recognised  restrictions.  If  this 
be  true  the  stress  of  desire  ought  to  be  relieved  by  activities 
which  are  represented  in  connection  with  it,  which  is  a 
generally  acknowledged  truth ;  or  by  the  diversion  of  the 
obstructed  energies  into  new  channels — that  is,  by  the  rise 
into  absorbing  attention  of  other  activities ;  this  too  accords 
with  experience.  As  Mr.  Spencer  puts  it,  "  Desires  when 
ungratified  become  feebler  and  finally  die  away." 

B.  But,  as  I  have  already  noted,  the  pain  of  restriction 
is  not  all  of  desire ;  were  there  nothing  more,  craving  would 
then  not  be  differentiated  from  it ;  to  complete  the  desire 
there  must  be  added  the  persistent  image  of  the  realisation 
of  an  unrealised  objective  idea.  We  must  desire  some 
object  which  is  not  real  for  us  at  the  moment  of  desire, 
be  this  object  a  person  or  thing  in  the  outer  world,  or  such 
a  vague  thing  as  an  unremembered  name,  or  a  condition  of 
mind.  If  the  object  were  realised  this  would  bring  the 
desire  to  an  end  and  relieve  its  pain. 

The  importance  of  this  point  is  grasped  by  many  of  the 
later  German  psychologists ;  but  the  Herbartian  notion 
that  each  rise  of  an  element  in  consciousness  is  a  striving 
of  a  presentation  against  opposition  has  made  the  conception 
difi&cult  to  hold  by  those  whom  he  has  influenced ;  has  made 
it  hard  to  draw  the  line  between  a  desire  and  the  general 


350  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  in 

flow  of  consciousness,  especially  in  expectation,  which,  to 
the  Herbartian,  would  appear  'to  be  merely  a  marked  case 
of  the  general  striving  for  realisation.^ 

One  who  does  not  accept  this  Herbartian  notion  of  a 
sub -conscious  contest  meets  with  no  difficulty  in  this 
direction.  Any  idea  is  an  expectation  if  it  has  the 
future-time  quality  and  the  quality  of  realness ;  and  it  is 
distinctly  diiBferentiated  from  desire,  as  I  have  defined  it 
above. 

The  realisation  in  the  case  of  desire  may  refer  to  an 
image  only,  as  when  we  desire  the  prosperity  of  our  off- 
spring ;  the  realisation  must  be  for  us,  and  it  must  relate 
especially  to  a  presentation  to  our  consciousness,  and  not 
especially  to  a  reaction  of  ours,  which,  as  we  shall  presently 
see,  is  a  characteristic  of  impulse.^ 

§  7.  Let  us  now  turn  to  the  consideration  of  impulse 
proper,  which  appears  to  be  made  up  of  two  elements  as 
follows : — 

A.  The  psychosis  of  painful  obstruction  of  systemic 
motor  activities,  i.e.  sl  blind  impulse  (Trieb) ;  and 

B.  The  persistent  image  of  the  realisation  of  a  distinctly 
motor  activity,  concerning  which  we  judge  in  reflection 
that  if  the  motor  activity  were  realised,  the  result  would  be 
relief  of  the  obstructive  pain ;  but  neither  this  act  of  judg- 
ment nor  its  outcome  is  necessary  to  the  impulse. 

That  impulses  have  always  the  painfulness  of  repressed 
activity  inherent  in  them,  and  always  contain  also  the  motor 
idea,  is  not  questioned :  it  is  of  their  essence  that  the 
unrealised  idea  shall  relate  to  our  own  reactions  upon  our 
environment. 


1  Cf.  Drobisch,  especially  JEmp.  Psy.  §  143,  quoted  by  Volkmann  ;   also 
Volkmann,  Lehr.  Psy.  ii.  §  139  ;  Lipps,  Grund.  d.  Seelenlebens,  p.  610. 

2  Cf.  Bradley,  Mind,  xlix.  p.  21. 


CHAP.  XIII  THE  NATURE  OF  IMPULSE  351 

Impulses  do  not  become  emphatic  in  consciousness  except 
where  there  is  distinct  opposition,  the  uneasiness  in  all  such 
cases  being  painful. 

If  the  restriction  which  determines  the  impulse  be 
broken  down,  and  the  instinctive  tendencies  as  modified  by- 
experience  work  themselves  out,  we  have  the  psychoses 
which  I  have  called  "  instinct  feelings,"  which,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  under  certain  conditions  of  co-ordination  and 
fixity  are  called  emotions. 

§  8.  We  have  then — 

1.   Craving  2.  Desire 

3.  Trieb  (Blind  Impulse)         4.  Impulse 

in  which  2  and  4  are  clearer  intellectually  than  1  and  3. 

1  and  2  relate  to  effects  upon  us,  while  3  and  4  relate  to 
effects  by  us  upon  tbur  environment. 

As  motor  activities  are  the  last  in  the  physical  series 
which  begins  with  stimulation,  we  should  expect  to  find 
"  blind  impulse  "  bound  to,  but  most  often  appearing  as  sub- 
sequent to,  craving.  This  accords  with  my  own  introspection. 
While  craving  may  appear  alone,  it  tends  to  run  into  trieb ; 
on  the  other  hand,  trieh  often  appears  alone,  without  bring- 
ing a  craving  into  consciousness,  the  restriction  in  the 
region  of  stimulation  to  the  motor  activities  not  having 
been  effective  to  emphasise  the  craving,  while  the  restriction 
to  the  motor  reaction  itself  is  emphatic. 

Desire  and  impulse  we  should  expect  to  find  similarly 
related.  Desire  should  naturally  lead  to  impulse,  and 
should  most  often  be  found  bound  to  it,  although  we  should 
be  able  to  note  cases  of  desire  where  impulse  seems  to  be 
wanting  or  only  incipient.  On  the  other  hand,  we  should 
expect  to  find  impulse  appearing  quite  distinct  from  desire, 
and  not  calling  desire  into  being  immediately.      I  may  feel 


352  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

desire  for  some  horse  I  see,  and  in  what  appears  to  be  one 
and  the  same  mental  state  find  myself  impelled  to  jump  on 
his  back  and  take  a  ride;  or  I  may  feel  the  impulse  to 
jump  on  his  back  without  experiencing  any  desire  for  the 
animal. 

It  seems  to  me  clear  that  impulse  is  easily  held  apart 
from  desire,  although  ordinarily  the  two  states  are  not  con- 
sidered separable.  A  formidable  array  of  authorities  indeed 
take  the  position  that  impulse  is  of  the  very  essence  of 
desire:  for  instance  J.  S.  Mill,^  Lewes,^  Volkmann,^  Horwiez,* 
Wundt,^  HofPding,^  Sully."^  Still  I  am  convinced  that  there 
are  cases  of  desire  which  have  little  or  nothing  of  impulse 
in  them :  such  cases  as  the  "  desire  to  know,"  the  "  desire 
to  recollect,"  for  instance.  These  seem  to  me  to  be  clear 
cases  of  desire,  but  no  impulse  element  in  such  mental 
states  is  appreciable. 

It  seems  proper,  then,  to  exclude  impulse  from  the  essence 
of  desire,  although  on  the  other  hand  we  must  acknowledge 
that  desire  can  seldom  occur  without  calling  out  impulsive 
tendencies. 

We  here  find  explanation  of  another  fact  of  interest, 
namely,  that  so  many  thinkers,  and  common  folk  in  general, 
speak  of  desires  as  emotional.  The  explanation  in  this 
case  seems  to  be  bound  up  with  the  fact  that  emotions 
are  complex  impulsive  phenomena.  As  we  have  just 
seen,  impulses  are  the  most  likely  outcome  of  desires,  and 
are  therefore  most  often  held  together  with  desire  in 
reflection. 

Desire  is  often  identified  with  the  desire  state  of  love, 
i.e.  with  longing ;  and  thus  is  considered  to  be  the  opposite 


^  J.  S.  Mill's  edition  of  James  Mill's  Analysis,  chap.  xxiv.  footnote  66. 

'^  Problems,  3rd  series,  p.  248.  ^  Zehrhuch  d.  Psy.,  ii.  p.  437. 

■*  Psy.  Analysen,  iii.  chap.  iv.  ^  Phil.  Studien,  vi.  iii.  p.  373  ff. 

«  Outlines  of  Ps.  chap.  vi.  2  c.  ^  Human  Mind,  ii.  p.  180. 


CHAP.  XIII  THE  NATURE  OF  IMPULSE  353 

of  aversion.  Longing  and  aversion  are  distinctly  related  to 
instinctive  emotional  reactions,  the  striving  towards  and 
the  striving  away  from  objects,  which  in  a  further  develop- 
ment give  us  love  and  hate.  But  desire  which  is  not  itself 
impulsive  must  be  distinctly  differentiated  from  longing  and 
aversion,  which  are  emotional  and  hence  impulsive  in  their 
nature. 

If  our  view  be  correct,  therefore,  we  should  not  be 
surprised,  rather  should  we  expect  to  find  the  desire  phase 
very  closely  related  with  the  distinct  emotions. 

§  9.  It  may  be  well  to  explain  the  nature  of  desire  and 
impulse  in  terms  of  the  modern  doctrine  of  apperception, 
as  I  hold  it,  which  seems  to  be  demanded  by  the  prominence 
given  to  this  doctrine  by  Mr.  Stout  in  his  Analytic  Psychology, 
which  will  probably  establish  the  trend  of  psychological 
thought  for  a  long  time  in  the  future.  I  take  this  oppor- 
tunity to  state  my  obligations  to  Mr.  Stout  for  his  very  able 
elucidation  of  this  doctrine,  although  I  would  not  of  course 
hold  him  responsible  for  the  expression  of  it  in  what 
follows. 

An  idea  may  appear  in  mind  as  real  in  a  certain 
apperceptive  system  :  I  may  perceive  an  object  approach- 
ing me ;  it  may  be  part  and  parcel  of  my  present  apper- 
ceptive system,  and  in  it  may  appear,  for  instance,  a  man 
as  a  relatively  stable  object,  as  real,  as  a  real  man.  But 
presently  a  new  apperceptive  system  develops  out  of  the 
jfirst,  the  new  system  being  determined  by  recognition  of 
the  features  and  the  postures  and  the  environment  of  that 
man.  This  system  also  contains  as  a  new  element  the  idea 
which  we  call  this  man's  name.  But  this  man's  name  is 
not  recalled,  and  just  so  far  the  total  of  qualities  in  this 
new  apperceptive  system  that  involves  the  notion  of  that 
thoroughly  familiar  man   fails  to  be  wholly  realised ;    the 

2  A 


354 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 


other  qualities,  however,  which  make  him  real  for  me  are 
presented  in  that  form  of  relative  stability  which  constitutes 
reality. 

Here  the  idea  of  that  man's  name  as  part  of  the  new 
apperceptive  system  presents  itself  to  my  mind,  but  it  is 
not  reahsed,  although  the  fact  that  it  may  be  realisable  is 
marked  by  the  very  failure  in  the  perfection  of  the  realisa- 
tion ;  by  the  blank  in  the  picture,  so  to  speak. 

The  idea  of  that  man's  name  is  a  persistent  idea,  real  in 
some  apperceptive  system  indeed,  but  for  all  that  unrealised 
in  the  new  apperceptive  system  which  is  forcing  itself  upon 
my  mind.  We  have  the  painfulness  of  a  craving  due  to 
the  restriction  to  the  unfolding  of  the  new  apperceptive 
system,  and  also  an  idea  of  activities,  not  distinctly  motor, 
felt  to  be  unrealised,  yet  realisable.  In  and  by  the  exist- 
ence of  the  combination  we  have  the  mental  state  which  we 
call  desire :  the  desire  in  this  case  for  the  man's  name. 

§  10.  Similarly  in  reference  to  impulse.  The  newly 
arising  apperceptive  system  may  hold  as  part  of  its  totality 
the  idea  of  an  action  of  my  own,  an  idea  which  presents 
itself  to  my  mind  as  not  realised,  although  the  fact  that  it 
may  be  realisable  is  marked  by  the  very  failure  in  the  per- 
fection of  the  realisation  of  the  new  apperceptive  system, 
which  would  be  totally  realised  were  the  action  performed. 
Here  we  have  the  painfulness  of  a  craving  due  to  a  restric- 
tion of  the  unfolding  of  the  new  apperceptive  system,  and 
also  an  idea  of  distinctly  motor  activities  felt  to  be  unrealised 
yet  realisable.  In  and  by  the  existence  of  this  combination 
we  have  the  mental  state  which  we  call  impulse :  the 
impulse  to  perform  an  act. 

§  11.  Now  the  fact  that,  where  impulses  are  concerned, 
the  motor  idea  although  unrealised  is  felt  to  be  realisable ; 


CHAP.  XIII  THE  NATURE  OF  IMPULSE  355 

the  fact  that  the  outcome  in  motor  activities  is  acknow- 
ledged to  be  natural ;  the  .  fact  that  the  mere  removal  of 
restraint  results  in  the  occurrence  of  the  appropriate 
activities ;  the  fact  that  these  activities  are  "  spontaneous," 
as  we  say,  and  are  not  felt  to  be  due  to  our  own  effort  or 
guidance ;  all  these  facts  of  observation  and  introspection 
agree  with  the  views  we  have  already  presented,  and  confirm 
the  notion  that  impulses  are  due  to  organic  trends  which 
imply  their  dependence  upon  co-ordinated  neural  structures 
existing  within  us,  and  which  must  be  due  to  forms  in- 
herited from  our  ancestors,  or  to  modifications  of  these  forms 
due  to  life  experience.  All  this  goes  to  confirm  our  state- 
ment that  impulses  are  due  to  the  inhibition  of  instincts 
or  of  those  modifications  of  instincts,  those  pseudo-instincts, 
which  we  call  acquired  habits. 

The  statement  of  the  nature  of  desire  and  impulse  made 
above  may  seem  to  some  to  be  little  more  than  an  attempt 
at  definition,  but  I  think  that  the  development  of  my  view 
in  succeeding  chapters  will  show  that  the  statement  accords 
with  the  facts  of  experience. 

§  12.  In  what  has  preceded  this  the  reader  who  has 
followed  my  argument  with  approval  must  have  become 
convinced  that  desire  and  impulse  are  not  identifiable,  for 
desire  may  occur  with  no  trace  of  impulse  about  it;  the 
apperceptive  system  which  involves  the  desire  may  be 
displaced  by  a  new  system  before  the  impulse  is  developed. 
Impulse  also  may  occur  with  no  trace  of  desire,  there  having 
been  no  effective  opposition  to  the  realisation  of  the  non- 
motor  stimulating  idea.  We  must  agree,  however,  that  the 
distinction,  although  a  necessary  one,  is  one  which  is  produced 
by  the  natural  division  of  our  complex  life  of  mental  activity 
into  receptive  and  reactive  parts,  and  not  because  of  any 
fundamental  difference  in  the  form  of  the  psychoses  involved. 


366  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

The  content  of  the  impulse  is  in  large  measure  determined 
by  the  content  of  the  desire  if  it  appear,  and  in  a  large  pro- 
portion of  cases  both  desire  and  impulse  do  appear  in  mind; 
and  then  both  appear  as  the  accompaniments  of  a  total 
state  which  has  to  do  with  our  activity  in  relation  to  our 
environment. 

In  treating  of  this  activity  in  relation  to  the  world  sur- 
rounding us,  it  would  be  strictly  accurate  to  use  the  phrase 
"desire-impulse."  This,  however,  would  be  most  cumbersome, 
and  in  the  chapters  to  follow  I  shall  use  simply  the  word 
"  impulse  "  to  express  my  meaning,  with  the  understanding 
that  so  far  as  desire  arises  in  connection  with  the  impulse 
it  is  included  in  our  conception.  This  seems  perfectly 
proper,  as  desire  when  it  appears  without  impulse  is  not 
provocative  of  action  upon  our  environment,  the  develop- 
ment of  the  series  being  then  lacking. 

The  reader  will  comprehend  the  necessity  of  this  ex- 
planatory statement  when  he  comes  to  study  the  nature  of 
moral  codes  in  the  next  chapter,  for  morality  has  to  do  not 
only  with  the  relation  between  impulses,  but  also  with  the 
relation  between  desires  where  they  occur  without  impulses  : 
for  persistent  encouragement  of  desires  which  do  not  at  the 
time  lead  to  impulses,  may  eventually  lead  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  impulses  in  connection  with  the  appearance  of 
the  desires ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  restrictions  of  the 
desires  may  overcome  all  possibility  of  the  appearance  of 
the  appropriate  impulses. 


J 


CHAPTEE   XIV 

THE    HIEKARCHY    OF   IMPULSES 

I. — The  Nature  of  Moral  Codes 


§  1.  In  consideration  of  the  explanations  made  in  the 
previous  chapter,  I  think  we  may  now  assume  that  our 
impulses  are  mental  states  which  are  determined  by  the 
inhibition  of  instinctive  tendencies,  as  these  have  been  more 
or  less  modified  by  the  experience  of  life. 

I  would  now  ask  the  reader  to  recall  the  discussions  of 
Chapter  VI.,  where,  at  the  close  of  Division  II.,  we  were  led 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  instinct  actions  expressive  of  the 
instincts  included  within  a  given  group  taken  as  a  whole, 
and  of  the  instincts  as  compared  severally,  must  vary  in 
perfection  of  co-ordination  in  proportion  as  they  have 
existed  long,  and  have  been  often  brought  into  activity,  in 
the  life-history  of  our  ancestors ;  that  where  instincts  have 
been  formed  approximately  at  the  same  period  in  that  past, 
the  frequency  with  which  they  have  been  called  into  action 
will  determine  the  thoroughness  of  this  co-ordination ;  that 
thus  in  different  individuals  we  must  expect  to  discern 
differences  in  quickness  of  response  in  connection  with 
instinctive  reactions  of  different  types ;  or,  in  other  words, 
that  the  hierarchy  of  the  instincts  within  the  great  groups, 
and  to  a  less  extent  of  the  groups  themselves,  will  neces- 


358  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

sarily  differ  in  different  races  and  in  different  individuals  of 
the  same  race. 

If  then  it  be  true,  as  we  have  concluded,  that  impulses 
correspond  to  instincts  as  modified  by  experience,  necessarily 
a  closely  correspondent  statement  to  that  made  in  reference 
to  instinct  may  be  made  in  reference  to  impulse. 

The  impulses  which  are  determined  by  the  inhibition  of 
modified  instinct  actions  must  vary  in  efficiency  as  these 
instinct  actions  vary  in  perfection  of  co-ordination.  The 
efficiency  of  impulses,  therefore,  must  vary  in  proportion  as  the 
instincts  with  which  they  are  related  have  existed  long  in 
the  history  of  our  race,  and  in  proportion  as  they  have 
been  often  brought  into  activity  in  the  lives  of  our  ancestors, 
or  especially  in  the  course  of  our  own  personal  experience. 
Where  certain  instincts  which  are  efficient  in  producing 
certain  impulses  have  been  formed  approximately  at  the 
same  period  in  the  past,  the  frequency  with  which  they 
have  been  called  into  action  in  that  past,  but  especially  in 
our  own  experience,  will  determine  at  any  time,  for  any 
individual,  the  relative  efficiency  of  the  corresponding 
impulses ;  so  that  in  different  individuals  we  must  expect 
to  discover  differences  of  what  for  the  sake  of  brevity  we 
shall  speak  of  as  impulse  efficiency. 

In  other  words,  we  should  expect  to  find  in  ourselves 
first  a  broad  hierarchy  of  impulse  efficiencies  corresponding 
with  the  order  of  subordination  of  the  great  groups  of 
instincts  which  we  have  above  considered ;  and  also  a  less 
definite  hierarchy  of  impulse  efficiencies  in  correspondence 
with  the  impulses  within  these  groups.  And  in  different 
individuals  we  should  expect  to  find  differences  in  this 
hierarchy  of  impulse  efficiencies  both  in  relation  to  the  great 
groups,  and  especially  in  relation  to  the  impulses  determined 
by  the  instincts  within  these  great  groups. 

Concerning  this  point  I  think  I  need  make  no  further 


CHAP.  XIV  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  IMPULSES  359 

argument,  but  taking  it  for  granted  I  shall  proceed  to  con- 
sider some  of  the  implications  necessarily  connected  with  it. 
Before  doing  so,  however,  I  must  ask  the  reader  to  note 
that  the  word  "  efficiency "  is  used  here  to  express  a  fact, 
and  is  not  intended  to  serve  as  an  explanatory  term.  In 
speaking  of  the  greater  or  less  efficiency  of  two  impulses 
we  express  the  fact  that  where  two  impulses  which  would 
lead  us  to  diverse  ends  present  themselves  in  consciousness, 
one  shows  itself  to  be  relatively  efficient  by  leading  to  its 
appropriate  expressive  acts,  while  the  other  shows  itself 
relatively  inefficient  by  failure  to  express  itself.  To  con- 
sider here  what  may  be  the  basis  of  this  efficiency  would 
be  apart  from  our  present  inquiry. 

It  cannot  be  doubted,  as  I  have  said  above,  that  instincts 
have  been  formed  in  our  progenitors  at  different  eras  of  our 
racial  existence,  and  it  is  a  generally  accepted  doctrine  that 
these  instincts  appear  in  our  individual  life  in  a  serial  order 
corresponding  in  general  to  the  order  in  which  they  have 
been  acquired  in  the  racial  life  of  our  progenitors.  This 
fact  no  one  will  question  when  he  considers  how  clear  it  is 
that  different  instincts  make  their  first  appearance  in  us  at 
different  periods  in  our  life-history ;  some  are  "  connate," 
others  are  "deferred,"  a  fact  which  has  been  sufficiently 
dwelt  upon  in  what  has  already  been  written,  and  which 
therefore  requires  no  illustration  here. 

But  it  is  well  to  ask  the  reader  to  note  that  the  fact 
just  stated  carries  with  it  the  implication  that  in  the  very 
nature  of  man's  development,  the  relative  efficiency  of 
diverse  impulses  will  vary  at  different  moments  of  his  life. 
In  childhood  the  instincts  relating  to  the  demands  for 
sustenance  and  for  self- protection  evidently  overmaster 
those  sexual  and  social  instincts  which  are  at  most  only 
beginning  to  appear.  In  early  manhood  the  sexual  instincts 
evidently   play   a   much   more   important    role,   and    often 


860  INSTINCT  AND  EEASON  part  hi 

entirely  overmaster  the  instincts  which  relate  to  sustenance 
and  to  self-protection  which  a  few  years  before  held  complete 
supremacy.  In  like  manner  in  later  years  the  fully  de- 
veloped man  finds  his  social  instincts  gaining  an  efficiency 
in  reference  to  the  sexual  instincts,  and  in  reference  to 
those  relating  to  sustenance ;  which  efficiency  is  entirely 
different  from  that  observed  in  his  early  manhood.  These 
well  -  recognised  examples  will  serve  to  illustrate  a  fact 
which  obtains  with  reference  to  all  our  instincts,  and  which 
must  therefore  obtain  also  with  reference  to  all  the  im- 
pulses which  are  determined  by  the  inhibition  of  these 
instincts. 

Moreover,  quite  apart  from  the  nature  of  the  inherited 
mode  of  development  which  we  have  thus  far  been  con- 
sidering, the  experience  and  habits  of  man's  life  after  birth 
tend  to  enforce  certain  instincts  and  to  dwarf  others  in  a 
manner  to  be  discussed  more  fully  later;  and  this  con- 
sidered in  connection  with  what  we  have  said  before,  makes 
it  appear  all  the  more  certain  that  the  relative  efficiency  of 
diverse  impulses  will  vary  at  different  moments  of  man's 
life. 

Of  the  relativity  of  the  impulse  series  in  the  individual 
life  which  we  are  thus  forced  to  consider,  I  shall  not  speak 
here ;  I  reserve  the  treatment  of  that  subject  for  the  second 
division  of  this  chapter.  I  wish  here  to  study  some  one 
moment  in  a  man's  life  in  which  the  order  of  impulse 
efficiencies,  as  determined  by  the  processes  inherent  in 
development  or  by  life  experience,  cannot  be  supposed  to 
alter;  I  would  analyse  the  nature  of  a  man's  impulse 
experience  at  such  a  special  moment. 

§  2.  From  what  has  been  said  above  we  are  evidently 
forced  to  acknowledge  that  at  such  a  chosen  moment  in  a 
man's  life  there  exists  within  him  a  certain  definite  serial 


CHAP.  XIV  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  IMPULSES  361 

order  of  impulse  efficiencies.     To  make  clear  my  meaning 
let  us  make  use  of  a  symbolic  series. 

At  this  present  moment  I  am  capable  of  exhibiting  an 
indefinite  number  of  complex  instinct  actions  more  or  less 
definite  and  specific,  determined  by  an  indefinite  number  of 
stimuli  correspondingly  varied  and  more  or  less  definite 
and  specific.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity  let  us  take  out  of 
this  indefinite  number  a  limited  number  for  study,  let  us 
say  five  ;  and  let  us  agree  that  at  this  moment  stimuli  S^,  S^, 
S^,  S*,  S^  will  produce  in  me  respectively  "  instinct  actions  " 
la,  1/3,  I-y,  1$,  le,  and  that  correspondent  to  these,  whenever 
they  occur,  I  shall  experience  "  instinct  feelings "  Fa,  F/s, 
¥yy  Fs,  Ff. 

This  supposes  that  there  is  no  obstruction  to  the  respec- 
tive reactions.  But  if  in  each  case  there  be  an  inhibition 
of  the  reaction  to  the  stimulus  which  presents  itself  in  con- 
sciousness, then  I  shall  have  the  mental  states  known  as 
impulses  correspondent  to  each  of  these  possible  instinct 
actions ;  and  these  impulses  we  may  symbolise  by  the 
letters  A,  B,  C,  D,  E. 

This  set  of  possible  impulses,  moreover,  may  in  every 
case  be  arranged  in  a  series  A,  B,  C,  D,  E  of  such  nature 
that  any  one  impulse  is  more  efficient  than  any  one 
following  it  in  the  series ;  so  that  if  a  stimulus  S^,  for  in- 
stance, act  upon  me  in  such  manner  as  to  induce  in  me  both 
the  instinct  actions  I^g  and  I^^  which  are  incompatible  with, 
and  which  momentarily  inhibit,  each  other ;  then  while  the 
inhibition  is  maintained  I  shall  experience  impulses  B  and 
D,  but  B  will  finally  prevail ;  or  if  in  like  manner  stimulus 
S^  arouse  the  incompatible  impulses  A  and  E,  A  will  finally 
prevail. 

§  3.  It  is  the  impulse  series  of  a  definite  order  of  effi- 
ciencies at  any  moment,  it  seems  to  me,  which  when  recalled 


362  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  hi 

by  revival  at  the  successive  moment,  gives  me  my  Individual 
Ethical  Standard  of  the  Moment.  When  an  objective  occur- 
rence arouses  two  opposed  impulses,  then  the  existence  of 
this  standard  becomes  apparent. 

In  ordinary  cases  of  action,  after  such  opposition  of 
instincts,  the  more  efficient  impulse  prevails  without  my 
attention  being  attracted  to  the  opposition  that  has 
obtained. 

If  the  opposition  leads  to  such  hesitation  that  I  hold  in 
consciousness  the  two  opposed  actions  to  which  the  opposed 
impulses  would  lead,  I  then  recognise  consciously  that  there 
are  two  opposed  impulses,  that  one  is  more  efficient  than 
the  other,  and  that  I  am  acting  out  the  more  efficient  im- 
pulse. 

I  also  note  that  in  certain  cases  the  balance  of  efficiencies 
is  very  even,  and  that  it  is  an  open  question  for  a  time 
which  way  the  balance  will  fall ;  and  then  I  experience 
suddenly  the  emphasis  of  one  of  these  doubtful  impulses  by 
influences  which  I  cannot  clearly  grasp  in  attention,  but 
which  I  realise  to  arise  from  within  my  field  of  inattention, 
from  that  part  of  consciousness  which  makes  up  my  ego- 
hood  ;  ^  and  then  it  is  that  I  feel  that  I  myself  threw  the 
balance  in  one  direction  rather  than  the  other;  in  other 
words,  I  will  which  impulse  I  shall  follow. 

Of  the  nature  and  limitations  of  the  act  of  willing  I 
shall  not  stop  to  speak,  for  I  am  concerned  here  to  describe 
the  relations  between  the  impulses  which  are  acted  upon 
in  willing  rather  than  the  act  of  will  itself.  But  I  would 
ask  my  reader  to  note  that  the  impulse  series  which,  as  I 

^  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  this  doctrine  the  reader  is  referred  to  the 
division  of  Chapter  II.  on  "Parallelism."-  I  may  say  here,  however,  that 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  our  ego  of  experience  is  of  this  field  of  inattention  ; 
and  further  that  I  find  myself  unable  to  discover  any  part  of  this  field  of  in- 
attention that  is  not  part  of  this  ego,  that  can  be  cut  out  of  it  without  muti- 
lating this  ego.  The  ego  and  the  field  of  inattention,  therefore,  seem  to  me 
to  be  identical. 


CHAP.  XIV  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  IMPULSES  363 

have  said,  gives  us  the  Individual  Ethical  Standard  of  the 
Moment,  is  revivable,  and  only  because  it  is  revivable  does 
this  ethical  standard  exist ;  for  certain  parts  of  this  impulse 
series  are  brought  into  consciousness  in  relation  to  any 
remembered  action  of  our  own  in  response  to  a  definite 
stimulus,  or  in  relation  to  the  action  of  a  fellow-man  whom 
we  judge  to  have  been  subjected  to  this  definite  stimulus. 

When  this  action  of  our  neighbour,  as  recalled  without 
any  time  for  consideration  or  reflection,  fits  in  with  that 
part  of  our  impulse  series  of  the  moment  which  is  aroused, 
when  it  accords  with  our  Individual  Ethical  Standard  of  the 
Moment,  then  we  feel  no  sense  of  opposition,  and  if  we  are 
called  upon  to  remark  upon  the  subject  we  say  that  the  act 
of  our  neighbour  of  a  moment  ago  was  right.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  remembered  action  of  our  neighbour  of  a 
moment  ago  fails  to  fit  in  with  this  part  of  the  impulse 
series  of  the  present  moment,  fails  to  accord  with  our  Indi- 
vidual Standard  of  the  Moment,  then  we  feel  a  shock,  we 
judge  our  neighbour  to  be  wrong  in  his  action. 

If  I  am  correct,  we  ourselves  never  act  contrary  to  this 
standard  of  the  moment,  and  never  condemn  ourselves  in 
this  moment ;  we  do  not  condemn  ourselves  unless  we  give 
time  to  reflection  in  a  manner  to  be  described  below. 

The  reader  will  have  noticed  a  certain  correspondence 
with,  and  yet  a  divergence  from,  the  views  of  Dr.  Martineau 
in  what  has  thus  far  been  written.  I  refer  to  these  views 
in  a  later  paragraph. 

§  4.  Thus  far  I  have  been  speaking  only  of  my  own 
experience,  or  of  the  experience  of  some  one  individual  man  ; 
and  of  the  impulse  series  which  he  flnds  within  him  at  some 
special  chosen  moment.  But  now  I  wish  to  call  attention 
to  certain  considerations  which  will  lead  us  to  see  that  there 
is  very  little  chance  that  for  any  two  men  the  order  of  the 


364  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

series  of  impulse  efficiencies  at  any  such  chosen  moment  can 
be  the  same. 

In  order  to  show  this  we  may  refer  again  to  the  special 
impulse  series  of  the  moment  which  we  have  been  consider- 
ing, my  own  impulse  series  if  you  will.  It  will  appear 
evident  to  the  reader,  as  soon  as  I  mention  it,  that  this 
impulse  series  to  which  I  am  subject  at  this  moment  is  not 
the  series  that  would  affect  me  if  I  had  just  sprung  into 
existence  full  grown,  and  yet  formed  in  accordance  with 
the  laws  of  development  through  heredity.  I  would  clearly 
be  a  very  different  man  if  the  varied  influences  from  the 
variously  integrated  systems  which  have  united  to  bring 
me  into  being  had  alone  acted,  and  had  I  had  no  experience 
of  the  activities  of  life. 

The  influences  inherited  from  the  organic  life  of  my  pro- 
genitors, had  they  alone  acted  upon  me,  might  have  produced 
in  me  at  this  moment  an  impulse  series  which  may  be  repre- 
sented by  the  letters  A,  E,  B,  D,  C,  a  series  which  contains 
the  same  impulses  but  in  which  the  efficiency  of  the  several 
impulses  differs  materially  from  that  found  in  the  series 
which  I  note  within  me  at  this  moment,  and  which  I  have 
symbolised  above  under  the  form  A,  B,  C,  D,  E. 

The  difference  between  the  series  A,  B,  C,  D,  E,  which 
I  now  know,  and  the  series  A,  E,  B,  D,  C,  which  I  would 
have  known  had  I  had  no  experience  of  life,  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  complex  stimuli  from  my  ever-changing  environ- 
ment have  varied  as  to  quality  or  intensity  from  those  forms 
to  which  I,  through  inheritance,  was  exactly  fitted  to  answer. 
Thus,  referring  to  my  inherited  impulse  series.  A,  E,  B, 
D,  C,  we  may  suppose  that  the  stimulus  to  the  instinct 
action  which  determined  impulse  E  has  for  some  reason  not 
often  reached  me,  and  that  the  stimuli  to  the  instinct 
actions  determining  the  impulses  B  and  D  have  much 
oftener  reached  me,  and  that  the  stimulus  to  the  instinct 


CHAP.  XIV  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  IMPULSES  365 

action  determining  the  impulse  C  has  been  -still  more  often 
experienced,  so  that  I^  and  I^^  have  gained  tendencies  to 
promptness  and  strength  of  reaction  which  will  at  this 
moment  give  impulses  B  and  D  greater  efficiency  than  E, 
and  that  I-y  for  similar  reasons  has  gained  the  same  tend- 
encies to  a  degree  which  gives  impulse  C  an  efficiency 
greater  than  E  and  D,  but  less  than  B;  so  that  instead  of 
the  natural  order  A,  E,  B,  D,  C,  due  to  inheritance,  I  ex- 
perience at  this  moment,  as  I  know,  the  order  A,  B,  C,  D,  E. 

Now  it  will  be  evident  to  the  reader  in  the  first  place 
that  there  is  very  little  chance  that  any  other  individual  is 
born  with  exactly  the  same  influences  bearing  upon  him 
from  his  progenitors  as  bear  upon  me,  so  that  there  is  very 
little  chance  that  in  any  other  person  the  natural  order  of 
the  impulse  series  if  determined  only  by  inheritance  would 
have  been  A,  E,  B,  D,  C,  as  it  would  have  been  with  me ; 
rather  would  it  be  more  likely  to  have  varied  from  mine, 
taking,  let  us  say,  the  form  A,  E,  B,  C,  D. 

Moreover,  there  is  scarcely  any  chance  that  another 
individual's  experience  in  life  can  have  been  the  same  as 
mine;  very  little  chance  that  exercise  has  enforced  the 
same  set  of  impulses  in  the  same  relation  to  other  impulses  ; 
very  little  chance,  therefore,  that  any  other  man's  order  of 
impulse  efficiencies  of  this  moment  has  been  modified  exactly 
as  mine  has  been,  and  that  for  any  one  else  it  is  represent- 
able  by  the  series  A,  B,  C,  D,  E,  as  mine  is :  rather  is  there 
great  chance  that  it  varies  from  mine,  taking  in  another 
man,  let  us  say,  the  form  A,  C,  B,  D,  E. 

But  if  the  order  of  impulse  emphasis  in  the  series  of  the 
moment  is  altered  by  inheritance,  and  by  previous  experi- 
ence during  life,  it  is  altered  also  by  the  nature  of  the 
stimulus ;  and  it  is  to  be  noted  that  a  stimulus  S  which 
reaches  me,  whose  order  of  impulse  efficiency  is  A,  B,  C,  D,  E, 

1  See  symbols  on  p.  361. 


366  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  pakt  hi 

if  it  also  reach  my  neighbour,  whose  order  of  impulse  effi- 
ciency is,  say,  A,  C,  B,  D,  E,  then  in  effect  it  is  for  my 
neighbour  no  longer  stimulus  S,  but  quite  another  stimulus, 
viz.  S\  which  tends  to  produce  in  him  a  reaction  quite 
different  from  the  reaction  that  S  would  produce  in  me. 

The  order  of  impulse  emphasis  is  also  altered  by  the 
strength  or  intensity  of  the  stimulus :  for  a  hypernormal 
intensity  tends  to  produce  a  hypernormal  and  more 
immediate  reaction ;  a  subnormal  intensity,  a  subnormal 
and  less  immediate  reaction. 

The  order  of  impulse  efficiencies  of  this  moment,  if 
determined,  as  we  have  argued,  by  inheritance,  by 
experience,  and  by  the  nature  of  the  stimulus,  is  also  de- 
termined by  what  has  been  for  me  in  the  past  the 
normal  order  and  intensity  of  the  stimuli  which  have 
reached  me.  It  is  highly  improbable  that  that  exact  order 
and  intensity  of  stimulus  of  the  past  reaches  me  at  this 
moment  when  my  order  of  impulse  efficiency  is  A,  B,  C,  D,  E  ; 
in  some  respects  it  is  probable  that  the  relative  intensity  of 
the  stimuli  received  is  abnormal ;  hence  at  any  other  moment 
the  order  of  impulse  efficiencies  is  likely  to  be  different  from 
that  of  this  moment  because  of  the  relative  change  of  the 
intensity  of  the  stimuli. 

But  now  it  is  to  be  noted  further  that  there  is  very  little 
probability  that  any  particular  individual  other  than  myself 
has  at  this  moment  exactly  the  same  norm  of  stimulus 
leading  to  a  given  order  of  impulse  efficiencies ;  and  as  little 
probability  that  the  stimulus  reaching  this  particular  in- 
dividual is  normal  for  him,  at  this  same  moment,  or  ab- 
normal in  the  same  relations  that  appear  in  me. 

§  5.  If  the  argument  of  the  last  section  be  valid,  then  it 
is  clear,  as  I  said  in  the  opening  paragraph  of  that  section, 
that  there  is  very  little  chance  that  for  any  two  men  at  the 


CHAP.  XIV  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  IMPULSES  367 

same  moment  the  order  of  the  series  of  impulse  efficiencies 
can  be  exactly  the  same;  and  this  cacries  with  it  the 
implication  that  there  is  small  likelihood  that  any  two 
men  will  at  any  given  moment  have  exactly  the  same 
Individual  Ethical  Standard  of  the  Moment. 

But  I  have  presented  this  argument  in  detail,  because  in 
picturing  the  influences  which  produce  the  difference  of  this 
order  of  impulse  efficiencies  between  different  individuals  at 
the  same  moment,  I  have  at  the  same  time  emphasised  the 
fact  that  the  same  influences  must  produce  similar  differences 
of  this  order  in  a  given  individual  at  different  moments. 

For  although  in  a  given  individual  the  effects  of  in- 
heritance do  not  differ  appreciably  from  moment  to  moment, 
yet  that  they  do  differ  from  moment  to  moment,  although 
inappreciably,  is  shown  in  the  fact  that  they  differ  per- 
ceptibly so  soon  as  we  compare  the  influences  which  are 
efficient  at  periods  of  life  far  separated  from  one  another. 
This  we  have  seen  to  be  implied  in  the  existence  of 
"  deferred  "  instincts,  and  in  the  accepted  doctrine  that  we 
individuals  develop  capacities  in  an  order  comparable  with 
the  order  in  which  these  several  capacities  have  been  gained 
in  the  life-history  of  our  progenitors  through  the  dim  past. 

But  if,  on  the  one  hand,  differences  of  the  order  of 
impulse  emphasis  in  an  individual  from  moment  to  moment 
as  caused  by  inheritance  certainly  exist,  although  they  are 
not  obvious,  on  the  other  hand  such  differences  as  would  be 
caused  by  accumulation  of  experience,  by  change  in  the 
nature  of,  and  by  alteration  in  the  intensity  of,  the  stimulus, 
must  also  certainly  exist.  For  at  no  two  successive  moments 
can  our  experience  of  life  be  the  same ;  each  moment  adds 
its  increment  to  this  experience ;  and  at  no  two  successive 
moments  is  the  nature,  or  the  intensity,  of  the  experience  at 
all  likely  to  be  the  same  in  the  same  individual. 

In    any    individual,    therefore,   we    must    find    at    two 


368  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

successive  moments  divergencies  in  the  order  of  impulse 
emphasis  due,  of  necessity,  to  differences  of  influence 
from  inheritance  and  experience;  and,  in  all  probability, 
other  divergencies  due  to  differences  in  the  nature  and 
the  intensity  of  the  stimuli  received  at  these  successive 
moments. 


II 

§  6.  If  all  that  has  preceded  this  be  true,  if  the  order 
of  the  series  of  impulse  emphasis  be  different  at  each  special 
moment  for  each  individual,  and  if  different  also  for  each 
individual  in  each  successive  moment ;  if  also  it  be  true  that 
this  order  of  the  series  of  impulse  emphasis  determines  our 
moral  standard  of  the  moment,  then  it  is  clear  that  for  each 
man  at  each  specific  moment  there  is  a  special 


(A)  Individual  Ethical  Standard  of  the  Moment 

This  individual  standard  of  the  moment  is  that  to  which 
we  refer  when  we  make  off-hand  judgments  as  to  the 
propriety  of  certain  actions  in  others.  In  its  nature  it 
must  be  exceedingly  variable,  for  it  is  changed  by  each 
variation  in  our  surroundings,  by  each  alteration  of 
associative  train,  by  every  difference  in  our  physical 
condition. 

This  individual  standard  of  the  moment  is  quickly 
recognised  to  be  unreliable,  and  we  learn  to  appeal  to  a 
"  higher "  standard,  as  we  call  it,  which  is  still  individual, 
but  which  relates  to  a  less  variable  field;  this  "higher" 
standard  we  shall  now  consider. 

§  7.  As  I  have  just  said,  no  one  finds  himself  for  any 
length  of  time  content  with  the  dictates  of  his  own  off-hand 


CHAP.  XIV  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  IMPULSES  369 

moral  judgments,  even  if  he  acknowledge  that  they  are  his 
own,  as  we  shall  presently  see  he  often  does  not. 

When  he  views  his  deliberate  acts  in  retrospect  he  finds 
that  they  do  not  harmonise  with  his  standard  at  the  time 
of  retrospective  thought ;  or,  in  terms  of  our  psychological 
analysis,  he  discovers  that  his  act  in  relation  to  two 
alternatives,  as  recalled,  does  not  correspond  with,  or  fit 
in  with,  the  order  of  impulse  efficiencies  which  is  his  own 
at  the  moment  of  retrospect. 

At  times,  indeed,  the  divergence  is  so  marked  that  he  is 
startled  and  forced  to  give  attention  to  this  divergence,  and 
then  it  is  that  he  either  feels  that  he  has  erred,  or  else 
makes  effort  to  shift  the  responsibility  from  his  shoulders. 
This  shifting  of  responsibility  he  attempts  to  effect  in  a 
variety  of  ways.  If  he  be  schooled  in  the  current  thought 
of  our  half-educated  people  he  is  likely  to  repudiate  his  act 
altogether,  is  likely  to  ascribe  it  to  a  leading  by  the  devil ; 
or  if  he  has  given  up  belief  in  evil  spirits  he  is  wont  to  lay 
blame  for  the  act  upon  N'ature,  complaining  of  the  strength 
of  the  stimulus,  the  overwhelming  nature  of  the  temptation  ; 
or  perhaps  he  falls  back  upon  the  effects  of  habit,  or  upon 
the  nature  of  his  organism  over  the  formation  of  which  he 
has  had  no  control. 

But  whatever  be  his  action  in  this  respect,  he  is  forced 
to  acknowledge  that  this  choice  of  impulses,  made  at  the  time 
of  the  now  regretted  act,  clashes  with  the  choice  he  would 
make  in  the  moment  of  deliberation. 

This,  as  I  have  said  above,  means  that  a  man's  order  of 
impulse  efiBciencies  after  deliberation  is  different  at  times 
from  that  order  of  impulse  efficiencies  which  prevails  when 
deliberation  is  impossible ;  and  when  we  consider  the  subject 
we  at  once  perceive  that,  if  our  analysis  be  correct,  this  is 
exactly  what  we  should  expect  to  find  to  be  the  case. 

For  we  have  seen  that,  quite  apart  from  idiosyncrasies 

2  B 


370  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

which  must  arise  in  consequence  of  inheritance  from 
ancestors  who  have  been  at  different  stages  of  develop- 
ment at  the  time  of  mating,  and  which  cannot  affect  the 
matter  of  consideration,  each  one's  individual  ethical 
standard  of  the  moment  is  determined  in  its  nature  by 
at  least  four  variables,  viz.  (1)  the  order  of  the  rise  of  his 
instinct  -  born  impulses,  (2)  the  effect  of  his  experience 
during  life,  (3)  the  nature  of  the  stimulus,  and  (4)  the 
intensity  of  the  stimulus. 

The  first  factor,  viz.  the  order  of  the  rise  of  his  instinct- 
born  impulses,  may  be  passed  over  lightly,  for  changes  in 
this  order  usually  take  place  so  slowly  that  they  cannot 
effect  an  appreciable  difference  between  the  impulse  series 
of  the  moment  and  the  impulse  series  of  reflection,  except 
in  those  rather  rare  cases  when  some  act  of  long  ago  is  held 
in  mind  and  compared  with  the  impulse  standard  of  later 
years ;  or  in  those  other  cases  where  a  sudden  "  conversion  " 
brings  into  prominence  in  a  man's  mind  a  new  set  of 
impulses. 

The  effect  of  life  experience,  however,  is  of  much  moment 
in  this  connection,  for  we  have  seen  that  experience  has 
changed  the  order  of  impulse  efficiencies  in  us  from  that 
which  would  be  normal,  through  inheritance,  if  no  experience 
had  affected  us.  Habits  of  action  have  tended  to  make 
easy  the  reactions  to  certain  special  impulses,  and  hence 
have  tended  to  keep  out  of  mind  the  opposed  impulses 
which  have  not  been  strengthened  by  habit.  We  have 
"yielded  to  temptation"  so  often  in  certain  directions 
that  an  artificial  order  of  impulse  efficiencies  of  the 
moment  has  been  formed  in  us. 

It  seems  necessary,  therefore,  to  concede  that  if  time  for 
reflection  be  given,  inasmuch  as  the  effects  of  habit  will 
then  lose  efficacy  because  the  stimulus  is  not  realised  in 
completeness,  the   less   habitually  answered   impulses  will 


CHAP.  XIV  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  IMPULSES  371 

tend  to  gain  their  natural  strength,  so  that  in  reflection 
the  order  of  impulse  efficiencies  will  be  different  from  that 
order  as  grasped  at  the  moment  of  stimulation  to  reaction ; 
i.e.  the  order  of  impulse  efficiencies  then  presented  will 
tend  to  correspond  with  our  own  norm  as  determined  by- 
inheritance,  will  represent  our  "  better  self,"  as  we  are  wont 
to  say. 

The  very  nature  of  the  stimulus  will  also  be  altered  if 
time  be  given  to  reflection :  for  it  will  be  conceded  that  our 
conception  of  the  various  elements  which  go  to  make  up  the 
complex  that  stimulates  us  to  activity  will  change  with 
time,  one  element  gaining  in  power,  another  losing  its 
influence ;  associations  appearing  which  develop  the 
stimulating  complex  in  directions  which  modify  its 
quality  essentially  and  alter  the  mode  of  the  reaction  it 
tends  to  induce. 

Still  more  marked  is  the  change  due  to  alteration  of  the 
intensity  of  the  stimulus,  which  is  liable  to  result  from 
reflection ;  for  stimuli  are  wont  to  vary  in  intensity  from 
moment  to  moment,  and  furthermore  are  reduced  in  power 
relatively  by  the  development  of  associative  trains,  which 
development  involves  distraction  of  attention  from  the 
stimulus  that  originally  affected  us. 

Thus  it  is  that  in  moments  of  restraint  from  immediate 
reaction  to  stimuli  there  arises  within  us  another  order  of 
impulse  efficiencies  than  that  of  the  moment,  and  this  new 
order  gives  us  a  new  standard ;  viz. 

(B)   The  Relatively  Stable  Individual  Ethical  Standard 

Judgment  under  this  standard  is  determined  by  the  fact 
that  the  arrangement  of  the  series  of  impulses  alters,  as 
above  explained,  if  held  for  any  length  of  time  in  considera- 
tion, and  we  are  therefore  led  to  judge  as  to  what  is  right 


372  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

or  wrong  by  that  special  series  which  shows  itself  most 
effective  after  the  enthusiasms  of  the  first  moment  are  gone. 
These  more  permanent  series  are  the  bases  of  our  mature 
ethical  judgments,  they  determine  our  personal  code  of 
morals.  To  these  standards  we  refer  all  cases  of  action  in 
others  or  in  our  own  past,  when  we  are  making  a  careful 
estimate  of  others'  characters,  or  are  passing  judgment  on 
our  own  actions  in  moments  gone  by. 

That  the  "individual  ethical  standard -of- the -moment" 
varies  very  noticeably  from  this  "  relatively  stable  individual 
standard  "  in  each  of  us  is  evidenced  by  the  frequency  with 
which  our  conscience  ^  smites  us  in  remembering  our  past 
acts ;  in  other  words,  by  the  frequency  with  which  we  find 
that  the  arrangement  of  the  impulse  series  of  the  moment 
has  in  the  past  differed  from  the  relatively  permanent 
individual  series  which  now  gives  us  this  relatively  stable 
individual  ethical  standard. 

But  it  must  be  noted  that  we  are  still  dealing  with 
series  that  are  only  relatively  permanent  in  their  order ; 
with  standards  that  are  liable  to  change  from  year  to  year, 
and,  to  a  lesser  degree,  from  day  to  day :  for  it  is  clear  that 
as  these  standards  are  determined  by  the  individual  mental 
constitution  of  the  man,  they  must  change,  as  do  the  man's 
mental  fields,  with  growth  and  development  and  alteration 
of  environment.  These  more  permanent  ethical  standards 
of  our  youth  are  remembered  with  shame  or  wonder,  or  even 
with  laughter,  in  middle  age. 

The  effects  of  habit  too,  as  we  have  above  noted,  are 
here  most  marked.  Habit  changes  the  current  of  our 
thinking,  and  altering,  therefore,  the  efficiency  of  certain 
impulses  changes  our  ethical  standards.  It  is  because 
habit  is  so  powerful  an  agent  in  the  formation  of  our 
standards  that  width  of  view  and  of  moral  education  is  so 
1  Cf.  Chapter  XV.  below. 


CHAP.  xiT  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  IMPULSES  373 

important  in  ethical  matters.  If  we  individuals  constantly 
surround  ourselves  with  companions  whose  actions  are  de- 
termined by  standards  which  the  race  of  moral  men  as  a 
whole  has  declared  unworthy,  we  shall,  nevertheless,  all  too 
soon  learn  to  forget  their  immoralities,  and  actually  may 
come  to  feel  a  sense  of  loss  when  we  are  not  under  their 
influence.  We  are  ourselves,  to  a  large  extent,  responsible 
for,  as  we  are  to  a  great  extent  the  makers  of,  our  own 
ethical  standards. 

As  we  have  said  above,  we  are  evidently  still  dealing 
with  standards  that  are  only  relatively  permanent,  that  are 
constantly  liable  to  change.  Few  men,  however,  realise  this 
variability,  this  shifting  nature,  of  individual  moral  standards. 
The  average  man  never  realises  it.  He  is,  although  un- 
wittingly, the  most  ardent  of  absolutists.  His  own  personal 
standard  he  takes  to  be  a  reflection,  as  it  were,  of  a  certain 
fixed  Absolute ;  and  if  others  differ  from  him,  it  is,  in  his 
view,  because  they  are  thoughtless,  or  are  led  by  other 
than  moral  influences,  or  are  not  sufficiently  developed  to 
appreciate  what  is  really  moral.  He  is  content,  although 
he  know  it  not,  to  deal  always  entirely  with  subjective 
standards,  and  when  he  would  have  something  less  variable 
than  the  individual  standards  of  those  who  surround  him  he 
canonises  his  own  standard. 

§  8.  As  soon  as  we  do  realise  the  variability  of  the 
individual  standard,  however,  we  refuse  to  be  satisfied ; 
we  ask  for  something  more  certain  and  stable ;  we  no 
longer  care  so  much  what  our  own  or  another  person's 
individual  standard  is,  but  we  do  ask  what  it  ought  to  be. 

We  long  to  discover  some  standard  which  will  be  fixed 
and  stable  for  us  at  all  times;  which  will  show  no 
variability;  which  will  enable  us  by  attention  to  avoid 
acting  at  one  time  in  accord  with  our  momentarily  fixed 


374  INSTINCT  AND  KEASON  part  hi 

series  of  impulse  efficiencies,  and  yet  in  such  manner  that 
the  act  as  recalled  will  stand  in  opposition  to  the  series 
dominant  in  subsequent  reflection.  We  look  for  some 
standard  which  we  may  depend  upon  at  any  moment,  and 
this,  we  realise,  can  only  be  obtained  if  we  can  verify  its 
qualities  by  the  evidence  of  others  than  ourselves  ;  we  look 
for  a  standard  which  will  not  only  serve  us,  but  one 
which  will  be  recognised  by  all  of  that  set  of  men  with 
whom  we  wish  to  class  ourselves.  It  becomes  evident  to 
us,  then,  that  standards  of  individuals  can  have  no  philo- 
sophical validity.  It  is  thus  that  we  formulate  for  our- 
selves standards  which  contain  all  that  we  think  best  in 
ourselves  and  in  those  who  surround  us :  furthermore,  we 
become  more  or  less  familiar  with  the  items  of  which  these 
new  standards  are  composed,  and  with  the  order  of  efficiency 
of  these  items,  so  that  we  are  enabled  to  place  them  in 
comparison  with  our  own  series  of  impulse  efficiencies  of  the 
moment  of  reflection  and  perchance  modify  this  latter. 
Thus  we  reach  what  we  may  call 

(C)   The  Ethical  Standard  of  the  most  highly  moral  man 
of  whom  we  can  conceive 

This  is  the  standard  we  all  use  more  or  less  completely, 
whether  we  recognise  that  fact  or  not.  Constituted  as  we 
are,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  live  unaffected  by  the  standards 
of  those  with  whom  we  live ;  from  the  very  fact  that  we 
are  social  beings  our  standards  must  be  influenced  by  the 
standards  of  others ;  standards  of  Class  B  constantly  tend 
to  be  replaced  by  standards  of  Class  C. 

Especially  true  is  it  that  we,  as  ethical  critics,  must 
acknowledge  this  standard  of  the  ideal  man  apart  from  our 
own  individual  standards,  if  we  are  to  treat  practical  ethics 
with  any  breadth.      The  individual  peculiarities  of  our  own 


CHAP.  XIV  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  IMPULSES  375 

impulse  series,  whilst  they  must  remain  none  the  less  valid 
for  us,  must  be  treated  as  individual  rather  than  general ; 
and  our  criticism  must  be  determined  by  reference  to  a 
field  broader  than  the  individual  field ;  one  which  contains 
all  that  is  common  to  those  with  whom  we  wish  to  class 
ourselves. 

We  reach  here,  in  the  words  of  Professor  J.  Mark 
Baldwin,^  "  a  position  taken  up  by  Aristotle,  and  so  often 
reasserted  in  the  history  of  ethical  discussion,  the  position 
which  finds  itself  obliged  to  fall  back  upon  a  hypothetical 
'  best  man '  or  oracle,  whose  judgment  would  be  correct  if 
it  could  be  had."  This  standard  the  reader  will  note,  how- 
ever, is  not  that  of  the  "  perfectionists  "  whose  conception  of 
the  ideal  man  commonly  assumes  the  very  standard  which 
it  attempts  to  explain.  The  ideal  standard  which  we  here 
consider  has  its  value  through  its  width  of  reach  and 
application,  through  the  objectivity  which  is  attached  to 
it,  and  which  it  gains  as  all  other  concepts  gain  their 
objectivity. 

This  standard  indeed  is  still  really  changeable  and 
unstable,  but,  relatively  speaking,  it  is  unchangeable  and 
stable,  for  its  variations  are  determined  by  processes  of 
wide  reach  and  slow  development.  It  must  vary  with 
width  of  experience,  of  education,  of  refinement.  It  will 
change  as  a  person  limits  his  notions  of  life  and  of  the 
Universe,  or  as  his  views  become  broader  and  more  sympa- 
thetic. It  will  alter  with  variation  of  his  conception  as  to 
what  is  worthy  in  the  world  surrounding  him,  and  as  to 
the  sincerity  and  value  of  other  people's  beliefs.  But  for 
all  this  it  is  relatively  stable. 

The  relative  stability  of  this  standard  gives  it  objective 
force  as  a  real  existing  Ideal.     It  becomes  real  in  nearly 

^  Philosophical  Review,  vol.  iv.  No.  3.     Cf.  also  Professor  J.  Mark  Bald- 
win's contributions  to  this  subject  in  his  Menial  Development  and  elsewhere. 


376  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

the  same  sense  that  objects  in  the  physical  world  are  real ; 
and  it  is  for  such  a  real  standard  that  we  search.  As  late 
thinkers  have  taught  us,  our  notions  of  reality  in  the  world 
about  us  are  to  a  great  extent  dependent  upon  the  possibility 
of  comparison  by  individuals  of  effects  upon  themselves  and 
others,  and  by  the  perception  of  agreement  in  the  experiences 
involved ;  in  other  words,  are  dependent  upon  social  recog- 
nitions. As  Professor  Eoyce  puts  it,  "it  is  social  com- 
munity that  is  the  true  differentia  of  our  external  world."  ^ 
With  this  view  in  mind  it  becomes  clear  that  the  standards 
that  we  are  now  discussing  must  become  objective  in  a 
sense  that  allies  them  closely  to  the  realities  of  the  external 
world ;  for  in  the  conception  of  these  standards  we  are 
taking  account  of  the  agreements  in  the  experience  of  those 
whose  judgment  we  believe  to  be  most  worthy  of  confidence, 
and  are  endeavouring  to  co-ordinate  our  own  experience 
with  these  agreements.  As  Green  tells  us,^  "  man  must  in 
some  way  identify  himself  with  others  in  order  to  conceive 
himself  as  the  subject  for  a  good  which  can  be  opposed  to 
such  as  passes  with  his  own  gratification." 

It  is  this  impulse  series  of  the  model  man  as  we  con- 
ceive him  which  is  considered  by  the  theoretical  moralist. 
It  is  such  an  impulse  series,  as  I  understand  it,  that  Dr. 
Martineau  has  depicted  in  his  valuable  Types  of  Ethical 
Theory.  His  introspection  has  shown  him  that  the  standard 
that  obtains  most  permanently  for  himself,  in  common  with 
the  men  he  most  honours,  is  based  upon  the  relative  efficiency 
of  the  impulses  which  within  him  and  them  press  for  re- 
cognition and  expression.  But  he  appears  to  me  to  be  in 
error  in  so  far  as  he  would  lead  us  to  assume  that  the  order 
of  impulse  efficiencies,  which  he  describes,  has  absolute 
validity.^ 

1  Philosophical  Meview,  vol.  iii.  No.  5,  pp.  529,  530. 

2  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  p.  264. 

3  Cf.  Sidgwick,  Method  of  Ethics,  p.  370  ff. 


CHAP.  XIV  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  IMPULSES  377 

§  9.  In  emphasising,  as  we  have  done  above,  the  value 
of  the  recognition  of  others'  standards,  we  must  not,  how- 
ever, overlook  the  fact  that  individual  differentiation  of 
impulse  series  is  none  the  less  exceedingly  important,  for 
upon  it  is  dependent 


(D)   The  Ideal  Ethj/ial  Field  of  the  Individical 

This  ideal  field,  from  our  standpoint,  must  be  a  variable 
one  indeed,  for  it  will  differ  for  each  individual ;  it  is  no 
Absolute  as  usually  conceived ;  no  fixed  objective  Platonic 
ideal  towards  which  we  weakly  strain ;  but  it  is  determined 
by  the  impulse  series  which  in  some  direction  differs  from 
the  normal  series,  and  persists  with  each  one  of  us ;  and  in 
this  divergence  the  individual  feels  that  the  world  ought  to 
agree  with  him.  It  is  the  living  in  accord  with  this  moral 
ideal  that  constitutes  a  man  an  effective  moral  being,  and 
makes  his  life  of  consequence  in  the  world. 

This  ideal  represents,  or  corresponds  with,  the  process 
of  divergence  from  typical  reaction,  concerning  the  im- 
portance of  which  we  speak  at  length  in  the  next  Part  of 
this  book. 

Each  one  of  us,  however  prosaic,  has  some  sort  of  an  ideal 
field  of  this  kind ;  non-agreement  with  it  in  others  looks 
like  moral  error.  So  firmly  rooted  is  this  belief  in  one's 
own  ideal  that  intolerance  is  proverbial  among  fanatical 
sectarians ;  intolerance  which,  were  the  subject  not  too 
serious,  would  often  appear  all  but  amusing  to  one  who 
looks  at  the  subject  from  a  student's  standpoint. 

In  the  course  of  history  now  and  again  an  individual 
ideal,  when  expressed,  enlightens  the  world  ethically,  and 
in  him  whose  ideal  thus  enlightens  we  have  the  ethical 
genius,  the  prophet.  It  is  the  prophet  who  shows  to 
others  an  ideal  impulse  series,  which  they  at  once  recognise 


378  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

as  effective  for  themselves,  although  but  for  him  it  would 
have  been  unknown  to  them. 

A  genius  in  any  field  is  always  impelled  by  instinctive 
forces  which  he  finds  it  difficult  to  suppress  or  control ; 
forces  which  are  combinations  of  inherited  instincts  of 
unusual  form  or  power ;  as  we  have  seen,  he  not  unusually 
feels  these  forces  as  leading  him  from  without ;  they  at 
times  appeal  to  his  consciousness  as  voices  or  visions  rising 
even  to  the  verge  of  actual  hallucination.  Intellectual 
endeavour  can  never  create  the  light  which  displays  itself 
in  the  actions  of  the  genius,  although  it  may  aid  him  in 
the  development  of  his  power,  and  may  teach  him  valuable 
methods  of  using  this  power.  The  genius  teaches  us  the  way: 
Nature  through  him  sheds  a  light  on  some  dark  place  in 
life  and  shows  us  sources  of  delight,  possibilities  of  activity, 
which  have  always  been  within  our  grasp,  but  which,  without 
the  genius,  would  have  remained  hidden  from  us. 

The  prophet  is  a  special  type  of  genius  whose  message 
to  the  world  is  ethical  in  form ;  one  who  gains  a  special 
ethical  insight,  hears  a  special  "  voice,"  and  is  able  to  tell  of 
his  vision  or  message  to  others  of  us  who  cannot  see  nor 
hear  by  ourselves,  but  who  recognise  the  vision  or  word 
when  the  lesson  taught  by  the  prophet  reaches  our  minds. 

In  closing  this  first  division  of  this  chapter,  I  may 
remark  that  if  my  argument  be  correct,  and  if  religion  be 
of  instinctive  nature,  then  the  impulse  which  leads  to 
religious  expression  must  become  part  of  the  latest  form  of 
the  impulse  series  which  has  been  developed  in  man ;  not 
only  must  it  govern  and  enforce  the  instincts  of  earlier 
origin,  but  it  must  function  with  them  all  in  the  production 
of  our  highest  moral  codes  which  make  the  basis  of  the 
noblest  character. 

In  other  words,  the  highest  form  of  moral  code  must 


CHAP.  XI 7  THE  HIERARCHY  OF  IMPULSES  379 

include,  and  be  dominated  by,  this  impulse  to  restraint 
which  permits  the  instincts  of  broader  scope  to  repress 
those  of  less  wide  importance. 

Of  this  I  shall  speak  more  at  length  in  later  chapters. 


II. — Of  the  Eelativity  of  Moral  Codes 

§  10.  The  reader  will  have  noted  long  since  that  we 
have  been  leading  up  to  a  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of 
moral  standards ;  no  novel  doctrine  he  will  say  to  be  sure. 
But  it  is  worth  while  to  note  that  we  have  above  been 
studying  the  nature  of  these  moral  standards  solely  in 
relation  to  our  impulses ;  and  worth  while  also  to  remind 
ourselves  that  the  doctrine  of  relativity,  which  has  often 
been  suggested  to  thinkers  as  the  result  of  the  study  of 
moral  phenomena  as  seen  in  men  around  them,  appears  to 
be  a  doctrine  which  is  necessarily  involved  in  the  very 
nature  of  the  impulses  which  determine  the  existence  of 
ethical  standards ;  is  dependent  upon  the  serial  order  of 
their  rise  into  consciousness,  and  upon  their  development 
in  a  more  or  less  definite  order  co-ordinate  with  the  growth 
and  development  of  the  men  who  experience  them. 

We  see  that  the  very  nature  of  the  development  of 
man's  impulses  involves  the  existence  of  different  standards 
at  different  eras  in  his  development,  of  different  standards 
in  different  races  of  men  of  any  one  era,  of  different  stand- 
ards in  different  men  of  the  same  race  and  tribe,  of  different 
standards  for  the  same  man  at  different  times  of  his  life. 
We  see  that  the  lack  of  agreement  among  men  in  reference 
to  any  ethical  principle,  which  is  brought  out  so  forcibly  by 
Professor  Sidgwick  in  the  third  Book  of  his  Method  of  Ethics, 
is  essentially  necessary  in  man,  constituted  as  he  is.  It  is 
the  observation   of  the  existing   facts,  corresponding  with 


380  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

these  deductions,  that  has  led  men  to  uphold  doctrines  of 
ethical  relativity. 

We  see  furthermore  that  this  nature  of  impulse  involves 
the  necessity  of  the  existence  of  a  difference  between  the 
standard  of  the  moment  and  the  relatively  permanent 
standard.  The  standard  of  the  moment  leads  us  to  deal 
with  emergencies  and  is  retained  by  nature  because  in 
emergencies,  under  conditions  where  reflection  is  impossible, 
the  individualistic  self- preservative  instincts  are,  on  the 
whole,  more  important  to  emphasise  than  the  social  instincts. 
The  more  permanent  standards,  however,  are  those  which 
are  most  important  for  each  and  all  of  us ;  for  upon  them 
is  dependent  our  sense  of  moral  failure,  of  sin,  in  relation 
to  our  action  in  the  past ;  to  them  we  must  trust  for  a 
strengthening  of  the  more  persistent,  the  so-called  "  higher  " 
impulses,  so  that  in  our  action  without  reflection  we  may 
tend  less  and  less  to  act  in  opposition  to  these  more  per- 
manent standards ;  or,  in  other  words,  so  that  we  may  come 
to  sin  less  and  gain  in  righteousness,  so  that  our  acts  when 
viewed  in  retrospect  will  not  stand  in  opposition  to  those 
more  permanent  series  of  impulse  efficiencies  which  deter- 
mine our  higher  standards. 

§  11.  The  method  of  psychological  analysis,  with  which 
we  have  approached  this  subject,  also  enables  us  to  brush 
away  certain  difficulties  which  appear  to  oppose  the  accept- 
ance of  a  doctrine  of  moral  relativity. 

As  I  have  said  above,  when  men  come  to  think  of  the 
subject  of  right  and  wrong  seriously,  and  note  the  diversity 
of  standards,  they  demand  to  know  not  what  men's  stand- 
ards are,  but  what  they  ought  to  be  ;  they  demand  what  we 
speak  of  as  an  absolute  code  of  morals ;  they  ask,  in  other 
words,  for  what  is  real  in  gpodness. 

Now  I  have  no  quarrel  with  metaphysical  doctrines  of 


CHAP,  xrv  THE  RELATIVITY  OF  MORAL  CODES  881 

the  Absolute,  which  may  be  true  without  at  all  interfering 
with  the  conclusions  which  we,  as  psychologists,  here  reach. 
It  is  a  satisfaction,  therefore,  to  find  that  this  practical 
reality  of  the  good,  as  psychically  experienced,  is  discover- 
able under  our  conceptions. 

We  all  realise  that  in  psychic  experience  that  is  real 
which  is  most  highly  stable  in  consciousness:  indeed  I  hold 
that  the  quality  of  reality  is  given  to  any  object  in  con- 
sciousness by  its  relative  stability,  by  the  absence  of  opposi-, 
tion  to  its  taking  its  place  in,  to  its  absorption  into,  the 
apperceptive  system  existing  in  us  at  the  time  of  considera- 
tion. It  is  apparent  therefore  that,  speaking  psychologically, 
the  quality  of  reality,  of  absoluteness,  may  obtain  as  well 
for  standards  of  ethics  as  for  any  other  type  of  mental 
objects ;  and  that  all  that  is  necessary  in  order  that  they 
may  show  this  absolute  character  is  that  they  have 
just  such  a  relative  fixity  as  we  have  seen  they  do  have 
under  the  processes  of  reflection  upon  our  own  standards 
and  those  of  the  best  of  men  as  we  are  able  to  conceive  of 
them. 

Analytical  psychology  thus  gives  us  an  explanation,  and 
in  fact  a  description,  of  the  absolute  ethical  standard  in 
terms  of  relativity :  so  that  we  are  no  longer  compelled  to 
conceive  of  this  Absolute  as  forced  upon  our  attention  from 
without,  as  many  idealists  would  teach  us  that  it  is :  nor  as 
determined  by  a  future  quasi-static  condition  which  we  now 
conceive  of  because  we  know  our  race  to  be  approaching  to 
it,  as  Spencer  would  teach  us ;  ^  this  latter  teaching  being 
based  upon  a  notion  of  a  coming  man  in  whom  there  is  pro- 
duced "  a  correspondence  between  all  the  promptings  of  his 
nature  and  all  the  requirements  of  his  life  as  carried  on  in 
society  "  ;  a  man  of  whose  probable  existence  in  the  future 
I  see  no  evidence  whatever  in  the  processes  of  development 

1  Data  of  Ethics,  §104. 


382  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

as  they  unfold  themselves  before  our  eyes  with  ever -in- 
creasing complexity,  involving  ever  -  new  necessities  of 
adjustment. 

8  12.  In  closing  this  chapter  I  must  say  a  word  to  some 
readers  whom  I  seem  to  see  depressed  by  loss  of  faith 
in  conceptions  which  have  gained  fixity  in  their  minds 
as  years  have  flown.  In  scientific  study  the  facts  must  be 
faced  whether  we  enjoy  the  process  or  not.  And  yet  while 
I  sympathise  with,  as  I  have  in  years  past  known,  the  sense 
of  loss  experienced  by  such  readers,  still  I  think  that  on  the 
whole  we  must  agree  that  we  are  not  losers  by  our  change 
of  conception.  This  notion  of  the  relativity  of  ethical 
standards  is  surely  not  in  any  respect  an  ignoble  one ;  rather 
does  it  appear  to  me  to  be  nobler  than  the  notion  of  absolute 
standards  as  most  men  conceive  of  them. 

The  conception  of  an  absolute  standard  in  ethics,  the 
notion  of  a  fixed  universal  good  which  the  moral  man  strives 
to  conceive  and  to  represent,  has  in  itself,  as  I  have  sug- 
gested elsewhere,  great  value  of  an  aesthetic  type  altogether 
apart  from  its  philosophic  value ;  it  attracts  us  by  the  relief 
it  offers  from  the  distracting  oppositions  of  individualism, 
and  bythe  fact  that  it  arouses  within  us  that  certain  sense 
of  sublimity  which  attaches  to  all  things  that  are  dimly 
felt  to  exist,  and  yet  but  indefinitely  realised ;  to  all  that 
which,  on  account  of  inscrutableness,  invites  worship.  This 
aesthetic  value  is  perhaps  to  a  great  extent  lost  if  we  accept 
the  doctrine  of  relativity  here  urged. 

But  if  we  lose  something  in  adopting  the  standards  of 
relativity,  I  think  we  are  on  the  whole  gainers :  for  it  is 
apparent  that  our  view  teaches  us  that  the  sense  of  good- 
ness is  never  to  be  lost  to  us.  If  an  absolute  fixed  good 
existed  and  were  once  attained,  if  the  code  of  an  absolute 
Ethic  were  once  known  so  that  it  could  be  applied  to  all 


CHAP.  XIV  THE  RELATIVITY  OF  MORAL  CODES  383 

of  life,  then  surely  with  this,  as  with  all  else  of  human 
attainment,  its  commonplaceness  would  involve  less  of 
interest  for  us ;  for  with  the  attainment  of  the  goal  fixed 
for  us,  in  the  end  our  race  would  be  deprived  of  all  con- 
ception of  npble  action;  would  automatically  act  in  a  fixed 
way  with  no  thought  of  results. 

The  doctrine  here  defended,  on  the  other  hand,  eaiables 
us  to  look  forward  to  an  ever-new  conception  of  the  Good, 
arising  as  man  develops.  As  these  standards  are  determined 
by  subjective  states,  as  they  differ  with  human  attainment 
and  enlightenment,  so  evidently  must  they  be  determined 
by  individual  character ;  as  that  develops,  so  will  our 
estimate  of  goodness  continue  to  develop,  ever  disclosing  to 
our  view  new  moral  realms  towards  which  we  may  reach 
out,  and  ever  bringing  to  us  new  enthusiasms. 

But  some  critic  is  not  unlikely  to  say  that  all  this  is 
very  cold  comfort  if  at  the  same  time  we  are  compelled  to 
grant  that  these  very  standards  which  are  to  arouse  our 
enthusiasms  are  as  fleeting  and  unstable  as  they  are  here 
held  to  be.  We  must  remember,  however,  that  it  is  only 
in  practical  life  that  there  is  any  proper  demand  for  un- 
changing objective  standards,  and,  as  I  have  shown  above, 
such  standards  as  are  thus  demanded  do  exist  for  us, 
standards  which  have  a  stability  very  closely  comparable 
to  that  of  the  objects  in  the  physical  world  in  which  we 
live. 

Nor  do  I  see  why  the  philosopher  should  ask  for  more. 
It  is  true  that  if  we  think  of  ourselves  as  entities  freed 
from  the  influences  which  move  the  universe  and  guiding 
our  own  conduct  altogether  without  compulsion,  then  we 
may  well  be  discouraged  and  dismayed  to  feel  that  there  is 
no  fixed  type  of  the  best  conduct  which  we  may  use  as  a 
basis  for  imitation  in  the  building  up  of  morality.  But  if 
we  are  logical  determinists  who  realise  that  we  are  but  part 


384  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

of  the  great  universe  which  is  moved  by  powers  beyond 
our  ken,  who  acknowledge  with  Professor  Sidgwick  that 
whilst  the  sense  of  freedom  is  necessarily  connected  with 
the  act  of  willing,  nevertheless  our  free  egohood  is  an 
inherent  part  of  this  universe,  the  development,  of  which  is 
fully  determined ;  then  it  appears  to  me  -that  there  is  no 
proper  philosophic  demand  for  the  existence  of  an  absolute 
ethical  standard,  such  as  we  might  comprehend  by  reflection, 
so  long  as  the  relative  standards  which  we  can  grasp  are 
sufficiently  stable  to  appear  to  the  average  man  to  be  firmly 
rooted  in  common  human  nature. 


CHAPTEE  XV 

OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY 

T. — Of  Conscience 

§  1.  In  the  preceding  chapters  we  have  frequently  assumed 
the  existence  in  ourselves  of  what  we  call  conscience,  and 
I  have  taken  it  for  granted  that  the  reader  appreciates  cor- 
rectly the  nature  of  that  state  of  mind  which  results  from 
the  action  of  conscience :  I  shall  now  ask  him  to  study  this 
mental  state  with  me  a  little  more  in  detail. 

The  experience  to  which  we  refer  when  we  speak  of  the 
"  voice  of  conscience  "  is  familiar  to  all ;  as  we  use  the  word 
objectively,  conscience  is  but  a  term  employed  to  describe  a 
certain  capacity  which  we  possess ;  a  capacity  which  is 
appreciated  subjectively  by  the  forceful  presentation  in  con- 
sciousness of  an  impulse  which  arises  as  we  reflect  upon  our 
past  actions,  and  as  we  perceive  that  this  impulse  was  not 
followed  in  that  past,  although  it  would  be  followed  could 
we  now  live  in  that  past  again,  and  could  we  act  again  as 
now  in  the  moment  of  reflection  we  wish  we  had  acted. 

Conscience,  then,  is  determined  by  the  powerful  pre- 
sentation in  consciousness  of  an  impulse ;  this  powerful 
presentation  resulting  from  the  fact  that  an  instinct  of  a 
persistent  if  not  of  an  intense  type  has  been  inhibited  in 
our  life  of  the  past ;  this  inhibition  having  been  effected  by 
some  force  which  was  temporarily  more  powerful,  although 

2  c 


386  INSTINCT  AND  KEASON  part  in 

less  continuous  in  its  influence,  than  that  which  presses  the 
persistent  impulse  into  prominence. 

I  need  scarcely  tell  my  reader  that  this  view  is  sub- 
stantially that  expounded  by  Charles  Darwin  in  the  fourth 
chapter  of  his  Descent  of  Man;  nor  can  I  too  urgently 
beg  him  to  re-read  this  chapter  if  by  chance  its  teachings  are 
dim  in  his  mind.  It  would  be  unnecessary  for  me,  indeed, 
to  do  more  than  show  the  harmony  between  the  results  of 
our  previous  consideration  and  this  doctrine  of  Darwin's 
did  I  not  wish  to  emphasise  certain  points  which  Darwin 
himself  was  not  concerned  to  treat  in  detail,  and  to  make 
certain  explanations  without  which  the  doctrine  seems  to 
me  to  be  open  to  criticism. 

Darwin's  statement  of  the  case  is  so  strong  that  I  shall 
quote  quite  at  length  certain  passages  from  the  chapter 
above  mentioned. 

"  The  more  enduring  Social  histinds  conquer  the  less  persistent  Instincts^ 
Why  should  a  man  feel  that  he  ought  to  obey  one  instinctive  desire 
rather  than  another?  .Why  is  he  bitterly  regretful,  if  he  has  yielded 
to  a  strong  sense  of  self-preservation,  and  has  not  risked  his  life  to  save 
that  of  a  fellow-creature  ?  or  why  does  he  regret  having  stolen  food  from 
hunger  ? 

It  is  evident,  in  the  first  place,  that  with  mankind  the  instinctive 
impulses  have  different  degrees  of  strength  ;  a  savage  will  risk  his  own 
life  to  save  that  of  a  member  of  the  same  community,  but  will  be 
wholly  indifferent  about  a  stranger :  a  young  and  timid  mother,  urged 
by  the  maternal  instinct,  will,  wathout  a  moment's  hesitation,  run  the 
greatest  danger  for  her  own  infant,  but  not  for  a  mere  fellow-creature. 
Nevertheless,  many  a  civilised  man,  or  even  boy,  who  never  before 
risked  his  life  for  another,  but  full  of  courage  and  sympathy,  has  dis- 
regarded the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  and  plunged  at  once  into  a 
torrent  to  save  a  drowning  man,  though  a  stranger.  In  this  case  man 
is  impelled  by  the  same  instinctive  motive  which  made  the  heroic 
little  American  monkey,  formerly  described,  save  his  keeper,  by 
attacking  the  great  and  dreaded  baboon.  Such  actions  as  the  above 
appear  to  be  the  simple  result  of  the  greater  strength  of  the  social  or 
maternal  instincts  than  that  of  any  other  instinct  or  motive;  for  they 
are  performed  too  instantaneously  for  reflection,  or  for  pleasure  or  jjain 
to  be  felt  at  the  time  ;  though,  if  prevented  by  any  cause,  distress  or 
even  misery  might  be  felt.      In  a  timid  man,  on  the  other  hand,  the 


CHAP.  XV     OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  387 

instinct  of  self-preservation  might  be  so  strong,  that  he  would  be  un- 
able to  force  himself  to  run  any  such  risk,  perhaps  not  even  for  his 
own  child.   .  .  . 

Man,  from  the  activity  of  his  mental  faculties,  cannot  avoid  reflec- 
tion :  past  impressions  and  images  are  incessantly  and  clearly  passing 
through  his  mind.  Now  with  those  animals  which  live  permanently 
in  a  body,  the  social  instincts  are  ever  present  and  persistent.  Such 
animals  are  always  ready  to  utter  the  danger-signal,  to  defend  the 
community,  and  to  give  aid  to  their  fellows  in  accordance  with  their 
habits  ;  they  feel  at  all  times,  without  the  stimulus  of  any  special 
passion  or  desire,  some  degree  of  love  and  sympathy  for  them ;  they 
are  unhappy  if  long  separated  from  them,  and  always  happy  to  be 
again  in  their  company.  So  it  is  with  ourselves.  Even  when  we  are 
quite  alone,  how  often  do  we  think  with  pleasure  or  pain  of  what 
others  think  of  us — of  their  imagined  approbation  or  disapprobation  ; 
and  this  all  follows  from  sympathy,  a  fundamental  element  of  the 
social  instincts.  A  man  who  possessed  no  trace  of  such  instincts  would 
be  an  unnatural  monster.  On  the  other  hand,  the  desire  to  satisfy 
hunger,  or  any  passion  such  as  vengeance,  is  in  its  nature  temporary, 
and  can  for  a  time  be  fully  satisfied.  Nor  is  it  easy,  perhaps  hardly 
possible,  to  call  up  with  complete  vividness  the  feeling,  for  instance, 
of  hunger  ;  nor  indeed,  as  has  often  been  remarked,  of  any  suffering. 
The  instinct  of  self-preservation  is  not  felt  except  in  the  presence  of 
danger ;  and  many  a  coward  has  thought  himself  brave  until  he  has 
met  his  enemy  face  to  face.  The  wish  for  another  man's  property  is 
perhaps  as  persistent  a  desire  as  any  that  can  be  named  ;  but  even  in 
this  case  the  satisfaction  of  actual  possession  is  generally  a  weaker 
feeling  than  the  desire  ;  many  a  thief,  if  not  a  habitual  one,  after 
success  has  wondered  why  he  stole  some  article. 

A  man  cannot  prevent  past  impressions  often  repassing  through  his 
mind  ;  he  will  thus  be  driven  to  make  a  comparison  between  the 
impressions  of  past  hunger,  vengeance  satisfied,  or  danger  shunned  at 
other  men's  cost,  with  the  almost  ever-present  instinct  of  sympathy, 
and  with  his  early  knowledge  of  what  others  consider  as  praiseworthy 
or  blameable.  This  knowledge  cannot  be  banished  from  his  mind, 
and  from  instinctive  sympathy  is  esteemed  of  great  moment.  He  will 
then  feel  as  if  he  had  been  baulked  in  following  a  present  instinct  or 
habit,  and  this  with  all  animals  causes  dissatisfaction,  or  even  misery. 

The  above  case  of  the  swallow  affords  an  ill  ustration,  though  of  a 
reversed  nature,  of  a  temporary,  though  for  the  time  strongly  persistent, 
instinct  conquering  another  instinct,  which  is  usually  dominant  over 
all  others.  At  the  proper  season  these  birds  seem  all  day  long  to  be 
impressed  with  the  desire  to  migrate ;  their  habits  change  ;  they 
become  restless,  are  noisy,  and  congregate  in  flocks.  Whilst  the 
mother-bird  is  feeding,  or  brooding  over  her  nestlings,  the  maternal 
instinct  is  probably  stronger  than  the  migratory  ;  but  the  instinct 
which  is  the  more  persistent  gains  the  victory,  and  at  last,  at  a  moment 


388  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

when  her  young  ones  are  not  in  sight,  she  takes  flight  and  deserts 
them.  When  arrived  at  the  end  of  her  long  journey,  and  the  migratory 
instinct  has  ceased  to  act,  what  an  agony  of  remorse  the  bird  would 
feel,  if,  from  being  endowed  with  great  mental  activity,  she  could  not 
prevent  the  image  passing  through  her  mind  of  her  young  ones 
perishing  in  the  bleak  north  from  cold  and  hunger. 

At  the  moment  of  action,  man  will  no  doubt  be  apt  to  follow  the 
stronger  impulse  ;  and  though  this  may  occasionally  prompt  him  to 
the  noblest  deeds,  it  will  more  commonly  lead  him  to  gratify  his  own 
desires  at  the  expense  of  other  men.  But  after  their  gratification, 
when  past  and  weaker  impressions  are  judged  by  the  ever-enduring 
social  instinct,  and  by  his  deep  regard  for  the  good  opinion  of  his 
fellows,  retribution  will  surely  come.  He  will  then  feel  remorse, 
repentance,  regret,  or  shame  ;  this  latter  feeling,  however,  relates 
almost  exclusively  to  the  judgment  of  others.  He  will  consequently 
resolve  more  or  less  firmly  to  act  differently  for  the  future ;  and  this 
is  conscience  ;  for  conscience  looks  backwards,  and  serves  as  a  guide 
for  the  future." 


§  2.  We  may  speak,  then,  of  conscience  as  the  protest  of 
a  persistent  instinct  against  its  inhibition  by  a  less  persistent, 
but  for  the  moment  more  powerful,  force.  This  opposing 
force  may  be  the  outcome  of  reasoned  process,  or  it  may  be 
due  to  the  existence  of  what  is  recognised  *to  be  another 
instinct  which  is  less  persistent,  but  liable  to  be  temporarily 
more  powerful,  than  the  persistent  instinct  which  it  inhibits. 

If  this  be  the  true  view  of  the  nature  of  conscience,  then 
we  should  expect  to  find  it,  as  we  do,  appearing  most  clearly 
in  our  introspective  and  retrospective  moods,  when  we  think 
over  the  acts  of  the  past  and  reflect  upon  the  nature  of  the 
revived  impulses  which  are  brought  to  mind  by  the  remem- 
bered circumstances  attending  these  past  acts.  For,  in 
the  first  place,  at  such  moments  of  retrospect,  the  active 
resultants  of  the  reasoned  processes  of  the  past  can  no 
longer  follow  upon  the  course  of  thought  as  it  is  revived ; 
and  on  that  account  the  persistent  impulses,  which  would 
lead  us  to  actions  opposed  td  those  that  were  dictated  by 
reason  in  that  past,  are  able  in  the  moment  of  retrospect  to 
impress  themselves  upon  the  mind. 


CHAP.  XV     OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  38& 

In  the  second  place,  we  must  note  that  it  is  the 
earlier  formed,  the  more  thoroughly  co-ordinated  instincts, 
those  which  we  are  wont  to  speak  of  as  the  "  lower " 
instincts,  that  are  temporarily  forceful ;  and  these  in 
moments  of  retrospect  fail  to  react  because  the  actual 
stimuli  to  their  hypernormal  reaction  are  lacking.  Thus 
it  is  that  the  persistent  impulses  that  have  been  opposed 
will  be  able  to  come  into  prominence. 

A  man,  for  instance,  may  reason  within  himself  that  a 
theft  from  his  rich  employer  will  harm  the  latter  little,  and 
will  bring  to  himself  and  to  his  family  much  that  is  of  real 
value  to  him  and  to  them ;  and  with  the  opportunity  for 
peculation  before  him  to  strengthen  his  argument  he  may 
take  the  other's  property.  But  in  the  stillness  of  the  night, 
when  the  active  steps  which  his  defalcation  involves  cannot 
result  from  the  argument  with  which  he  has  sophisticated 
himself — when  the  development  of  his  thought  into  action 
is  inhibited  by  the  circumstances  in  which  he  is  placed, — 
then  the  persistent  social  instinct  gains  his  attention,  then 
his  conscience  "  smites  him."  In  other  words,  the  impulse 
resultant  from  the  inhibition  of  the  persistent  social  instinct 
(against  stealing)  occurs  and  recurs  to  his  mind,  together 
with  the  pain  that  necessarily  goes  with  the  idea  of  the  in- 
hibition of  this  impulse  by  the  remembered  past  act. 

Or  to  turn  to  the  clash  of  instinct  with  instinct,  a  man 
overwhelmed  by  passion  may  strike  his  opponent,  and  may 
strike  to  kill.  But  in  a  calmer  moment,  when  this  opponent 
is  not  at  hand  to  be  struck,  when  the  development  of  the 
instinct  leading  to  individualistic  protective  action  is  not 
called  out, — and  this  in  consequence  of  the  absence  of  the 
real  stimulus  to  such  action, — then  the  persistent  social 
instinct  has  opportunity  to  develop,  and  becomes  prominent 
in  the  voice  of  conscience  which  reproaches  him. 


390  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

In  order  that  we  may  gain  a  more  complete  conception 
of  the  nature  of  conscience,  let  us  make  a  further  study  of 
it  in  these  two  aspects.  '■ 

§  3.  Let  us  consider,  in  the  first  place,  the  inhibition 
of  one  instinct  by  another.  As  Darwin  says,  "  The  more 
enduring  social  instincts  conquer  the  less  persistent  in- 
stincts." Why  it  is  that  these  social  instincts  are  "more 
enduring "  we  have  already  briefly  suggested :  we  shall 
discuss  this  question  more  fully  in  §  10  below. 

But  here  I  wish  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  it  is 
not  only  the  social  instincts  that  are  more  enduring,  and 
that  conquer  less  persistent  instincts,  as  might  appear  from 
the  above  quotation  from  Darwin  ;  for,  as  we  have  seen,  there 
is  a  hierarchy  of  instinct  groups,  and  a  hierarchy  of  the 
instincts  within  each  group,  and  these  hierarchies  evidently 
imply  differences  of  persistence ;  consequently  we  must 
expect  to  find  these  differences  of  persistence,  and  conscience 
which  is  determined  by  them,  appearing  in  the  broadest  of 
relations. 

It  thus  becomes  easy  to  explain  the  fact  that,  where  the 
instincts  that  relate  to  the  persistence  of  the  species  have 
been  carelessly  gratified,  men  often  find  themselves  in  retro- 
spect oppressed  by  conscience,  i.e.  by  the  ever-recurring 
pressure  of  those  instincts  regulative  of  sexual  relations 
which  relate  to  social  advantage,  and  which  latter,  had  they 
been  followed,  would  have  led  to  the  curbing  of  passion. 
The  licentious  man,  if  he  be  not  too  hardened,  when  he 
reflects  upon  his  past,  must  feel  reproach  arising  from  the 
pressure  of  those  instincts  that  guide  our  social  life  in  the 
direction  of  monogamous  sexual  life,  and  which  produce  in 
the  best  of  us  devotion  to  one  wife  and  to  the  children 
borne  by  her. 


CHAP.  XV     OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  391 

It  is  thus  also  that  where  the  purely  individualistic 
instincts  have  been  gratified  we  often  experience  a  protest 
from  the  various  grades  of  instincts  which  are  higher  in 
the  scale  than  the  individualistic  ones ;  not  only  from  the 
instincts  which  relate  to  social  life,  but  also  from  those 
instincts  which  relate  in  certain  connections  to  the  persist- 
ence of  the  species. 

We  may  illustrate  the  last -mentioned  class  first,  by 
noting  how  the  man  who  has  fled  from  personal  danger  is 
reproached  by  his  conscience  when  he  reflects  that,  in  his 
efforts  to  save  himself,  he  left  wife  and  children  unprotected. 

The  contests  between  social  and  individualistic  instincts, 
however,  furnish  us  with  the  most  vivid  examples  of  the 
enduring  reproaches  of  conscience,  and  this  because  the 
individualistic  instincts  are  the  least  persistent  and  in 
general  the  most  powerful,  while  the  social  instincts  are  the 
most  persistent  and  in  general  the  least  powerful.  The 
"  Fury "  who  pursues  the  murderer  is  the  personification 
of  the  pressure  of  the  enduring  social  instinct  which  leads 
to  the  protection  of  human  life,  an  instinct  upon  which  the 
very  existence  of  the  more  complex  social  fabrics  depends. 
The  remorse  of  the  man  who  has  gained  individualistic 
advantage  by  lying,  or  by  stealing,  is  closely  allied  to  the 
distress  of  the  murderer. 

§  4.  In  §  3  we  have  spoken,  as  Darwin  did  almost 
exclusively,  of  conscience  as  it  is  developed  by  the  clash  of 
instinct  with  instinct ;  but  clearly,  under  this  view,  if  an 
emphasis  of  opposition  to  a  persistent  instinct  is  brought 
about  in  any  other  way,  then  we  shall  have  the  same  voice 
of  conscience  raised  in  protest.  It  must  be  apparent  that 
the  reasoned  emphasis,  or  the  argumentative  strengthening,  of 
the  more  thoroughly  co-ordinated  instincts  may  often  bring 
about  such  an  opposition  as  that  above  referred  to. 


392  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

The  man  who  argues  himself  into  the  belief  that  the 
necessities  of  self-preservation  demand  and  excuse  lying 
must  expect  to  be  belaboured  by  his  conscience  after  the 
danger  is  past.  He  who  reasons  that  abounding  sexual 
capacity  would  not  have  been  given  to  man  had  Nature  not 
intended  him  to  exercise  this  capacity  without  restraint, 
and  who  acts  in  accord  with  that  reasoned  result  forgetful 
of  the  value  of  the  later  developed  restraining  instincts, — 
such  a  man  must  expect  eventually  to  find  himself  smitten 
by  a  conscience  born  of  his  social  instincts. 

The  reasoned  emphasis  of  ideal  ends  may  also  lead 
to  similar  results.  The  man  who  convinces  himself  by 
argument  that  indiscriminate  benevolence  is,  on  the  whole, 
injurious  to  the  recipient  of  charity,  if  he  act  in  accordance 
with  his  conviction,  must  expect  to  face  the  burden  arising 
from  the  obstructed  social  forces  within  him,  from  the 
pressure  of  his  deep-seated  benevolent  instincts.  We  have 
all  had  such  experience. 

§  5.  Some  critical  reader  may  be  inclined  to  say  that  I 
have  thus  far  been  considering  conscience  in  an  artificially 
simplified  form :  for,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  in  our  complex  life 
the  variations  of  impulse  are  indefinite  in  number  and  the 
oppositions  of  conscience  often  unanalysable  in  their  variety. 
As  Professor  Eoyce  has  well  said  of  conscience  as  we  usually 
experience  it :  "  Conscience  is  a  well-knit  system  of  socially 
acquired  habits  of  existing  acts,  a  system  so  constituted  as 
to  be  easily  aroused  into  conscious  presence  by  the  coming 
of  the  idea  of  any  hesitantly  conceived  act."  ^  All  this  is 
without  doubt  true  in  relation  to  our  normal  experience  of 
conscience ;  but  my  object  here  is  not  to  describe  conscience 
in  its  full  and  complex  development,  but  conscience  in  its 
simplest  forms.     In  so  brief  a  study  as  we  have  space  for 

^  Philosophical  Review,  II.  v.  p.  454. 


CHAP.  XV     OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  393 

here  we  can  hope  to  do  little  more  than  sift  out  certain 
more  or  less  typical  forms  for  consideration. 

If  the  position  taken  above  be  correct,  then  we  may  say 
that  conscience  is  no  power  or  "  faculty  "  of  a  unified  nature, 
as  it  is  not  infrequently  conceived  to  be ;  rather  that  for 
each  persistent  instinct  there  exists  a  special  type  of 
conscience,  each  type  differing  as  to  the  psychic  elements 
involved,  but  all  having  a  common  ground  in  their  always 
painfully  persistent  impulsive  demand.  In  this  sense  there 
is  a  special  form  of  conscience  felt  by  the  lover  if  he 
neglect  his  mistress ;  another  form  felt  by  the  husband  if 
he  neglect  his  pregnant  wife :  another  that  impresses  the 
father  who  may  have  neglected  his  children  ;  these  all  relat- 
ing to  the  instincts  which  are  of  importance  to  the  persist- 
ence of  the  species. 

There  is  another  group  of  consciences,  if  we  may  so 
speak,  that  relates  to  what  we  may  call  the  more  direct 
social  instincts — the  ethical  consciences  that  contend  against 
lying  and  theft,  murder  and  adultery.  There  is  still 
another  group  of  consciences  to  which  we  have  already 
referred  in  an  earlier  chapter — consciences  that  relate  to 
instincts  which  are  effective  in  producing  social  consolida- 
tion. We  clearly  have  a  patriotic  conscience  which  re- 
proaches us  if  we  act  for  individualistic  benefit,  or  even  for 
the  advantage  of  wife  and  children,  without  regard  to  the 
advantage  of  the  special  social  group  that  we  call  "  our 
country " :  we  as  certainly  have  a  benevolent  conscience 
which  smites  us  when  we  "  harden  our  hearts,"  even  though, 
as  happens  in  not  a  few  cases,  this  repression  of  the  ex- 
pression of  sympathy  happens  to  be  unquestionably  wise. 

So  also  if  our  view  be  correct  we  might  expect  to  find 
within  ourselves  an  aesthetic  conscience  protesting  against  the 
careless  production  of  ugliness  in  our  handiwork ;  and  this 


594  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

for  the  very  reason  that,  as  we  have  already  seen,  we  are 
compelled  to  believe  artistic  expression  to  be  the  result  of 
the  working  out  of  a  true  instinct,  the  function  of  sesthetic 
expression  being  the  fostering  of  social  consolidation.  If 
such  an  aesthetic  conscience  exist  we  should  expect  to  find 
it  developed  only  so  far  as  our  tendencies  to  aesthetic  ex- 
pression are  strongly  developed ;  and  I  think  it  can  be  seen 
to  be  gradually  dawning  within  our  race. 

Some  of  my  readers,  especially  if  they  be  artists,  will,  I 
doubt  not,  deny  that  even  the  ghost  of  an  aesthetic  con- 
science exists  among  the  mass  of  the  people ;  but  I  would 
remind  such  doubters  that  we  are  all  also  not  infrequently 
tempted  to  ask  whether  the  ethical  conscience  also  is  really 
widely  existent  in  man,  or  whether  it  may  not  be  dis- 
appearing among  the  masses :  yet  from  time  to  time  our 
doubts  in  this  direction  are  set  at  rest  by  some  powerful  and 
widespread  movement  in  the  right  direction ;  perhaps  by 
some  indignant  protest  of  the  people  against  political  crime 
which  we  had  thought  they  had  come  to  condone.  I  myself 
am  confident  that  there  exists  within  each  of  us  the  germ 
of  an  aesthetic  just  as  much  as  of  an  ethical  conscience,  and 
that  the  former  as  the  latter  needs  but  opportunity  and 
encouragement  to  grow  into  a  force  most  powerful  for  good. 

§  6.  But  it  must  be  evident  to  the  reader  of  the  pre- 
ceding argument  that  if  these  consciences  of  ours  are 
determined  by  the  existence  of  impulses  which  are  due  to 
the  inhibition  of  instincts  as  modified  by  life  experience, 
then  there  are  also  very  likely  to  be  noted  what  we 
niay  call  pseudo- consciences  which  we  should  find  to  be 
determined  altogether  by  the  existence  of  individual 
idiosyncrasies,  or  of  individually  acquired  habits  of  action, 
which  from  time  to  time  are  inhibited.  These  pseudo - 
consciences,  having  individualistic  value  only,  must  be  care- 


CHAP.  XV     OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  395 

fully  differentiated  from  the  true  consciences  that  have 
relation  to  racial  values. 

An  example  of  the  idiosyncratic  type  we  have  in  what 
we  may  call,  by  a  stretch  of  verbal  usage,  the  physiological 
conscience,  which  for  each  individual  enters  a  protest  against 
his  eating  certain  foods  that  at  certain  times  in  his  life  may 
have  disturbed  his  digestion.  This,  as  I  have  just  said, 
would  not  generally  be  called  a  protest  of  conscience,  but 
in  my  own  experience  I  feel  that  there  is  no  essential 
difference  to  be  noted,  except  as  to  content,  between  the 
mental  state  thus  experienced  and  the  mental  state 
experienced  when  I  review  some  failure  in  what  we  are 
accustomed  to  speak  of  as  the  moral  life. 

An  example  of  the  broader  habit  type  we  have  in  what 
may  be  truly  called  the  "  business  conscience  "  that  smites 
the  average  hard-worked  man,  whose  life  is  little  varied  by 
holidays,  when  for  some  days  he  "  takes  a  vacation." 

The  distinction  between  these  individualistic  quasi-con- 
sciences  and  the  real  racial  ones  is  made,  as  is  the  distinction 
between  individually  acquired  habit  reflexes  and  instincts  of 
which  we  have  spoken  in  a  preceding  chapter,  by  noting 
the  variable  nature  of  the  former  class  and  the  persistent 
invariableness  of  the  latter ;  and  in  the  fact  that  the  former 
class  are  personal,  individual,  while  the  latter  are  found  to 
belong  to  all,  or  to  a  large  proportion  of  our  race.  That  it  is 
most  important  to  distinguish  between  the  true  and  the 
pseudo-consciences  goes  almost  without  saying,  if  one  recall 
what  we  have  argued  above  concerning  the  very  great 
practical  importance  of  the  distinction  between  instinct  and 
acquired  habit ;  for  true  conscience  tells  us  of  instinct,  while 
the  pseudo-conscience  tells  us  merely  of  idiosyncrasy,  or  of 
acquired  habit,  in  nearly  or  quite  reflex  form.  The  true 
conscience  warns  us  against  actions  which  in  the  past 
Jiistory  of  our  race  have  almost  certainly  been  opposed  to 


396  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

the  welfare  of  the  individual,  or  more  often  of  the  species, 
or  of  the  social  aggregate;  while  the  pseudo- conscience 
merely  tells  us  that  we  are  subverting  an  artificial 
individualistic  habit. 

It  is  one  of  the  special  functions  of  the  religious  instinct 
that  it  enables  us  to  differentiate  between  the  pseudo- 
consciences  and  the  real  consciences  which  are  implanted 
in  us  by  Nature,  and  which  are  not  due  to  individually 
acquired  habit;  for  the  restraint  which  religion  imposes 
enables  us  to  note  the  differences  of  persistence  and  width 
of  application  more  clearly  than  would  otherwise  be  possible. 

With  conscience  is  connected  a  distinct  sense  of  obliga- 
tion ;  this,  however,  is  more  especially  developed  in  con- 
nection with  the  differentiation  of  conscience  which  we 
discuss  in  the  second  division  of  this  chapter,  and  I  shall 
therefore  reserve  all  consideration  of  this  subject. 

II. — The  Sense  of  Duty 

§  7.  In  what  has  preceded  this  we  have  been  considering 
the  effect  in  consciousness  of  the  protest  of  impulses  which 
are  determined  by  instincts,  whether  modified  or  unmodified 
by  life  experience,  all  of  which  are  on  an  equal  plane,  so  to 
speak,  all  under  appropriate  conditions,  having  equally  their 
proper  place  in  man's  life ;  this  protest,  therefore,  and  its 
conscious  result  cannot  but  be  in  main  the  same  in  quality, 
however  varied  be  the  impulses  which  stand  opposed. 
Introspection  shows  that  this  deduction  from  theory  is 
correct,  for  no  distinction  is  to  be  made  between  conscience 
as  it  arises  in  connection  with  the  most  varied  of  impulses. 

The  conscience,  for  instance,  which  affects  one  who 
allows  his  individualistic  impulses  to  overpower  those  relating 
to  the  persistence  of  species  is  not  differentiated,  except  so 


CHAP.  XV      OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  397 

far  as  the  contents  differ,  from  the  conscience  which  affects 
one  who  permits  his  sexual  instincts  to  overwhelm  those 
that  relate  to  social  life.  So  true  is  this,  indeed,  that  men 
have  been  led,  as  we  know,  to  look  upon  conscience  as  a 
special  "  faculty,"  independent  of  the  impulses  which  bring 
it  into  consciousness,  a  "  faculty "  which  is  stimulated  to 
activity  by  failures  to  act  in  accordance  with  any  of  those 
standards  which  we  call  "  nobler." 

But  if  the  position  taken  in  what  has  preceded  this 
be  correct,  the  impulses  which  must  appear  upon  the 
inhibition  of  the  religious  instinct  will  vary  noticeably 
from  the  impulses  corresponding  with  the  other  instincts, 
in  one  important  particular. 

The  religious  instinct,  it  must  be  remembered,  according 
to  our  hypothesis,  functions  to  the  production  of  restraint 
from  all  variation  from  typical  reaction ;  consequently  while 
on  the  one  hand  all  impulses  other  than  the  religious 
impulse  are  brought  into  consciousness  under  special  con- 
ditions of  opposition  only,  and  can  only  come  in  conflict 
with  a  limited  number  of  other  impulses,  on  the  other 
hand  the  religious  impulse  must  be  called  out  in  all  cases 
where  the  development  of  organic  instincts  tends  to  be 
opposed  by  variant  process,  and  whenever  opposition  appears 
to  the  development  of  life  in  accord  with  that  order  of 
instinct  efficiency  that  has  become  established  in  each  one 
of  us  in  the  course  of  our  evolution  as  part  of  our  race. 

"We  should  expect,  therefore,  to  find  a  new  development 
of  conscience  in  connection  with  the  development  of  the 
religious  instinct ;  a  differentiation  of  conscience,  so  to 
speak,  that  would  not  appear  in  connection  with  any  other 
impulses :  a  differentiation  that  would  be  determined  by  its 
very  general  occurrence,  by  its  appearance  in  connection 
with  all  sorts  and  kinds  of  impulses,  only  provided  they  be 
repressed  by  variant  processes,  provided  they  tend  to  pro- 


398  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

duce  an  inversion  of  that  order  of  impulse  efi&ciencies  which 
nature  has  impressed  upon  us. 

Such  a  differentiation  of  conscience  I  think  we  find 
developed  within  us,  and  it  is  this  differentiation  that  we 
usually  have  in  mind  when  we  speak  of  "  the  sense  of 
duty." 

Duty  as  usually  conceived  is  not  concerned  with  the 
opposition  of  two  specific  impulses,  but  with  the  conduct 
of  our  lives  in  accordance  with  our  recognised  moral 
standards :  it  deals  thus  with  the  relatively  permanent 
series  of  impulse  efficiencies  which  determines  these 
standards.  It  leads  us  to  make  effort  to  live  in  accord 
with  that  order  of  impulse  efficiencies  which  although 
modified  by  our  experience  is  nevertheless  impressed  upon 
us  by  Nature's  own  hand. 

In  passing  I  may  note  one  implication  from  this  con- 
sideration which  has  perhaps  already  occurred  to  the 
reader,  viz.  that  the  existence  within  us  of  the  sense 
of  duty,  as  it  is  experienced  in  its  fullest  form,  is  con- 
clusive evidence  at  the  same  time  of  the  existence  within 
us  of  the  religious  instinct ;  for  if  my  view  be  correct  the 
full  sense  of  duty  is  brought  into  consciousness  by,  and  only 
by,  the  inhibition  of  that  order  of  impulse  efficiencies  which 
it  is  the  function  of  the  religious  instinct  to  impress  upon 
us :  it  is  the  religious  instinct  which  produces  within 
us  the  call  to  conduct  our  lives  in  accordance  with  duty. 

We  all  know  of  many  men  outside  of  the  Churches  who 
decline  to  call  themselves  religious  men  because  they  do 
not  find  it  possible  to  conform  to  current  religious  customs 
or  to  believe  in  current  religious  doctrines,  and  yet  who 
endeavour  most  strenuously  to  guide  their  lives  in  accord- 
ance with  the  call  of  duty.  Such  men  we  now  see  must 
still  be  called  religious,  though  they  fail  to  recognise  that 
they  are  led  by  the  same  influences  that  guide  their  acknow- 


CHAP.  XV     OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  39^ 

ledgedly  religious  neighbours,  whose  thought  is  developed  on 
lines  different  from  their  own.  Thus  we  find  ourselves  led 
from  a  new  point  of  view  to  the  position  already  reached  in 
a  former  chapter. 


III. — Objections  and  Explanations 

§  8.  The  main  objections  to  the  theory  of  conscience  as 
above  expressed  are  made  on  two  grounds.  The  first  objec- 
tion is  that  the  theory  "  does  not  give  conscience  as  we 
know  it,"  and  that  if  it  does,  conscience  itself  "  is  virtually 
assumed  either  at  the  beginning  or  at  some  other  stage  of 
the  explanation."  ^ 

Let  us  first  consider  the  second  complaint  here  made, 
the  complaint  that  this  theory  does  not  explain  the  origin 
of  conscience.  This  I  am  glad  to  concede,  for  I  hold,  as  I 
have  already  noted  in  Chapter  II.,  that  the  theory  of  evolu- 
tion is  not  competent  to  deal  with  the  question  of  origins 
at  all:  although  it  is  true  that  evolutionary  writers  often 
speak  as  though  they  were  giving  us  a  theory  of  origins 
when  they  are  merely  explaining  the  forms  of  development, 
I  do  not  grant  that  they  have  any  right  to  take  any  such 
position. 

All  that  can  be  properly  claimed  under  their  theory  is 
that  conscience  in  its  developed  form,  as  we .  know  it,  has 
arisen  as  a  natural  product  in  the  course  of  evolution,  and 
that  the  germ  from  which  our  conscience  has  developed 
must  necessarily  be  found  in  lower  forms  of  activity  than 
those  which  are  noted  in  man,  in  whom  alone  we  can  assert 
its  presence. 

Attention  is  drawn  by  opponents  of  this  view  to  the 
fact  that  we  cannot  positively  prove  the  existence  of  any- 
thing like  conscience,  as  we  know  it,  in  the  animals ;  but 

^  Cf.  Knowlton,  Origin  and  Nature  of  Conscience,  p.  57. 


400 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON 


this  surely  does  not  by  any  means  prove  its  absence  in 
them.  If  we  are  to  uphold  such  a  contention  we  must 
on  the  same  grounds  decline  to  believe  that  any  form  of 
sentience  exists  in  connection  with  the  activities  of  animals 
which  are  unable  to  express  themselves  in  the  language  of 
men.  But  just  as  we  have  all  come  to  believe  in  animal 
sentience,  so  we  are  compelled  to  believe  in  the  existence 
in  animals  of  the  germ  of  our  developed  conscience  in  much 
the  same  form  in  which  this  same  germ  appears  in  the 
early  life  of  the  young  child.  There  is  no  evidence  that 
the  conception  of  morality  ever  comes  into  our  experience 
as  a  new  creation.  The  moral  shades  into  the  non-moral, 
and  the  non-moral  into  the  moral,  very  much  as  the  field 
of  attention  shades  into  the  field  of  inattention.  There  is 
no  more  reason  to  conceive  of  the  moral  as  a  new  creation 
than  there  is  to  conceive  of  the  field  of  attention  as  some- 
thing superadded  to  consciousness. 

Moreover,  nothing  could  be  more  absurd  than  the  objec- 
tion to  the  view  of  the  evolutionist,  who  holds  that  the 
activities  which  involve  conscience  in  man  are  found  in 
germ  in  the  lower  orders  of  animal  life,  when  this  objec- 
tion comes,  as  it  usually  does,  from  one  who  believes  that 
conscience  is  a  special  Divine  gift  to  man ;  inasmuch  as 
the  objector  himself  must  of  necessity  dogmatically  assume 
that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  an  animal  in  which  no  germ 
of  moral  feeling  exists,  without  having  any  possible  means 
of  verifying  his  assumption. 

§  9.  The  claim  that  the  theory  of  conscience  we  are 
considering  does  not  give  conscience  as  we  know  it  is  a 
more  serious  objection,  and  one  to  which  we  must  give 
fuller  consideration. 

The  opponents  of  our  theory  hold  first  that  there  is  no 
sufficient  reason  to  grant  that  the  altruistic  impulses  are 


CHAP.  XV     OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  401 

more  persistent  than  the  egoistic ;  second,  that  even  if  this 
be  granted,  the  theory  does  not  explain  the  sense  of  obliga- 
tion which  appears  in  connection  with  conscience ;  and 
third,  that  it  does  not  explain  the  special  experience  of 
remorse  which  is  of  the  very  essence  of  our  experience  of 
conscience.     Let  us  consider  these  objections  in  their  order. 

§  10.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  considerations  presented 
in  the  preceding  chapters  of  this  book  give  us  very  good 
ground  for  contending  that  in  their  very  nature  the  altru- 
istic impulses  must  necessarily  be  more  persistent  than  the 
egoistic.  We  have  noted  that  our  impulses  may  always  be 
arranged  in  a  hierarchal  order,  and  that  those  impulses 
which  correspond  with  the  inhibition  of  instincts  that  have 
become  thoroughly  co-ordinated  seldom  appear  in  conscious- 
ness. We  have  noted  also  that  as  the  instincts  have  been 
acquired  in  a  certain  order  so  the  completeness  of  their  co- 
ordination must  be  expected  to  vary  in  a  like  order ;  and 
evidently  the  prominence  in  consciousness  of  the  impulses 
due  to  the  inhibition  of  the  several  instincts  will  also  vary 
in  relation  to  their  co-ordination,  so  that  the  impulses  deter- 
mined by  the  latest  acquired  instincts  will  in  general  be 
more  likely  to  be  frequently  presented  to  consciousness 
than  the  impulses  determined  by  the  earlier-formed  instincts. 
But  it  appears  clear,  I  think,  that  the  altruistic  instincts 
have  been  much  later  in  development  than  the  egoistic 
instincts,  and  we  should  therefore  expect  to  find  the  altru- 
istic impulses  more  persistent  in  our  consciousnesses  than 
the  egoistic  impulses  are. 

Again,  it  appears  that  the  altruistic  instincts  are  built 
upon  already  existing  egoistic  instincts,  which  are  more  or 
less  modified  in  the  process,  so  that  when  conditions  are 
normal  the  action  of  the  egoistic  and  altruistic  instincts 
will   coincide.      Now   as   the  egoistic  instincts   which   are 

2  D 


402  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  pakt  hi 

modified  to  serve  higher  instinctive  ends  are  more  thoroughly 
co-ordinated  than  the  more  complex  altruistic  instincts,  the 
former,  as  we  have  seen  above,  tend  to  influence  con- 
sciousness less  often  than  the  latter  do  ;  but  beyond 
that  the  impulses  resulting  from  the  inhibition  of  the  ego- 
istic instincts,  out  of  or  upon  which  the  altruistic  instincts 
are  built,  will  not  be  likely  to  appear  unless  the  disturbance 
of  the  normal  action  is  relatively  extreme ;  only  under  a 
strong  stimulus  will  they  influence  consciousness  in  a  vivid 
form.  In  retrospect,  therefore,  where  the  unusual  force  of 
stimulus  is  lacking,  we  should  certainly  expect  the  influence 
of  the  altruistic  instincts  to  be  the  more  persistent  of  the 
two. 

"What  is  more,  as  we  have  already  explained,  the  value 
of  the  altruistic  instincts  to  the  race  is  dependent  almost 
entirely  upon  their  determination  of  general  trends  of 
action  running  through  varied  reactions  to  varied  stimuli ; 
and  it  thus  appears  that  if  our  hypothesis  be  correct,  they 
must  necessarily  be  persistent  in  relation  to  those  instincts 
which  are  developed  in  response  to  special  stimuli  that  are 
effective  under  less  permanent  conditions ;  or  in  relation  to 
those  which  are  of  individualistic  value  only,  and  which  are 
only  occasionally  called  into  existence. 

But  we  must  hasten  to  acknowledge  that  this  pushing  to 
its  conclusion  of  an  argument  based  upon  an  hypothesis  will 
have  no  result  other  than  the  upsetting  of  the  hypothesis, 
unless  the  facts  of  experience  accord  with  the  theoretical 
result.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  there  is  a  very 
general  agreement  that  Darwin  truly  stated  the  facts  when 
he  held  that  the  altruistic  impulses  are  more  persistent  and 
permanent  than  the  egoistic  impulses.  What  seem  at  the 
first  glance  to  be  exceptions  to  this  rule  appear  only  in 
those  who  may  well  be  held  to  be  atavistic  members  of  the 
race  ;  or  else  they  are  illusions  due  to  a  confusion  of  thought 


CHAP.  XV     OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  403 

on  the  part  of  the  critic,  who  thinks  that  under  the  theory 
we  should  look  for  a  sudden  revulsion  from  hate  to  pity 
for  instance ;  ^  forgetful  that  the  fading  away  of  the  egoistic 
impulse  must  be  gradual,  and  cannot  be  expected  to  be 
reduced  to  its  normal  force  until  the  direct  stimulus  to  its 
appearance  is  altogether  lacking, 

§  11.  Let  us  turn  now  to  the  objection  that  the  theory 
does  not  explain  the  sense  of  obligation  which  appears  in 
connection  with  conscience. 

In  a  preceding  chapter  we  have  seen  how  natural  it  was 
that  the  primitive  man  should  have  looked  upon  the  pressure 
of  inhibited  but  persistent  impulses  as  determined  by  forces 
acting  upon  him  from  without,  how  natural  that  the  guid- 
ance of  conscience  should  have  been  attributed  by  him  to 
influences  beyond  the  limits  of  his  own  spirit ;  and  we  have 
seen  that  we  ourselves  have  not  yet  cast  off  this  illusion 
altogether,  for  although  we  know  the  influence  of  conscience 
to  be  within  us  we  are  not  quite  content  to  acknowledge 
its  purely  subjective  origin,  we  still  think  of  and  describe  it 
as  a  "  voice  "  ;  as  though  it  were  the  utterance  of  some  being 
speaking  to  us  from  without. 

It  seems  to  me  that  one  main  reason  for  this  persistent 
objectivication  lies  in  the  fact  that  conscience  appeals  to  us 
apparently  without  previous  preparation,  in  the  current  of 
our  mental  life,  just  as  soon  as  the  forces  which  inhibit  the 
repressed  persistent  instincts  have  lost  their  power ;  two 
impulses  are  felt  to  be  opposed,  and  presently  one  of  them, 
for  some  reason  which  is  apparently  not  inherent  in  it, 
acquires  strength,  and  compels  our  acquiescence.  This  is 
exactly  the  way  the  objective  world  affects  us,  the  way,  too, 
in  which  our  fellow-man  often  alters  the  stream  of  conscious- 
ness in  us  when  he  wishes  to  modify  our  action. 
1  Cf.  Knowlton,  op.  cit.  p.  78. 


404  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

The  differentiation  of  conscience,  to  which  we  generally 
mean  to  refer  when  we  speak  of  the  "  sense  of  duty/'  will 
tend  to  be  thus  objectified  just  as  all  else  of  conscience  is ; 
but  it  will  have  a  further  basis  for  objectivication  in  the 
fact  already  spoken  of  that  when  once  a  man  is  influenced 
by  it,  it  is  aroused  in  connection  with  all  sorts  and  kinds  of 
impulses  and  under  very  varied  conditions.  To  the  man, 
even  when  he  is  uninfluenced  by  the  religious  instinct  which 
arouses  this  sense  of  duty,  any  suggested  action  that  stands 
in  opposition  to  a  persistent  impulse  carries  with  it  a  sense 
of  contest ;  but  the  man  who  allows  his  religious  impulses 
to  prevail,  judges  all  actions  by  their  harmony  with,  or 
opposition  to,  the  order  of  impulse  efficiencies  which  Nature 
has  implanted  and  developed  within  him.  Thus  it  comes 
about  that  he  is  constantly  affected  by  this  pressure  leading 
him  to  adhere  to  his  moral  standards ;  thus  that  this  sense 
of  duty  gains  a  relative  permanence  or  stability ;  and  as  all 
reality,  all  objectivity  is  determined  by  relative  stability  of 
conception,  this  sense  of  duty  becomes  real  in  so  forcible  a 
way  that  it  is  not  surprising  that  we  find  it  difficult  to 
avoid  its  objectivication,  difficult  to  gain  the  habit  of  think- 
ing of  it  as  a  subjective  phenomenon  caused  from  within  and 
not  due  to  command  or  pressure  from  without. 

Furthermore,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  fully  developed 
sense  of  objectivity  and  of  the  existence  of  ourselves  over 
against  the  world  around  us  is  determined  largely  by  our 
existence  in  social  relations ;  as  Professor  J.  Mark  Baldwin 
has  pointed  out,^  we  gain  a  special  conception  of  self  in 
relation  to  our  moral  life,  which  in  the  beginning  is  em- 
phasised  by  the   restriction  of  our  natural  individualistic 

1  Phil  Review,  vi.  3.  In  Professor  Baldwin's  Social  and  Ethical 
Interpretation,  which  appears  just  as  this  book  goes  to  press,  the  reader 
will  find  (chap.  viii.  2)  a  very  interesting  account  of  the  steps  in  the 
process  by  which  this  sense  of  obligation  comes  to  be  attached  to  the 
*' higher"  rather  than  to  the  "lower"  impulses. 


CHAP.  XV     OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  405 

impulses  by  the  guardians  of  our  extreme  youth,  and 
which  gradually  develops,  until  we  conceive  of  a  power 
beyond  and  over  all  human  guides,  who  knows  all  and 
guides  all,  and  whose  rule  is  of  universal  scope ;  or,  as 
Mr,  Leslie  Stephen  puts  the  same  thought,-^  "  The  perception 
that  this  rule  is  formed  by  something  outside  us,  that  we 
imbibe  it  from  the  medium  in  which  we  live,  gives  the  sense 
of  obligation,  though  we  may  become  conscious  of  it  as  the 
expression  of  instincts  which  have  grown  up  before  distinct 
reflection,  and  are  involved  in  all  our  modes  of  thought  and 
feeling." 

It  is  not  difficult,  then,  to  understand  the  sense  of 
obligation  in  relation  to  conscience,  the  persistency  of  the 
notion  that  the  sense  of  duty  is  determined  by  our  intellectual 
recognition  of  a  power  beyond  ourselves,  which  gives  sanction 
to  this  sense  of  duty.  "  Without  objective  conditions,"  says 
Dr.  Martineau,^  "  the  idea  of  duty  involves  a  contradiction, 
and  its  phraseology  passes  into  an  unmeaning  figure  of 
speech."  And  in  a  certain  sense  this  is  true ;  for  I  cannot 
think  of  a  man  (myself  perhaps)  owing  allegiance  without 
conceiving  of  some  one  to  whom,  or  some  "  cause  "  to  which, 
the  allegiance  is  owed.  There  are,  however,  as  Professor 
Sidgwick  has  noted,^  certain  cases  (truth-speaking,  for 
instance)  in  which  the  feeling  which  we  ordinarily  call 
the  sense  of  duty  does  not  seem  to  involve  obligation  to 
another  than  ourselves.  But  all  this  has  to  do  with  the 
study  of  concepts,  which  we  are  not  considering  here ;  what 
we  are  considering  is  the  sense  of  duty  as  a  psychological 
fact ;  a  state  of  consciousness  which  arises  clearly  out  of  the 
impulse  order  of  our  nature,  is  of  purely  subjective  origin,  and 
is  never  directly  resultant  from  any  process  of  ratiocination. 

^  ScieTice  of  Ethics,  chap.  viii.  §  39. 

2  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  ii.  p.  4. 

3  Op.  cit.  p.  218. 


406  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

§  12.  It  will  be  seen  from  what  I  have  said  in  the 
preceding  section  that  I  am  not  in  sympathy  with  certain 
attempts  which  have  been  made  by  prominent  ethical  writers 
of  the  evolutionary  school  to  account  for  the  genesis  of  this 
sense  of  obligation :  no  modern  psychologist  will  allow  that 
we  can  account  for  the  appearance  of  conscience  as  a  quasi- 
chemical  product  of  other  mental  states,  as  was  suggested 
by  the  language  of  the  early  associationists.  Nor  do  I  think 
there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  lead  us  to  uphold  the  view 
of  Hobbes  that  the  moral  sentiments  can  be  deduced,  either 
directly  or  indirectly,  "from  the  self-regards  of  collective 
man " ;  there  is,  in  my  opinion,  no  satisfactory  evidence 
that  the  processes  of  association  or  of  inheritance  can  be 
made  to  account  for  the  rise  of  this  sense  of  obligation 
through  the  process  of  transference  from  means  to  end,  as 
Mill  would  have  us  believe.  Nor  do  I  think  that  this 
sense  of  obligation  can  be  accounted  for  by  the  supposition 
that  the  fear  of  punishment  for  certain  acts  dealt  out  by 
the  Deity,  or  by  a  primitive  society  for  a  recognisedly  bene- 
ficial end,  can,  by  association  and  inheritance,  have  de- 
veloped into  this  sense  of  obligation-fear  directly  connected 
with  the  acts  themselves. 

These  and  all  like  hypotheses,  it  seems  to  me,  have  been 
brought  forward  in  order  to  rationalise  the  acts  we  perform 
under  the  sway  of  this  sense  of  obligation.  Men  feel  the 
obligation  and  know  not  whence  it  comes ;  they  have  not 
found  it  easy  to  defend  their  subservience  to  these  suggestions 
within  them ;  they  have  devised  these  theories  to  account 
for  the  mental  pressure,  and  to  enable  them  to  defend  the 
rationality  of  their  action  in  yielding  to  this  pressure. 

On  the  other  hand,  under  the  correct  evolutionary  con- 
ception, that  which  makes  the  very  essence  of  conscience 
is  no  new  element  added  to  man's  mental  endowment,  but 
is  something  already  inherent  in,  and  necessarily  attendant 


CHAP.  XV     OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  407 

upon,  the  complex  mental  states  in  connection  with  which 
conscience  appears. 

§  13.  Let  us  now  examine  the  third  objection  mentioned 
above,  viz.  that  the  evolutionary  theory  does  not  explain 
the  special  experience  of  remorse,  which  is  of  the  very 
essence  of  our  experience  of  conscience. 

I  cannot  present  the  objection  in  better  form  than  by 
quoting  from  Dr.  Martineau  where  he  says :  "  Whenever 
two  incompatible  springs  of  action  simultaneously  urge  us, 
there  is  an  attendant  consciousness  of  superior  excellence  in 
one  of  them ;  an  excellence,  not  in  point  of  pleasure  or 
advantage,  which  it  were  wise  to  take  ;  not  in  respect  to  seem- 
liness  and  beauty,  which  it  were  tasteless  to  decline ;  but  in 
the  scale  of  right,  which,  in  carrying  our  assent,  commands  our 
obedience.  All  these  kinds  of  superiority  it  is  open  to  us 
to  disregard,  but  at  the  cost,  in  the  first  two  cases,  merely 
of  personal  inferiority ;  in  the  third,  of  a  mysterious  and 
haunting  disloyalty.  Accusing  ourselves  of  this,  we  are 
aware  that  our  offence  is  not  a  private  mistake  to  be  settled 
with  in  our  home  accounts,  but  looks  beyond  ourselves  and 
infringes  rights  that  are  not  our  own ;  and  we  are  visited 
by  more  than  shame  at  failure  or  regret  at  folly ;  we  are 
cast  down  in  severe  compunction  under  the  very  different 
sense  of  guilt." 

Dr.  Martineau  thinks  that  this  experience  is  incompatible 
with  the  theory  of  conscience  as  Darwin  states  it.  "  Surely 
it  is  not  enough,"  says  he,  "to  say,  with  Mr.  Darwin,  that 
this  is  due  to  our  having  indulged  the  intense  momentary 
impulse  which  has  now  faded,  at  the  cost  of  a  persistent 
feeling  which  has  returned  to  its  usual  force.  This  difference 
may  exist  without  inducing  any  sense  of  sin.  .  .  ." 

Dr.  Martineau  is  greatly  interested  in  the  overthrow  of 
the  doctrine,  derived  from  Hobbes,  that  the  moral  sentiments 


408  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

are  deduced  "  from  the  self-regards  of  collective  man  "  ;  and 
it  seems  to  me  that  he  fails  to  appreciate  that  the  psycho- 
logical theorem  which  Darwin  presents  does  not  necessarily 
involve  any  such  doctrine :  at  all  events,  I  think  it  can  be 
affirmed  that  Darwin's  view,  as  I  venture  to  restate  it,  does 
not  in  any  way  involve  the  doctrine  that  conscience,  or  the 
sense  of  duty,  is  determined  by  any  past  or  present  recog- 
nition of  benefits  for  humanity ;  rather  does  it  involve  the 
doctrine  that  the  determinants  are  entirely  of  an  instinctive, 
impulsive,  nature,  and  are  not  in  the  least  derived  from  con- 
vention of  any  kind. 

Dr.  Martineau's  real  difficulty,  however,  seems  to  me  to 
arise  from  the  fact  that  he  fails  to  discriminate  between  the 
sense  of  duty  and  the  emotional  reaction  to  which  it  gives 
rise.  It  is  the  fact  that  we  are  depressed  in  spirit,  are  filled 
with  despair,  as  the  result  of  our  recognition  of  failure  to 
live  in  accord  with  our  sense  of  duty,  that  leads  him  to 
dissent  from  Darwin's  analysis ;  but  this  sense  of  un- 
worthiness,  of  contrition,  of  helplessness,  of  dependence,  is 
in  the  nature  of  an  emotional  reaction :  ^  it  is,  as  we  have 
seen,  part  and  parcel  of  religious  expression,  and  is  indeed 
the  very  basis  of  moral  regeneration ;  but  it  is  far  removed 
from  that  impression  by  the  more  persistent  impulses  which 
constitutes  the  simpler  form  of  conscience,  and  equally  far 
removed  from  that  pressure  arising  from  our  religious  in- 
stinct, which  gives  us  the  conscience  in  its  highest  develop- 
ment ;  although  out  of  these  very  states  arise  the  emotional 
instinctive  acts,  which  go  so  far  towards  the  strengthening 
of  our  morality. 

Let  me  here  say  one  word  concerning  another  point.  It 
must  be  noted,  as  I  have  above  said,  that  neither  conscience 
nor  the  sense  of  duty  are  themselves  instincts ;  they  are 
states  of  mind   determined  by  a  special  relation  between 

^  Cf.  Leslie  Stephen,  Science  of  Ethics,  chap,  viii.,  especially  §  14. 


CHAP.  XV     OF  CONSCIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE  OF  DUTY  409 

instincts.  I  mention  this  because  many  writers  treat  of 
conscience  as  if  it  were  an  instinct.^  There  is  no  reason 
whatever  to  suppose  that  conscience,  as  we  know  it,  would 
not  be  developed  in  the  animals  had  they  those  highly 
organic  forms  of  retentiveness  which  make  possible  the 
persistence  of  the  ideal  realisations  of  inhibited  impulses 
which  condition  man's  moral  life ;  nor  can  it  be  shown 
that  animals  have  not  in  their  experience  the  germ  out  of 
which  our  conscience  and  our  sense  of  duty  have  developed ; 
but  this  being  acknowledged  we  certainly  have  no  reason  to 
hold  that  conscience  is  itself  an  instinct. 

I  cannot  help  feeling  that  if  Dr.  Martineau  had  escaped 
this  special  psychological  error  ^  he  would  have  found  less 
difficulty  in  accepting  the  doctrine  which  he  so  strongly 
opposes. 

§  14.  In  closing,  I  may  perhaps  be  allowed  to  say  a 
word  concerning  the  relation  of  the  conception  of  conscience 
discussed  in  what  has  preceded  this,  to  that  conception 
which  is  usually  held  by  the  religious  world  at  large  in  our 
day. 

The  developmental  view  of  the  formation  of  conscience 
is  often  dreaded  by  the  best  of  people  because  it  seems  to 
undermine  the  very  foundations  of  their  beliefs ;  but  I 
think  if  properly  conceived  this  difficulty  will  be  seen  to  be 
less  formidable  than  at  first  appears. 

If  the  reader  be  a  believer  in  the  time-honoured  doctrine 
of  moral  intuitions  he  must,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  either  take 
the  ground  that  the  Creator  places  conscience  in  the  man  at 
birth  as  a  guide  which  shall  show  him  the  right  way,  a 
guide  which  grows  and  develops  with  his  growth ;  or  else 

^  Cf.  Leslie  Stephen,  ScieTice  of  Ethics,  chap.  ix.  §  22 ;  and  Dr.  Mezes 
{Philosophical  Review,  vol.  5,  No.  5),  who  has  lately  argued  that  conscience 
is  an  instinct  given  to  man  alone  and  accounting  for  his  advance. 

2  Cf.  types  of  Ethical  Theory,  vol.  ii.  book  ii.  §  8. 


410  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  hi 

he  must  hold  that  conscience  in  each  case  of  its  action  has 
as  its  basis  a  direct  and  specific  intuitive  command  from 
his  Creator.  In  other  words,  he  must  take  the  ground  that 
conscience  is  in  general  the  safest  guide  that  he  can  have  to 
lead  him  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  law  of  God. 

But,  as  we  have  seen  above,  we  here  conceive  of  con- 
science as  the  protest  of  a  persistent  instinct  against  a  less 
persistent  but  momentarily  more  powerful  one,  and  we  are 
led  to  the  belief  that  conscience  has  been  evolved  by  natural 
evolutionary  forces.  We  are  thus  led,  therefore,  to  look 
upon  conscience  as  being  in  general  the  surest  guide  we 
have  to  mark  the  way  in  which  we  should  direct  our  lives 
if  we  would  act  in  accord  with  what  we  call  the  law  of 
development.  This  law  of  development,  if  accepted  by  the 
believer  in  an  Almighty  Creator,  as  it  is  now  very  generally 
accepted,  must  be  regarded  by  him  as  a  law  to  which  God 
calls  upon  us  to  conform  in  our  lives. 

In  other  words,  even  if  he  comes  to  believe  that 
evolutionary  doctrine  must  be  accepted,  he  is  compelled 
to  accept  no  other  law  than  that  which  his  earlier  belief 
led  him  to  hold.  He  is  now,  as  of  old,  led  to  take  the 
ground  that  conscience  is  in  general  the  safest  guide  that  he 
can  have  to  lead  him  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  law  of  God  ;  and 
evidently,  then,  the  opposition  between  the  two  views  at 
once  disappears. 


PAET   IV 

CONCERNING    REASON 


CHAPTEE    XVI 

THE    NATURE    OF    REASON 

§  1.  In  the  second  part  of  this  book  I  think  I  have  justified 
the  usage  of  the  word  "  Instinct "  which  I  adopt,  connected 
as  it  is  with  the  necessary  interpretation  of  the  significance  of 
instinct  actions.  I  shall  now  attempt  to  explain  the  meaning 
of  "  Reason  "  and  to  justify  the  position  I  take  in  reference 
to  the  use  of  the  word. 

Perhaps  I  ought  to  say  to  the  general  reader  that 
this  and  the  following  chapter  will  not  be  the  easiest  of 
reading  for  one  not  versed  in  psychological  technicalities : 
although  I  shall  endeavour  to  make  my  argument  as  clear 
as  possible,  it  is  necessary  to  be  technical  if  one  is  to  be 
exact.  The  summary  in  Chapter  XIX.  is  written  for  those 
who  wish  to  note  the  gist  of  the  argument  without  testing 
its  accuracy. 

In  what  has  preceded  this,  and  notably  in  the  caption 
of  the  book,  I  have  placed  the  word  "  instinct,"  as  we  often 
find  it  placed,  in  contradistinction  to  the  word  "reason." 
This  implies  that  in  a  certain  sense  Instinct  and  Eeason 
stand  opposed  the  one  to  the  other.  The  exact  nature  of 
the  distinction  between  the  two  I  shall  here  endeavour  to 
state. 

If  the  word  "  instinct "  is  to  be  used  objectively,  then  to 
be  consistent  "  reason  "  should  also  be  used  objectively  :  and 


414  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

where  I  speak  of  "reason"  as  opposed  to  "instinct"  I 
intend  to  employ  the  former  word  in  an  objective  sense 
to  indicate  the  capacity  found  in  animals,  and  in  ourselves 
as  animals,  to  act  apparently  in  opposition  to,  or  at  least 
without  reference  to,  instinct. 

It  will  be  evident  to  the  reader  at  once  that  this  use  of 
"  reason "  implies  a  wide  extension  of  the  meaning  of  the 
word ;  for  "  reason "  is  commonly  applied  to  describe  only 
certain  highly  elaborated  forms  of  what  is  commonly  spoken 
of  as  "  intelligence."  Of  this  I  shall  speak  more  at  length 
below. 

It  is  true  that  the  word  "  reason "  is  often  used  with  a 
subjective  connotation  just  because  we  employ  it  to  objectify 
conscious  states.  We  ascribe  "  reason "  and  intelligence 
generally,  to  animals  and  men  around  us,  and  often  when  we 
do  so  we  mean  to  refer  to  psychic  states  that  occur  in  them. 
Nevertheless  I  think  I  use  the  word  as  I  do  with  an 
objective  connotation  properly  and  correctly.  The  word 
"  reason "  is  also  used  by  certain  mystic  metaphysicians 
in  many  occult  ways ;  but  with  none  of  these  vague  mean- 
ings have  we  to  do. 

But  in  order  to  avoid  so  far  as  possible  questions  as  to 
my  meaning,  I  shall  in  general  here,  as  in  the  case  of 
"instinct,"  adopt  a  special  terminology.  In  dealing  with 
the  objective  view  I  shall  speak  of  "  reasoned "  or  of 
"  intelligent  actions,"  and  I  shall  then  mean  to  refer  to 
those  actions  which  in  an  objective  view  appear  as  the 
expression  of  "  reason  "  or  of  "  intelligence." 

In  speaking  from  a  subjective  standpoint  I  should 
perhaps  properly  use  the  terms  "  reasoned  feelings "  or 
"  intelligent  feelings "  to  make  my  terminology  consistent ; 
but  it  would  be  demanding  too  much  of  the  reader  to  ask 
him  to  labour  with  expressions  which  all  will  acknowledge 
have  a  most  unnatural  sound,  and  I  shall  therefore  use  the 


CHAP.  XVI  THE  NATURE  OF  REASON  415 

word  "reasoning"  in  general  in  a  subjective  sense  to  indicate 
those  psychic  states  that  precede  the  appearance  of  reasoned 
actions  ;  and,  in  consideration  of  facts  presently  to  appear,  I 
shall  often  widen  the  application  of  this  term  to  indicate 
the  psychic  side  of  acts  which  usually  would  scarcely  be 
called  more  than  intelligent. 

§  2.  Professor  James,  in  his  well  -  known  Psychology 
(vol.  i.  p.  8),  tells  us  that  "  pursuance  of  future  ends  and 
the  choice  of  means  for  their  attainment  are  the  mark  and 
criterion  of  the  presence  of  mentality  in  a  phenomenon." 
If  the  word  "  reason "  be  substituted  for  the  word 
"  mentality "  I  subscribe  to  this  view,  and  I  believe  I 
mean  exactly  what  Professor  James  means,  and  what  all 
biological  psychologists  must  agree  to.  Professor  James 
uses  "  mentality  "  here  as  the  equivalent  of  "  intelligence," 
as  appears  by  the  context,  and  by  his  index  reference.  I 
cannot  use  "  mentality "  in  this  sense  because,  usage  here 
not  being  fixed,  I  employ  the  term,  as  appears  in  my  dis- 
cussion of  parallelism  in  a  previous  chapter,  in  a  very  broad 
sense,  and  to  cover  even  those  psychic  states  that  cannot  be 
held  in  the  light  of  attention  in  reflective  consciousness.  If 
all  neural  action  has  its  physical  correspondent,  as  I  think 
it  has,  then  as  there  is  much  neural  action  which  is  al- 
together free  from  hesitancy,  so  there  is  much  of  "mentality" 
that  has  in  it  no  element  of  choice,  although  it  may  well  be 
claimed  that  very  little  if  any  of  the  field  of  attention  can 
be  shown  to  be  devoid  of  this  element. 

Nor  do  I  think  that  the  word  "  intelligence  "  can  properly 
be  used  in  a  strictly  scientific  manner  in  this  connection,  as 
Professor  Lloyd  Morgan  uses  it  in  his  Habit  and  Instinct 
(p.  155),  where  he  says:  "  The  point,  however,  which  it  is 
desirable  to  emphasise  is  that  intelligence  involves  selection 
and   choice."     For   as  Professor  Morgan   has  himself  well 


416  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

said  in  another  work,^  there  is  a  great  deal  of  what  the 
average  man  calls  intelligence  which  is  mere  perceptiuil 
intelligence,  due  to  no  pursuance  of  ends  nor  choice  of 
means,  but  determined  solely  by  association  through  past 
experience;  as,  for  instance,  when  the  intelligent  dog, 
having  "  occasion  to  swim  across  a  stream,  enters  the  water 
at  such  a  point  as  to  allow  for  the  force  of  the  current " ; 
if  this  be  called  intelligence,  it  is  impossible  to  make  choice 
a  differentia  of  intelligence. 

I  propose,  then,  to  overcome  this  difficulty  arising  from 
the  loose  use  of  terms,  by  employing  the  word  "  reason  "  to 
cover  all  those  cases  in  which  choice  appears.  I  hold  that 
"  the  pursuance  of  future  ends  and  the  choice  of  means  for 
their  attainment  are  .  .  .  the  mark  and  criterion  of  the  pres- 
ence of"  reason  "in  a  phenomenon."  Keason  is  thus  marked 
by  choice,  and  choice,  be  it  noted,  is  the  evidence  of  will ; 
although  subjectively  viewed  the  consciousness  of  willing 
may  be  very  rudimentary  even  where  choice  is  clearly 
indicated  in  an  action  as  it  is  objectively  viewed. 

I  thus  broaden  the  meaning  to  be  attached  to  the  term 
"  reason,"  so  that  it  cover?  much  more  than  the  ratiocinative 
processes  with  which  the  word  is  usually  associated  ;  ^  which 
ratiocinative  processes  appear  to  arise  in  connection  with  a 
specially  elaborated  form  of  reasoned  actions  which  compel 
the  special  steps  in  the  correspondent  psychic  life  to  be 
distinctly  held  in  reflective  consciousness. 

This  matter  is  so  important  that  I  must  beg  the  reader 
to  dwell  upon  it  with  me  a  little  longer. 

§  3.  "  Choice,"  as  it  leads  us  to  believe  in  the  existence 
of   "mentality"  as    James    puts    it,   or   "intelligence"   as 

1  Animal  Life  and  Intelligence,  p.  365.  I  do  not  find  Professor  Morgan's 
use  of  terms  always  consistent:  cf.  op.  cit.  p.  95,  where  he  says:  "Selection 
involves  intelligence,  involves  the  play  of  appetence  and  choice." 

2  Cf.  again  Professor  Morgan's  Animal  Life  and  Intelligence,  p.  365. 


CHAP.  XVI  THE  NATURE  OF  REASON  417 

Morgan  puts  it,  or  "  reason "  as  I  use  the  term,  is  an 
objective  phenomenon ;  it  is  noted  in  the  action  of  other 
men  and  of  living  beings,  and  in  ourselves  as  well, 
when  we  consider  ourselves  as  objects ;  and  just  because 
we  so  note  it  in  ourselves,  and  note  also  its  subjective 
accompaniment  in  ourselves,  do  we  ascribe  correspond- 
ing subjective  accompaniments  to  the  men  and  other 
living  beings  around  us  in  whom  the  evidence  of  choice 
appears. 

Choice  is  an  objective  result,  and  as  objectively  viewed 
is  preceded  by  hesitancy.  Now  evidently,  if  the  theory  of 
parallelism  between  psychic  and  neural  action  be  true,  some 
psychic  process  or  other,  corresponding  to  this  hesitancy, 
must  precede  the  choice,  and,  furthermore,  to  this  choice 
must  also  correspond  some  psychic  occurrence. 

But  in  the  highest  forms  of  life,  in  our  own  selves,  we 
find  that  the  occurrence  of  choice  is  represented  on  the 
psychic  side  by  will.  Moreover  we  note  in  those  cases 
which  we  are  able  to  study  in  reflection  that  the  mental 
occurrence  which  we  call  will  is  preceded  by  the  mental 
process  which  we  call  reasoning. 

Now,  so  far  as  we  can  discover  by  objective  observation, 
there  is  no  difference  of  kind  in  choice  in  men  at  different 
times ;  no  difference,  furthermore,  between  choice  as  shown 
in  men  and  in  the  animal  life  that  surrounds  us.  So  clear 
is  this  that  it  appears  probable  that  will,  which  in  ourselves 
is  the  psychic  correspondent  of  clioice,  is,  in  some  form  or 
other,  the  psychic  correspondent  of  choice  in  all  living 
forms,  be  they  high  or  low ;  and  this  broad  generalisation 
is  one  with  which  all  students  of  psychology  and  philosophy 
are  to-day  familiar. 

If  this  generalisation  be  well  founded,  the  reader  will 
agree,  I  think,  that  it  is  highly  probable  that  the  psychic 
process,  which  is  antecedent  to  willing  (as  marked  by  choice), 

2  E 


418  INSTINCT  AND  EEASON  part  iv 

is  also  of  one  and  the  same  kind  in  ourselves  and  in  all  the 
animal  forms  which  surround  us. 

But  in  our  own  conscious  lives  reasoning  is  the  mental 
process  which  precedes  choice  and  which  determines  our 
will,  and  we  are  thus  led  to  hold  that  Eeason  in  germ,  or 
in  more  or  less  developed  complexity,  is  a  general  psychic 
phenomena  in  the  mental  lives  of  all  animals  from  the 
highest  to  the  lowest  forms. 

This  view  is  corroborated  when,  by  a  study  of  our  inner 
experience,  we  note  the  indissoluble  connection  between  our 
rational  life  and  our  volitional  experience. 

The  proposition  that  choice  is  the  mark  of  rationality 
would  be  granted  without  question  if  we  were  all  willing  to 
grant  that  all  of  choice,  as  we  know  it,  is  rational.^  But 
there  is  no  more  common  notion  than  that  which  leads  men 
to  say  that  they  or  their  fellows  often  choose  to  do  utterly 
irrational  acts.  The  proposition  which  I  maintain,  that  all 
choice  is  rational,  is  therefore  very  likely  to  be  questioned, 
and  I  must  beg  my  reader  to  consider  for  a  moment  my 
reasons  for  upholding  such  a  view. 

§  4.  In  an  exceedingly  stimulating  article,  published  in 
Mind  in  April  1893,  Professor  Sidgwick  made  a  searching 
but  I  think  only  partial  investigation  of  what  he  called 
"  unreasonable  action  " ;  as  his  analysis  is,  on  the  whole,  an 
almost  complete  vindication  of  the  position  I  here  take,  I 
shall  consider  it  at  length.^ 

In  the  article  referred  to,  which  I  hope  the  interested 
reader  will  study  with  care,  Professor  Sidgwick  asks  us  to 
consider  what  is  called  subjectively  unreasonable  action, 
wider  than,  but  inclusive  of  strictly  moral  judgments.  He 
excludes  all  abnormalities  that  might  be  looked  upon  as 

^  Cf.  Green,  op.  cit.  p.  186  ff. 
2  The  substance  of  this  section  was  published  in  Mind,  January  1894. 


CHAP.  XVI  THE  NATURE  OF  REASON  419 

leanings  away  from  sanity,  and  especially  does  he  eliminate 
all  cases  in  which  men  feel  that  they  are  carried  away  by 
sudden  or  overwhelming  impulses ;  and  this  he  does  in 
order  to  fasten  our  minds  upon  that  action  which  is  held 
to  be  voluntary  and  yet  contrary  to  a  man's  deliberate 
judgment  as  to  what  is  right  or  best  for  him  to  do,  i.e.  the 
action  we  are  here  considering. 

In  the  first  place  he  calls  our  attention,  by  way  of 
emphasising  the  importance  of  the  subject,  to  the  fact  that 
writers  of  the  most  opposite  schools  for  the  most  part  fail 
to  discuss  cases  of  irrational  volition  altogether ;  but  where 
these  are  considered  it  is  found  that  the  opposed  thinkers, 
imply,  when  they  do  not  distinctly  make  the  claim,  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  wilful  unreasonableness.  This  is 
surely  a  most  significant  fact ;  one  which  should  lead  us  to' 
examine  with  the  greatest  care  all  cases  in  which  this"^ 
questioned  characteristic  appears.  Professor  Sidgwick,  in- 
deed, proceeds  a  great  way  in  this  direction,  but,  as  I  shall 
attempt  to  show  in  the  sequel,  not  quite  so  far  as  he  might  do. 

1.  He  acknowledges  in  the  first  place  that  cases  bf 
so-called  "  wilful  unreasonableness  "  are  relatively  very  rare 
indeed. 

2.  He  shows  that  in  a  large  number  of  cases  where 
voluntary  unreasonableness  appears  to  exist,  the  action  is 
in  reality  merely  action  taken  contrary  to  some  general 
resolution  which  has  been  adopted  by  the  agent,  and  is  to 
be  included  in  one  or  two  great  classes. 

A.  The  first  class  covers  those  cases  where  the  action 
involves  no  consciousness,  at  the  time,  of  a  conflict  between 
volition  and  practical  judgment;  the  rule  being  simply 
forgotten  {x) ;  or  the  rule  being  remembered  without 
acknowledgment  that  the  case  in  mind  falls  under  the 
rule  {y) ;  or  the  agent  suspending  his  rule  from  a  tempor- 
ary conviction   that  he   has  adopted   it  without   sufficient 


420  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

reason  (z).  In  these  cases,  there  being  no  consciousness  of 
a  conflict  between  the  will  and  the  judgment,  there  can  be 
at  the  moment  no  irrationality  in  relation  to  the  volition. 

B.  The  second  class  covers  those  cases  where  the  action 
involves  the  consciousness  of  unreasonableness,  but  only 
obscurely ;  the  man  sophisticates  himself,  being  obscurely 
conscious  of  the  sophistry.  Here  it  seems  to  me  there  will 
be  no  claim  that  the  voluntary  action,  to  which  attention  is 
directed  under  the  terms  of  the  discussion,  is  itself  irrational, 
for  in  all  cases,  as  Professor  Sidgwick  acknowledges,  "  by 
hook  or  by  crook  a  quasi-rational  conclusion  on  the  side  of 
Desire  will  be  attained."  For  the  irrational  volition,  if  it 
exist,  we  must  look  back  of  the  act  which  is  thus  made 
rational,  to  the  act  of  self-sophistication ;  and  this  makes 
the  case  practically  identical  with  that  specially  subtle  case, 
mentioned  by  Professor  Sidgwick,  where  the  agent  con- 
sciously refrains  from  directing  attention  away  from  certain 
aspects. 

In  such  cases  I  submit  that  it  is  possible,  and  so  far  as 
my  introspection  tells  highly  probable,  that  there  is  nothing 
irrational  in  such  an  emphasis  of  certain  aspects  through 
guidance  of  the  attention.  So  long  as  the  agent  has  not 
before  him  any  consequences  in  practical  life  as  the  result 
of  allowing  one  series  of  thought  to  play  in  consciousness 
to  the  exclusion  of  another,  there  does  not  appear  to  me  to 
be  anything  irrational  in  allowing  such  play,  nor,  in  fact,  in 
inducing  it  by  an  emphasis  of  certain  aspects  which  are  not 
naturally  powerful :  indeed,  one  cannot  object  to  such  pro- 
cedure without  breaking  down  the  argument  for  deliberation 
in  general.  Of  course,  if  the  agent  realise  that  he  is 
sophisticating  himself,  or  emphasising  certain  aspects  in  a 
way  that  will  lead  him  to  recognisedly  irrational  action,  he 
is  in  this  voluntarily  irrational;  but  it  is  apparent  that 
this  is  at  best  a  very  rare  case,  among  very  rare  cases,  and 


CHAP.  XVI  THE  NATURE  OF  REASON"  421 

I  am  inclined  to  think  that  in  such  instances  the  agent 
does  not  realise  this  as  he  does  it,  but  rather  realises,  after 
the  act,  that  he  has  done  it.  He  may  in  the  next  moment 
fall  back  into  the  doing  of  it,  but  in  this  case  I  do  not 
think  the  claim  that  he  realises  the  irrationality  of  the  act 
can  be  made  with  any  degree  of  probability  on  the  side  of 
the  claimant  when  we  consider  the  enormous  number  of 
cases  of  apparent  voluntary  irrationality  that  Professor 
Sidgwick  has  found  no  difficulty  in  explaining  away  into 
rationality. 

3.  There  remains  for  further  consideration  the  residuum 
of  apparent  wilful  irrationality  (in  which  class,  perhaps,  the 
last  case  stated  is  to  be  included),  which  is  so  very  rare, 
but  which  Professor  Sidgwick  thinks  undeniably  occurs. 
Unfortunately,  Professor  Sidgwick  fails  here  to  illustrate 
with  examples,  although  his  habit  of  making  clear  his 
position  by  means  of  vivid  instances  is  well  exemplified  in 
the  rest  of  his  article.  I  feel  a  good  deal  of  confidence, 
indeed,  that  he  is  here  speaking,  not  as  the  result  of  the 
observation  of  his  own  inner  experience,  but  in  consideration 
of  what  he  looks  upon  as  objective  evidence;  and  it  is 
therefore  all  the  more  important  to  examine  these  residual 
cases  with  especial  care. 

4.  In  doing  so  I  must  call  attention  to  a  set  of  cases, 
not  mentioned  by  Professor  Sidgwick,  the  obverse,  in  a  sense, 
of  one  class  presented  by  him,  enumerated  above  under 
2.  A.  {z).  I  refer  to  cases  where  a  man,  having  determined 
upon  a  rule  of  conduct  or  a  habit  of  life  as  rational,  acts  in 
accordance  with  this  rule,  notwithstanding  the  presentation 
of  arguments  at  the  moment  which  would  lead  him  to 
abrogate  the  rule.  Here  very  often  he  seems  to  outsiders 
to  act  irrationally,  and  perhaps  to  himself,  some  moments 
after  the  act,  he  would  judge  it  to  have  been  irreconcilable 
with  a  rational  judgment ;  but  at  the  moment  of  action  I 


422  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

feel  that  it  must  be  granted  that  he  acted  with  distinct 
rationality. 

Examples  are  given  in  the  lives  of  religious  devotees 
who,  on  general  principles,  cast  aside  the  claims  of  scientific 
argument  in  favour  of  the  official  dictates  of  their  Church. 
Similar  is  often  the  case  of  the  Utilitarian  who  fails  to  act 
in  an  individual  instance  as  he  would  act  if  he  listened  to 
argument,  and  this  because  he  declines  to  act  in  opposition 
to  rules  looking  to  the  attainment  of  average  happiness 
which  he  has  adopted  as  a  guide  to  life,  because  he  has 
become  convinced  that  they  are  proper.  Another  and 
striking  instance  is  given  in  the  life  of  the  man  whom  we 
call  obstinate  or  strong  willed,  according  as  his  action 
happens  to  be  disapproved  or  approved  by  us :  he  surely 
considers  that  the  course  in  which  he  persists  is  entirely 
rational. 

It  is  worth  noting  here  that  in  all  such  cases,  which  at 
first  sight  appear  to  tell  against  my  position  but  really  tend 
to  uphold  it,  we  have  clearly  an  emphasis  of  a  result  due  to 
the  inhibition  of  action  rather  than  to  the  causing  of  action  : 
and  this  is  characteristic  of  what  seem  to  be  the  residual 
cases  of  wilful  irrationality,  a  characteristic  to  which  Pro- 
fessor Sidgwick  himself  draws  attention. 

It  is  indeed  highly  probable,  as  he  acknowledges  (p.  187), 
that  "even  in  the  exceptional  case  of  a  man  openly 
avowing  that  he  is  acting  contrary  to  what  he  knows  to  be 
both  his  interest  and  his  duty,  it  cannot  be  assumed  that  a 
clear  conviction  of  the  truth  of  what  he  is  saying  is  neces- 
sarily present  to  his  consciousness.  For  a  man's  word  in 
such  a  case  may  express  not  a  present  conviction,  but  the 
mere  memory  of  a  past  conviction ;  moreover,  one  of  the 
forms  in  which  the  ingenuity  of  self-sophistication  is  shown 
is  the  process  of  persuading  oneself  that  a  brave  and  manly 
self-identification   with   a  vicious   desire   is   better   than   a 


CHAP.  XVI  THE  NATURE  OF  REASON  423 

weak  self-deceptive  submission  to  it,  or  even  than  a  feeble 
fluctuation  between  virtue  and  vice."  Now  this  being 
granted,  I  am  inclined  to  believe  it  will  be  found  that  all 
the  cases  of  Professor  Sidgwick's  residuum  can  be  subsumed 
under  these  classes  which  have  been  above  enumerated :  if 
this  is  not  true,  and  there  are  other  cases  which  involve 
subjective  appreciation  of  willed  irrationality  at  the  time  of 
the  act,  I  myself  fail  to  note  them. 

On  the  whole,  therefore,  it  may  be  held,  I  think,  as 
highly  probable  from  a  psychological  standpoint  that  all 
cases  which  appear  to  be  recognised  subjectively  as  voluntary, 
and  at  the  same  time  irrational  action,  are  cases  of  illusion 
occasioned  by  faulty  analysis  of  the  mental  states  involved, 
or  by  failure  to  analyse  them  at  all. 

In  many  cases  where  "  pure  impulse  "  or  the  influence  of 
habit  carries  a  man  into  activities  contrary  to  his  wish,  he 
distinctly  feels  that  he  is  not  responsible  because  he  is 
forced  to  act  as  he  does ;  however  much  he  acknowledge 
his  responsibility  for  having  in  the  'past  acted  (in  ways  which 
now  appear  irrational),  through  voluntary  emphasis  of  the 
impulses  which  press  him  on,  or  the  acquiescence  in  the 
formation  of  the  habits  which  govern  him. 

In  all  other  cases  that  are  analy sable  with  any  clearness 
it  appears  that  whilst  there  is  recognition  of  an  irrationality 
after  the  act,  there  is  none  at  the  tinfie  of  the  act.  The  illu- 
sion would  therefore  appear  to  be  due  to  a  failure  to  note 
the  difference  between  immediate  judgments  of  the  moment 
and  judgments  in  regard  to  past  moments  ;  and  at  the 
same  time  to  the  unwarranted  assumption,  so  commonly 
made,  that  the  elements  entering  into  a  judgment  in  relation 
to  a  past  judgment  must  be  the  same  as  those  which  were 
present  in  making  that  judgment  in  that  past. 

Properly  speaking,  then,  we  cannot  be  said  to  act  irra- 
tionally, although  we  can  be  said  to  have  so  acted.     Similarly, 


424 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 


treating  the  moral  as  a  sub -class  under  the  rational  as 
Professor  Sidgwick  does,  we  cannot  truly  be  said  to  sin, 
although  we  all  surely  have  sinned  and  come  short  of  our 
duty.^ 

§  5.  In  the  preceding  sections  we  have  seen — 

1st.  That  choice,  and  hesitancy  preceding  choice,  are 
objective  phenomena. 

2nd.  That  choice  in  ourselves  is  represented  psychically 
by  Will,  and  that,  as  choice  does  not  differ  in  kind  wher- 
ever it  is  observed,  so  we  judge  that  Will  is  a  psychic 
phenomenon  as  broad  as  psychic  life. 

3rd.  That  as  choice  does  not  differ  in  kind,  so  the 
process  antecedent  to  choice  probably  does  not  differ  in 
kind,  wherever  choice  occurs. 

4th.   But  Eeason  determines  the  psychic  correspondent 

of  the  process  antecedent  to  Will  in  our  conscious  lives : 

hence  we  conclude  that  Eeason  in  germ  or  in  complex  form 

must  be  a  process  as  wide  as  psychic  life. 

r       5th.  This  view,  as  we  have  just  seen,  is  corroborated  by 

/    our  argument  that  Eeason  and  Will  are  indissolubly  con- 

^    nected  ;  that  all  rational  processes,  unless  inhibited,  end  in 

volition ;  and  that  all  volition  is,  at  the  moment  of  the  will 

act,  rational. 

Now  we  note  that  in  our  own  lives  choice  is  the  mark 
of  individual  variation  from  the  typical  forms  of  action  to 
which  we  would  be  led  by  the  instincts  which  we  have 
inherited,  as  they  have  been  modified  by  our  experience 
during  life.  Hence  on  purely  a  priori  grounds  we  seem  led 
to  the  conclusion  that  Eeason  is  the  psychic  correspondent 

^  And  after  all  it  is  this  recognition  of  having  sinned  that  brings  the 
hopefulness  of  repentance.  The  cry,  "  I  am  sinning,"  if  ever  heard,  is  the  cry 
of  the  bound  soul,  for  whom  there  is  no  help  within.  The  cry,  "I have  sinned 
against  heaven  and  before  thee,"  is  of  the  very  essence  of  personal  moral 
regeneration. 


CHAP.  XVI  THE  NATURE  OF  REASON  425 

of  the  process  of  variation  from  typical  reaction,  which  is 
itself  as  wide  as  life.  Life  as  we  experience  it  involves 
adaptation,  within  limits,  to  an  environment  which  changes ; 
and  adaptation  is  attained  by  means  of  variation. 

The  argument  which  has  preceded  this,  then,  surely  lends 
strength  to  the  notion  that  reason  is  placed  in  contradis- 
tinction to  instinct,  because  reason  is  identifiable  with  the 
variant  influence  in  organic  life,  as  instinct  is  identifiable 
with  the  influence  which  leads  organisms  to  act  in  typical 
ways. 

Our  willingness  to  accept  this  conception  will  *  be 
strengthened  if,  by  an  examination  of  the  nature  of  the 
variant  processes,  we  discover  that  the  ratiocinative  pro- 
cesses, which  are  the  highest  forms  of  reason  as  it  is  repre- 
sented in  reflective  consciousness,  appear  as  the  conscious 
side  of  the  latest  and  most  complex  development  of  these 
variant  processes.  This  proposition  I  shall  presently  attempt 
to  establish. 

But  first  we  shall  find  it  advantageous  to  enquire  into 
the  nature  of  variation  itself,  a  very  knotty  problem  indeed, 
one  that  is  strictly  of  biological  significance,  but  one  which 
I  think  psychology  is  able  to  illumine  in  no  small  degree. 


CHAPTEK    XVII 

THE    NATUEE    OF    VARIATION 

§  1.  What  we  call  diverse  forces  produce  diverse  results 
upon  the  bodies  upon  which  they  impinge:  this  is  our 
description  of  a  fact  which  we  observe  in  jiature. 

If  we  make  this  assumption  I  think  we  must  all  agree 
that  if  we  postulate  the  existence,  in  the  dim  past,  of  uniform 
undifferentiated  living  masses,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  con- 
ceiving of  the  appearance  in  them  of  variations,  provided 
only  they  be  acted  upon  by  different  forces.  There  is  no 
more  reason  to  doubt  that  variations  would  thus  occur  in 
living  matter  than  there  is  to  question  the  fact  that  in- 
organic elements  will  vary  in  reaction  under  like  conditions 
of  varying  stimulation. 

But  if  we  find  no  serious  difficulty  in  comprehending 
the  origin  of  simple  variation,  on  the  other  hand  it  is  far 
from  being  an  easy  matter  to  define  the  modes  of  occurrence 
of  this  variation  in  complex,  differentiated,  and  yet  inte- 
grated organic  matter.  It  is  true  that  the  average  follower 
of  Darwin  writes  as  though,  in  describing  certain  ways  in 
which  this  variation  has  become  fixed  in  the  race,  he  had 
solved  not  only  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  these  variations 
but  had  discovered  the  very  basis  of  variation  itself ;  with 
such  matters,  however,  Darwin's  thesis  had  nothing  what- 
ever to  do.      I  have  already  disclaimed  any  such  conception ; 


CHAP.  XVII  THE  NATURE  OF  VARIATION  427 

I  think,  however,  that  we  may  get  a  little  nearer  to  the 
root  of  our  difficulties  if  we  study  the  mode  in  which 
organic  variation  presents  itself  to  us. 

If  biological  actions  are  parallel  with  what  we  know  in 
consciousness  ;  if  mental  effects  are  co-ordinate  with  physical 
effects  in  neural  fields ;  if,  moreover,  biological  variation  be 
going  on  in  our  lives  to-day;  then  that  neural  variation 
which  is  all-important  in  higher  life  should  be  evidenced 
by  psychic  variation,  and  the  mode  of  this  variation 
might  not  impossibly  be  found  reflected  in  some  mode 
recognisable  in  our  conscious  life.  It  would  seem  possible, 
then,  that  an  examination  of  psychological  data  might  throw 
some  light  upon  the  problem  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  the 
variations  that  perplex  us ;  at  all  events,  it  seems  to  me  to 
be  quite  worth  while  for  the  biologist  to  turn  to  psychology 
and  to  enquire  whether  our  science  may  not  have  a  word  to 
say  to  him  on  this  subject. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  instincts  are  evidenced  in  our 
conscious  life  by  "  instinct  feelings "  which  are  coincident 
with  "  instinct  actions  "  ;  and  also  by  "  impulses  "  which 
appear  in  consciousness  as  the  result  of  the  inhibition  of 
instinct  actions,  as  these  are  modified  by  experience.  We 
have  also  seen  that  it  is  the  highest  form,  the  latest 
elaboration,  of  impulses  which  we  find  most  distinctly  pre- 
sented for  analysis  in  reflective  consciousness.  To  these, 
therefore,  our  attention  may  well  be  given  for  a  moment. 

If  we  examine  our  mental  experience  in  connection  with 
those  most  complex  impulses  which  we  are  accustomed  to 
call  the  "  higher  "  ones,  viz.  the  ethical  impulses,  we  are 
naturally  led  to  recall  in  the  first  place  the  fact  that  they 
are  dependent  upon  the  existence  of  the  organised  social 
life  in  which  we  individual  men  and  women  are  elements. 
Oppositions  to  murder,  to  theft,  to  adultery;  impulses  to 


428  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

benevolence  and  sympathetic  aid,  would  all  be  functionless 
if  each  one  of  us  existed  in  isolation  from  the  social  fabric. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  equally  clear  that  at  least 
a  very  large  proportion  of  the  actions  which  lead  to  the 
suppression  of,  or  to  divergence  from,  these  impulsive 
demands  of  social  import  have  themselves  relation  to  our- 
selves as  individuals,  and  that  it  would  be  impossible  to 
hold  for  a  moment  that  these  actions  inhibitive  of  the  social 
instincts  would  be  functionless  if  we  happened  to  be  leading 
a  life  uninfluenced  by  the  existence  of  the  social  fabric. 
Murder,  theft,  adultery,  hatred,  envy,  and  malice,  all  arise 
as  individualistic  tendencies,  and  foster  individual  efficiency ; 
and  they  would  be  of  great  value  to  us  as  individuals 
were  we  not  also  elementary  members  of  a  social  aggregate. 

We  are  led,  then,  to  the  position  that  in  the  quasi-organic 
social  life  variation  from  the  typical  forms  which  are  re- 
presented by  the  ethical  impulses  is  determined,  to  a  great 
extent  at  least,  by  action  on  our  part  as  though  for  the 
moment  we  were  individuals  without  close  bonds  to  this 
social  hfe. 

We  individuals  who  are  elements  in  the  social  aggregate 
tend  to  vary  from  our  social  type  when  we  act  as  individuals, 
as  elements,  without  reference  to  the  whole  aggregate  with  which 
we  find  ourselves  hound  up. 

This  seems  to  indicate  that  the  action  of  an  element  of 
an  aggregate  as  though  it  were  an  isolated  entity,  without 
reference  to  its  position  in  the  aggregate,  might  be  of  im- 
portance in  the  consideration  of  variation  in  general ; 
without  further  examination  from  the  point  of  view  just 
taken,  I  shall  ask  the  reader,  following  the  suggestion  thus 
gained,  to  turn  with  me  to  an  objective  consideration  of 
the  subject. 

§  2.  In  what  follows  I  shall  attempt  to  indicate,  as  briefly 


CHAP.  XVII  THE  NATUEE  OF  VARIATION  429 

as  may  be,  the  evidence  which  leads  me  to  believe  that 
variation  from  typical  forms  of  action  in  complex  organic 
life  is  determined  by  conditions  which  lead  elementary  parts 
of  an  organism  to  act  for  themselves  as  though  they  were 
separate  entities  and  not  related  to  the  aggregates  of  which 
they  are  elements. 

At  the  risk  of  some  little  repetition  I  shall  ask  the 
reader  to  recall  that  in  earlier  chapters  we  considered  the 
probable  effect  upon  a  simple  aggregate  of  simple  living 
masses  if  one  element  in  the  aggregate  were  affected  by  a 
special  stimulus  from  the  environment ;  and  that  we  con- 
cluded that  under  such  conditions  the  element  affected 
would  tend  primarily  to  react  upon  the  disturbing  force  as 
though  it  were  an  isolated  element;  and  that  secondarily 
only  would  this  action  be  modified,  or  inhibited  more  or 
less  fully,  by  the  influence  of  the  other  elements  of  the 
aggregate. 

Here,  then,  we  have  in  this  hypothetical  simple  aggre- 
gate, under  such  conditions,  a  mass  of  elements,  a  large 
part  of  which  act  in  some  definite  manner,  but  one  of 
which  acts  differently  under  a  special  stimulus ;  and  if  we 
happened  to  view  the  aggregation  as  a  whole  we  should 
express  this  fact  by  saying  that  the  action  in  one  part 
varied.  And  it  is  to  be  noted  that  this  variation  means 
simply  the  action  of  one  element  of  the  aggregate  as  though 
it  were  without  connection  with  the  other  elements.  If  we 
use  the  word  "  instinct "  in  the  broad  sense  which  I  think 
should  be  attached  to  it,  then  we  may  say  that  the  single 
element  acts  in  accordance  with  its  own  simple  instincts, 
and  that  in  so  reacting  it  modifies  the  more  complex 
instinctive  reaction  of  the  aggregate  of  which  it  is  an 
element. 

If  now  we  substitute  the  word  "  cell "  for  the  word 
"element,"  in  the  section  that  has  preceded  this,  we  shall  have 


430  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

a  description  of  action  in  the  lowest  forms  of  what  we  call 
organic  life.  If  we  agree  that  the  connection  between  the 
cells  of  the  aggregate  has  become  intimate  and  the  relations 
of  the  actions  of  these  cells  therefore  important,  then  we  see 
that  each  cell  that  is  specially  acted  upon  from  its  environ- 
ment will  tend  primarily  to  react  upon  the  disturbing  force 
as  though  it  were  an  elemental  cell,  and  secondarily  only  as 
though  it  were  a  part  of  the  aggregate.  It  follows,  then,  that 
if  the  disturbance  from  the  environment  be  forceful,  then,  in- 
asmuch as  the  instinctive  tendency  to  act  as  an  isolated 
element  is  earlier  in  genesis,  and  hence  more  thoroughly 
organised,  than  the  instinctive  tendency  to  act  for  the 
benefit  of  the  whole  aggregate,  therefore  under  the  con- 
ditions we  are  considering  the  instinct  action  as  an  element 
will  become  more  emphatic  than  the  action  as  a  part  of  the 
aggregate ;  furthermore,  if  we  look  at  the  organic  aggregate 
as  a  whole,  then  we  should  be  led  to  say  that  this  particular 
cell  element  has  varied  from  the  typical  form  of  action  noted 
in  the  cell  complex  as  a  whole.  It  is  further  to  be  noted 
that  this  tendency  to  variation  will  be  modified  by,  and  will 
be  determined  in  a  secondary  way  by,  the  closeness  of  the 
relation,  the  integration,  between  the  cell-made  parts. 

§  3.  I  think  I  may  take  it  for  granted  that  the  reader 
will  follow  my  thought  if  for  the  sake  of  brevity  I  make  a 
great  leap  and  take  up  now  the  consideration  of  the  higher 
organic  forms  which  are  made  up  of  parts  which  are  them- 
selves intimately  integrated  aggregates  of  cell  life.  Here  I 
think  we  shall  see  that  there  is  much  evidence  that  variation 
from  typical  forms  can  be  identified,  to  a  great  extent  at 
least,  with  action  of  a  special  part  as  though  it  were  an 
individual  entity  out  of  relation  with  the  larger  organic 
aggregate  of  parts  of  which  it  is  in  reality  but  one  element. 

In  all  the  animals  of  higher  grade  we  find,  as  we  have 


CHAP.  XVII  THE  NATURE  OF  VARIATION  431 

often  noted,  specially  differentiated  organs,  as  we  call  them, 
which  are  employed  in  different  functionings. 

To  one  special  point  in  reference  to  this  differential 
functioning  which  is  of  importance  to  our  general  argument 
I  would  ask  the  reader's  attention. 

It  seems  clear  that  in  an  organism  made  up  of  differently 
functioning  cells,  or  of  differently  functioning  parts  formed 
of  aggregations  of  cells,  the  differentiated  parts  must  have 
come  to  act,  where  the  conditions  are  normal,  in  a  manner 
which  is  best  suited  to  their  own  perfect  working :  this 
normal  action,  however,  at  the  same  time  being  suited  to 
the  maintenance,  under  these  normal  conditions,  of  the  life 
of  the  organism  to  which  the  differentiated  parts  belong. 
Let  me  explain  this  symbolically. 

If  we  suppose  that  in  an  organism  A,  formed  of  differen- 
tiated parts  a,  h,  c,  the  normal  functioning  of  a,  or  of  &,  or 
of  c  does  not  produce  results  favouring  the  persistence  of 
the  whole  organism  A;  but  that,  on  the  other  hand,  in 
organism  B,  formed  of  differentiated  parts  o},  b^,  c^,  the  normal 
functioning  of  a^,  b^,  and  c^  does  produce  results  favouring  the 
persistence  of  the  whole  organism  B ;  then  evidently  organism 
A  will  be  likely  to  be  destroyed,  while  organism  B  will  be 
likely  to  persist,  and  we  shall  have  its  differentiated  parts 
a\  6^,  c^  functioning  normally  as  they  would  if  the  organism 
did  not  exist,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  by  this  very  func- 
tioning bringing  about  certain  actions  in  the  organism  as  a 
whole,  which  actions  will,  under  normal  conditions,  tend 
also  to  result  in  the  persistence  of  this  organism. 

The  point  that  I  would  ask  the  reader  to  note  here 
is  this,  that  on  the  whole  each  differentiated  part  of  an 
organism  under  normal  conditions  acts,  as  it  were,  to  its 
own  elemental  advantage :  and  although  evidently  the  parts 
have  been  so  modified  that  the  action  they  would  properly 
make  for  their  own  individual  advantage  as  parts  will  also 


432  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

be  best  adapted  to  arouse  such  activities  of  the  organism  as 
a  whole  as  will  lead  to  the  advantage  of  the  organism  rather 
than  the  parts,  still  it  is  clear  that  this  action  in  reference 
to  the  whole  organism  is  of  a  secondary  nature,  if  we  may 
so  speak. 

If,  for  instance,  the  source  of  stimulation  from  the 
environment  be  mechanical  pressure,  then  under  the  laws 
of  survival  certain  cells  of  the  more  or  less  developed  touch 
organs  must  tend  to  become  so  differentiated  that  they  as 
individual  cells  will  react  healthily, — i.e.  to  their  best 
individual  advantage, — in  answer  to  those  stimuli  which 
more  or  less  indirectly  bring  advantage  not  to  themselves 
but  to  the  organism  as  a  whole.  In  like  manner  will  it  be 
throughout  the  system  with  all  other  cells,  or  with  all  parts 
formed  by  the  aggregation  of  cells,  that  have  come  to  function 
in  special  ways. 

But  now  let  us  consider  what  will  happen  if  the  stimuli 
reaching  these  differentiated  parts  should  happen  to  be 
abnormal.  Under  such  circumstances  these  parts,  knowing 
(if  I  may  be  allowed  so  to  speak)  only  of  their  own  function- 
ing, only  of  the  demands  upon  them  to  react  to  these  unusual 
stimuli,  will  tend  first  to  act  as  usual  as  though  they  had 
no  relation  to  the  whole  organism ;  and  only  secondarily 
will  their  action  be  modified  by  the  influence  of  the  other 
parts  of  the  organism  which  are  drawn  into  unusual 
functioning  as  the  result  of  the  abnormal  action  of  the 
part  first  affected. 

Under  conditions  of  morbid  stimulation  the  lungs  and 
heart  will  often  undertake  extraordinary  work ;  this  action 
may  be  modified  by  the  influences  from  the  rest  of  the 
organism  sufficiently  to  prevent  disaster  to  the  organism 
itself;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  excessive  activity  may, 
and  not  infrequently  does,  result  destructively  to  the  system 


CHAP.  XVII  THE  NATURE  OF  VARIATION  433 

as  a  whole,  before  this  modification  through  systemic 
influences  can  take  place.  The  intestines  in  like  manner 
will  function  with  excessive  vigour  to  throw  off  colonies  of 
poisonous  microbes ;  and  if  the  restraining  influences  from 
the  organism  are  not  effectual,  their  action  may  bring  death 
to  the  whole  organism  through  the  general  exhaustion  caused 
by  their  efforts  to  function  for  the  advantage  of  their  own 
special  part  of  the  larger  organism. 

Of  course  with  the  increase  in  integration,  in  inter- 
dependence of  the  parts,  the  tendencies  to  act  as  parts 
without  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  organism  become  less 
marked,  and  the  influences  from  the  organism  become  more 
quickly  effectual;  but  nevertheless  it  seems  clear  that  the 
influence  from  the  organism  must  always  be  secondary,  and 
if  the  stimulus  to  the  special  part  be  sufficiently  forceful 
there  will  always  be  danger  that  the  influences  from  the 
organism  will  not  be  able  to  hold  the  more  thoroughly 
organised  elemental  action  in  check. 

The  actions  which  I  have  above  illustrated  are  accom- 
modative actions,  and  the  capacity  to  make  such  accom- 
modations to  abnormal  conditions  as  those  described  must 
tend  to  produce  variations  from  the  normal  type.  And  the 
reader  will  note  that  if  I  am  correct  these  variations  from 
type  are  also  explicable  as  due  to  the  action  of  elemental 
parts  of  a  complex  organic  aggregate  as  though  they  were 
independent  of  the  organism,  and  without  relation  to  the 
part  they  normally  play  in  the  functioning  of  the  organism 
as  a  whole. 

§  4.  And  now  again  I  shall  ask  the  reader  to  make  with 
me  a  great  leap ;  to  consider  those  actions  which  imply 
variation  of  individuals  from  the  forms  of  action  which  are 
typical  in  our  social  life. 

The  reader  who  has  been  interested  to  examine  Chapter 

2  F 


434 


INSTINCT  AND  EEASON  part  iv 


VII.,  in  which  I  discuss  the  conception  of  the  social  organism, 
will  find  that  I  there  lay  especial  stress  upon  the  limitations 
of  this  conception.  I  argue  that  although  we  are  compelled 
to  acknowledge  that  social  life  may  be  found  to  be  organic 
in  its  nature,  still  it  is  very  clear  that  if  this  quasi-organic 
social  life  exist  it  must  be  of  a  type  corresponding  in 
integration  to  very  low  forms  of  individual  organisms. 
And  surely  this  lack  in  the  social  organism  of  that  close 
integration  between  the  individual  elements  that  is  so 
distinctly  marked  between  the  elemental  parts  of  the 
liigher  animals,  and  which  tends  to  limit  or  prevent  varia- 
tion in  them,  should  lead  us  to  expect  to  find  in  the  social 
organism  a  very  distinct  tendency  to  variation  from  typical 
action  in  the  lives  of  ourselves,  who,  though  individuals,  are 
nevertheless  also  elements  of  this  hypothetical  wider  organic 
whole. 

Now  it  is  clear,  as  we  have  already  seen,  that  in  the 
evolution  of  normal  individual  life  the  primary  action  in 
response  to  stimuli  from  without  upon  the  cells  must  on 
the  whole  have  been  subordinated  to  secondary  actions 
tending  to  produce  efficiency  of  the  individual,  in  case  the 
two  were  not  thoroughly  adjusted  to  the  same  end.  In 
like  manner,  in  the  evolution  of  normal  social  life  the 
response  to  the  complex  stimuli  from  without  upon  the 
individual  element  must,  on  the  whole,  be  subordinated  to 
secondary  actions  tending  to  produce  efficiency  of  the  social 
complex,  where  the  two  sets  of  actions  are  not  thoroughly 
adjusted  to  the  same  end.  Thus  it  will  happen  that  under 
normal  conditions  the  individual  will  act  as  though  he  had 
only  his  own  personality  to  consider,  and  yet  at  the  same 
time  this  action  of  his  will  tend  to  the  advantage  of  the 
social  fabric. 

But    it    is   also    clear    that    where    conditions    in  our 
social  environment  are  not   normal,   then  if  our  supposi- 


CHAP.  XVII  THE  NATURE  OF  VARIATION  435 

tions  be  correct  we  should  expect  to  find  forceful  stimuli 
tending  to  produce  action  in  individuals  still  for  their  own 
advantage,  but  now  as  though  they  were  disconnected 
altogether  from  the  social  aggregate.  This  involves  varia- 
tion from  typical  social  reaction,  and  this  tendency  to 
variance  from  the  normal  life  of  the  social  type  should  be 
expected  to  be  the  greater  because  of  the  sHghtly  integrated 
form  of  this  social  organism  of  which  we  individuals  are  the 
elements. 

I  think  it  will  be  apparent  to  the  reader  without 
argument  that  we  do  show  this  tendency  to  variance  from 
the  social  type  which  is  marked  out  by  our  ethical  instincts, 
and  this  variation  will,  I  think,  be  found  in  great  measure 
to  be  identical  with  our  action  as  individuals,  as  this  action 
would  be  noted  if  we  were  totally  isolated  and  not  affected 
by  social  demands.  Under  the  sudden  and  overwhelming 
appearance  of  extreme  danger,  as  in  the  case  of  earthquake, 
the  man  will  cower  or  flee,  in  answer  to  his  individualistic 
self-preservative  instincts,  which  are  earlier  in  genesis  and 
hence  more  thoroughly  organised,  who  would  be  not  at  all 
slow  under  ordinary  circumstances  to  act  in  answer  to  his 
social  instincts  for  the  protection  of  his  tribe,  which  instincts 
are  later  in  genesis  and  less  thoroughly  organised.  A  man 
if  placed  at  bay  may  kill  his  comrade  in  self-preservation 
although  ordinarily  he  would  avoid  such  an  act  by  means 
of  restraints,  all  of  which  have  social  import. 

In  other  words,  here  again  we  find  that  variation  from 
typical  forms  is  determined  by  action  of  the  elements 
(ourselves  in  this  case)  of  an  organic  aggregate  (the  "  social 
body")  as  though  they  were  isolated  and  had  little  or  no 
dependence  upon,  or  relation  to,  the  aggregate  as  a  whole. 

§  5.  I  shall  attempt  to  show  in  what  follows  ^  that  con- 

1  Chapter  XVIII. 


436 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 


scious  variation  conforms  with  the  type  of  actions  just 
described ;  but  I  cannot  do  this  without  very  technical 
discussions  which  would  not  be  in  place  here :  moreover, 
it  would  imply  too  great  a  break  in  the  course  of  our 
argument  did  I  stop  now  to  attempt  to  explain  complex 
cases  of  reasoned  variation  which  may  not  seem  at  first 
glance  to  fall  within  the  general  formula  here  suggested : 
I  shall  *  therefore  content  myself  with  one  example  to 
illustrate  the  point  I  make. 

A  man  has  grown  up  under  certain  influences,  inherited 
and  acquired,  which  lead  him  to  act  in  certain  determinate 
ways  under  the  normal  stimuli  of  life ;  attached  to  these 
actions,  or  coincident  with  them,  are  settled  trends  of 
thought  which  make  up  what  we  call  his  belief,  let  us  say, 
in  a  governing  God,  a  personal  being,  having  the  character- 
istics of  humanity,  with  all  its  captiousness,  vacillation, 
passion  and  vengefulness.  Such  was  the  God  of  the  early 
Hebrews.  But  this  man  is  affected  by  the  emphatic  pre- 
sentation to  his  mind  of  some  event  in  life,  some  fact  in 
nature,  some  thought  uttered  by  his  companions,  which 
makes  him  aware  of  his  belief,  of  his  typical  trend  of 
thought,  in  the  very  fact  that  in  doubt  this  typical  trend  is 
disturbed.  Doubt  may  be  of  but  an  instant's  duration ; 
but  doubt,  and  variation  from  the  typical  trend  of  his 
thought,  at  all  events  it  must  be  to  raise  into  his  con- 
sciousness the  fact  of  his  former  settled  belief.  Now  this 
variation  from  his  typical  trend  of  thought,  from  his  belief, 
may  in  the  next  moment  be  inhibited,  his  typical  trend 
may  be  practically  retained :  or,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
may  result  a  long  series  of  reasonings  as  we  call  them, 
disturbances  and  readjustments  of  conception,  until  he 
finally  recasts  his  belief  as  to  the  nature  of  his  God,  comes 
to  conceive  Him  of  nobler  nature :  or  perhaps  he  throws 
the  old  conception  off  entirely,  gaining  a  new  typical  form 


CHAP.  XVII  THE  NATURE  OF  VARIATION  437 

of  thought,  a  new  beHef  in  a  Universe  without  a  guiding 
Deity ;  which  new  behef  may  remain  or  may  be  again  dis- 
turbed and  forced  to  vary  in  the  manner  described 
above. 

In  the  beginning  and  ending  of  this  series  the  process  of 
variation  through  reason  which  I  have  been  describing  is 
pretty  clearly  exemplified  ;  but  many  a  reader  will  find 
his  mind  fixed  upon  those  intermediate  stages  of  shifting 
questioning,  of  anxious  searching,  of  painful  perturbation, 
which  follow  upon  the  initial  disturbance  of  his  belief,  of 
which  belief  doubt  alone  brought  him  realisation. 

Yet  these  intermediate  stages  of  reasoning,  and  mental 
striving,  themselves  present  also  all  the  marks  of  the  process 
of  variation  I  have  been  describing ;  for  after  each  varia- 
tion, each  readjustment  of  thought,  a  new  typical  mode  of 
thought  is  formed,  one  which  indeed  may  exist  but  for  a 
moment,  which  may  be  overturned  in  the  instant  following 
by  the  emphasis  of  some  new  thought-element,  through  some 
other  judgment  from  newly  appearing  premises ;  but  in 
each  such  case  we  have  a  balance  overturned  by  the 
emphatic  action  of  some  element  of  the  complex,  which 
but  for  that  emphasis  would  have  and  hold  the  essential 
nature  of  a  belief. 

§  6.  At  this  juncture  it  is  important  to  note  that  if  the 
hypothesis  here  presented  be  correct,  then,  whatever  be  the 
appearance,  all  of  variation  is  itself  determined  by  instinctive 
reaction.  In  the  study  of  organic  life  we  are  dealing  with 
organised  systems  existing  within  other  organised  systems. 
A  typical  reaction  of  an  organism  is  the  reaction  of  the 
whole  system  and  gives  us  a  typical  instinct  action ;  while 
divergence  from  typical  reaction,  under  the  view  here 
presented,  is  due  to  the  emphatic  reaction  of  a  subordinate 
system  which    is    part   and    parcel  of   the   whole   organic 


438  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  paet  iv 

system,  in  other  words  is  due  to  what  we  may  call  a  partial 
instinct  action. 

What  we  know  as  divergence,  therefore,  is  determined 
by  differences  in  breadth  of  the  organic  systems  involved, 
to  the  fact  that  the  instincts  which  relate  to  the  whole 
individual  organism,  or  to  the  developing  wider  social 
organism,  are  complex  instincts  built  upon  simpler,  partial, 
instincts  which  already  existed  before  the  more  complex 
instincts  were  evolved.  And  those  earlier-formed  instincts 
being  more  thoroughly  organised  tend  under  emphatic 
stimulation  to  react  more. quickly  and  accurately  than  the 
less  thoroughly  organised  and  more  complex  instincts ;  they 
tend  to  become  emphatic  upon  occasion,  and  thus  to  disturb 
the  balance  of  reaction  involved  in  the  functioning  of  the 
wider  instincts  of  later  genesis  and  less  thoroughly  fixed 
organisation  which  have  broader  significance. 

The  quick  reaction  which  determines  variation  is  thus 
seen  to  be  itself  an  instinct  action,  but  an  instinct  action  of 
lower  grade,  of  earlier  genesis,  of  more  thorough  organisa- 
tion, and  hence  capable  of  quicker  response  to  stimulation 
than  is  the  case  with  the  less  thoroughly  organised,  slow 
acting,  typical  instinct,  of  the  organism  as  fully  developed, 
and  which  we  appear  to  modify. 

We  thus  reach  the  important  conclusion  that  all  of 
reasoned  action  must  be  referred  back  to  instinct  action. 
But,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  closing  paragraph  of  Chapter 
IV.,  all  instincts  appear  as  modes  of  that  simplest  of  all 
phenomena  of  activity,  the  reaction  of  a  living  cell  to  the 
stimulus  received  from  its  environment:  hence  finally 
all  reasoned  actions  must  also  he  referred  hack  to  and 
appear  as  modes  of  that  simplest  of  all  phenomena  of 
activity,  the  reaction  of  a  living  cell  to  the  stimuli  from  its 
environment. 


CHAP.  XVII  THE  NATURE  OF  VARIATION  439 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  in  his  Principles  of  Psychology, 
vol.  i.,  accounts  for  reason  as  a  development  of  instinct,  even 
as  lie  claims  that  instinct  is  a  development  of  reflex  action ; 
the  differences  in  both  cases,  he  thinks,  are  due  to  the 
relative  complexity  of  the  phenomena  observed.  As  he 
calls  instinct  "  compound  reflex  action,"  so  under  his  view 
he  would  be  warranted  in  calling  reason  "compound 
instinct." 

He  thus  practically  asserts  the  existence  of  a  funda- 
mental identity  between  reason  and  instinct.  But,  as  the 
reader  will  readily  perceive,  the  relation  which  I  above 
suggest  as  adequate  to  account  for  the  bond  of  unity 
between  instinct  and  reason  cannot  be  held  to  be  an 
identity  in  the  same  sense  of  the  word.  His  explanation 
does  not  seem  to  me  to  be  adequate. 

§  7.  It  appears,  then,  that  the  distinction  between 
instinct  and  reason  is  indeed  not  really  fundamental ;  that 
the  apparent  difference  is  due  to  the  complexity  of  the 
organic  forms  which  we  study;  that  both  refer  back,  as  I 
have  already  said,  to  the  strife  for  persistence  of  life  in  the 
simple  protoplasmic  unit ;  that  both  are  referable  to  what 
Professor  Patten  would  have  us  call  the  "  economy  of 
effort." 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  distinction  is  clearly  of 
importance,  for  only  in  imagination  can  we  refer  back  to 
this  hypothetical  simple  unit ;  as  we  know  life  in  its 
biological  aspect  we  can  examine  only  more  or  less  com- 
plicated organised  aggregates  marked  by  systems  within 
systems  of  integration;  and  in  these  complex  aggregates 
the  reaction  of  the  systematised  part,  out  of  relation  to  the 
reaction  of  the  whole  organism,  is  of  very  notable  signifi- 
cance in  the  process  of  development ;  and  this  warrants  us 
in  preserving  the  distinction  between  instinct  and  reason, 


440  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

as  we  do  the  distinction  between  typical  action  and  varia- 
tion, notwithstanding  that  variation  may  be  referred  back 
in  the  end  to  the  same  "  economy  of  effort "  to  which  typical 
reaction  is  referred. 

The  distinction,  then,  between  instinct  and  reason,  as 
objectively  viewed,  is  as  clear  and  positive  as  the  distinction 
between  typical  reaction  and  variant  reaction ;  as  marked 
as  that  between  normal  stimulation  and  abnormal  stimula- 
tion, to  which  typical  and  variant  reactions  respectively 
correspond.  It  can  in  no  sense  be  said,  then,  that  the 
boundary  between  instinct  and  reason  is  indistinct ;  and 
nevertheless  it  is  true  that  as  in  our  complex  environment 
it  is  scarcely  possible  for  stimulations  to  be  altogether 
normal,  so  it  is  true  that  reactions  of  complex  organisms 
to  stimulations  can  theoretically  never  be  wholly  typical, 
but  must  always  in  some  measure  be  influenced  by  variation. 
In  other  words,  instinct  in  our  complex  life  must  always  to 
some  extent  be  touched  with  reason. 

In  relation  to  our  own  consciousness,  also,  the  distinction 
between  instinct  and  reason  is  as  clear  as  when  we  view 
the  subject  from  the  biological  standpoint. 

All  instinct  feelings  influence  the  consciousness  which  is 
correspondent  to  the  activity  of  that  neural  system  by 
which  the  instinct  actions  are  determined.  Some  few  only 
of  these  instinct  feelings,  however,  become  prominent  in 
that  field  of  attention  which  we  are  able  to  hold  in  reflective 
consciousness. 

So  also  is  it  with  reason.  All  variant  reaction  to 
unusual  stimuli  has  correspondent  with  it  some  measure  of 
reason,  but  much  of  this  reason  affects  only  what  we  call 
the  field  of  inattention  :  relatively  little  appears  in  attentive 
consciousness. 


CHAP.  XVII  THE  NATURE  OF  VARIATION  441 

Still  on  the  whole,  as  typical  reactions  of  the  whole 
organic  system  tell  of  the  experience  of  stimulation  during 
indefinite  ages  of  the  past,  while  variant  actions  tell  of  the 
experience  of  an  individual  life ;  so  the  effect  upon  the  field 
of  attention  from  instinct  actions  is,  as  we  should  expect 
it  to  be,  much  less  emphatic  on  the  whole  than  is  the  effect 
from  reasoned  processes. 

§  8.  Eeason  thus  represents  the  influence  in  organic  life 
which  breaks  down  our  complex  inherited  tendencies ;  the 
influence  which  leads  us  to  vary  from  typical  forms  of 
action  as  determined  by  instincts  of  broader  scope. 

If  this  be  true,  then  it  becomes  very  clear  why  it  is 
natural  to  look  upon  instinct  and  reason  as  indissolubly 
connected  phenomena,  and  yet  as  phenomena  which  must 
be  placed  in  contradistinction.  To  speak  of  them  as 
standing  in  opposition,  as  the  word  "  opposition  "  is  usually 
employed,  is  perhaps  incorrect ;  the  basis  of  the  distinction 
being  merely  this,  that  they  exclude  one  another  when 
under  diverse  conditions  they  might  appear  in  consciousness 
at  the  same  time  in  relation  to  the  same  set  of  external 
stimuli.  It  is  in  no  sense  true  that  he  who  acts  under  the 
pressure  of  instinct  acts  irrationally :  it  is  true  that  he  at 
the  moment  acts  non-rationally,  although  his  action  as 
viewed  in  retrospect  may  appear  to  be  entirely  rational ; 
for  variation  occurs  through  unusual  emphasis  of  what  we 
recognise  as  instincts  as  well  as  through  the  emphasis  of 
some  specific  set  of  acts  that  seem  on  their  face  to  have 
no  connection  with  instinct. 

§  9.  It  is  not  unusual  to  find  another  distinction  made 
between  instinct  and  intelligence,  starting  also  as  we  have 
done  with  the  observation  that  choice  is  a  characteristic  of 
non-instinctive  activities.     It  having  been  noted  that  the 


442  INSTINCT  AND  EEASON  part  iv 

hesitancy  that  goes  with  choice  is  lacking  where  the  acts 
are  instinctive,  this  lack  of  hesitancy  has  been  made  the 
basis  of  a  temporal  distinction  between  instinctive  and 
intelligent  acts,  it  being  held  that  the  reactions  tend  to 
become  instinctive  as  they  tend  to  accuracy  of  adjustment 
and  to  immediacy,  and  that  they  "  lapse  "  from  intelligence 
pari  passu  with  the  decrease  of  hefeitancy. 

In  this  connection  we  note  that  if  the  word  "  intelligence  " 
be  used  here  to  include  such  forms  of  reflective  conscious- 
ness as  Professor  Morgan  speaks  of  as  "  perceptual  intelli- 
gence," the  distinction  under  consideration  cannot  properly  be 
made,  for  many  recognisedly  instinctive  acts  are  accompanied 
by  this  form  of  intelligence.  The  distinction  can  only  be 
defended  in  case  the  word  "  intelligence  "  is  meant  to  cover 
what  I  speak  of  as  "  reason."  Then  it  is  true  enough  in  a 
rough  way  that  actions  become  instinctive  pari  passu  with 
the  lapse  of  "  intelligence." 

But  even  then  it  cannot  be  maintained  that  this  holds 
except  in  this  rough  way ;  and,  furthermore,  the  distinction 
on  a  temporal  basis  seems  to  me  to  be  unavailable  in  a 
strictly  scientific  treatment  of  the  subject,  for  the  reason 
that  there  is,  as  we  have  already  seen,  a  marked  difference 
in  immediacy  of  reaction  between  different  sets  of  instinctive 
acts  of  the  same  organic  grade,  this  temporal  unlikeness 
being  determined  partly  by  differences  in  the  complexity 
and  mode  of  development  of  the  several  instincts,  and 
partly  by  the  fact  that  some  instincts  must  act  quickly,  and 
others  slowly,  if  they  are  to  function  to  the  best  advantage 
of  the  organism  in  which  they  appear. 

The  distinction  that  I  propose  seems  to  me  to  avoid  the 
confusion  connected  with  these  difficulties  by  emphasising 
the  difference  between  the  instinct  actions  as  being  the 
typical  actions  of  organisms,  and  reasoned  actions  as  due  to 
the  disturbance  of  these  typical  actions  by  the  hypernormal 


CHAP.  XVII  THE  NATURE  OF  VARIATION  443 

action  of  elements  that  go  to  make  up  organisms ;  the 
distinction  between  instinct  actions  on  the  one  hand  and 
elemental  variant  ones  on  the  other. 

Some  reader  who  has  become  accustomed  to  the  temporal 
distinction  just  noted  may  not  impossibly  think  for  a 
moment  that  he  has  discovered  a  defect  in  my  argument  in 
the  fact  that  I  treat  of  reasoned  action  as  variant  action, 
and  describe  variation  as  determined  by  quick  reaction  of 
an  element  to  a  strong  stimulus  before  there  is  time  for  the 
whole  organic  system  to  react.  My  critic  may  say  that 
this  very  quickness  of  reaction  to  which  you  thus  refer 
reason  and  variation  is  the  mark  of  instinct :  and  indeed 
this  is  true.  But  what  at  first  appears  to  him  to  be  a 
difficulty  is  in  reality  a  necessary  implication  of  the  thesis 
I  present :  in  fact  I  am  sure  it  will  not  appear  to  the 
careful  reader  as  a  difficulty  at  all ;  for  he  will  have  noted 
that,  as  I  have  already  said,  the  quick  reaction  which  deter- 
mines variation  is  itself  an  instinct  action,  but  an  instinct 
action  of  lower  grade,  of  earlier  genesis,  of  more  thorough 
organisation,  and  only  on  this  account  capable  of  the  quicker 
reaction  than  that  of  the  less  thoroughly  organised,  slower 
acting,  typical  instinct  from  which  we  vary.  It  is  not  this 
special  quick  reaction,  however,  which  we  consider  when  we 
note  a  case  of  variation,  but  the  whole  process  of  this 
reaction  and  its  resultant,  and  it  is  this  process  that  seems 
slower  than  the  response  of  the  instinct  action  of  the 
complex  system  when  viewed  by  itself. 

§  10.  In  closing  I  may  properly  speak  of  one  more 
point,  viz.  in  reference  to  the  notion  that  intelligence,  or 
reason  as  I  call  it,  involves  a  new  factor  in  variation. 
Professor  Lloyd  Morgan,  for  instance,  says:^  "With  the  advent 

1  Edbit  and  InstiTwt,  p.  271. 


444  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

of  effective  consciousness  not  only  a  new  factor  but  a  new 
method  of  evolutionary  progress  is  introduced."  But  where, 
I  would  ask,  does  this  new  factor  make  its  entrance  in  the 
biological  series  ?  Under  the  theory  I  am  here  defending 
there  is  no  moment  of  organic  life  which  involves  adjust- 
ment to  stimuli  that  are  in  any  degree  abnormal,  which 
does  not  involve  on  its  psychic  side  reason,  in  simple  or 
complex  form;  and  I  fail  to  see  that  any  indication  is 
gained  in  the  objective  study  of  life  around  us  to  uphold 
the  notion  that  such  "  an  advent  of  effective  consciousness  " 
ever  takes  place.  Wherever  there  is  variation  from  purely 
instinctive  reaction,  whenever  there  is  adjustment  of  means 
to  end  and  choice  of  means  or  end,  then,  if  I  am  right, 
reason  is  present  on  the  psychic  side,  although,  as  we  have 
seen  in  §  7,  this  may  not  come  into  clear  consciousness.  It 
seems  to  me  to  cloud  the  questions  at  issue  in  a  very 
undesirable  way  to  make  the  assumption  that  the  choice 
and  the  variation  come  to  differ  in  kind  at  some  point  as 
they  rise  in  the  scale  and  take  on  that  specially  complex 
form  which  we  are  able  to  hold  in  our  own  reflective 
consciousness. 


CHAPTEE    XVIII 

I. — The  Function  of  Eeason 

§  1.  The  study  of  reason  in  connection  with  instinct  in  the 
preceding  chapters  has  already  shown  us  the  essential 
importance  of  the  former  as  well  as  of  the  latter  in 
biological  development.  We  have  argued  that  reason  is 
our  name  for  the  process  which  in  an  objective  view 
appears  as  organic  variation ;  that  the  ratiocinative  process 
which  we  recognise  as  the  latest  development  of  reason  is 
the  psychic  coincident  of  the  highest  elaboration  of  the 
variant  capacity  within  us ;  that  reasoning  is  our  name  for 
the  conscious  side  of  those  activities  of  our  nature  which 
enable  the  organism  to  depart  from  typical  reactions,  so  far 
as  the  beginnings  of  these  variations  produce  an  effect  in 
consciousness ;  that  reason  is  therefore  the  psychic  co- 
incident of  that  capacity  within  us  which  is  all-important 
in  the  adaptation  of  life  to  an  environment  which  in  its 
very  nature  must  be  ever  variable. 

If,  on  the  one  hand,  without  the  typical  reactions  of 
instinct  we  cannot  conceive  of  continued  organic  existence, 
so,  on  the  other  hand,  without  variations  from  typical  forms, 
and  reason,  we  cannot  conceive  of  individual  adaptation  and 
of  organic  development. 

Eeason  is  indeed  the  expression  of  an  opposition  within 
us  to  the  performance  of  our  entire  function  in  the  wider 


446  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

organic  life  in  which  as  the  result  of  inherited  traits  we 
appear  as  elements :  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  basis 
of  all  our  hope  for  the  production  of  a  higher  organic  life 
than  that  which  now  exists,  one  which  shall  bring  our  lives 
into  more  harmonious  relation  with  our  ever -varying 
environment.  But  for  the  ability  to  accommodate  them- 
selves, organisms  are  liable  to  be  overwhelmed  by  special 
conditions  in  their  environment :  with  this  ability  developed 
within  them  they  may  chance  to  produce  a  favourable 
variation  which  will  render  the  part  of  the  race  they 
represent  better  fitted  to  survive  than  others  which  do  not 
vary  in  the  same  manner  or  degree. 

These  facts  being  granted,  the  important  problem  to 
which  we  referred  in  our  opening  chapter  at  once  presents 
itself  to  our  attention  in  connection  with  the  consideration 
of  these  two  forces  in  our  lives :  the  problem  of  the  deter- 
mination of  the  balance  which  should  be  maintained 
between  these  two  great  influences  acting  upon  organic  life: 
the  problem  as  to  the  relative  weight  which  should  be  given 
to  reason  and  to  instinct  in  our  conscious  existence.  This 
problem  is  the  more  important  to  us  because,  as  we  have 
argued,  a  tendency  to  wide  variation  exists  in  the  higher 
organic  life,  a  special  governing  instinct,  the  religious 
instinct,  having  been  formed,  so  far  as  we  can  judge, 
especially  to  regulate  this  variation. 

Before  we  can  attack  this  problem  profitably  we  must 
make  clear  our  conceptions  in  a  number  of  directions.  This 
can  best  be  done  in  connection  with  the  technical  treatment 
of  the  functioning  of  reason  in  relation  to  instinct,  which 
we  deferred  from  Chapter  XYII.,  and  to  which  I  shall  now 
turn. 


CHAP.  XYiii  THE  FUNCTIONING  OF  REASON  447 

II. — The  Functioning  of  Eeason 

Whilst  I  think  it  necessary  to  completeness  to  consider 
here  the  functioning  of  reason  in  some  detail,  I  may  per- 
haps here  warn  my  reader  that  the  analysis  we  are  about 
to  make  will  not  be  easy  reading,  if  I  may  judge  from  my 
own  experience  with  it,  and  to  advise  him,  unless  he  is 
exceptionally  interested  in  psychological  discussion,  to  pass 
over  the  remainder  of  this  chapter,  in  which  I  shall  attempt  to 
show  by  a  further  examination  of  the  rational  process  that 
theory  and  experience  corroborate  the  views  already  presented. 

§  2.  In  what  has  preceded  this,  having  been  led  by 
various  arguments  to  hold  that  reason  is  the  capacity 
^withinus_that  determines  variation  from  typical  reactions, 
we  have  also  been  led  to^see^thaT^^ere  variation  occurs"" 
some  part  of  an  organic  system  acts  to  express  its  own 
special  instincts,  the  instinct  actions  thus  produced  being 
out  of  harmony  with  those  instinct  actions  of  the  whole 
organic  system  which  are  normal  for  this  system  at  the 
moment  of  stimulation :  in  other  words,  variation  is  due  to 
an  emphasis  of  the  action  of  a  part  of  an  organic  system,  so 
that  the  part  tends  to  act  for  itself  as  though  it  were  an 
independent  entity  and  out  of  relation  with  the  whole 
organic  system  of  which  it  is  an  element.  I  shall  attempt 
here  to  show  that  the  analysis  of  those  conscious  states  which 
in  our  experience  are  antecedent  to  the  action  of  variation 
shows  them  to  be  of  a  nature  consistent  with  this  view. 

As  we  have  also  seen  in  our  previous  studies,  instinct 
actions,  so^L_as_theyu,ffect  our  mentaljife^ jre^epresented 
in  consciousness  by  "  instinct  feelings,"  and,  whenever  the 
iflstinct  actionsare  inhibited,  impulses  present  themselves_^ 

in   consciousness. -It   is   apparent  that  in  a  study  of  the 

processes  which  precede  the  act  of   variation  we  do   not 


448  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

have  to  consider  the  "  instinct  feelings  "  coincident  with 
the  instinct  actions ;  they  are  part  and  parcel  of  the  act, 
and  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  genesis  of  the  act  which 
we  examine  in  any  special  case.  The  impulses  due  to 
inhibition  of  instinct  actions  as  modified  by  experience  are, 
however,  clearly  antecedent  to  the  act,  and  we  must  therefore 
take  them  into  consideration  in  the  study  of  rational  process. 

If  instinct  actions,  incipient  but  inhibited,  give  rise  to 
impulses  in  consciousness,  and  if  variation  is  due  to  the 
expression  of  the  instincts  of  a  part  acting  out  of  relation 
to  the  instincts  of  the  whole  organic  system  of  which  the 
part  is  an  element,  then,  when  variation  seems  to  involve 
any  previous  effects  upon  consciousness  at  all,  i.e.  when  it 
is  not  produced  immediately  as  the  result  of  a  very  forcible 
stimulus,  we  should  expect  to  find  it  preceded  by  the 
emphasis  of  certain  impulses  peculiar  to  the  part,  and 
which  are  out  of  normal  relation  to  the  body  of  impulses 
appropriate  to  the  whole  organic  system. 

If  this  view  be  correct,  then  we  should  expect  to  find 
the  direct  mental  antecedents  of  variant  action  to  be,  in  a 
general  way,  quite  of  a  kind  with  the  mental  antecedents  of 
typical  action ;  the  difference,  however,  lying  in  this,  that  in 
the  case  of  variant  action  there  would  arise  (and  usually  out  of 
the  ego,  the  field  of  inattention)  an  emphasis  of  one  impulse, 
only  part  of  the  impulse  system,  which  emphasis  would 
determine  the  variant  action.  This  is  a  conclusion  thoroughly 
in  accord  with  our  discussion  in  the  preceding  chapter,  where 
we  argued  that  "  all  of  variation  is  determined  finally  by 
instinctive  reaction,  divergence  being  due  to  differences  of 
width  and  complexity  of  the  organic  systems  involved."  I 
shall  endeavour  to  show  that  this  expectation  is  fulfilled. 

§  3.  All  psychologists  nowadays  agree Jhatjmpulses  do 


CHAP.  XVIII  THE  FUNCTIONING  OF  REASON  449 

not  arise  within  us  spontaneously.  We  know  full  well  that 
we"do^uL  ai^l-Ttnless'^e  are  stimuTated  directTy~or  indirectly]" 
that  our  organisms  are  ^oBjects  which  l^ature  uses  for  the 
purposes  of  transforming  certain  kinds  of  energy  which 
impinge  upon  us  into  energies  of  other  types  which  are 
spent  in  reaction  upon  our  environment. 

If  this  be  true^en,  for  the  basis  of  the  emphasis  of  these 


partial^mpulses  connected  with  variation  we    must    look 
BacFof  the  mere  impulses^wEicir~wouId  lead   to   action^ 
to^the  stimuliwhich  determine  the8e_impulses,i- anj(LJiere___ 
we  find  ourselves  dealing  with^the^ssential   processes  of_ 
reasoning.     We  must  look  back  of  the^  inhibited  instinct  _ 
action  to  t!ie  stimulus  which  arouses  this  instinct  action, 
or,  in~psychrc^efms,n5ack^ri.lie  conscious  impulse  to  the 
presence  in  our^ental  life  ofa  powerful  stimulating^  idea. 

This  stimulating  idea  may  present  itself  suddenly  to 
consciousness.  Where  this  happens  it  is  usually  because 
our  organisms  have  been  directly  stimulated  from  without, 
and  then  the  stimulating  idea  seems  to  be  traceable  to  the 
effects  of  sensation,  or  rather  to  the  effects  of  the  percep- 
tions which  ensue  upon  the  rise  of  sensation  in  conscious- 
ness. In  some  cases  of  this  type,  however,  the  stimulating 
idea  may  arise  from  some  obscure  process  within  ourselves 
which  is  not  assignable  to  any  stimulation  from  the  world 
around  us,  nor  to  perceptions  aroused  by  such  stimulation  : 
we  then  assume  that  it  is  due  to  some  combination  of 
influences  within  ourselves,  none  of  which  has  availed  to 
affect  the  field  of  attention.  In  all  such  cases  the  stimu- 
lating idea  results  in  immediate  instinctive  reactions  which 
are  marked  in  consciousness  by  "  instinct  feelings,"  or  at 
most,  if  any  hesitancy  is  involved,  by  a  merely  momentary 
pressure  of  the  impulses  caused  by  the  momentary  inhibi- 
tion of  the  instinct  actions.  In  such  cases  we  scarcely  feel 
that  we  govern  the  act,  we  do  not  consider  that  we  distinctly 

2g 


450  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

will  to  do  .what  we  do ;  rather  do  we  feel  that  we  are  forced 
to  the  action  by  stimuli  over  which  we  have  no  control. 

There  are  many  cases,  however,  in  which  we  do  feel  that 
we  have  control,  in  which  we  feel  that  we  use  our  reason 
and  that  we  will  the  variation ;  these  are  the  ones  in  which 
the  processes  antecedent  to  variation  become  prominent, 
and  the  ones  to  which  the  greatest  interest  attaches  in 
our  mental  life  :  I  wish  to  show  that  even  in  these  cases  the 
process  is  fundamentally  the  same  as  that  already  described. 

§  4.  All  men  and  women  of  active  mind  find  in  their 
experience  constant  trains  of  thinking,  note  the  continuous 
presentation  of  a  stream  of  mental  objects  which  are  con- 
stantly modifying,  and  being  modified  by,  the  apperceptive 
systems  ^  in  which  they  appear.  These  mental  objects  are 
more  or  less  real  for  us ;  that  is,  they  fit  in  more  or  less 
completely  with  the  whole  mental  life  of  the  moment ;  they 
are  more  or  less  stable  in  relation  to  what  we  call  the 
apperceptive  systems  which  form  the  body  of  the  experience 
to  which  these  objects  are  attached,  or  from  which  at  times 
they  seem  to  obtrude,  if  we  may  so  speak.  It  is  from 
amongst  these  mental  objects,  these  ideas,  that  arise  those 
efficient  ones  which  stimulate  us  to  the  activities  which 
result  in  variation. 

When  a  mental  object,  an  idea,  is  real  for  us  it  is  such 
because  it  forms  part  and  parcel  of  a  relatively  stable 
apperceptive  system  which  is  existent  for  us  at  the  time 
under  consideration.  This  apperceptive  system,  which  is  of 
psychic  significance,  must  be  supposed  to  have  corresponding 
with  it  on  the  physical  side  a  system  of  typical  reaction 
which  is  stimulated  by  the  activities  corresponding  with  the 
apperceptive  system. 

Variation  from  such  a  typical  system  of  reaction,  by  the 

^  Cf.  Stout's  Analytical  Psychology. 


CHAP.  XVIII  THE  FUNCTIONING  OF  EEASON  451 

emphasis  of  an  action  which  is  partial  in  relation  to  the 
activity  of  the  system  as  a  whole,  can  occur  as  the  result  of 
action  within  the  system  (which  alone  we  are  now  consider- 
ing) only  where  some  idea  within  the  corresponding  apper- 
ceptive system  becomes  emphatic  at  the  same  time  that  it 
becomes  an  idea  stimulating  to  partial  action.  This  can 
only  occur  when  the  stimulating  idea,  as  the  result  of  its 
own  special  development,  fails  to  remain  stable  as  part  and 
parcel  of  the  apperceptive  system  existing  at  the  moment 
of  stimulation,  when  it  fails  to  be  altogether  real  in  relation 
to  that  system.  The  process  antecedent  to  variation,  there- 
fore, so  far  as  it  is  represented  in  our  world  of  ideas,  is 
determined  by  the  presence  of  an  idea  which  is  unrealised 
and  which  is  recognised  to  be  unrealised. 

There  are  cases  in  which  the  stimulating  idea  is  recog- 
nised as  being  not  only  unrealised  hut  as  being  unrealisahle  ; 
i.e.  when  it  fails  of  assimilation  with  the  newly  arising 
apperceptive  system  which  its  special  emphasis  determines ; 
when  it  fails  to  become  real  in  this  new  apperceptive 
system.  This  state  of  mind  we  know  as  a  loish :  but  with 
it  we  have  no  direct  concern  here,  for  a  wish  pure  and 
simple  leads  to  no  variant  action. 

There  are  other  cases,  and  these  are  many  and  most 
important  for  our  consideration,  where  the  stimulating  idea  is 
recognised  not  only  as  unrealised  hut  as  realisable,  i.e.  when 
a  new  apperceptive  system  arises  in  consciousness  as  the 
result  of  the  special  emphasis,  in  which  new  apperceptive 
system  we  feel  that  this  idea  might  become  real,  and  with- 
out which  realisation  this  newly  appearing,  possible,  apper- 
ceptive system  fails  of  completeness. 

It  is  apparent,  therefore,  that  the  process  anterior  to 
variation,  wherever  it  rises  into  consciousness,  must  involve 


452  im^.TINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

the  appearance  of  an  idea  which  is  recognised  to  be  realisable 
but  not  realised  in  some  newly  arising  apperceptive  system. 
But  the  presence  in  consciousness  of  an  unrealised  yet 
realisable  idea  is,  as  we  have  already  seen  in  a  previous 
chapter/  the  state  which  we  designate  as  Desire. 

It  is  apparent,  therefore,  that  theoretically  the  mental 
state  which  we  call  desire  is  the  one  we  are  most  concerned  to 
consider  in  relation  to  the  origin  from  within  ourselves  of  con- 
scious variation;  and  this  accords  with  general  experience,  for 
it  is  a  generally  acknowledged  fact  that  desire  determine^  im- 
pulse, and  desire  and  impulse  determine  will,  will  as  we  have 
seen  being  the  psychic  correspondent  of  the  act  of  variation. 

But  desire,  as  we  have  just  seen,  is  the  effect  in  con- 
sciousness of  the  emphasis  of  a  special  element  of  an 
a,pperceptive  system,  which  emphasis  corresponds  with  the 
emphatic  partial  action  of  some  element  of  a  system  of 
typical  physical  reaction,  which  thus  occasions  variation. 
It  thus  appears  that  the  mental  process  in  cases  of  variation 
is  only  different  from  that  in  cases  of  typical  organic 
reaction  in  that  it  stimulates  to  a  partial  instinctive  reaction 
and  not  to  the  reaction  of  the  whole  system.  This  is  what 
we  should  be  led  to  expect  as  the  result  of  our  considera- 
tion in  the  seventeenth  chapter  of  the  nature  of  variation 
from  an  objective  standpoint. 

The  emphasis  of  the  stimulating  idea  in  desire  is  that 
which  marks  the  direction  of  variant  action,  and  for  the 
basis  of  this  emphasis  we  must  look  to  the  process  of 
reasoning  which,  as  we  shall  see  (§  7  below),  when 
analysed,  in  those  forms  in  which  it  is  clearly  grasped 
in  reflection  in  the  process  of  ratiocination,  appears  as  a 
process  of  strengthening  and  rendering  persistent  some 
specially  stimulating  idea. 

1  Chapter  XIII. 


CHAP.  XVIII  THE  FUNCTIONING  OF  REASON  45a 


III. — Desire — Eeasoning — Impulse — Will 

§  4.  Erom  what  has  immediately  preceded  this,  and 
from  our  discussion  of  the  nature  of  impulse  in  Chapter 
XIII.,  it  appears  that  the  voluntary  act  which  produces 
variation  is  the  result  of  a  determination,  from  the  ego,  of 
the  higher  efficiency  of  an  inhibited  instinct  producing  an 
impulse,  or  of  one  of  several  opposed  instincts  represented 
in  consciousness  by  opposed  impulses ;  but  that,  inasmuch 
as  the  impulses  are  mere  marks  of  the  inhibition  of  in- 
stinctive efficiency  of  the  system  involved,  for  the  cause  of 
this  action  which  emphasises  one  impulse  we  must  look  to 
the  process  which  is  antecedent  to  the  appearance  of  the 
impulse  in  consciousness.  This  antecedent  process  we  have 
seen  to  be  marked  by  the  rise  of  desire,  and  the  action  of 
reasoning  which,  as  we  have  argued  in  Chapter  XVII.,  seems 
to  involve  the  strengthening  of  some  partial  idea  within  an 
existing  apperceptive  system. 

It  will  not  be  denied,  I  think,  that^desire  is  n^mally  ^ 
followed  by  instinctive  reaction,  or  by  an  impulse  to  action^  j 
in  case  there  is  an  inhibition  of  instinctive  reaction.  ,  Where  ^ 
desires  are  balanced,  reasoning  steps  in  and  determines  the 


efficient  resultant  by  rendering  one  desire  stronger,  and 
fifvrmi^rthfi^yTig  the  JTTipulse  corresponding  with  it.  Eeason- 
ing, to  be  sure,  does  not  always  appear  as  strengthening 
desire :  reasoning  often  seems  to  move  in  trains,  as  we  say, 
from  one  strengthened  idea  to  another;  its  outcome  in 
desire,  in  impulse,  and  in  action  being  absent,  or  lost  sight 
of  when  it  occurs.  But  where  desires  clash,  and  are  not 
influenced  by  stimuli  from  without,  but  are  determined  by 
influences  from  within  the  ego,  then  it  is  that  reasoning 
steps  in  to  determine  the  resultant,  emphasising  one  of  the 
opposed  desires  which  determines  the  act  of  will. 


454  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

It  is  of  course  true  that  there  are  few  cases  where  this 
whole  course  is  run  in  consciousness.  I  may  find  myself 
willing  to  do  a  certain  difiicult  task  without  having  been 
conscious  of  the  desire,  or  of  the  impulse,  or  of  the  reason- 
ing which,  had  the  conditions  been  appropriate,  would  have 
been  clear  in  my  consciousness.  So  I  may  feel  the  clash  of 
opposed  desires  and  then  find  the  act  accomplished  with 
no  sense  of  having  willed,  and  little  appreciation  of  an 
impulse  leading  to  the  act,  or  of  the  process  by  which  it 
was  strengthened.  So  I  may  note  the  reasoning  process 
and  give  no  attention  to  desire,  to  impulse,  or  to  the 
voluntary  act;  or  I  may  note  the  clash  of  opposed  im- 
pulses and  give  no  heed  to  desire,  or  reasoning,  or  the 
will  act. 

I  may  attend  thus  to  one  only  of  the  four  mental 
processes  under  discussion,  or  I  may  attend  to  more  than 
one  and  less  than  all,  or  I  may  attend  to  all ;  but  I  think 
it  must  be  taken  for  granted  that  in  all  cases  of  volitional 
variation  the  course  of  mental  activity  is  the  same,  in  all 
cases  the  desire,  the  impulse,  the  reasoning,  and  the  will  are, 
in  a  sense,  one  act. 

This  brings  us  back  to  the  position  already  reached  by 
our  argument  in  Chapter  XVI.,  viz.  that_jn^j:aTying_con- 
jaQiousl;^:^^^  always  act  rationally,  through  the  emphasis,^ 

ig  impulse__element  in  that  system  of  impulses  which 
detfiimines  our  staS^^^oribIie~moment ;  and  not  only  that 
we_always^thus  in  acting  voluntarily  act  rationally,  but  that 
we  always  act  aright,  i.e.  in  accord  with  the  order  of  impulse 
efficiencies  of  the  moment ;  the  irrationality,  the  error,  of 
our  act  appearing  only  after  the  fact,  when  we  compare 
the  impulses  which  governed  us  with  the  relatively  per- 
manent order  of  impulse  efficiencies  of  the  moment  of 
reflection. 

When  we  consider  our  acts  of  the  past,  or  the  acts  of 


CHAP.  XVIII  THE  FUNCTIONING  OF  REASON  455 

others,  we  judge  them  to  be  reasonable  or  unreasonable  so 
far  as  they  do  or  do  not  harmonise  with  the  hierarchy  of 
the  desire-impulse  efficiencies  of  the  moment  of  reflective 
consideration.  Where  the  efficient  desires  are  egoistic  it 
seems  unreasonable  to  act  disinterestedly ;  where  they  are 
altruistic  it  seems  equally  unreasonable  to  act  with  self- 
interest  as  our  aim.  For  instance  :  where  I  have  laboured 
hard  and  have  earned  a  needed  holiday,  and  where  there 
are  no  duties  to  prevent,  it  seems  unreasonable  not  to 
choose  the  greatest  pleasure  I  can  think  of  that  is  not 
vicious ;  but  if  there  are  urgent  altruistic  duties  to  perform, 
it  seems  in  like  manner  irrational  to  leave  them  aside,  and 
to  seek  for  pure  pleasure  which  is  not  demanded  in  the 
interests  of  health. 

§  6.  So  much  attention  has  been  given  in  later  years  to 
the  analysis  of  the  act  of  will,  and  of  the  feelings  of  effort 
which  often  go  with  this  act,  that  I  think  it  may  be  well  to 
express  the  thesis  I  am  maintaining  in  other  terms  which 
bear  some  reference  to  these  discussions. 

We  may_ii(m£eivfiL_Jihe_  existence  oL^the  mentaljlife  of  a 
psychic  element  corresponding  to  activity  in  a  physical 
element  ;^his  mental  life  is  a  psychic  whole,  andjt  seeins^ 
necessary  in  such  a  case  to  conceive  the  psychic  corre- 
spondents of  stimulation  and  of  reaction  as  forming  one 
psychic  state.  Moreover  it  seems  to  me  that  we  must 
conceive  of  complex  psychic  systems  in  the  same  way :  as 
the  whole  physical  system  at  any  one  moment  must  be  con- 
ceived as  a  whole  in  a  certain  balance  of  reaction,  so  the 
corresponding  system  of  consciousness  must  be  conceived 
as  a  psychic  whole  in  that  moment.  But  in  objective 
reflection  (which  is  itself  a  unified  pulse,  such  as  we  have 
just  described)  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  limit  our  thought 
to  any  one  moment ;  we  must  take  into  our  field  of  view 


466  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

more  than  a  single  psychic  element,  more  even  than  a  single 
complex  psychic  unit :  we  are  thus  forced  in  reflection  to 
view  readjustments  of  psychic  systems. 

In  reflection  we  thus  find  certain  activities,  which  we 
call  the  psychic  correspondents  of  stimulation,  held  apart 
from  certain  activities  which  we  call  the  psychic  corre- 
spondents of  reactions  to  these  stimulations.  The  separation 
is  justified  indeed  in  descriptive  psychology,  for  we  there 
consider  special  moments,  and  in  some  of  these  the  psychic 
unit  of  activity  is  markedly  related  to  stimulation  of  the 
organic  system,  while  in  others  it  is  markedly  related  to  reac- 
tion of  the  system  upon  the  environment.  Such  a  distinction 
is  strengthened  by  the  anatomical  differences  discovered 
between  the  receptive  neural  systems  and  the  reactive 
neural  systems.  But  the  neural  activity  of  the  receptive 
organ  is  as  truly  a  state  of  reaction  as  the  last  observed 
contractions  of  a  muscle.^ 

Our  bodily  systems,  the  psychic  correspondents  of  which 
we  view  in  consciousness,  are  in  an  objective  view  as  a 
whole,  or  in  part,  but  the  means  of  transformation  of 
physical  forces  into  many  forms  of  activity.  As  we  view 
life  we  note  these  totalities  of  reaction,  and  we  call  them 
instinct  actions.  In  a  system  of  instinct  actions,  if  one  part 
becomes  abnormally  emphatic,  a  readjustment  of  the  total 
system  is  compelled,  the  result  being  the  production  of  a 
new  system ;  and  this  when  objectively  viewed  is  a  variation. 
Subjectively  speaking,  if  I  am  correct,  this  variation  involves 
an  act  of  reason.  When  it  produces  an  effect  upon  con- 
sciousness, it  involves  certain  inhibitions  which  themselves 
involve  pain:  the  total  state  of  the  psychic  system — the 
feelings    corresponding    with     the    emphasised    instinctive 

^  Compare  Herbert  Nichol's  very  clear  argument  in  reference  to  this  in 
his  article,  "The  Psycho-Motor  Problem,"  published  in  the  Am.  Journal  of 
Insanity,  1897. 


CHAP.  XVIII  THE  FUNCTIONING  OF  REASON  457 

activity,  and  of  the  activities  readjusted,  and  of  the  painful- 
ness  of  those  inhibited — give  us  what  we  speak  of  in  a 
broad  way  as  the  phenomena  of  conation. 

In  our  complex  life  we  are  able  to  note  certain  portions 
of  the  psychic  stream  in  which  the  conative  aspect  of  the 
moment  seems  to  be  identified,  to  a  great  extent  at  least, 
with  the  sensations  arising  as  a  result  of  the  activities  of 
the  bodily  organs  which  express  the  will  act  of  the  moment. 
To  these  Professor  James  has  given  much  prominence  in  his 
valuable  studies ;  but,  as  is  usual  in  such  cases,  less  able 
minds  have  fallen  into  the  error  of  misconceiving  the  doctrine 
he  has  taught,  and  have  interpreted  him  as  teaching  that 
voluntary  feeling  consists  of  the  feelings  of  muscular  activity 
only.  If  I  understand  him  correctly  I  do  not  believe  that 
he  wouli  disagree  with  the  main  statement  above  made. 
It  is  true  that  remembrances  of  these  special  feelings  of 
activity  are  of  great  importance  in  our  voluntary  life ;  as 
Professor  Eoyce  says,  "  we  can  directly  will  an  act  only 
when  we  have  before  done  that  act " ;  but  evidently  that 
is  because  desires  and  impulses  imply  experience:  the 
idea  not  realised,  before  it  can  become  realised,  before  it 
can  become  desire  and  serve  as  the  basis  of  voluntary 
variation,  must  be  thought  as  realisable,  and  that  implies 
previous  experience. 

If  this  view  of  the  nature  of  conation  be  correct, 
evidently  there  must  be  many  forms  of  conation.  There 
is  conation  in  the  mere  cravings,  where  no  clear  idea  of 
the  basis  of  the  systematic  disturbance  is  presented  to  mind; 
in  the  desires,  where  an  objective  idea  is  presented  to  mind 
as  realisable  and  yet  unrealised,  and  where  we  set  ourselves 
over  against  it,  the  emphatic  tendency  being  part  of  us ;  ^ 

^  In  the  act  of  volition  the  effective  impulse  becomes  absorbed  as  part  of 
the  ego,  whilst  the  ineffective  impulse  is  detached  and  appears  as  an  object 
apart  from  the  ego. 


458 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 


in  the  impulses,  where  the  idea  unrealised  yet  realisable  is 
one  related  to  motor  readjustment ;  in  the  act  of  will  which 
determines  choice,  due  to  an  opposition  of  desires  or  impulses 
as  noted  in  tlie  judgment  "  I  will  try."  ^ 

This  special  aspect  of  conation  which  we  speak  of 
usually  as  volition  is  not  necessarily  involved  in  desire 
as  some  would  have  us  think,  for,  as  Mr.  Shand  has 
shown,^  desire  may  occur  without  volition,  as  where  we 
say,  "  If  he  is  there  I  shall  see  him,  for  I  desire  to  do  so  " 
— although  it  may  also  occur  with  volition  where  we  say, 
"  If  he  be  there  I  will  see  him,  as  I  desire  to  do  so."  The 
act  of  will  proper  is  a  special  case  of  conation  which,  as  Mr. 
Stout  points  out,  always  involves  a  judgment  and  a  belief 
that  we  will  try  to  realise  the  unrealised,  and  that  implies 
a  sense  of  an  obstruction  to  be  removed. 

§  7.  We  have  held  above  that  our  variant  action  is 
determined  by  the  appearance  of  especially  efficient 
stimuli,  which  lead  us  to  react  as  though  we  were  iso- 
lated elemental  parts,  and  without  dependence  upon  the  forces 
which  would  guide  us  if  we  acted  exclusively  for  the  preser- 
vation of  the  species,  or  for  the  maintenance  of  the  existence 
of  the  quasi-organic  social  body  of  which  we  are  elements. 

We  are  led  to  this  view  especially  because  we 
seem  to  be  able  to  identify  reasoning  processes  with  the 
highest  elaboration  of  the  emphasis  of  environmental 
stimuli  upon  the  individual  who  reasons. 

If  this  thesis  be  correct,  the  variation  in  complex  organic 
bodies  is  determined  partly  by  the  degree  of  integration 
existing  between  the  members  of  the  aggregate,  and  partly 
by  the  force  of  the  stimulus  which  reaches  the  element 
from  its  environment ;  this  latter  being  the  efficient  factor. 

1  Cf.  stout,  Mind,  N.S.  No.  19. 
2  j^f^^^^  jq-^g_  23,  p.  297. 


CHAP.  XVIII  THE  FUNCTIONING  OF  REASON  459 

Now  we  find  in  our  highly  differentiated  life  that  in  great 
measure  the  process  of  reasoning  is  that  which  determines 
our  revolt  against  what  we  recognise  as  instinct, —  our 
variations  from  the  ancestral  type ;  it  seems  highly  probable, 
therefore,  a  'priori  that  we  shall  find  ratiocination  to  be  the 
conscious  side  of  the  latest  development  of  the  elemental 
variant  process. 

As  we  all  know,  there  exists  in  all  organisms,  to  speak 
first  of  the  physical  aspect,  a  balance  of  activities  fitted  to 
answer  to  environmental  conditions ;  and  furthermore  {a)  it 
seems  clear,  as  we  have  shown  above,  that  if  one  element 
of  a  complex  organism  alters  its  activity  in  consequence  of 
influences  from  without  itself,  this  one  alteration  of  one 
element  will  tend  to  effect  alteration  of  the  relation  between 
the  actions  of  all  the  elements  of  the  organic  system  to 
which  the  changing  element  belongs.  Furthermore,  (/3)  if 
this  one  element's  tendency  to  alteration  of  the  relation  of 
its  activity  to  that  of  the  organism  persists  with  sufiicient 
strength,  there  may  result  a  variation  of  the  action  in  that 
organism  from  its  ancestral  type.  Now  evidently  this 
course  of  action  must  have  its  correspondents  in  the  mental 
life  that  is  coincident  with  the  action,  and  I  think  that  this 
same  process  can  be  shown  to  be  effective  in  the  higher 
mental  life  as  we  experience  it. 

In  correspondence  with  the  action  described  under  {a) 
above,  it  seems  clear  to  me  that  if,  in  any  case,  one  psychic 
element  in  a  mental  complex  becomes  hypernormally  effect- 
ive, it  will  tend  to  restrict  the  natural  psychic  development 
of  the  mental  complex  to  which  it  is  attached ;  this  natural 
development  which  is  thus  restricted  being  determined  by 
inheritance  or  individual  adaptation.  In  other  words,  this 
action  will  tend  to  overpower  impulsive  or  quasi-impulsive 
leadings  of  wider  scope  in  favour  of  elemental  variation. 


460  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

This  whole  process  on  the  physical  side  is  determined, 
as  appears  above,  by  the  persistence  of  the  activity  of  some 
one  physical  element,  and  this  persistence  in  turn  may  be 
held  to  be  determined  to  a  great  extent  by  the  reduplication 
of  the  stimulus  to  action  in  an  organ  that  is  prepared  to  react 
efficiently} 

In  the  region  of  the  correspondent  mental  development 
this  means  the  reduplication  of  the  stimulus  to  the  recur- 
rence of  the  idea,  which  therefore  becomes  persistent  and 
effective. 

But  on  the  psychic  side  the  latest  elaboration  of  the 
process  of  becoming  persistent  is  apparently  the  same 
thing  as  the  process  of  ratiocination.     It  consists  in  this — 

It^being^  recognised  that  a  leads_tO-^>  and  that  h  leads 
_td^-a^  it  results^  that  whenever  h  occurs,  x  follows^  as 
happens^ako  when  «- occurs.  Hence  the  process  of  identi- 
fication of  the  issues  of  a  and  h  in  x  tends  to  a  duplication 
of  the  stimulus  to  the  resultant  x,  and  hence  tends  to  the 
persistence  of  x. 

But  this  process  of  the  identification  of  the  issues  of  a  and 
6  in  ic  is  the  basis  of  the  syllogistic  form  to  which  all  ratio- 
cination is  reducible,  viz.  if  a  then  x,  if  b  then  a,  if  b  then  x. 

This  argument,  therefore,  leads  us  directly  to  the  state- 
merit  that  ratiocination  is  the  psychic  aspect  of  the  latest 
elaboration  of  the  variant  principle  within  us. 

The  reader  will  observe  that  as  a  result  of  this  study 
we  have  in  the  last  section  arrived  at  the  conclusion 
we  looked  forward  to  reaching  at  the  close  of  Chapter  XVI. 
after  we  had  studied  the  nature  of  reason  and  had  found 
ourselves  led  on  a  priori  grounds  to  the  conclusion  that 
Eeason  is  the  psychic  correspondent  of  the  process  of 
variation  from  typical  reaction. 

1  Compare  Professor  J.  Mark  Baldwin's  doctrine  of  "circular  activity." 


CHAP.  XVIII  THE  FUNCTIONING  OF  REASON  461 

§  8.  Let  us  repeat  the  summary  of  §  5  of  that  chapter, 
and  then  attempt  to  carry  the  argument  a  step  farther.  We 
have  seen — 

1st.  That  choice,  and  hesitancy  preceding  choice,  are 
objective  phenomena. 

2nd.  That  choice  in  ourselves  is  represented  psychically 
by  Will,  and  that  as  choice  does  not  differ  in  kind  wherever 
it  is  observed,  so  we  judge  that  Will  is  a  psychic  pheno- 
menon as  broad  as  mental  life. 

3rd.  That  as  choice  does  not  differ  in  kind,  so  the 
process  antecedent  to  choice  probably  does  not  differ  in 
kind,  wherever  choice  occurs. 

4th.  But  Eeason  is  the  psychic  correspondent  of  the 
process  antecedent  to  Will  in  our  conscious  lives ;  hence  we 
conclude  that  Eeason  in  germ  or  in  complex  form  must  be 
a  process  as  wide  as  psychic  life. 

5  th.  This  view  is  corroborated  by  our  argument  that 
Eeason  and  Will  are  indissolubly  connected ;  that  all 
rational  processes,  unless  inhibited,  end  in  volition ;  and 
that  all  volition  is,  at  the  moment  of  the  will  act,  rational. 

6th.  But  choice  is  the  mark  of  variation,  and  in  con- 
sideration of  what  has  preceded,  we  are  led,  on  a  'priori 
grounds,  to  the  conclusion  that  Eeason  is  the  psychic 
coincident  of  the  process  of  variation. 

This  conclusion  is  verified  when  we  consider  the  nature 
of  organic  variation,  for  we  find  that  variation  involves  the 
emphatic  action  of  an  element  of  an  organic  aggregate,  so 
that  it  functions  as  though  it  were  more  or  less  discon- 
nected from,  and  independent  of,  the  whole  of  which  it  is 
an  element.  Furthermore,  as  we  have  just  seen,  Eeason,  as 
we  know  it  in  the  highest  processes  of  ratiocination,  acts  by 
the  emphasis  of  some  psychic  element  in  such  a  way  that 
it  results  in  alteration  of  that  flow  of  thought  which  would 
have  normally  appeared  had  this  emphasis  been  lacking; 


462  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

and  we  are  led  to  hold  that  "  ratiocination  is  the  psychic 
aspect  of  the  latest  elaboration  of  the  variant  principle 
within  us."  Thus  the  suggestion  with  which  we  began, 
that  Eeason  is  the  psychic  coincident  of  the  process  of 
variation,  is  corroborated. 

§  9.  We  now  bring  to  a  close  this  brief  study  of  Eeason  ; 
unexpectedly  brief,  some  may  think,  in  consideration  of  the 
many  pages  given  to  the  study  of  Instinct.  To  one  wha 
has  followed  the  course  of  our  thought,  however,  it  will 
appear  natural  that  greater  space  is  given  to  the  considera- 
tion of  Instinct  than  to  the  study  of  Eeason ;  for,  as  we 
have  seen  above,  Eeason  in  a  final  analysis  appears  as  a 
special  development  of  Instinct,  determined  by  the  com- 
plexity of  the  integrated  systems  which  are  united  in  our 
wide  organic  life :  variation,  which  Eeason  effects,  being 
determined  finally  by  instinctive  reaction  of  parts  as  though 
they  were  isolated  from  the  whole  entity  in  which  they 
appear  as  parts ;  divergence  being  due  to  differences  in 
width  and  complexity  of  the  organic  systems  involved,  and 
to  the  fact  that  complex  instincts  are  built  upon,  and  out 
of,  instincts  of  simpler  form,  of  earlier  genesis,  and  of  more 
thorough  organisation ;  these  simpler  instincts  reacting 
more  quickly  to  hypernormal  stimuli  than  the  complex 
instincts  are  able  to. 

Moreover  it  is  to  be  noted  that  Eeason  is  recognised  as 
a  general  and  subjective  process :  Instincts,  on  the  other 
hand,  being  usually  separated  into  classes  by  the  marked 
differences  of  objective  manifestation,  naturally  require  a 
more  detailed  treatment  than  the  general  process  in  Eeason. 

With  this  apology  I  turn  to  the  discussion  of  certain 
relations  between  Instinct  and  Eeason  which  are  of  interest 
and  importance. 


CHAPTEK   XIX 

SUMMARY 

I  HAVE  promised  in  the  opening  of  the  sixteenth  chapter  to 
present  to  the  reader  who  is  not  familiar  with  psychological 
technicalities  a  condensed  statement  of  the  course  of  our 
thought  in  relation  to  Eeason ;  and  inasmuch  as  our  argu- 
ment has  been  long  and  discursive,  I  think  even  those  who 
are  thoroughly  versed  in  the  language  of  psychology  may  be 
glad  at  this  juncture  to  consider  the  main  conclusions  we 
have  reached  in  clear  form,  free  from  illustrations  and  dis- 
cussions. 


Organisms  are  aggregates  of  living  elements,  or  of  com- 
plex living  elementary  parts,  which  are  so  inter-related  that 
where  any  stimulus  calls  for  a  reaction  in  one  element 
or  part,  the  stimulus  must  necessarily  affect  all  the  other 
elements  of  the  system  to  which  the  stimulated  part  belongs ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  reaction  to  this  stimulus  must 
be  affected  by  the  relation  of  the  other  elements  of  the 
system  to  the  one  that  is  stimulated.  The  effect  upon  the 
other  elements  from  the  one  stimulated,  and  from  the  other 
elements  upon  the  one  reacting,  may  be  indirect,  immeasur- 
ably small,  obscure,  but  it  is  a  corollary  from  our  concep- 


464  INSTIlSrCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

tion  of  organic  relation  that  these  effects  must  exist  within 
the  limits  of  the  system  which  is  organically  connected. 


II 

There  are  two  results  from  this  postulate,  which  are  of 
great  moment  in  all  organic  development. 

A.  Where  the  stimulus  which  reaches  a  special  element 
or  elementary  part  of  an  organism  is  normal  for  that  part, 
is  one  to  which  the  part  and  the  system  are  fully  capable 
of  reacting,  then  while  on  the  whole  the  element  or 
elementary  part  which  is  stimulated  will  tend  to  react  to 
its  own  readjustment,  nevertheless  it  will  also  at  the  same 
time  tend  to  act  to  the  peculiar  benefit  of  the  whole  organic 
system,  of  which  it  is  a  part. 

B.  Where  the  stimulus  which  reaches  a  special  element 
or  elementary  part  is  abnormal  for  that  part,  then  the 
element,  or  elementary  part,  which  is  stimulated  will  still 
tend  to  react  in  a  manner  appropriate  to  its  own  constitu- 
tion ;  but  it  will  not  necessarily,  at  the  same  time,  react  in 
a  manner  appropriate  to  the  constitution  of  the  whole 
organic  system,  of  which  it  is  a  part. 

Ill 

What  I  have  spoken  of  as  normal  reactions  to  normal 
stimuli  under  II.  A  above,  even  in  the  very  simplest  of 
organisms,  come  to  serve  biological  ends  valuable  to  the 
organism  and  its  elements;  these  reactions  would  be 
eliminated  in  the  process  of  development  if  they  did  not 
serve  such  ends.  As  the  organisms  become  more  complex, 
these  actions  become  more  complex,  and  are  found  often  to 
relate  to  ends  of  little  immediate  importance,  but  of  great 
import  in  the  later  life  of  the  organisms.  They  are  moulded 
by   the    processes   of  elimination,  so  that   each  new-born 


CHAP.  XIX  SUMMARY  465 

organism  tends  to  act,  in  answer  to  stimuli,  as  its  ancestors 
in  the  past  have  acted,  to  the  best  advantage  of  the  race  to 
which  they  have  belonged,  and  to  which  the  new  individual 
belongs  also.  They  tend  to  produce  typical  reactions,  and 
these,  when  looked  upon  objectively,  are  designated  as  the 
expressions  of  "  instincts,"  using  the  term  very  broadly. 

Instincts  aire  expressed  by  "  instinct-actions  "  which  vary 
in  complexity  and  co-ordination ;  the  most  thoroughly  co- 
ordinated of  these  "instinct-actions,"  and  those  most  free 
from  control  by  the  great  central  nervous  system  in  the 
higher  animals,  being  called  reflex  actions. 

These  "  instinct- actions "  have  psychic  correspondents 
which  I  have  called  "instinct -feelings."  All  of  these 
"  instinct- feelings  "  influence  the  totality  of  the  conscious- 
ness correspondent  to  the  neural  system  which  reacts, 
although  many  of  them  fail  of  sufficient  vigour  to  become 
marked  in  the  field  of  attention.  When  the  expression  of 
an  instinct  is  inhibited,  if  there  be  an  effect  upon  con- 
sciousness, we  designate  that  effect  by  the  word  "  impulse." 


IV 

(1)  In  the  nature  of  life  in  a  variable  environment  there 
must  arise  frequently  in  all  organisms  conditions  under 
which  the  stimulus  and  the  reaction  thereto  must  be 
abnormal,  in  the  sense  described  under  II.  B  above.  The 
result  must  appear  as  the  modification  of,  or  the  inhibition 
of,  the  typical  reactions  which  we  consider  as  determined  by 
Instinct :  in  other  words,  the  process  must  lead  to  variation 
from  typical  reaction.  Furthermore,  this  process  must  be 
as  broad  as  the  process  of  Instinct ;  must  be  as  constant 
and  as  wide  in  its  appearance.  This  process  we  find  to 
consist  in  the  reaction  of  a  part  for  itself  as  though  it  were 

2h 


466  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  pakt  iv 

an  isolated   entity  and   not  an  element   in  a  more  widely- 
organised  system. 

But  it  also  appears  evident  that  this  process  must  be 
represented  by  some  effect  upon  mental  life,  which  effect 
must  be  as  broad  as  the  process  itself. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  instincts,  we  should  not  expect  to 
note  all  the  effects  of  this  process  in  the  field  of  attention, 
although  we  may  agree  that  all  such  effects  influence  in 
some  measure  the  totality  of  the  consciousness  correspondent 
to  the  system  which  reacts :  hence  to  the  less  thoroughly 
habitual  forms  of  such  effects  upon  consciousness  must  we 
look  for  the  distinctive  marks  of  the  process. 

The  process,  as  we  have  argued  in  detail,  involves 
inhibition  of  instincts,  and  hence  it  must  bring  into  being 
impulses,  and  must  modify  reaction  by  repressing  some  of 
them  in  the  very  fact  that  it  is  sustaining  others. 

In  the  most  complex  form  of  our  conscious  life  we 
discover  that  the  process  of  ratiocination  does  this  very 
thing.  This  process  of  ratiocination  when  examined 
analytically  appears  to  act,  in  accord  with  the  general 
process  of  variation,  through  the  production  of  an  emphasis 
of  a  stimulating  idea,  thus  tending  to  produce  variation 
from  the  typical  movement  in  consciousness. 

But  although  the  process  of  variation  through  ratiocina- 
tion is  marked  only  in  the  most  vivid  moments  of  our 
conscious  life,  we  do  not  fail  to  notice  that  there  are  many 
actions  of  our  own  which  we  think  of  as  the  result  of 
reasoning,  in  which  the  process  of  ratiocination  is  never 
brought  into  consciousness.  Furthermore,  we  note  in  our- 
selves many  actions,  which  seem  to  have  no  effect  upon  the 
field  of  attention  whatsoever,  which,  however,  cannot  be 
separated  from  reasoned  actions. 

(2)  These  observations  lead  us  naturally  to  the  hypo- 
thesis that  reason  is  the  mental  process  correspondent  with 


CHAP.  XIX  SUMMARY  467 

variation  in  organic  aggregates  and  is  as  wide  as  life :  that 
reasoning  is  a  process  as  broad  as  consciousness  but  not 
necessarily  brought  into  the  field  of  attention. 

(3)  This  hypothesis  is  corroborated  again  when  we 
consider  that  conscious  variation  is  indicated  by  voluntary 
choice.  If  our  hypothesis  be  true,  then  volition  (as  indicated 
by  choice)  and  reason  must  be  equally  broad  in  occurrence, 
must  indeed  be  as  broad  as  life.  This  conclusion  is  enforced 
by  the  observation  that  will  and  reason  are  coextensive  and 
conterminous ;  that  all  rational  action  is  voluntary ;  and 
conversely  that  all  volitional  acts  are  rational  at  the 
moment  of  the  act :  the  notion  of  the  deliberate  choice  of 
an  irrational  act  being  illusory. 

Or  expressing  this  in  other  words  :  all  of  variation  thus 
appears  to  be  of  one  type.  But  the  most  complex,  forms 
of  variation  have  reasoning  and  will  as  their  psychic 
coincidents,  and  reasoning  and  will  appear  to  conform 
with  variation  as  it  is  studied  objectively :  hence  we  are 
compelled  to  assume  that  all  of  variation  has  as  its  psychic 
correspondent  reason  and  will  of  simple  form ;  the  reasoning 
and  will  which  attract  our  attention  in  reflection  being  of  a 
highly  elaborated  kind. 


The  conclusion  that  we  reach  as  the  result  of  this 
argument  is  this:  that  as  Instinct  constitutes  the  typical 
organic  process,  so  Eeason  and  Choice,  indissolubly  con- 
nected, constitute  the  variant  process  in  organic  life :  the 
effect  upon  attentive  cons6iousness  being  marked  in  rela- 
tively few  cases ;  the  reasoning  and  the  willing  sinking  back 
of  the  "  threshold,"  into  the  field  of  inattention,  in  a  large 
proportion  of  cases. 


468  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  iv 

VI 

Finally  it  is  to  be  noted  that  we  have  come  to  the  con- 
clusion in  the  course  of  our  study  that  all  of  reasoned  action, 
all  of  variation,  is  determined  finally  by  instinctive  reaction ; 
what  appears  as  divergence  from  instinctive  forms  being 
due  to  the  complexity  of  the  organic  systems  involved,  and 
to  the  fact  that  complex  instincts  are  built  upon  instincts 
of  simpler  form,  of  earlier  genesis,  and  of  more  thorough 
organisation,  which  therefore  react  more  quickly  to  hyper- 
normal  stimuli  than  those  less  thoroughly  organised. 

"We  have  also  concluded  that  all  instinct  appears  as  a 
mode  of  that  simplest  of  all  phenomena  of  activity — the 
reaction  of  a  living  cell  to  the  stimulus  from  its  environ- 
ment. 

To  this  simplest  of  all  reactions,  therefore,  we  finally 
trace  back  both  Instinct  and  Eeason.  Both  are  but  aspects 
of  the  basic  tendency  to  the  persistence  of  life ;  they  appear 
in  opposition  because  we  look  only  at  complex  organic  forms, 
while  the  tendency  to  strive  for  persistence  of  life  is 
fundamentally  elemental,  only  secondarily  relating  to  more 
or  less  integrated  aggregates  of  elements,  with  which,  in 
more  or  less  complex  organic  form,  biology  has  to  deal. 

If  this  view  be  sustained,  then  the  problems  of  instinct 
and  reason,  of  typical  reaction  and  accommodative  variation, 
are  thrown  one  stage  farther  back ;  they  are  resolved  into 
the  problems  connected  with  the  determination  of  the 
nature  of  that  bond  which  unites  the  elements  of  organic 
wholes,  and  upon  which  depends  what  we  call  their 
"  integration." 


PAKT  V 

CERTAIN  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  INSTINCT  AND 
REASON 


CHAPTEE   XX 

I. — The  Kelation  of  Eeason  to  Moral  Codes  " 

§  1.  It  will  be  evident  to  the  reader  without  argument  that 
variation  in  moral  standards  is  necessary  if  newer  standards 
better  fitted  to  our  use  are  to  arise.  If  moral  codes  of  the 
same  nature,  fixed  and  unchangeable,  were  given  to  all  of 
us,  there  would  be  no  hope  of  their  betterment ;  no  hope,  in 
other  words,  that  the  conduct  which  they  tend  to  produce 
could  change  to  correspond  with  the  alterations  that  must 
be  constantly  occurring  in  an  environment  like  that  in 
which  we  find  ourselves  placed.  Unless  such  variation  did 
occur  there  would  be  practically  no  opportunity  for  the 
development  of  a  more  perfect  relation  between  the  form 
and  conditions  of  our  social  life,  and  scarcely  any  chance 
whatever  of  an  improvement  in  the  adaptation  of  the  ethical 
demands  of  our  nature  to  the  new  conditions  which  arise  as 
evolution  advances ;  for  without  moral  variation,  and  the 
opposition  of  action  or  of  idea  which  it  engenders,  there 
could  be  no  emphasis  of  the  more  advantageous,  no  suppres- 
sion of  the  less  advantageous,  standards  of  living  except 
through  the  most  adventitious  of  conditions. 

§  2.  In  the  chapters  preceding  this  in  which  we  have 
discussed  the  nature  of  moral  codes  we  have  noted  that  the 
very  conditions   which  call   them   into   existence   make   it 


472 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 


necessary  that  these  codes  and  the  moral  standards  which 
determine  their  nature  should  be  dififerent  in  different 
individuals,  and  in  the  same  individual  at  different  stages 
of  his  development. 

The  differences  of  which  we  have  spoken  in  those 
chapters  have  been  almost  entirely  those  which  are  deter- 
mined by  the  complexity  of  the  influences  which  mould  our 
lives  through  inheritance,  and  by  the  diversity  of  conditions 
which  in  our  experience  affect  us  as  stimuli  to  reaction  upon 
the  environment. 

Variation  from  typical  racial  forms  of  reaction,  the 
reader  will  perceive,  may  thus  arise  in  an  individual,  either 
as  the  result  of  the  mere  emphasis  of  special  impulses 
through  processes  which  are  determined  entirely  by  his 
inheritance  from  ancestors  in  whom  different  orders  of 
impulse  efficiency  have  occurred,  or  else  as  the  result  of 
change  in  the  conditions  which  surround  his  life. 

Furthermore,  it  is  to  be  especially  noted  that  this 
variation  of  standard  may  not  appear  as  such  in  conscious- 
ness at  all ;  may,  and  indeed  is  likely  to,  appear  to  be  the 
perfectly  normal  standard  to  the  man  who  varies  as  the 
result  of  inheritance  or  even  of  past  experience ;  may  lead 
him  to  think,  and  wonder,  that  the  world  is  all  against  him 
and  all  wrong ;  may  be  to  him  a  source  of  astonishment 
and  vexation  of  spirit  because  it  is  inexplicable  by  any 
experience  or  by  any  teaching  his  fellows  may  be  able  to 
give  to  him. 

But  were  improvements  in  our  moral  codes  determined 
alone  by  the  clash  of  standards  dependent  upon  inherited 
processes,  and  upon  differences  of  experience,  which  have  so 
little  effect  upon  consciousness  that  they  lead  the  man  who 
varies  to  overlook  the  fact  of  his  variation ;  were  our 
standards  perfected  by  nought  but  the  contest  for  persistence 
of   the    life   which    these    standards    represent;    then    the 


CH.  XX      THE  RELATION  OF  REASON  TO  MORAL  CODES  473 

improvements  would  indeed  be  of  very  slight  moment  in 
our  lives. 

We  find,  however,  as  a  matter  of  fact  that  we  take  the 
deepest  kind  of  interest  in  that  special  type  of  variation 
which  is  consciously  effected  in  the  lives  of  thoughtful  men 
who  realise  the  nature  of  the  typical  standards  which  are 
presented  in  their  psychic  experience,  who  find  suggestions 
of  divergence  arising  in  mind,  who  treat  these  suggestions 
rationally,  and  who  deliberately,  and  voluntarily,  act  to 
effect  variations. 

This  process  is  going  on  around  us  at  all  times  amongst 
men  who  are  conscious  of,  even  though  they  be  unable  to 
analyse,  the  steps  they  are  taking ;  though  they  be  incap- 
able of  appreciating  the  ends  towards  which  their  actions 
tend.  It  is  this  process  of  conscious  variation  that  deter- 
mines the  alteration  of  moral  standards  in  an  individual  by 
voluntary  effort,  and  which  is  therefore  most  important  in 
the  development  of  character ;  without  it  alteration  of  moral 
codes  would  take  place  only  in  a  wholly  automatic  and  quasi- 
mechanical  way. 

§  3.  Now  there  is  one  point  in  the  chapters  which  have 
preceded  this  that  I  think  has  been  made  clear,  viz.  that,  if 
our  notions  are  valid,  so  far  as  we  are  ourselves  able  to  alter 
the  efficiency  of  an  impulse,  it  must  be  by  rational  process : 
and  this  carries  with  it  the  implication  that  so  far  as  the 
balance  of  impulse  efficiencies  is  altered,  not  by  extraneous 
influence  but  by  our  own  effort,  this  must  also  occur  through 
rational  process.  But  it  is  the  order  of  impulse  efficiencies 
within  us  apparently  which  determines  our  moral  codes,  and 
it  thus  follows  that  reason  must  be  the  determinant  of  varia- 
tion in  moral  standards. 

Or  to  put  this  in  another  form :  if  voluntary  variance 
from  typical  standards  of  action  is  always  rational,  and  if 


U 


474  INSTINCT  AND  EEASON  part  v 

growth  towards  perfection  is  dependent  upon  variation,  then 
reason  is  the  determinant  in  the  struggle  towards  the  per- 
fection of  our  moral  standards. 

It  is  important  to  note  this  point  because,  as  we  shall 
see  below,  it  is  assumed  by  many  people  that  the  perfec- 
tion of  moral  codes  in  the  lives  of  individual  men  is  reached 
to  a  great  extent  not  by  rational  process,  which  as  we 
have  seen  involves  the  emphasis  of  some  partial  instinct 
in  that  whole  instinct  system  which  determines  our  moral 
codes,  but  is  reached  through  their  willingness  to  be 
influenced  by  the  very  broadest  of  all  instincts,  an  instinct 
which  would  not  appear  but  for  the  existence  of  the  most 
highly  organised  form  of  social  life,  viz.  the  governing 
instinct,  the  religious  instinct.  This  claim,  in  consideration 
of  the  argument  preceding  this,  cannot  be  granted  for  a 
moment. 


CH.  XX      THE  RELATION  OF  RELIGION  TO  MORAL  CODES        475 


II. — The  Eelation  of  Eeligion  to  Moeal  Codes 


§  4.  In  the  preceding  division  of  this  chapter  we  have 
noted  that  in  the  process  of  the  perfecting  of  n^oral  cqdes,  as 
they  are  usually  conceived,  such  changes  from  typical  forms 
of  these  codes  as  are  determined  by  the  voluntary  effort  of 
individuals  are  eiffected  through  the  functioning  of  reason 
within  us,  and  not  through  instinctive,  typical,  reactions 
functioning  for  the  benefit  of  the  organism.  If  then  religion 
be  instinctive  in  its  nature,  it  is  evident  that  improvements 
in  our  own  individual  standards  are  not  directly  effected  by 
religious  influences :  that  they  may  be  indirectly  effected 
by  them  we  shall  see  below. 

But  if  we  turn  from  the  consideration  of  individual  life 
and  study  the  effect  of  religious  functioning  upon  racial  life, 
we  find  the  influence  of  the  religious  instinct  in  this  direc- 
tion most  important  in  relation  to  ethics.  We  have  seen 
that  ethical  standards,  determined  as  they  are  by  balance  of 
impulse  efficiencies,  must  necessarily  vary  in  different  indi- 
viduals, and  in  the  same  individual  at  different  periods  of 
his  development.  But  the  religious  influence,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  directly  concerned  with  no  balance  of  instincts, 
modified  or  unmodified ;  but  with  a  single  complex  instinct 
which  is  a  heritage  of  the  race,  is  typical :  except  in  very 
superficial  directions  it  is  unchanged  and  identical  in  the 
adult  and  the  youth,  in  the  man  of  culture  and  the  man 
who  has  nought  of  advantage  either  through  inheritance 
or  circumstance.  The  savage  and  the  civilised,  the  wise 
man  and  the  child,  when  swayed  by  religious  enthusiasms 
are  affected  by  the  same  racial  power,  although  it  acts  upon 
beings  in  whom  different  standards  of  action  are  developed. 


476  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

Eeligion  does  this  for  all  alike  ;  it  impresses  upon  them 
the  weighty  importance  of  the  broadest,  "  noblest,"  impulses 
which  affect  them,  however  much  the  character  of  these 
impulses  may  differ  in  the  men  affected :  and  the  standards 
determined  by  these  impulses  will  be  defended  with  ardour 
by  men  in  proportion  to  the  power  of  their  religious  con- 
victions. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  the  religious  influence  will  be 
of  great  service  in  the  process  of  the  perfecting  of  standards 
through  racial  instrumentality,  even  though  it  be  of  little 
moment  in  individual  conscious  life.  For  where  diversity 
of  ethical  standards  appears  and  results  in  conflict  between 
those  upholding  two  opposed  moral  codes,  the  force  of 
religion  will  act  to  give  enthusiasm  for  their  special 
standards  to  those  who  are  thus  brought  into  opposition ; 
it  will  tend  to  force  the  issue,  and  will  thus  bring  out  of 
the  conflict  new  standards,  standards  which  may  be  found 
to  be  influenced  by  both  of  those  which  have  stood  in 
opposition,  or  to  be  gained  by  the  overthrow  of  one  and  the 
uplifting  of  another. 

If  this  be  true  we  should  be  led  to  expect  to  find  dif- 
ferent races  of  men  in  which  religious  fervour  is  equally 
developed  defending  ethical  doctrines  of  the  most  diverse 
character ;  and  in  the  days  of  cruder  thinking  we  should 
expect  frequently  to  find  this  diversity  tending  to  result  in 
physical  contest,  in  a  conflict  which  would  determine  whether 
some  one  race  A,  which  religiously  preached  and  acted  in 
accord  with  the  doctrines  determined  by  the  efficiency  of 
some  one  impulse  a,  would  overcome  or  conquer  in  the 
contest  for  survival  another  race  JB,  which  with  equal 
religious  fervour  preached  and  acted  in  accord  with  the 
doctrines  determined  by  the  efficiency  of  an  opposed 
impulse  h. 


CH.  XX      THE  RELATION  OF  RELIGION  TO  MORAL  CODES        477 

§  5.  Illustrations  of  a  limited  form  of  this  conflict  of 
impulses  as  emphasised  by  religious  fervour  are  found,  as 
the  reader  will  readily  note,  in  the  intolerant,  fanatical, 
persecutions  so  common  amongst  savage  tribes  and  semi- 
barbarous  races,  and  even  amongst  those  whom  we  do  not 
usually  class  with  the  uncivilised;  indeed,  we  do  not  find 
it  needful  for  example  to  go  back  farther  toward  barbarism 
than  to  St.  Bartholomew's  Day. 

If,  however,  we  would  convince  ourselves  of  the  import- 
ance of  this  conflict  to  the  development  of  moral  life,  we 
have  but  to  turn  our  attention  to  broader  considerations 
than  those  just  touched  upon. 

We  may  note  in  passing  the  profound  contests  which 
must  have  occurred,  in  the  days  before  accurate  historical 
record  was  made,  between  the  established  phallic  religions 
which  emphasised  sexual  life,  and  the  newer  religions  which 
emphasised  the  ethical  codes  that  arose  later  in  the  history 
of  development :  of  these  contests  we  find  some  lingering 
examples  noted  in  the  scriptural  accounts  of  the  efforts  of 
the  followers  of  Jehovah  to  overwhelm  the  prophets  of 
Baal. 

Turning  from  these  suggestions  to  the  study  of  times  in 
which  historical  record  is  more  accurate,  we  may  note  in 
brief  one  form  of  moral  opposition  which  has  been  in  the 
past,  and  in  the  future  is  not  unlikely  again  to  be,  deter- 
mined by  distinct  physical  contest  strongly  influenced  by 
religious  enthusiasms. 

In  the  very  first  consideration  of  the  subject-matter  of 
this  book  we  noted  that  the  units  of  simple  aggregates 
might  find  success  in  the  struggle  of  life  either  through 
separation  from  one  another,  or  else  through  continuance  of 
aggregation  coupled  with  growth  of  integration  and  differ- 
ence of  functioning  in  the  different  units.  We  also  noted 
that  social  organisation  amongst  men,  so  far  as  it  exists  at 


478 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 


all,  is  closely  allied  in  form  to  the  simpler  types  of  aggrega- 
tion. 

In  correspondence  with  these  forms  of  lower  life  we  see  in 
mankind  two  ways  in  which  success  might  be  realised  in  social 
life.  It  might  be  realised  in  the  first  place  by  the  segregation 
of  small  families  or  tribes,  whose  needs  are  simple  and  whose 
numbers  do  not  rapidly  increase;  tribes  which  live  by 
jealously  guarding  their  small  possessions  and  attempting 
to  possess  themselves  of  stores  which  have  been  collected  by 
other  and  similar  small  tribes.  Such  was  apparently  to  a 
great  extent  the  tribal  condition  of  primitive  man,  and  we 
have  ample  example  of  such  condition  among  the  nomadic 
races  still  living  in  uncivilised  lands. 

Now  evidently  in  tribes  dependent  upon  such  conditions 
for  their  existence,  among  the  impulses  most  important  to 
their  welfare  must  be  (1st)  those  that  lead  to  suspicion 
of  others,  and  readiness  to  attack  those  that  appear  to  be 
enemies ;  and  (2nd)  those  that  lead  to  the  taking  possession 
of  the  properties  of  their  adversaries.  In  such  people  we 
should  expect  to  find  religion  giving  emphasis  to  these  most 
important  racial  impulses ;  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  find 
just  such  a  case  in  the  religion  of  the  early  Hebrews ;  here 
we  have  a  most  telling  example  of  a  truly  religious  emphasis 
of  impulses  that  are  entirely  repugnant  to  us  who  are  brought 
up  in  the  midst  of  a  Christian  civilisation,  but  which  were 
very  important  for  the  maintenance  of  the  low  social  tribal 
life  in  which  they  were  thus  emphasised. 

To  return  to  the  thought  above;  we  have  noted  that  racial 
success  might  be  reached  not  only  thus  by  tribal  isolation, 
but  also  in  a  later  and  nobler  development  by  the  growth 
of  large  and  complex  systems  involving  differentiation 
of  functioning,  division  of  labour,  and  interdependence 
of  relation  amongst  individuals;  by  the  growth  of  such 
social  systems  as  have  been  the  basis  of  all   the   higher 


CH.  XX      THE  RELATION  OF  RELIGION  TO  MORAL  CODES        479 

civilisations  of  the  past,  and  are  the  basis  of  those  in  our 
own  day.  Among  the  impulses  of  greatest  importance  to 
the  people  of  these  larger  social  groups  will  be  those  which 
would  lead  to  co-operation  and  to  mutual  helpfulness,  and 
we  should  expect  in  such  races  to  find  religion  tending  to 
strengthen  these  social  impulses. 

And  as  a  matter  of  fact,  in  the  greater  civilisations  we 
do  find  religion  acting  to  make  efficient  these  very  impulses 
as  they  exist  in  one  form  or  another.  In  India,  where  the 
division  of  labour  is  most  marked  in  the  separation  of  castes, 
we  find  religious  observance,  notwithstanding  numerous 
historic  reformations,  to  a  great  extent  emphasising  the 
differences  between  classes,  and  leading  to  conceptions  of 
duty  in  conformity  with  these  divisions ;  conceptions  which 
do  not  appeal  to  us  who  belong  to  social  groups  that  depend 
less  upon  division  of  labour  than  upon  other  social  forces. 
In  the  Christian  civilisation  we  find  less  division  of  labour, 
less  of  caste  classification,  but  a  greater  development  of  certain 
characteristics  which  we  think  more  than  take  the  place 
of  such  divisions,  and  which  are  evidenced  in  the  impulses 
which  lead  tp  co-operation  and  social  consolidation :  and  we 
find  this  exemplified  in  the  opposition  to  plundering  and 
murder  in  general ;  in  the  deprecation  of  hate  and  of 
vengeance,  even  when  those  concerned  are  not  kinsmen ;  in 
the  fostering  of  brotherly  love,  of  the  widest  sympathy, 
of  the  broadest  benevolence ;  all  of  which  impulses  are 
characteristic  of  the  Christian  morality,  and  all  entirely 
diverse  from  those  appearing  in  the  moral  forms  taught, 
for  instance,  by  the  religion  of  the  early  Hebrews  above 
referred  to. 

It  is  clear  that  in  the  process  of  development  great 
differences  of  racial  impulse,  and  of  religious  emphasis  of 
such  impulse,  might  accrue  in  different  races  which  them- 
selves   had    not    come    in    contact ;    such    differences    are 


480  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

found  existing  between  the  impulses  of  minor  importance 
emphasised  by  the  religions  of  India,  and  of  greater  im- 
portance emphasised  by  the  religion  of  Islam;  and  those 
opposed  impulses  emphasised  by  the  religions  of  Western 
Europe. 

The  reader  will  realise  that,  in  the  past,  religious  fervour 
has  given  enthusiasm  to  those  led  by  the  impulses  which 
determine  these  diverse  forms  of  civilisation ;  has  led  them 
to  distinct  attempts  by  physical  contest  to  blot  out  their 
opponents  who  have  held  diverse  views  of  a  moral  nature. 
The  Crusades  of  the  Middle  Ages  were  contests  between  two 
diverse  civilisations,  between  civilisations  involving  diverse 
impulse  emphasis  and  diverse  moral  codes ;  were  in  effect 
contests  for  the  supremacy  between  two  divergent  types  of 
morality.  Nor  does  it  seem  improbable  that  a  similar 
contest  may  be  renewed  at  no  distant  day,  as  all  students 
will  agree  who  study  the  attempt  of  European  civilisation 
to  curb  and  guide  the  many  millions  who  own  the  Sultan 
of  Turkey  as  their  leader. 

I  have  said  enough,  I  think,  to  remind  the  reader 
that  the  religious  force  which  brings  into  prominence 
the  divergence  of  moral  codes  may  be  most  efficient  in 
the  displacement  of  one  by  another,  and  in  the  enforce- 
ment of  one  that  is  more  effective  for  social  life  rather 
than  another  which  is  less  so :  in  other  words,  that  religious 
influences  working  through  racial  contest  must  necessarily 
have  in  the  past  done  much  to  perfect  moral  codes  through 
the  medium  of  physical  contest :  but,  as  he  will  of  course 
realise,  large  differences  of  impulses,  and  of  religious  emphasis 
of  these  impulses,  might  occur  which  would  have  no  bearing 
whatever  upon  the  efficiency  of  the  races  struggling  for 
persistence ;  and  conflict  might  result  in  the  extermination 
of  certain  racial  impulses,  and  of  their  religious  emphasis, 
through   the  destruction   of  the   races   holding   them,  this 


CH.  XX      THE  RELATION  OF  RELIGION  TO  MORAL  CODES        481 

destruction  being  due  to  causes  entirely  unrelated  to  these 
impulses. 

It  is  not  improper,  perhaps,  to  call  attention  here  to  the 
self-confidence,  which  we  of  the  "Western  civilisation  display 
in  the  necessary  triumph  of  the  moral  code  we  uphold. 
We  are  all  too  wont  to  underestimate  the  numerical 
strength,  and  the  merely  physical  power,  of  the  races 
which  oppose  our  civilisation,  founded  as  it  is  upon  our 
specially  differentiated  moral  code :  we  are  wont  to  forget 
that  our  moral  code  involves  the  ideal  of  peace  and  the 
cessation  of  physical  contest,  while  the  codes  of  a  large 
part  of  our  opponents  do  not  involve  this  notion.  Indeed, 
it  may  not  be  for  our  type  of  the  higher  civilisation  to  win 
the  battle,  to  determine  the  moral  trend  of  the  future,  to 
fix  a  moral  code  which  we  shall  be  able  eventually  to  force 
upon  all  mankind  :  it  cannot  be  claimed  to  be  in  any  respect 
a  settled  fact  that  the  establishment  of  our  civilisation  will 
prove  to  be  the  mission  of  our  race,  although  our  confidence 
in  this  future  dominance  of  our  ideals  is  a  sign  of  vigour  I 
which  argues  well  for  the  fulfilment  of  our  hope. 


II 

§  6.  We  have  considered  in  the  preceding  sections  the 
action  of  religion  upon  moral  codes  through  racial  influences, 
through  contests  between  those  diverse  civilisations  which 
difference  of  moral  codes  has  determined  :  let  us  now  return 
to  the  study  of  individual  life  and  ask  ourselves  what  in- 
direct influence  the  religious  instinct  may  have  upon  the 
perfecting  of  moral  codes  of  men  considered  as  individuals ; 
direct  influence  we  have  seen  it  cannot  have. 

We  have  already  noted  more  than  once  that  in  individual 
life  variation  through  reason  determines  the  changes  in  moral 
codes  through  which  their  perfecting  must  be  wrought,  that 

2i 


482 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 


our  instincts  cannot  effect  these  changes ;  but  this  does  not 
imply  that  religion  may  not  affect  the  rapidity  with  which 
these  changes  occur  and  the  stability  of  the  newer  moral 
forms  which  are  thus  produced. 

The  religious  instinct,  as  we  have  seen,  functions  to  bring 
into  prominence  the  instincts  of  later  development  and  of 
broader  racial  significance,  and  it  does  this  by  restraint  of 
the  instincts  which  are  of  earlier  development  and  of  narrow 
and  individualistic  significance.  It  is  apparent,  then,  that 
when  there  once  occurs  in  an  individual  a  variation  of  moral 
code  which  would  lead  to  fuller  social  opportunity  and  ad- 
vantage, it  would  tend  to  be  enforced  and  made  recurrent 
in  the  life  of  the  individual  by  the  influence  of  religion, 
which  in  restraining  the  "  lower  "  reactions  would  give  the 
newer  forms  of  broader  worth  power  to  assert  themselves. 

To  a  man  uninfluenced  by  religious  restraint  the  newer 
moral  code  might  become  known,  and  its  value  might  be 
thoroughly  appreciated ;  but  for  all  that  it  might  fail  to 
exert  any  power  in  his  life  because  in  the  moment  of 
temptation  the  impulses  emphasised  in  the  newer  moral 
code  might  be  overwhelmed  by  the  force  of  individualistic 
and  other  impulses  of  narrower  significance,  and  this  because 
although  the  higher  code  has  been  acknowledged  intellectually 
it  had  gained  no  impulsive  backing.  But  if  this  newer  moral 
insight  be  given  to  the  religious  man  it  at  once  becomes  a 
power  in  his  life,  for  each  expression  of  his  religious  instinct 
gives  prominence  to  the  newer  impulse  relation  through 
restraint  of  all  the  impulses  of  less  broad  social  import. 

The  religious  instinct  thus  appears  to  be  of  great  im- 
portance in  the  establishment  within  a  man  of  the  highest 
form  of  moral  code  which  has  arisen  within  him,  even 
though  it  has  nought  to  do  with  the  first  appearance  of  this 
highest  form.  The  power  of  religion  in  reference  to  the 
ethical  life  of  a  man  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  impresses  upon 


CH.  XX      THE  RELATION  OF  RELIGION  TO  MORAL  CODES        483 

him  the  habit  of  listening  for  the  less  boisterous  but  more 
persistent  of  the  guiding  voices  within  his  soul;  that  it 
gives  him  enthusiasm  to  act  in  accordance  with  these 
voices ;  that  it  fosters  within  him  the  habit,  where  alter- 
natives present  themselves,  of  choosing  naturally  that  which 
is  of  the  deepest  significance  for  him  as  an  integral  element 
of  the  social  life  which  is  developing  around  him.  In  other 
words,  if  he  allow  himself  to  be  guided  by  the  religious 
instinct,  he  is  compelled  to  act  out  the  best  that  is  in  him 
impulsively  without  necessity  of  waiting  for  slow  process  of 
argument  and  conviction.  Although  religion  does  not  in 
itself  perfect  our  moral  code,  that  perfection  being  a  matter 
of  individual  development  and  individual  effort,  it  does 
serve  the  purpose  of  giving  to  us  an  instinctive  tendency  to 
express  and  to  strengthen  the  best  that  is  ours  by  Nature's 
gift,  as  our  moral  life  unfolds. 

This  it  is  that  a  man  gains  when  he  falls  under  the 
sway  of  the  religious  instinct :  a  tendency  has  arisen  within 
him  to  give  his  higher  instincts  full  play,  a  tendency  which 
has  itself  become  instinctive. 


Ill 

§  7.  We  have  thus  far  been  considering  the  influence  of 
the  religious  instinct  upon  the  formation  and  the  perfection 
of  moral  standards  during  relatively  long  periods  of  racial 
and  individual  life ;  now  I  shall  ask  the  reader  to  study 
with  me  the  relation  of  religion  to  the  moral  code  which 
exists  in  individual  life  at  any  special  period  of  life. 

It  is  apparent  that  we  are  here  dealing,  not  with  the  action 
of  the  highest  of  instincts  in  relation  to  the  rational  pro- 
cesses, but  solely  and  altogether  with  phenomena  of  instinct ; 
treating  of  the  relation  between  the  highest  of  instincts  and 
the  instincts  of  lower  grades  whether  unmodified  or  modified 


484 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 


by  experience.     Moral  codes  are  instinct  born,  and  religion 
itself  is  of  instinctive  nature. 

x4s  we  have  already  seen  in  a  preceding  chapter,  if  we 
speak  strictly  the  impulses  determined  by  the  religious 
instinct  must  make  part  of  the  highest  form  of  moral  code. 
But  we  have  also  seen  that  this  fact  is  not  generally  recog- 
nised, and  furthermore  that  moral  codes  of  a  very  high  type, 
although  I  would  claim  not  of  the  highest,  may  exist  in 
those  in  whom  the  religious  instinct  has  not  been  awakened : 
we  have  not  been  surprised,  therefore,  to  find  that  rules 
which  have  been  intended  to  serve  as  guides  to  moral 
conduct  relate,  for  the  most  part,  to  the  forms  of  ethical 
code  which  are  exclusive  of  the  impulse  due  to  the  existence 
of  the  religious  instinct. 

§  8.  Considering  morality  in  the  narrower  sense  as 
exclusive  of  religion,  as  it  is  usually  considered,  we  note 
that  the  religious  impulse,  representing  only  one  broad 
instinct,  is  stable;  while  the  moral  code,  which  is  inter- 
preted as  exclusive  of  religion,  and  on  which  religion  acts, 
being  determined  by  varying  emphasis  of  varied  instinct 
elements,  is  unstable. 

Thus  the  religious  impulse,  on  the  one  hand,  is  one 
which  may  be  possessed  by  the  dullard  as  well  as  by  the 
thoughtful  and  acute.  When  it  is  felt  it  appears  as  a 
power  within  us  as  we  bring  ourselves  to  bow  our  wills  to 
the  Highest  Conceivable  Will.  Once  grasped,  this  inward 
force  retains  for  all  time  the  same  general  qualities :  it  may 
increase  or  decrease  in  volume,  so  to  speak ;  it  may  be  lost 
and  reclaimed ;  but  it  does  not  change  its  general  character. 
Gained  in  childhood,  it  remains  the  same  with  the  religious 
man  until  death.  Attained  in  manhood,  it  brings  the  strong 
man  to  be  likened  to  a  little  child  in  submission  to  its 
guidance. 


CH.  XX      THE  RELATION  OF  RELIGION  TO  MORAL  CODES        485 

On  the  other  hand,  the  ethical  standard  in  its  narrower 
form  as  exclusive  of  religious  qualification  is  seen  to  be 
constantly  changing. 

If  we  think  of  the  religious  impulses  of  our  youth  as 
compared  with  those  of  our  manhood,  we  clearly  recognise 
them  to  be  the  same  in  essence,  however  much  they  may  have . 
changed  in  fervour;  but  when  we  compare  our  ethical 
standard  of  to-day  with  that  of  a  decade  in  the  past,  we  see 
as  clearly  that  it  has  changed  its  form  for  better  or  for 
worse  with  our  changes  of  thought  and  condition. 

§  9.  We  are  now  in  position  to  answer  a  question  of 
some  importance  which  is  often  raised  in  the  minds  of 
thoughtful  men ;  the  question  as  to  the  priority  of  ethics 
to  morals.  It  has  been  assumed  by  certain  thinkers  that 
religious  impulses  are  naturally  much  later  in  appearance  in 
the  human  mind  than  the  ethical  impulses  proper,  as  these 
are  usually  conceived ;  and  from  this  assumption  is  developed 
the  notion  that  those  men  who  teach  their  children 
religious  doctrine,  and  who  endeavour  to  produce  in  them 
religious  convictions  in  their  early  youth,  are  encouraging 
habits  which  are  not  only  futile,  but  vicious,  in  that  they 
warp  the  child's  normal  development,  and  produce  character 
of  an  artificial  form. 

There  is  something  startling  in  the  arrogance  that 
assumes  to  have  found  in  a  special  theory  the  basis  for 
attack  upon  a  habit  which  is  established  almost  universally 
in  man :  that  does  not  rather  look  with  confidence  for  some 
limitation  of  the  theory  which  will  account  for  the  existing 
widespread  habit  of  the  race.  It  seems  to  me  that  our 
study  brings  out  the  truth  in  this  matter  with  a  good  deal 
of  clearness. 

It  may  be  said  without  question  that  in  the  theoretical 
sense  the  germ  of  ethics  must  have  appeared  prior  to  the 


486  INSTINCT  AND  EEASON  paet  v 

germ  of  religion.  There  must  in  the  beginning  have  been, 
as  the  outcome  of  that  restraint  of  individualistic  instincts 
from  which  religion  develops,  some  emphasis  of  non- 
individualistic  instincts :  and  these  non  -  individualistic 
instincts  must  have  been  developed  before  restraint  of 
the  individualistic  tendencies  could  have  become  of  suffi- 
ciently great  racial  advantage  to  furnish  the  basis  for  the 
building  up  of  a  new  guiding  instinct,  such  as  the  religious 
instinct  appears  to  be. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  the  very  earliest  instincts  of  a 
non-individualistic  nature  were  those  that  led  to  the  intro- 
duction of  a  relatively  permanent  bond  between  the  father 
and  mother  of  the  offspring,  to  the  end  that  the  offspring 
might  be  preserved ;  in  which  instincts  we  have  the  germ 
of  family  life.  These  earliest  of  non-individualistic  instincts 
must  have  been  favourably  emphasised  by  the  habits  of 
restraint  of  the  individualistic  instincts  which  religion 
involves  ;  and  as  I  have  already  suggested  the  prominence 
of  phallic  worship,  cast  off  by  Nature  now  that  she  has  fixed 
in  the  race  the  instinct  for  the  establishment  of  which  this 
worship  was  originally  emphasised; — this  prominence  of 
which  we  have  much  evidence,  shows  how  deep-seated  in 
the  past  must  have  been  the  influence  of  the  religion  which 
forced  upon  a  race  of  promiscuous  sexual  proclivities  the 
habits  which  form  the  basis  of  that  feeling  of  responsibility 
for  the  care  of  one's  offspring  which  in  lower  or  higher 
degree  is  now,  and  through  all  historic  ages  has  been,  so 
marked  a  feature  of  man's  life  as  one  compares  it  with  the 
life  of  the  highest  of  animals  below  man. 

If  this  be  true,  then  the  germ  of  religion  must  have 
appeared  prior  to  the  appearance  of  those  higher  complex 
social  instincts  of  which  we  treat  almost  entirely  in  ethical 
studies,  although  it  could  not  have  appeared  while  individual- 
istic instincts  alone  prevailed. 


CH.  XX      THE  RELATION  OF  RELIGION  TO  MORAL  CODES        487 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  of  course  equally  clear  that  the 
greatest  power  of  religion  in  relation  to  the  advancement  of 
the  race  appears  in  its  emphasis  of  what  are  generally  known 
as  the  strictly  ethical  instincts,  through  the  restraint  of  the 
power  not  only  of  the  individualistic  instincts,  but  in  certain 
relations  of  the  sexual  instincts  also.  Thus  the  very  forms  of 
worship  which  at  first  were  of  purely  phallic  nature  prob- 
ably became  gradually  transferred  to  use  in  newer  religions 
which  emphasised  the  ethical  instincts  together  with  those 
relating  to  the  family  life ;  and  these  forms  in  turn  were 
transmuted  into  newer  forms  which  led  to  an  emphasis  of 
what  are  now  known  as  the  ethical  instincts  as  these 
gradually  developed. 

If  this  be  true,  we  should  expect  to  find  the  earliest 
germ  of  the  religious  instinct  appearing  in  the  child  almost 
coincidently  with  the  appearance  of  the  sexual  instincts : 
and  we  have  seen  in  an  earlier  chapter  how  true  this  is. 
As  the  sexual  instincts,  however,  are  adumbrated  in  the 
early  years  of  child  life,  so  it  would  seem  must  the  religious 
instinct  in  its  crudest  of  forms  be  adumbrated. 

As  Nature  has  devised  by  use  of  the  play  instinct  the 
means  of  pressing  forward  in  life  the  practice  of  activities 
which  are  some  day  to  become  habitual ;  as  doll  plays 
indicate  the  shadow  of  the  mother's  cares  in  the  future 
woman :  so  has  Nature  led  the  race  to  press  forward  in  the 
life  of  the  child  the  forms  of  religious  expression  at  the 
earliest  budding  of  the  instinct  they  express,  and  this  long 
before  it  awakens  in  that  form,  and  with  that  force,  which 
marks  its  functioning  in  relation  to  the  higher  ethical 
instincts  which  appear  later  on  in  life.  In  similar  manner 
Nature  has  led  men  to  teach  to  young  children  the  practice 
of  ethical  habits  before  these  habits  are  developed  by  the 
natural  growth  of  the  instincts  which  later  on  might  make 
the  ethical  expression  spontaneous.     As  I  have  already  said 


488  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

in  a  previous  chapter,  the  child  that  is  cut  off  by  careless 
guardians  from  the  early  encouragement  of  religious  habits 
is  likely  to  lose  in  later  life  the  restraining  influences  of 
religion  altogether ;  for  rare  indeed  is  the  parent  who, 
having  thus  avoided  the  encouragement  of  the  religious 
instinct  in  his  or  her  young  child,  has  the  wisdom  to 
encourage  its  unfolding  when  the  child  becomes  old  enough 
to  appreciate  its  full  power. 

When  we  turn  from  the  consideration  of  this  very  early 
functioning  of  religion,  which  shows  it  to  be  in  a  sense  in 
advance  of  the  (development  of  the  earliest  of  the  higher 
ethical  instincts,  to  the  study  of  religion  as  fully  developed, 
we  see  clearly  the  priority  in  a  theoretical  sense  of  the 
ethical  instincts  to  the  religious  instinct.  The  ethical 
instincts,  as  we  have  already  remarked,  must  be  already 
existent  before  the  restraint  of  individualistic  instincts 
through  religious  functioning  can  bring  them  into  promi- 
nence. In  other  words,  ethical  codes,  as  defined  in 
the  narrow  sense,  give  the  material  upon  which  the  fully 
developed  religious  instinct  must  act,  and  without  which  its 
functioning  would  be  of  no  service  to  the  race. 

§  10,  But  although  religion  is  based  upon  existent 
moral  capacity,  nevertheless  it  seems  to  me  to  be  clear  that 
a  morality  without  religion  is  an  unstable  product.  It  is 
certain  that  a  man  who  has  gained  a  noble  moral  code 
through  inheritance  from  virtuous  ancestry,  or  through 
mere  circumstance  of  life;  yet  in  whom,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  has  not  developed  the  religious  instinct  which 
leads  him  impulsively  to  reach  out  for  and  follow  the  best 
that  is  in  him ; — it  is  certain  that  such  a  man  will  be  very 
likely  to  fall  away  from  his  high  moral  estate  if  special 
temptation  assail  him,  or  circumstances  lead  to  an  over- 


..-*^' 


CH.  XX      THE  RELATION  OF  RELIGION  TO  MORAL  CODES        489 

throw  of  those  forces  which  have  led  him  in  the  past  to 
consider  only  the  nobler  impulses  within  him. 

The  attainment  of  religion  is  thus  seen  to  be  most 
important  to  our  moral  life,  a  fact  which  is  overlooked  in 
the  theory  of  those  who  would  teach  an  ethics  without 
religion.  In  the  theory,  I  say,  because  I  believe  that  in  fact 
these  very  moral  teachers,  so  far  as  they  succeed,  do  not  in 
practice  overlook  the  value  of  religion  as  I  understand  it: 
they  usually  unwittingly  are  working  in  line  with  the 
Churches  to  formulate  a  new  morality,  a  higher  form  of 
ethics,  in  which  the  religious  impulse,  the  impulse  towards 
restraint,  is  the  crowning  element,  and  the  nibst  efficient  aid 
to  enforce  that  order  of  the  impulses  lower  than  itself  which 
is  most  effective  for  racial  development. 


IV 

§  11.  In  our  moral  life,  then,  it  appears  that  the  attain- 
ment of  the  religious  habit  of  mind  should  be  our  most 
persistent  aim;  or,  in  other  words,  the  influence  of  the 
religious  life  is  the  very  basis  of  the  highest  morality :  "  the 
fear  of  the  Lord  is  the  beginning  of  wisdom." 

But,  as  we  have  seen,  this  highest  of  impulses  may  appear 
not  only  in  the  life  of  the  man  who  has  gained  a  noble 
moral  code,  but  also  in  the  life  of  some  weaker  brother. 

Eeligion  may  be  reached  by  one  who  is  entirely  unable 
to  see  that  it  is  not  a  perfectly  just  thing  to  take  what 
belongs  to  his  neighbour,  and  who  will  fervidly  pray  for 
help  in  highway  robberies,  as  we  see  in  many  historical 
examples  ;  nor  will  it  per  se  teach  him  better.  And,  on  the 
other  hand,  religion  may  be  reached  by  the  man  of  affairs  who 
appreciates  the  nicest  points  of  honour ;  to  whom  it  indeed 
gives  courage,  even  though  in  itself  it  effects  no  change  in 
his  standard. 


490 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 


The  "getting  of  Eeligion" — the  attainment  of  such  a  con- 
dition of  mind  that  the  tendency  to  do  what  is  thought  to 
be  rif^ht  has  become  impulsive, — that  is  the  essential  thing 
in  the  highest  form  of  moral  life;  and  it  is  no  wonder 
indeed  that  the  importance  of  its  attainment  leads  thought- 
less men  to  think  that  moral  striving  may  cease  when  once 
the  religious  impulse  is  felt ; — to  believe  that  perfection  of 
moral  type  is  thereby  attained. 

In  fact,  however,  the  moral  life  of  the  man  of  religious 
habit  should  be  one  of  constant  endeavour  to  gain  a  nobler 
code  of  moral  guidance,  rejoicing  merely  that  he  finds 
himself  under  the  dominance  of  the  influence  which  will 
be  most  powerful  to  aid  him  in  his  effort  to  work  out,  and 
hold  to,  the  best  that  is  within  him. 

§  12.  All  who  appreciate  the  richness  of  religious  pos- 
session, and  wish  for  all  men  the  comfort  and  help  it  gives, 
are  naturally  led  to  consider  the  causes  that  are  at  work 
among  that  large  class  of  intelligent  men  whom  we  find 
holding  aloof  from,  or  absolutely  rejecting,  all  religious 
influence  and  repressing  all  religious  tendencies.  One  of 
the  most  important  causes  of  this  rejection,  I  cannot  help 
thinking,  is  connected  with  the  misconception  of  this  rela- 
tion of  religion  to  ethics,  of  which  I  here  speak.  There  is 
in  every  community  a  large  class  of  men  whose  quick 
intelligence  is  felt  in  all  directions  on  the  right  side,  and 
yet  who  reject  the  claims  of  religion  when  pressed  upon 
them  from  without,  or  when  calling  upon  them  from  within 
their  very  souls,  on  the  ground  that  it  fails  to  fulfil  its 
ethic  pretensions. 

This  position  is  based  upon  the  individual's  knowledge 
of  the  world  and  of  the,  religious  men  whom  he  meets  in 
his  affairs,  who  not  infrequently  show  lapses  from  morality 
which  he  cannot  condone  but  which  they  apparently  do  not 


CH.  XX      THE  RELATION  OF  RELIGION  TO  MORAL  CODES        491 

deprecate.  It  is  based  further  upon  the  proposition  which 
he  treats  as  a  truism,  that  a  standard  of  morality  lower 
than  his  own  standard,  which  he  calls  non-religious,  ought 
not  to  be  found  in  a  man  who  is  professedly  religious.  It 
leads  him,  on  the  one  hand,  to  give  open  expression  to  the 
belief  that  his  avowedly  religious,  but  to  his  view  erring, 
acquaintance  is  a  hypocrite;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  leads 
him  to  speak  in  scornful  tone  in  relation  to  all  religious 
thought  and  profession.  That  religious  fervour  brings  a 
high  grade  of  morals  or  tends  to  perfect  the  moral  standard 
is  what  he  denies,  and  in  denying  he  throws  aU  religion,  as 
he  understands  it,  to  the  winds. 

But,  as  the  reader  will  observe,  such  a  position  is 
based  altogether  upon  the  notion  that  religion  should 
perfect  moral  codes,  a  notion  which  is  as  far  as  possible 
from  being  correct. 

It  may  be  well  for  us  to  ask  how  it  happens  that 
intelligent  men  come  to  accept  this  false  position.  They 
in  some  way  gain  the  notion  that  the  true  end  of  religious 
experience  is  the  making  of  a  good  man,  and  that  if 
religion  does  not  make  a  man  as  good  as,  or  better  than, 
they  themselves  are,  who  are  as  they  think  without  religious 
guidance,  then  it  is  not  worth  the  having.  This  notion  is 
probably  gained  by  men  partly  from  observation  of  self- 
satisfaction  in  some  religious  acquaintance,  who  seems  to 
hold  that  if  he  is  religious  he  has  attained  to  all  that  is 
morally  needful ;  that  if  his  conscience  does  not  smite  him 
then  his  acts  must  be  beyond  criticism ;  that  his  standard 
of  morality  is  in  some  way  fixed  in  the  fact  of  his  attain- 
ment of  the  religious  basis.  What  is  more,  they  find  cor- 
roboration of  this  notion  in  much  of  the  prevalent  religious 
teaching,  which,  when  it  exhorts  to  the  attainment  of 
religion,  seems  to  teach  that  this  attainment  is  all  that 
is   necessary  for   a  man's  moral   health,  that   it  per  se  is 


492  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

to  make  him  a  good  man,  and  is  to  give  to  him  not  merely 
the  basis  of  a  new  morality  in  the  implanting  of  a  tendency 
to  choose  the  right,  but  the  new  morality  itself,  then  and 
there. 

If  the  prevalence  of  this  teaching  be  denied,  then  I  must 
fall  back  upon  the  statement  that  at  all  events  such  is  the 
teaching  as  it  is  understood  not  only  by  the  man  untouched 
by  religious  influences,  but  by  the  average  religious  listener 
himself;  for  unless  this  be  the  understanding  I  do  not  see 
how  we  are  to  account  for  the  sadness  and  discouragement 
felt  by  the  religious  man,  which  stands  side  by  side  with 
the  sneer  of  the  scofler,  when  failures  in  ordinary  morals 
among  those  who  are  ardent  professors  of  religion  are  noised 
abroad. 

But  it  is  clear,  as  we  have  already  seen,  that  the 
development  of  individual  ethical  standards  is  not  a  matter 
of  instinct  but  a  matter  of  intellectual  process, — a  matter  of 
reason. 

Surely  that  which  tends  to  perfect  the  ethical  standard 
is  directly  and  distinctly  intellectual.  The  discrimination 
of  motive ;  the  analysis  of  fact  and  condition ;  the  watch- 
fulness to  avoid  self-deception  and  to  gain  insight;  the 
conception  of  principles  and  the  recognition  of  cases  under 
those  principles,  and  of  those  which  are  of  doubtful  signifi- 
cance:  these  and  kindred  mental  activities  are  what  are 
concerned  in  the  perfecting  of  our  standards.  In  this 
process  we  ^e  not  dealing  with  instinct,  not  with  the 
attainment  of  the  impulse  to  the  right;  that  is  a  much 
broader  and  more  general  quality  of  character. 

We  and  our  religious  teachers  should  feel  that  it  is  our 
duty,  after  the  attainment  of  religion,  to  turn  our  attention 
most  strenuously  to  the  perfection  of  our  ethical  standards. 
This  would  not  make  of  less  importance  the  work  of  the 
prophet  who  calls  people  to  God,  but  it  would  lead  him 


CH.  XX      THE  RELATION  OF  RELIGION  TO  MORAL  CODES        493 

to  close  his  appeals  with  the  teaching:  "Now  that  the 
impulse  is  right,  now  that  '  the  heart  is  fixed/  now  is  the 
time  for  us  to  develop  our  present  notions  of  the  right,  and 
to  aim  to  make  our  standards  in  all  respects  the  highest 
attainable." 

A  clearer  apprehension  of  this  truth  would  lead  to  greater 
conscientiousness  in  not  a  few  of  our  clergy ;  for  instead 
of  being  led  to  feel  that  having  handed  down  rSigious 
enthusiasm  to  their  hearers  they  have  done  all  that  is 
demanded  of  them,  they  would  be  led  to  watch  more 
closely  their  own  standards  to  see  that  they  continue  to 
grow  in  accuracy  and  refinement ;  and  this  in  order  that 
they  may  be  able  to  lead  to  the  same  higher  attainment 
those  who  listen  to  their  teachings. 

But  the  fullest  effect  would  be  not  for  the  preacher  but 
for  those  whom  he  leads,  and  for  the  busy  men  of  the 
world  outside  of  his  flock.  For  the  religious  man  there 
would  be  a  gain  in  courage :  no  more  would  he  be  dismayed 
by  the  failures  of  his  religious  neighbours  to  act  in  accord 
with  the  highest  moral  standards ;  rather  would  he  see  in 
those  revelations  of  lower  standard  a  vision  of  new  ethic 
worlds  to  conquer.  There  would  be  a  gain  in  charity ;  for 
most  cases  of  apparent  hypocrisy  disappear  when  we  con- 
sider the  subject  from  the  standpoint  here  taken. 

Most  fortunate  of  all  would  be  the  gain  made  in  the 
removal   of  the   stumbling-block    of   which  've  above 

spoken  from  the  path  of  the  serious  thinker  i  ^^  religious 
subjects ;  the  removal  of  that  obstacle  which  so  often 
results  in  loss  of  the  possession  of  the  religious  impulse 
itself,  because  the  man  misunderstands  its  end  and  its 
means,  and  through  such  misunderstanding  rejects  as  a 
failure  what  would  be  for  him  a  most  effective  help. 

We  should  realise  that  religion  can  do  no  more  in  this 
relation  than  bring  out  the  force  of  men's  racial  standards 


494  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

and  give  him  the  habit  of  life  which  by  continuous  thought 
and  effort  will  lead  to  a  perfecting  of  these  standards.  We 
should  therefore  not  be  surprised  to  find  often  that  men 
who  are  deeply  religious  nevertheless  depart  from  moral 
standards  that  we  consider  vital,  and  we  should  even  expect 
to  find  them,  as  we  do  find  them,  defending  such  departures 
from  what  we  call  righteousness ;  nor  should  we  judge  on 
this  account  that  religion  is  the  less  of  value ;  if  we  do  so 
judge,  it  is  because  we  altogether  mistake  the  function  of 
religion. 

Eeligion  teaches  us  to  listen  to  the  past,  and  gives  us 
enthusiasm  to  do  the  work  commanded  by  the  "voice" 
from  that  past ;  it  gives  us  the  basis  for  the  perfecting  of 
our  moral  code ;  but  it  does  not  give  us  this  perfect  moral 
code  itself. 


CHAPTEE  XXI 

THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

I. — The  Balance  between  Eeason  and  Instinct 

§  1.  In  the  course  of  our  consideration  of  development  a 
most  interesting  series  of  scenes  in  the  unfolding  of  organic 
life  has  been  brought  into  view. 

^e  have  seen  that  the  multiplication  of  individual  cells, 
which  tend  to  aggregate  as  they  multiply,  necessarily  brings 
about  differentiation  of  functioning  in  the  several  parts  of  the 
aggregation.  When  the  elements  of  these  collections  of 
cells  gain  in  interdependence,  pari  passu  with  their  func- 
tional differentiation,  they  form  that  type  of  aggregates 
which  we  call  individual  organisms ;  in  them  we  see  arising 
certain  activities  of  the  aggregate  as  a  whole  which  we  call 
instinctive  activities,  and  which  we  discover  relate  to  the 
persistence  of  the  individual  organism,  and  not  to  that  of 
the  elements  composing  it,  which  latter,  however,  are  alone 
directly  stimulated  to  action. 

These  individual  organisms  in  their  turn  tend  to  become 
collective,  and  this  higher  aggregation  involves  further 
differentiations  of  functioning  in  the  individual  organisms. 
Most  notable  of  these  are  differences  of  reproductive 
capacity  which  bring  about  differences  of  sex,  changes 
which  carry  with  them  many  new  and  momentous  altera- 
tions in  functioning.     And  here  we  note  the  appearance  of 


496  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

instincts  of  a  new  type  relating,  not  to  the  advantage  of 
the  individual  organism,  but  rather  to  the  persistence  of 
the  species  to  which  the  individual  belongs. 

Again  the  inter-relations  of  individual  animal  organisms, 
and  the  differences  of  reaction  upon  the  environment  due  to 
divergent  influences,  produce  many  activities,  differing  in 
kind  in  different  individuals,  which  we  can  see  yield  benefit 
to  tribal  collections.  Unified  tribal  action  then  appears, 
and  co-operation  as  well  as  competition  between  tribes, 
until  we  reach  the  complex  life  of  the  present  day  with  its 
many  bonds  of  relation,  with  its  competitive  struggles  and 
its  sympathies ;  a  life  in  which  the  persistence  of  differ- 
entiations is  determined  more  largely  by  other  processes 
than  by  direct  contest,  the  ends  to  be  reached  as  a  result 
of  these  differentiations  being  still  unknown  to  us,  and 
being  unlikely  to  appear  clear  until  many  centuries  have 
passed  away. 

§  2.  In  all  parts  of  this  series,  even  as  soon  as  we  step 
away  from  the  simplest  isolated  protoplasmic  units,  there 
appear  in  and  through  the  processes  above  described  two 
influences  at  work  :  first,  the  elemental  variant  influences,  and 
second,  the  influences  from  the  organism  producing  typical 
reactions. 

Although,  as  we  have  seen,  the  elemental  variant  actions 
in  organic  aggregates  are  flnally  referable  to  instinct  actions 
of  the  elements  of  the  aggregates  in  which  they  appear, 
whether  these  be  simple  or  complex,  nevertheless  in  refer- 
ence to  the  organic  forms  we  are  here  considering  the 
variant  actions  are  clearly  separable  from  the  typical 
actions. 

The  elemental  variant  influences  appear  in  our  mental 
life  in  the  form  of  what  we  call  intelligence,  come  into  our 
consciousness  as  reasoned  choice. 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  497 

The  :.nfluences  from  the  organism,  on  the  other  hand, 
which  when  objectively  viewed  appear  as  instincts,  affect 
our  consciousness  by  the  appearance  in  the  first  place  of 
what  I  ca-ll  instinct  feelings,  which  are  the  coincidents  of 
instinct  astions ;  and  in  the  second  place  by  the  appearance 
of  impulses,  which  are  states  of  mind  coincident  with  the 
obstruction  to,  or  inhibition  of,  the  working  out  of  instinct 
actions ;  whether  this  hindrance  be  caused  by  what  is 
recognised  as  the  opposition  of  diverse  instincts,  or  appear 
in  connection  with  hesitancy  and  reasoned  choice. 

Here  we  see  that  we  have  in  consciousness  two  guides 
to  conduct,  Impulse  and  Eeasoning,  corresponding  respect- 
ively to  Instinct  and  Eeason,  and  the  question  I  would 
consider  in  this  chapter  is  this :  where  the  resultants  of 
r/ational  process  on  the  one  hand,  and  unreasoned  impulse 
on  the  other,  would  lead  to  opposed  actions ;  and  where  the 
opposition  is  of  such  nature  that  it  comes  into  clear  con- 
sciousness and  involves  a  final  act  of  reasoning,  a  decision 
and  a  choice ;  which  of  these  two  guides  shall  we  follow  ? 
Should  one  of  the  two,  reasoned  resultant  or  instinctive 
appeal,  always  have  the  precedence;  or  should  authority 
rest  with  Instinct  in  some  cases,  and  with  Eeason  in  others  ? 
Is  it  true  that  "  by  every  surrender  of  reason  to  passion  our 
humanity  is  dishonoured  "  ? 


I 


A 

§  3.  Let  us  study  this  question  first  with  especial 
reference  to  the  nature  of  Instinct.  In  so  doing  we  may 
well  begin  by  recalling  the  fact,  emphasised  in  the  previous 
chapters,  that  instincts,  which  call  forth  our  impulses^  can 
only  be  understood  if  we  suppose  that  in  general  the 
instinct  actions  which  express  them  have  become  fixed  and 

2  k 


498  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

organic  becausejbhej  have  proYBd-ta  he,  of  sfirvicp,  tfP  our 
ancestors  in  the  ages  that  have  preceded  ours. 

'Even  if  we  could  conceive  these  instincts  as  having 
come  into  existence  fully  formed,  we  should  find  it  difficult 
to  understand  how  they  could  have  persisted  and  have 
become  elaborated,  as  we  find  they  have,  unless  they  had 
been  of  service  to  the  race  in  which  they  appearj  for  under 
the  postulates  of  the  developmental  hypothesis  which  we 
assume  they  would  surely  have  tended  to  have  been 
eliminated  had  they  not  had  such  values. 

It  is  of  course  true  that  some  of  the  instinct  actions 
which  we  discern  may  possibly  be  forms  of  reaction  that 
have  belonged  to  individuals  of  a  race  that  has  persisted 
because  of  conditions  entirely  unrelated  to  these  specific 
actions  expressive  of  the  instinct^  It  is  possible,  in 
other  words,  that  these  instincts  may  be  retained  in  more 
developed  states  only  because  they  have  formed  no  obstruc- 
tion, or  only  a  minor  obstruction,  to  the  progress  of  the 
individual,  or  to  that  of  the  racial  life  of  the  organic  group 
in  which  they  appear:  it  is  possible  that  the  group  has 
come  to  persist,  not  because  of  the  efficiency  of  these  special 
instincts,  but  because  of  certain  other  capacities  which  have 
been  gained  by  the  race  in  which  these  special  instincts 
appear,  which  capacities  have  enabled  the  group  to  obtain 
advantage  in  the  contest  for  survival.  They  may  correspond 
to  the  "rudimentary  organs"  in  the  individual  organism 
(such,  for  instance,  as  the  nipple  on  the  breast  of  the  human 
male),  which  are  supposed  to  remain  uneliminated  in  the 
process  of  development  because  they  do  not  stand  in  serious 
opposition  to  the  advantage  of  the  individual  or  of  the  race 
to  which  he  belongs. 

But  even  if  we  accept  in  some  cases  this  possibility,  it 
will  at  once  be  apparent  to  the  reader  that  this  explanation 
itself  is  dependent  upon  the  acknowledgment  of  the  exist- 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  499 

ence  of  other  advantageous  habits  of  action  which  must 
themselves  be  instinctive,  and  which  can  only  have  per- 
sisted because  they  have  been  of  advantage  to  the  race  in 
which  they  appear. 

It  cannot  be  doubted,  then,  that  we  are  warranted  in 
upholding  the  generally  accepted  hypothesis  that  on  the 
whole  the  existence  of  an  instinct  carries  with  it  the  im- 
plication that  the  activities  which  it  entails  have  been  of 
advantage  to  the  ancestors  of  the  race  in  which  the  instinct 
appears. 

§  4.  In  studying  from  the  instinctive  side  the  opposition 

/  between  instinct  and  reason  as  it  appears  in  consciousness, 

we  may  advantageously  follow  the  main  groupings  made  in 

the  preceding  chapters   in   connection   with   our   study  of 

instinct. 

We  may  consider  in  their  order — 

First,  the  impulses  determined  by  the  instincts_which 
relate__to_ the  ^persistence  of  the  individual;  second,  the 
impulses  determined  by  the  instincts  which  relate  to  the 
persistence  of  the  species  to  which  the  individual  belongs ; 
tliird,  the  impulses  determined  by  the  instincts  which  relate 
to_the_persistence  of  the  tribe  within  that  species. 

§  5.  First,  then,  as  to  the  impulses  within  us  which 
relate  to  individual  persistence  and  the  oppositions  which 
reason  dictates  to  these  impulses.  The  great  mass  of  the 
instinct  actions  which  relate  to  individual'  subsistence,  and 
to  individual  protection,  are  so  thoroughly  organised  that  we 
are  seldom  impressed  by  their  conscious  side ;  their  corre- 
spondent instinct  feelings  sink  into  the  field  of  inatten- 
tion :  although  in  some  cases  of  more  complex  type  the 
instinct  feelings,  as  we  have  seen,  are  experienced  in  what 
we  know  as  emotions,  mainly  because  the  instinct  actions 


500  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

to  which  they  correspond  are  forceful  and  immediate  in 
reaction. 

Where  the  actions  within  ns  are  so  thoroughly  organised 
as  these  are  of  which  we  speak,  it  must  necessarily  be  that 
the  vast  mass  of  them  will  be  carried  on  without  sufficient 
obstruction  to  arouse  in  us  conscious  impulses.  It  is  true  that 
certain  of  those  instincts  which  relate  to  bodily  sustenance, 
when  obstructed,  arouse  within  us  the  painful  states  which 
we  designate  as  the  cravings :  but  relatively  seldom  do  they 
arouse  what  we  have  seen  is  a  necessary  component  of  a 
conscious  impulse,  viz.  the  thought  of  activities  which,  as. 
reflection  teaches  us,  if  realised,  would  break  down  the 
opposition  and  relieve  its  painfulness. 

With  the  emotions  obstruction  of  functioning  more 
often  produces  not  only  blind  cravings  but  distinct  impulses 
to  action. 

ISTotwithstanding  the  thorough  organisation  of  the 
majority  of  our  individualistic  instincts  there  are,  never- 
theless, not  a  few  cases  where  we  note  reason  urging  us  to 
contend  in  opposition  to  these  instincts;  cases  where  we 
conceive  it  to  be  possible  and  best  to  oppose  these  cravings 
and  the  simple  impulses,  where  they  are  aroused.  The 
doctor  tells  his  patient  that  he  must  resist  his  natural 
craving  for  meats  if  he  is  to  break  down  some  special 
disease,  or  delay  its  culmination ;  and  trusting  his  adviser 
he  reasons  that  the  craving  must  be  resisted.  In  the  field 
of  Emotion  we  may  note  as  an  example  that^  the  thought  of 
disgrace  is,  in  our  day  of  social  pressures,  likely  to  lead  a 
man  to  inhibit,  through  reason,  the  instincts  which  would 
lead  him  to  flight  at  the  approach  of  an  evident  danger. 

Now  quite  apart  from  the  propriety  of  the  action  in  these 
particular  cases  it  must  be  apparent  to  the  reader  that 
whenever  we  bring  into  being  such  cravings  and  impulses 
we  do  so  by  placing  opposition  in  the  way  of  the  fulfilment 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  601 

of  certain  functionings  which  tell  of  the  experience  of  the 
past  in  preserving  individual  life.-^  There  is  a  bare  possi- 
bility, indeed,  that  by  this  opposition  we  may  directly 
conserve  our  lives,  but  these  cravings  and  these  impulses, 
where  they  are  due  to  inheritance,  and  not  to  habit  acquired 
by  the  individual,  clearly  say  to  us :  "  In  the  development  of 
man  the  processes  which  you  oppose  have  on  the  whole 
been  those  which  have  conserved  the  individual;  if  you 
persist  in  your  opposition  you  run  great  risk  of  producing 
results  which  will  be  of  direct  disadvantage  to  the  indi- 
vidual, whatever  the  indirect  results  may  be." 

§  6.  Let  us  turn  from  this  brief  consideration  of  the 
impulses  which  have  only  individualistic  significance  to  the 
study  of  those  which  relate  to  the  persistence  of  species. 
At  the  start  we  are  led  to  recall  the  fact  that  the  instincts 
which  call  out  these  racial  impulses  can  be  explained  most 
easily  in  terms  of  our  present  biological  knowledge  if  we 
agree  that  the  instincts,  and  therefore  the  corresponding 
impulses,  relative  to  the  persistence  of  individual  existence 
have  become  subordinated  in  our  lives  to  those  relating  to 
the  persistence  of  the.  species  of  which  we  are  individual 
members. 

We  usually  fail  altogether  to  realise  how  habitual  this 
subordination  of  individual  value  to  racial  value  has  become. 
In  some  of  the  lowest  types  of  animal  life  total  destruc- 
tion of  individual  life  is  involved  with  the  processes  of 
reproduction ;  in  some  cases  both  parents  merge  into  one 
body  which  is  broken  up  into  numerous  new  individuals ;  in 
other  cases  one  parent  organism  dies  invariably  in  the  act 

1  For  the  sake  of  simplicity  I  overlook  here  those  few  cases  involving  the 
remote  possibility,  referred  to  in  previous  sections,  that  the  impulses  are 
caused  by  obstruction  of  instincts  which  have  had  no  significance,  but  have 
been  preserved  because  they  belong  to  a  race  conserved  by  other  protective 
instincts. 


502  INSTINCT  AND  KEASON  paet  v 

of  giving  life  to  her  numerous  progeny.  The  individualistic 
disadvantages  connected  with  the  processes  necessary  to  the 
continuation  of  the  species  are  less  marked  as  animals  rise  in 
the  scale  of  organisation,  but  even  in  the  human  animal  it 
is  easy  to  recognise  the  subordination  of  which  I  speak :  we 
all  appreciate,  for  instance,  how  often  the  human  mother 
wastes  her  individual  strength  in  suckling  and  caring  for 
her  babe ;  how  often  the  father  loses  his  health  in  providing 
sustenance  for  the  mother  and  her  babe  when  they  are 
unprotected  and  incapable  of  self  -  support.  But  self- 
sacrifices  of  this  nature  are  habitually  passed  over  without 
a  thought,  are  looked  upon  as  natural,  and  if  they  are  not 
willingly  assumed  the  parent  is  quickly  condemned ;  a  fact 
which  itself  shows  how  thoroughly  the  instincts  leading  to 
individual  advantage  have  in  our  race  become  subordinated 
to   those   tending   to   bring    about   the   persistence   of  the 


Another  point  I  think  my  reader  will  assent  to :  not 
,only  is  this  subordination  habitual,  but  it  evidently  is 
almost  certainly  necessary  if  the  species  is  to  be  conserved, 
for  we  can  with  difficulty  account  for  the  rise  and  elabora- 
tion and  persistence  of  these  instincts  relating  to  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  species  unless  we  assume  that,  on  the 
whole,  individual  life  has  been  made  more  secure,  and  better 
fitted  to  adaptation  to  a  changing  environment,  where  the 
individuals  have  lived  in  accord  with  these  wider-reaching 
instincts. 

Although  for  the  most  part  the  impulses  corresponding 
with  the  instincts  we  are  describing  are  scarcely  drawn 
into  consciousness,  for  the  reason  that  their  appropriate 
instinct  actions  are  not  obstructed ;  and  although  in  those 
cases  where  these  impulses  are  brought  into  consciousness 
they  usually  override  without  difficulty  all  purely  indi- 
viduaHstic  opposition  ;  still  in  this  region  we  begin  to  see 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  503 

more  clearly  the  action  of  reason,  which  appears  in  the 
emphasis  it  gives  to  the  individualistic  impulses  in  opposi- 
tion to  those  relating  to  reproduction,  and  in  the  pre- 
sentation of  ideal  ends  of  one  kind  or  another  which  tend 
to  bring  about  repression  of  those  impulses  which  would 
lead  to  the  persistence  of  species. 

For  instance,  pure  and  well -recognised  selfishness  will, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  lead  men  and  women  deliberately 
to  avoid  the  begetting  of  children  and  the  rearing  of 
families,  lest  they  themselves  suffer  individual  discomfort 
or  inconvenience ;  and  fanatical  religious  ideas  of  the  worth- 
lessness  of  all  things  relating  to  the  body  will  lead  to  the 
same  result. 

Now  quite  apart  from  the  propriety  of  the  action  in 
these  special  cases,  here  again,  I  think,  we  must  grant  that 
if  these  impulses  which  relate  to  the  persistence  of  the 
species,  and  which  habitually  subordinate  to  themselves 
the  purely  individualistic  impulses,  have  become  prominent 
in  our  lives  because  of  their  value  to  our  race  in  its 
struggle  towards  adaptation  to  its  environment;  then  if 
we  oppose  the  functioning  of  these  non-individualistic,  these 
racial,  instincts  of  which  we  are  speaking,  we  are  thwarting 
actions  which  tell  of  the  experience  of  the  past  in  preserving 
the  species  of  which  we  are  individual  members,  and  which 
are  therefore  indirectly  of  advantage  to  the  individual 
members  of  the  species. 

It  is  barely  possible,  indeed,  that  by  this  opposition  we 
may  conserve  our  lives,  and  that  indirectly  we  may  thus 
even  subserve  the  advance  of  the  species,  if  we  happen  to  be 
specially  vigorous  members  of  the  race ;  but  it  is  evident 
that  these  impulses  speak  to  us  with  no  doubtful  voice, 
telling  us  that  in  the  development  of  man  the  instincts 
which  determine  these  non-individualistic  impulses,  which 
we  perchance  oppose,  have  on  the  whole  been  those  which 


604  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

have  conserved  our  species  and  made  possible  our  own 
individual  lives.  If,  then,  we  persist  in  our  opposition 
we  evidently  run  great  risk  of  bringing  about  results  which 
will  be  of  direct  disadvantage  to  our  species,  and  of  indirect 
disadvantage  to  the  individuals  composing  it ;  risk  that  we 
will  thus  throw  ourselves  out  of  relation  with  that  part  of 
the  race  that  is  to  effect  its  persistence.  ^ 

§  7.  Let  us  now,  in  the  third  place,  turn  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  ethical  impulses,  those  which  relate  to 
tribal,  to  social,  persistence,  and  which  of  all  impulses  are  of 
most  interest  to  us  in  connection  with  the  argument  we  are 
making. 

Here  too  we  must  perceive,  as  we  have  argued  above, 
that  the  instincts  which  bring  out  these  impulses  can 
be  most  easily  understood  in  relation  to  our  modern  bio- 
logical tenets  if  we  adopt  the  hypothesis  that  the  impulses 
relating  to  persistence  of  individual  existence,  and  those 
relating  to  persistence  of  the  species,  have  both  become 
subordinated  in  our  lives  to  the  impulses  relating  to  the 
persistence  of  tribal  life  in  the  species,  of  which  species  we 
are  individual  elements. 

In  a  vast  majority  of  cases  here  also  this  subordination 
is  habitual  and  attracts  no  notice :  tendencies  to  lying,  to 
stealing,  to  licentiousness,  are  more  often  repressed  in  the 
civilised  man,  and  tendencies  to  benevolence  and  sympathy 
more  often  fostered,  than  we  are  wont  to  acknowledge  ;  the 
generous  liberality  of  the  very  poor,  for  instance,  is  recog- 
nised by  all  who  have  worked  amongst  them.  The  cases 
in  which  men  fail  to  act  in  accord  with  their  social  impulses 
attract  attention,  and  the  proportion  of  these  failures  of 
subordination  to  Nature's  order  is  exaggerated  in  our  minds 
to  an  unwarranted  degree. 

But  this  subordination  of  the  impulses  of  individualistic 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  505 

moment,  and  under  certain  conditions  of  those  relating  to 
the  persistence  of  the  species,  to  the  impulses  relating  to 
tribal  efficiency  is  not  only  to  a  great  extent  habitual,  but 
it  is  almost  certainly  necessary  if  this  tribal  life  with  all  its 
advantages  to  species  and  individual  is  to  be  conserved. 
And  here,  as  in  the  cases  previously  studied,  we  are  alto- 
gether unable  to  understand  the  rise  and  elaboration  and 
persistence  of  these  highly  complex  instincts  relating  to 
tribal  life  unless,  on  the  whole,  the  individual  life,  and  the 
species  to  which  it  belongs,  are  made  more  secure,  better 
fitted  to  adaptation  to  a  changing  environment,  by  the 
ordering  of  the  individual  lives  in  accord  with  these  wider- 
reaching  instincts. 

It  is  barely  possible  to  be  sure,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
that  some  of  these  elaborately  developed  instincts  in  man 
may  be  "  rudimentary  "  or  "  vestigial,"  and  without  special 
significance ;  but  in  the  nature  of  the  case  this  is  less 
probable  than  with  other  instincts  :  for  the  higher  instincts 
involve  the  most  complicated  of  adjustments  of  activities, 
and  these  activities  are  very  unlikely  to  have  become  thus 
adjusted  to  one  another  except  as  the  result  of  struggle  and 
conflict  determined  by  racial  demands  which  have  em- 
phasised the  existing  adjustments  and  have  brought  about 
the  elimination  of  others  which  have  been  equally  forcible  so 
far  as  the  individual  and  the  species  is  concerned,  but  less 
so  in  relation  to  tribal  development.  The  improbability  of 
this  lack  of  importance  increases,  the  deeper  seated  and 
more  persistent  these  instincts  appear  to  be :  for  where  they 
are  thus  powerful  and  persistent  they  must  have  belonged 
in  varying  degree  to  many  a  tribe  of  contestants,  with  other 
reasons  for  their  struggles ;  and  in  all  probability  they  must 
either  directly  or  indirectly  have  strengthened  those  in 
whom  they  were  especially  prominent,  this  strengthening 
in  the  case  of  the  higher  ethical  instincts  being  probably 


506  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

due  to  a  great  extent  to  their  efficiency  in  the  production 
of  unity  within  the  tribal  community. 

Where  the  ethical  instincts  act  without  opposition  they 
are,  of  course,  not  presented  to  consciousness  in  the  form  of 
impulses.  Where  opposition  does  arise,  the  ethical  impulses 
are  aroused :  and  it  is  important  to  note  that  they  are 
often  felt  to  be  more  persistent  and  yet  at  the  same  time 
less  powerful  than  the  impulses  of  a  lower  order;  and 
this,  I  take  it,  is  because  they  appear  in,  and  govern  in,  a 
great  many  cases  of  varied  nature,  being  concerned,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  in  establishing  general  trends  of  action 
through  very  numerous  sequences  of  activities,  which  are 
aroused  by  varied  stimuli. 

Where  these  ethical  impulses  do  appear  in  consciousness, 
it  seems  to  me  that  they  either  override,  or  bring  into  more 
effective  relation,  far  more  often  than  they  fail  to  do  so,  all 
purely  individualistic  impulses,  or  such  as  relate  solely  to 
the  persistence  of  the  species. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  we  are  dealing  with  instincts  of 
great  complexity,  and  of  the  latest  development  in  the  race, 
and  hence  of  less  fixed  co-ordination,  we  should  expect  to 
find,  what  we  do  find,  that  it  is  in  the  realm  of  the 
ethical  impulses  that  we  see  most  clearly  typified  the  action 
of  reason,  in  the  emphasis  it  gives  to  the  impulses  of  lower 
grade,  and  in  the  presentation  of  ideal  ends  which  tend  to 
repress  those  impulses  which  would  lead  to  tribal  persistence 
and  advance. 

I  shall  study  this  class  of  impulses  so  fully  below,  and 
shall  illustrate  this  opposition  in  so  many  ways,  that  I  do 
not  stop  now  to  give  examples  of  it.  But  I  am  concerned 
here  especially  to  ask  the  reader  to  note  concerning  these 
ethical  impulses  which  habitually  subordinate  to  themselves 
the  impulses  relating  to  the  persistence  of  the  individual, 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  507 

and  under  certain  conditions,  and  in  certain  connections, 
those  relating  to  the  persistence  of  the  species,  that  if  they 
have  become  prominent  in  our  lives  because  of  their  value 
to  our  race  in  its  struggle  towards  adaptation  to  its  environ- 
ment, then  when  we  oppose  the  functioning  of  the  corre- 
sponding ethical  instincts  we  are  thwarting  actions  which 
tell  of  the  experience  of  the  past  in  preserving  our  social 
life  which  we  all  acknowledge  brings  to  us,  as  individuals 
and  as  a  species,  inestimable  advantages. 

It  is  of  course  barely  possible  that  such  opposition  to 
our  ethical  instincts  may  in  some  cases  conserve  our  indi- 
vidual lives,  or  may  in  particular  instances  act  to  foster 
continuance  of  the  life  of  the  species ;  but  nevertheless  it 
is  clear  that  the  rise  of  these  ethical  impulses  teaches  us 
that  in  the  development  of  man  these  impulses,  which  we 
perchance  oppose,  have  on  the  whole  been  those  which 
have  conserved  the  complex  tribal  life  upon  which  our 
civilisation  is  founded,  with  all  the  benefits  this  civilisation 
brings  to  us  as  individuals,  and  indirectly  to  the  species  to 
which  we  individuals  belong.  If,  then,  we  persist  in  this 
opposition  we  evidently  run  great  risk  of  bringing  about 
results  which  will  be  of  direct  disadvantage  to  our  tribal 
life,  and  of  indirect  disadvantage  to  the  individuals  and  the 
species  to  which  it  relates. 

§  8.  And  now  let  us  restate  in  other  words  the  results 
to  which  we  are  led  by  consideration  of  this  contest  between 
reason  and  instinct,  approached  by  us,  as  it  has  been,  from 
the  instinctive  side. 

The  reader  will  scarcely  hesitate,  I  think,  to  accept  the 
view  that  our  impulses,  taken  as  a  whole,  are  voices  within 
us  that  tell  of  instincts  which  have  proved  to  be  of  value  to 
our  ancestors  in  one  way  or  another.  And  if  this  be  true 
it  is  certainly  clear  that,  if  any  part  of  our  race  determine 


508  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

after  process  of  reasoning  to  act  without  consideration  of  any 
one  of  these  instincts^  there  is  a  very  large  probability  that 
some  essential  advantage  will  be  missed  by  the  branch  of 
the  race  which  so  acts ;  and  also  a  large  probability  that 
this  part  of  the  race  that  so  acts  without  consideration  of 
this  instinct  will  suffer  in  the  contest  that  is  going  on  now, 
as  ever;  and  that  it  will  in  the  end,  other  things  being 
equal,  give  place  in  the  struggle  for  survival  to  that  other 
part  of  the  race  that  acts  with  consideration  of  this  instinct. 
This  one  thing  at  all  events  is  certain,  that  in  following' 
a  clearly  marked  instinct  in  any  instance  we  know  our- 
selves, with  scarcely  a  doubt,  to  be  supported  in  our  action 
by  the  experience  of  our  race ;  for  the  action  to  which  the 
instinct  urges  us  must  almost  certainly  have  been  valuable 
to  the  race  in  the  past,  and  in  any  event  must  have  been 
of  no  material  disadvantage  to  our  ancestry. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  to  me  to  be  perfectly  apparent 
that  if  we  follow  reason^where  its  dictates  are  in  opposition 
to  the  clearly  marked  demands  of  a  fundamental  instinct, 
then  we  are  undertaking  a  most  hazardous  course.  It  is 
true,  indeed,  that  we  may  possibly  be  right,  in  some  specific 
instance,  for  it  is  just  possible  that  the  variation  of  type 
that  we  propose,  if  we  determine  to  act  as  reason  dictates 
against  instinct,  may  be  of  no  disadvantage,  and  it  is  even 
possible  that  we  may  initiate  what  may  prove  to  be  an 
advantageous  variation,  one  that  may  become  effective  to 
the  advancement  of  ourselves  or  of  our  descendants  in  the 
struggle  of  life.  But  it  must  be  granted  that  the  chances 
of  our  being  right  in  any  such  special  variation  are  exceed- 
ingly small. 

This  will  appear  more  clear  when  we  consider  that 
through  the  long  periods  during  which  any  special  instinct 
has  been  forming,  an  indefinite  number  of  variations  from 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  509 

its  leadings  have  doubtless  been  attempted  and  have  failed 
to  become  effective ;  and  there  is  a  very  large  chance  that 
this  very  variation,  that  we  now  propose  to  make,  has 
been  amongst  those  that  have  been  tried  with  bad  result. 
At  all  events  we  may  be  positively  certain  that  through 
that  long  past,  during  which  this  instinct  has  been  forming, 
such  variant  action  as  reason  now  dictates,  if  it  has  ap- 
peared, has  not  been  effective ;  this  being  taught  by  the 
very  existence  of  the  opposing  instinct. 


§  9.  In  order  to  verify  the  conclusion  reached  above,  let 
us  turn  for  a  moment  to  the  consideration  of  this  question 
with  the  nature  of  reason  in  mind  ;  and  in  so  doing  I  think 
we  shall  find  ourselves  led  again  to  the  very  same  view. 

It  is  scarcely  needful  for  me  to  say  that  I  am  very  ready 
to  acknowledge  that  what  I  have  called  the  elemental  variant 
principle  in  organic  life  must  necessarily  on  its  face  have 
been  a  most  valuable,  and  indeed  a  necessary,  factor  in  the 
evolution  of  that  long  line  of  ancestral  forms  to  which  we 
look  back :  for  without  the  tendencies  to  special  elemental 
variation  from  typical  reactions,  under  the  influence  of 
special  stimuli,  the  forces  of  nature  would  be  without  the 
means  of  adapting  forms  of  life  to  the  changes  that  occur  in 
the  varying  environment. 

If,  then,  reason  is  the  latest  elaboration  of  this  elemental 
variant  principle,  and  is,  as  it  surely  seems  to  be,  at  least 
the  most  important,  if  not  the  only,  source  of  variation  in 
the  contest  for  survival  in  which  we  are  directly  engaged, 
then  clearly  reason  in  the  form  in  which  it  is  appreciated 
in  consciousness  has  a  most  important  function  in  our  lives : 
for  evidently  the  variations  that  reason  dictates  to  us  present 
to  Nature  the  material  for  her  most  elaborate  and  delicate 


510  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

experiments  in  the  higher  adaptation  of  our  complex  life  to 
the  changes  in  our  very  complex  and  very  variable  environ- 
ment. 

But  whilst  we  acknowledge  the  importance  for  develop- 
ment of  the  tendency  towards  elemental  variance,  on  the 
other  hand  we  cannot  fail  here  again  to  call  to  mind  with 
emphasis  the  weakness  connected  with  rational  processes. 
In  our  introduction  we  noted  the  conviction,  which  has 
become  forced  upon  us  in  the  course  of  the  study  of  science 
by  the  historical  method,  that  we  are  exceedingly  liable  to 
be  misled  if  we  trust  too  implicitly  to  reasoning  processes. 
For  we  must  not  allow  ourselves  to  forget  that  there  is  a 
very  great  chance  that  in  the  course  of  our  ratiocination  we 
may  unwittingly  have  made  some  false  step.  And  why 
indeed  should  we  weaklings  expect  to  avoid  such  failures  in 
our  thought  when  we  find  that  the  noblest  intellects  of  the 
past  have  not  escaped  logical  pitfalls  that  seem  to  us  now 
fairly  obvious  and  oftentimes  emphatically  defined  ? 

Then,  too,  we  must  remember  the  really  enormous 
probability  that  we  are  partly  or  entirely  unacquainted 
with  some  of  the  vital  data  that  should  properly  enter  into 
our  consideration,  data  which,  could  they  so  enter  into  the 
current  of  our  thought,  would  surely  modify  our  judgment, 
would  surely  change  the  force  or  the  direction  of  the 
demand  which  now  arises  in  opposition  to  instinct. 

It  becomes  evident,  therefore,  I  think,  that  if  all  things 
are  considered,  we  can  scarce  even  hope,  in  any  specific 
case,  to  avoid  error  in  the  variation  that  reason  seems  to 
dictate  to  us;  and  Nature  will  surely  in  the  end  stamp 
out  ruthlessly  the  race  that  varies  in  any  direction  that 
produces  a  reduction  of  efficiency  which  is  not  offset  by 
marked  advantage. 

§  10.  In   the    preceding    sections   we    have   considered 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  511 

cases  in  which  in  general  reason  appears  merely  to  dictate 
opposition  to  an  instinct ;  but  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapters 
XVII.  and  XVIII.  in  all  cases,  although  we  do  not  often 
appreciate  the  fact,  reason  acts  by  the  emphasis  of  some 
element  in  an  instinct  system.  It  is  natural  for  us  to 
find,  therefore,  a  large  number  of  cases  in  which  the  rational 
process  will  not  appear  as  a  mere  opposition  to  our  instinct, 
but  in  its  true  light  as  the  emphasis  of  one  impulse  in 
opposition  to  another.  Fear  of  infection  may  be  em- 
phasised by  rational  process  until  we  persuade  ourselves 
that  it  is  proper  to  suppress  the  impulses  which  would 
lead  us  to  aid  those  who  are  suffering  from  dangerous 
illness.  Other  examples  without  number  will  occur  to 
the  reader. 

In  this  connection  our  position  must  be  quite  in  line 
with  that  taken  above.  Where  we  find  ourselves  led  by 
argument  to  permit  an  individualistic  impulse  to  outweigh 
an  impulse  relating  to  the  persistence  of  our  species,  or 
where  we  find  ourselves  led  by  reasoning  process  to  allow 
an  ethical  impulse  to  be  overcome  by  an  impulse  of  import 
to  individual  or  species,  we  should  invariably  remember  that 
in  the  development  of  our  race  the  impulses  relating  to  the 
persistence  of  the  species  have  subordinated  those  of  purely 
individualistic  significance ;  and  that  those  of  an  ethical 
nature  have  in  like  manner  subordinated  both  the  impulses 
which  have  individualistic  import,  and  in  certain  relations 
those  also  that  have  to  do  with  the  persistence  of  our  kind 
through  reproductive  process. 

We  should  conclude,  therefore,  that  if  as  the  result  of 
reasoning  we  allow  individualistic  impulses  to  overpower 
those  which  relate  to  the  persistence  of  the  species,  or  if 
we  allow  either  of  these  types  of  impulse  to  overpower  the 
impulses  of  an  ethical  nature,  then  we  are  surely  under- 
taking a  most  dangerous  course. 


512  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

It  is  true  here  again  that  there  is  a  bare  possibility 
that  the  variation  we  propose  may  prove  to  be  an  effective 
one  for  ourselves  and  for  our  descendants,  but  surely  it  must 
be  granted  that  the  probabilities  of  the  variation  being  thus 
effective  are  exceedingly  small,  and  the  chances  that  the 
variation  will  bring  disaster  directly  or  indirectly  are 
exceedingly  large. 

So  here  also,  then,  the  truly  wise  course  to  adopt,  even 
on  purely  rational  grounds,  is  to  regard  seriously  the  fact 
that  we  are  led  by  nature  to  the  order  of  subordination 
which  I  have  above  described,  and  to  look  upon  this  fact 
as  a  preponderatingly  effective  element  in  our  argument :  to 
hesitate  long  before  we  presume  to  disturb  or  reverse  this 
order  of  instinct  subordination. 

§  11.  Thus  it  has  become  evident  that  from  both  points 
of  view,  both  from  that  taken  in  the  consideration  of  the 
nature  and  function  of  instinct,  and  from  that  taken  in 
the  consideration  of  the  nature  and  function  of  reason,  we 
are  led  to  the  general  conclusion  that  where  reason  opposes 
instinct  the  force  of  instinct  must  be  treated  as  of  the 
'highest  importance,  (instinct  tells  us  of  racial  habit  that 
forces  itself  upon  our  consciousness  in  the  form  of  impulse, 
and  which  exists  in  us  as  the  resultant,  so  to  speak, 
of  the  accumulated  experience  of  ages ; )  while  reason 
tells  only  of  special  experiences  within  the  ken  of  the 
individual  and  of  those  relatively  few  others  of  whom  Jje_ 
can  know. 

It  becomes  clear  then,  it  seems  to  me,  that  it  is  little 
less  than  utterly  perverse,  that  indeed  it  is  thoroughly 
stupid,  to  advocate  lightly  the  adoption  of  any  course  of 
action  that  runs  with  strength  counter  to  a  deep-seated 
instinct.      Where   there   appears   an   opposition   in   which 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  613 

reason  would  lead  to  the  adoption  of  such  a  course,  then 
surely  the  truly  wise  procedure,  even  on  purely  rational 
grounds,  is  to  take  the  existence  of  the  instinct  into 
consideration  as  a  preponderatingly  effective  element  in 
our  argument. 


2l 


614  INSTINCT  AND  REASON 


'■  II 

§  12.  In  the  several  sections  which  have  preceded  this 
we  have  enlarged  upon  the  importance  and  value  of 
following  the  impulses  brought  into  consciousness  by  the 
instincts  within  us,  in  opposition  to  what  appear  as  the 
dictates  of  reason.  But  there  is  another  and  diverse  view 
to  be  considered ;  there  is  a  special  word  to  be  said  in 
reference  to  the  importance  under  certain  conditions  of 
following  the  dictates  of  reason. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  the  variant  influence  in  organic 
life,  of  which  reason  is  the  latest  elaboration,  is  the  means 
which  Nature  employs  in  her  efforts  to  perfect  the  adjust- 
ment of  our  increasingly  complex  organisms  to  the  ever- 
changing  environmental  conditions  in  which  we  are  placed : 
and  surely  this  variation  in  accommodation  to  our  environment 
is  of  deep  importance,  is  in  truth  the  basis  upon  which  we 
must  rest  our  hope  that  our  race  is  to  continue  the  progress 
in  accommodation  which  we  believe  has  been  exemplified  in 
the  lives  of  our  ancestors. 

Instincts  which  are  evidenced  in  consciousness  by 
impulses,  as  we  have  seen,  do  in  truth  tell  us  of  certain 
activities  which  have  been  of  value  to  our  ancestors,  and 
which  will  be  of  advantage  to  our  race  also  upon  a  recurrence 
of  those  conditions  under  which  in  the  past  these  actions 
have  been  called  forth.  But  it  is  easy  to  see  that  it  may 
not  infrequently  happen  that  the  impulses  to  these  actions 
may  be  called  forth  when  the  conditions  which  have  made 
them  valuable  are  partly  recurrent,  but  in  some  measure 
changed.  In  fact,  in  a  variable  and  exceedingly  complex 
environment  this  must  of  necessity  frequently  happen. 

If,  then,  reason  acquaint  us  with  these  changes  of 
condition,   and   if   after   consideration   we    have   no    doubt 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  515 

that  these  altered  conditions  make  the  expression  of  the 
inherited  instincts,  which  the  impulses  indicate,  dangerous 
to  ourselves  or  to  the  race,  then  the  propriety  of  our  sub- 
serviency to  these  instincts  is  more  than  doubtful. 

To  make  this  point  more  clear  let  us  consider  some 
illustrations  from  the  various  types  of  instincts  that 
have  come  under  our  observation  in  what  has  preceded 
this. 

In  the  first  place  let  us  recall  our  observation  that  the 
instinct  actions  of  our  mere  assimilative  system,  which  work 
normally  for  the  benefit  of  our  whole  organic  life  where 
the  conditions  of  the  environment  themselves  approximate 
to  what  is  normal,  may  under  variation  of  conditions  work 
to  the  destruction  of  this  organic  life ;  and  this  just  because 
they  are  unable  to  vary  in  correspondence  to  the  changed 
conditions.  The  lungs  of  men  living  on  the  surface  of  the 
earth,  close  to  the  sea-level,  are  wont,  by  a  certain  degree 
of  activity,  to  supply  sufficient  oxygen  to  the  blood  to  serve 
the  functioning  throughout  the  whole  body.  But  if  we 
climb  to  altitudes  where  oxygen  is  rare,  the  failure  of  the 
lungs  to  accommodate  themselves  to  these  changed  conditions 
compels  increased  heart  action  and  wide  nervous  excitenient 
which  for  many  of  us  may  be  dangerous,  and  for  some 
suddenly  fatal. 

It  becomes  pretty  clear,  then,  that  cases  may  arise  where 
it  will  be  our  bounden  duty  to  repress  these  instincts  or 
restrict  their  expression.  The  wise  adviser  not  infrequently 
saves  the  life  of  some  ill  companion  by  avoiding  the  shock 
of  extreme  joy  or  sorrow,  by  gently  "breaking"  news  to 
him.  A  man  who  has  a  diseased  heart,  if  he  be  rational, 
will  himself  quite  properly  avoid  or  repress  extreme 
emotional  reactions. 

Again,  the  instincts  which  usually  tend  to  individualistic 


516  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

advantage  may  in  similar  manner  be  properly  restrained  by 
reason  in  certain  cases.  For  instance,  the  instinct  which 
would  lead  us  to  attack  a  dangerous  enemy  may  well 
be  curbed  when  we  perceive  that  his  strength  is  greater 
than  ours.  Then  clearly  "  discretion  is  the  better  part  of 
valour." 

Turning  from  individualistic  instincts  to  those  of  sexual 
import,  and  illustrating  my  point  by  an  example,  I  think 
we  may  take  it  to  be  fairly  clear  that  a  man  who  knows  he 
has  inherited  from  a  line  of  ancestors  some  serious  physical 
taint  is  justified  in  opposing,  or  repressing  by  indirection, 
as  the  result  of  reasoning,  the  gratification  of  his  sexual 
instincts,  which  would  lead,  so  far  as  he  can  judge,  to  the 
birth  of  children  who  might  not  improbably  turn  out  to  be 
imbeciles  or  criminals ;  and  we  in  our  turn  act  properly  in 
discountenancing  marriage  among  those  who  are  recognised 
as  sufficiently  opposed  to  the  interests  of  mankind  to  be 
kept  under  governmental  surveillance. 

But  our  thought  becomes  more  interesting  when  we  con- 
sider the  suppression,  by  reason,  of  the  ethical  impulses 
which  relate  to  tribal  hfe.  For  here  we  call  to  mind  the 
fact  that  in  the  hypothetical  social  life  to  which  these 
ethical  impulses  relate,  we  individuals  correspond  in  many 
ways  with  the  parts  of  an  individual  organism;  and  in 
correspondence  with  the  demands  for  the  stimulation  or 
repression  of  the  activity  of  special  organs  in  individual  life 
above  considered,  it  seems  most  natural  that  it  may  be  best 
at  times  for  the  social  life,  and  for  racial  persistence,  if 
certain  of  the  ethical  impulses  in  individuals  be  stimulated 
or  repressed  by  artificial  means,  where  the  conditions  differ 
widely  from  those  which  have  existed  whilst  these  instinc- 
tive habits  were  forming.     It  is  thus  that  in  certain  com- 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  517 

munities  it  may  well  be  advantageous  to  the  social  body  to 
restrict  marriages,  and  in  others  to  encourage  them. 

In  still  other  cases  where  there  is  no  appearance  of  the 
opposition  of  what  -are  acknowledgedly  diverse  instincts,  but 
where  some  one  instinct  stands  opposed  to  what  we  know 
as  an  ideal  end,  reason  may  lead  us  after  full  consideration 
to  restrain  the  expression  of  the  instinct,  to  thwart  its 
impulses.  I  shall  give  some  examples  of  this  opposition  in 
the  next  section,  and  I  shall  therefore  not  pause  here  to 
illustrate  this  special  point. 

If  all  that  we  have  just  said  be  true,  then  it  seems  to 
me  clear  that  if  after  such  thorough  consideration  of  the 
claims  of  instinct  as  we  have  above  suggested  ;  in  the  course 
of  which  our  impulses,  and  the  natural  order  of  their  sub- 
ordination, are  treated  as  preponderatingly  effective  elements 
in  our  argument : — if  after  such  consideration  reason  still 
urges  us  to  action  in  opposition  to  certain  marked  instinctive 
leadings,  then  most  surely  ought  we  to  feel  ourselves  called 
upon  to  follow  reason's  dictates. 

But  in  all  the  cases  where  we  allow  reason  to  restrict 
our  instincts  we  must  note  that  in  adopting  such  a  course 
we  should  never  allow  ourselves  for  a  moment  to  forget  that 
in  acting  thus  in  opposition  to  racial  experience  we  are 
taking  a  dangerous  step  ;  for  we  act  without  having  anything 
like  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  consequences  that  will 
follow.  We  take  a  great  risk  that  this  variation  which  we 
propose  may  prove  to  be  ineffective.  And  yet  for  all  that 
it  is  clear  that  we  should  be  willing  to  take  this  risk  even 
though  it  be  great ;  that  we  should  follow  this  course 
because  we  hope  thus  to  further  the  developmental  processes 
in  this  Universe  in  which  we  are  but  minute  atoms, 
struggling  for  adaptation  and  efticiency.  For,  as  we  have 
so  often  said,  the  variant  principle,  of  which  reasoning  is  the 


618  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

latest  elaboration,  is  Nature's  means  of  perfecting  the 
adjustment  of  our  increasingly  complex  organisms  to  ever- 
changing  environmental  conditions :  and  the  hope  of  our 
race  in  the  future  must  rest  upon  our  ability  to  make  such 
adjustments  as  completely  as  may  be  possible. 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  51ft 


III 

§  13.  It  seems  to  me  that  our  thought  will  be  clearer  if 
we  study  some  illustrations  of  these  contests  between  reason 
and  instinct  of  more  complex  type,  as  we  experience  them 
in  our  every-day  lives,  and  consider  the  decisions  that  seem 
proper  under  diverse  conditions,  at  one  time  in  favour  of 
reason,  and  again  in  favour  of  instinct.  So  far  as  the 
balance  in  the  contest  appears  to  be  delicate,  the  decisions 
I  suggest  are  of  course  to  be  considered  as  expressing  only 
my  personal  view. 

Let  us  take  first  an  instance  in  which  impulses  which 
relate  to  individual  welfare  are  strengthened  by  reason,  and 
thus  gain  sufficient  force  to  subvert,  or  at  least  to  hold  in 
abeyance,  those  instinct  actions  which  relate  to  the  perpetua- 
tion of  our  species. 

As  we  all  know,  young  men  and  young  women  have  an 
instinctive  tendency  to  amatory  passion ;  and  it  is  the 
commonest  thing  for  a  young  man  and  a  young  woman  to 
fall  seriously  "  in  love,"  as  we  say,  when  they  themselves 
realise  fully  that  there  is  no  prospect  of  the  man's  gaining 
for  many  years  an  income  which  will  enable  him  to  support 
a  wife,  and  the  children  that  might  be  born  to  her,  in  the 
same  comfort  that  has  heretofore  surrounded  the  life  of  the 
lovers.  Where  the  lovers  would  not  naturally  stop  to  con- 
sider such  matters,  their  thoughts  are  likely  to  be  turned  to 
them  by  anxious  parents  or  guardians.  In  such  cases,  in 
our  modern  complex  life,  reason  thus  often  leads  the  lovers 
to  think  too  much  of  personal  comfort ;  warns  them  not  to 
let  their  instincts  carry  them  away ;  urges  them  to  restrain 
the  declaration  of  love,  and  to  eschew  matrimony. 

Yet  it  is  not  seldom  exceedingly  doubtful  to  what  extent 


520  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

we  should  allow  the  racial  instinct  to  be  thus  overridden  by 
reason  in  such  matters.  If  the  powerful  instinct  be  re- 
pressed, there  is  no  little  danger  that  the  restriction  may 
lead  to  morbid,  neurotic,  conditions ;  to  hysteria  or  to  more 
serious  disorders;  or  even  to  the  contraction  of  vicious 
habits  of  one  kind  or  another.  Or,  what  is  a  more  serious 
matter,  the  repression  may  result  in  the  quenching  for  all 
time  of  the  capacity  for  deep-seated  love. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  this  powerful  instinct  be  followed 
in  opposition  to  reason,  suffering  may  embitter  life,  and  bring 
about  a  separation  of  feeling  between  those  married  under 
such  conditions,  if  it  do  not  lead  to  actual  divorce,  which 
carries  with  it  so  much  social  disadvantage. 

So  diverse  are  the  conditions  of  our  complex  life  that  in 
no  two  such  cases  are  the  circumstances  exactly  alike,  and 
thus  it  often  happens  that  a  right  judgment  is  not  easily 
reached.  Lovers  as  a  rule  are  too  apt  to  take  an  optimistic 
view  of  the  future  and  thus  to  favour  instinct,  forgetting 
the  dangers  of  racial  deterioration  that  go  with  extreme 
poverty.  "Hard-hearted"  parents  and  guardians,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  likely  to  take  too  pessimistic  a  view  of  the 
extent  of  the  hardships  that  go  with  deprivations  of  minor 
comforts ;  ignoring  the  joys  that  are  gained  in  happy  married 
life,  and  forgetting  that  poverty,  when  not  extreme,  is  often 
the  greatest  incentive  to  full  development. 

But  evidently  here  the  balance  is  so  fine  a  one  that  the 
proper  course  of  action  can  only  be  determined  after  the 
most  careful  consideration,  due  weight  being  given  to  alj. 
those  varying  circumstances  that  make  each  such  case  so 
eminently  interesting. 

jk         Let  us  take  another  example,  in  which  the  natural  sexual 

'    'instincts  are  emphasised   by  reason   to  oppose  the  ethical 

instincts  which  would  normally  govern  in  such  matters ;  a 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  521 

case  which  seems  to  me  to  be  less  open  to  doubt  than  that 
just  considered.  Under  certain  conditions  in  our  own 
civilised  life  it  none  too  seldom  happens  that  a  man  or  a 
woman  of  perfectly  pure  mind  becomes  convinced  that  love 
for  wife  or  husband  has  become  irretrievably  alienated, 
although  there  may  exist  no  valid  grounds  for  legal  separa- 
tion. When  under  such  conditions  a  deep  affection  arises 
towards  another  than  his  or  her  legal  consort,  it  not  in- 
frequently appears  to  be  utterly  irrational  to  remain  faithful 
to  the  vows  taken  in  marriage. 

But  here  the  leading  of  the  instinct  which  enforces 
permanency  of  mating,  and  which  in  our  modern  life  is 
expressed  in  the  demand  for  faithfulness  to  the  marriage  vow, 
certainly  teaches  us  of  habits  which  are  of  the  deepest 
service  to  the  social  body,  and  therefore  indirectly  to  the 
race ;  habits  which  have  been  gained  with  great  difficulty 
by  a  small  portion  of  men  only,  and  which  moreover  are  all 
too  readily  forgotten  by  the  careless  or  evil-minded  :  further- 
more, indifference  to  the  voice  of  instinct  which  calls  for  the 
restraint  we  speak  of,  is  likely  to  be  followed  directly  or 
indirectly  by  resultants  of  far-reaching  importance  which 
cannot  possibly  be  foreseen,  and  by  an  influence  of  example 
which  may  be  in  a  high  degree  unfortunate. 

It  were  better  under  such  circumstances,  it  seems  to  me, 
to  withstand  the  pain  of  repressed  love ;  to  bear  the  trial, 
in  the  interest  of  that  general  racial  morality  which  our 
instinct  tells  us  is  of  such  fundamental  value. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  certain  cases  which  show  opposition 
between  the  lower_jjQd_the  higher  types  of  the  ethical 
instincts. 
*  It  IS  not  difficult  for  us  to  conceive  of  circumstances  in 
which  perjury  upon  the  witness-stand  might  appear  in  the 
light  of  reason  to  present  the  only  hope  of  saving  the  life  of 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  pakt  v 

Ln  charged  with  a  crime  of  which  we  know  him  to  be 
innocent.  Here  the  instinct  to  preserve  human  life  stands 
opposed  to  that  lately  acquired  social  instinct  of  high  elabora- 
tion which  leads  us  to  avoid  gaining  advantage  by  perversion 
of  the  truth ;  reason  emphasises  the  earlier-formed  instinct, 
and  tells  us  that  less  harm  can  come  from  the  opposition  to 
truth  than  from  straightforward  truth-telling.  On  the  one 
hand,  reason  bids  us  to  lie,  in  order  to  serve  this  fellow- 
creature  ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  higher  instinct  cries  out 
against  the  perversion  of  the  truth.  Which  voice  shall  we 
heed  ? 

The  protest  of  this  higher  instinct  surely  means  that  our 
race  has  learned  by  long,  and  doubtless  bitter,  experience 
that  better  results  are  attained  in  the  long-run  by  expression 
of  the  strictest  truth.  Furthermore,  a  little  thought  shows 
us  that  it  is  entirely  impossible  for  us  to  foresee  the  results 
of  our  perjury :  it  may  seem  to  us  perfectly  certain  that 
this  act  of  ours  will  save  our  friend,  yet  the  result  may  be 
of  an  altogether  contrary  nature ;  for  the  course  of  evidence 
may  change,  and  our  own  contradictory  statements  may 
then  really  serve  to  invalidate  our  testimony  in  all  respects. 

In  such  a  case  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  wiser  to  follow 
the  higher  instinct,  and  take  the  evil  consequences  if  they 
accrue. 

One  more  example.  The  benevolent  impulses  wittiin  us 
are  of  marked  force  and  power,  and  consideration  teaches 
us  that  their  function  in  the  direction  of  social  consolidation 
is  of  the  greatest  moment  to  the  race.  JSTow  it  not  in- 
frequently happens  in  these  days  that  we  find  our  reason 
telling  us  that  harmful  results  accrue  to  those  whom  we 
carelessly  aid  as  we  follow  the  leadings  of  these  racial 
instincts. 

The    question    then    arises,  shall    we   crush    down    the 


CHAP,  xxr  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  523 

benevolent  impulses  within  us  ?  And  here  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  answer  is  a  decided  negative :  under  all  conditions 
must  these  benevolent  instincts  be  most  carefully  conserved 
and  fostered  within  us,  and  the  greatest  care  should  be 
given  by  intelligent  philanthropists  to  avoid  quenching  in 
others,  who  do  not  see  clearly,  these  impulses  that  lead  to 
such  valuable  results.  Thoroughly  vicious  are  the  argu- 
ments one  so  often  hears  from  half-fledged  sociologists,  from 
men  who  call  themselves  "  individualists,"  who  would  break 
up  benevolent  institutions,  on  the  ground  that  they  oppose 
Nature's  efforts  towards  individual  perfection;  for  they 
overlook  the  fact  that  these  same  benevolent  impulses 
which  they  would  crush  are  Nature's  very  late  acquirement 
in  her  strife  for  racial,  and  indirectly  therefore  for 
individual,  development. 

But,  notwithstanding  all  this,  reason  here  also  speaks  in 
clear  tones,  even  after  we  have  given  ear  to  all  that  instinct 
has  to  tell ;  and  hence  it  becomes  our  duty  to  take  steps, 
not  indeed  to  quench  the  benevolent  spirit  within  us,  but 
to  guide  it  from  channels  in  which  it  appears  to  us  to 
produce  evil  results  to  other  individuals,  and  into  channels 
in  which  the  evil  results  which  we  foresee  will  not  follow. 
Yet  even  here  we  should  avoid  over-confidence :  the  results 
which  may  follow  deviation  from  these  racial  leadings  are 
so  diverse,  and  so  impossible  to  foresee,  that  we  should  take 
our  steps  of  variation  from  the  racial  type  with  the  greatest 
deliberation  and  most  watchful  care. 

§  14.  Before  turning  to  the  next  point  of  importance 
I  must  ask  the  reader  to  note  that  if  the  view  above 
expressed  be  correct,  then  instinct  and  reason  in  a  certain 
sense  tend  to  exclude  one  another ;  as  broader  organic  forces 
tend  to  exclude  those  that  lead  to  elemental  variation,  and 
vice  versa.     But  I  wish   here   again  to  make   it   perfectly 


624  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

clear  also  that  this  view  does  not  imply  an  opposition 
between  the  two  principles  in  the  sense  that  men  who  are 
led  by  instinct  can  be  said  to  be  necessarily  irrational.  Nor 
does  it  imply  that  rationality  involves  the  total  annulment 
of  instinctive  forces ;  for,  as  we  have  already  seen,  there 
is  every  ground  for  the  belief  that  reasoned  actions  are 
instinct  actions  of  a  special  type,  determined  by  the 
emphasis  of  instincts  of  simpler  form  which  are  partiaT"o^ 
elemental  in  a  wider  instinctive  system. 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  525 


TV 

§  15.  We  have  thus  reached  what  seems  to  me  to  be  a 
just  apprehension  of  the  relative  weight  that  should  be 
given  to  instinct  and  reason  where  they  appear  opposed  in 
consciousness. 

But  now  I  wish  to  ask  my  reader  to  note  again  that 
racial  efficiency  is  on  the  whole  dependent  in  the  first 
place  upon  the  subordination  of  the  individual  variant 
forces,  where  they  are  emphasised  by  reason,  to  the  racial 
forces  present  to  us  in  recognised  impulses ;  for  although 
reason's  dictates  may  determine  some  special  value  for  some 
special  individual  in  some  special  case,  this  is  no  warrant 
that  the  same  action  in  another  individual  would  lead  to 
like  valuable  result;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  very 
existence  of  the  opposing  instinct  teaches  us  that  there  is 
very  little  likelihood  that  such  generally  valuable  result 
will  accrue. 

Even  if  we  make  the  bold  supposition,  to  which  hasty 
egoists  are  sometimes  led,  that  reason's  dictates  determine 
special  values  for  the  individuals  who  obey  them  with  ear 
deaf  to  the  voice  of  broader  racial  instinct ;  still  there  is  no 
proof  that  the  values  are  racial,  and  that  the  success  of 
these  individuals  will  result  in  advantage  to  the  race ;  in 
fact,  as  I  have  said  above,  the  very  appearance  of  the 
opposing  impulse  teaches  us  that  there  is  little  chance  that 
such  racial  advantage  will  result :  and  if  the  variation  be 
not  advantageous,  racially  speaking,  then  Nature  will  surely 
seek  means  to  crush  it  out. 

This  consideration  clearly  teaches  us  that  we  should,  in 
all  doubtful  cases,  carefully  avoid  leading  others  to  follow 
us  in  obeying  reason  in  opposition  to  instinct,  however 
willing  we  may  be  to  take  the  risk  of  variation  for  ourselves. 


526  mSTINCT  AND  KEASON  paut  v 

As  a  matter  of  fact  we  find  this  superior  value  of  what 
is  recognised  as  instinct  acknowledged  in  every-day  life  by 
the  common  man.  Common-sense  places  character  above 
intellectual  brilliancy ;  and  character  is  our  name  for  the 
complex  of  impulses  which  guide  a  man,  these  impulses, 
apart  from  personal  acquisition  during  life,  being  of  instinc- 
tive origin,  born  to  him  who  is  led  by  them,  belonging  to 
him  as  a  member  of  a  race.  The  common-sense  disbelief 
in,  and  lack  of  sympathy  with,  the  man  who  is  led  by 
deliberative  process  rather  than  by  impulse,  although 
common-sense  is  here  often  misguided,  must  be  acknowledged 
to  be  due  to  a  deep  natural  insight  and  to  be  on  the  whole 
most  valuable  and  reasonable. 

The  rationalistic  philanthropist,  for  instance,  is  distrusted 
by  the  average  man  who  is  filled  with  the  benevolent  spirit ; 
and  this  is  not  because  the  former  is  believed  to  be  un- 
trustworthy, but  because  his  less  thoughtful  neighbour  has 
learned  the  habit  of  trusting  to  his  own  best  instincts  and 
feels  that  his  rationalistic  friend  is  thwarting  them. 

The  average  man  is  much  more  sympathetic  with  the 
young  couple  who  have  rashly  married,  and  who  find  them- 
selves burdened  with  the  care  of  a  family,  than  he  is  with 
those  who  with  forethought  avoid  companionships  that  may 
lead  to  love  and  marriage  and  the  rearing  of  a  family ;  and 
he  is  far  more  likely  to  aid  to  success  the  former  than  the 
latter. 

In  both  these  cases  common-sense  refuses  to  listen  to 
reason  and  upholds  what  it  knows  as  its  instincts,  so  far 
indeed  that  reason's  teachings  where  clearly  proper  are  often 
most  unfortunately  disregarded. 

And  indeed  the  rationalist,  on  the  other  hand,  with  all 
his  foresight  is  very  likely  to  be  misled  in  his  cool 
calculations.  To  refer  again  to  the  cases  mentioned  above 
in   illustration;    the   rationalist   fails  usually   to   recognise 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  527 

that  the  average  man,  if  he  lose  in  himself  the  sympathy 
that  is  expressed  in  benevolent  action,  loses  also  the  return 
sympathy  of  his  neighbour,  and  the  helpful  co-operation 
which  that  sympathy  makes  possible.  The  astute  bachelor 
who  quenches  his  love  because  he  cannot  see  the  certainty 
of  prosperity  in  his  future  is  too  apt  to  forget  that  the 
average  mass  of  successful  men  are  men  who  have  married 
and  have  reared  families,  and  who  therefore  feel  a  fuller 
sympathy  with  the  young  man  who  is  fighting,  perhaps 
with  reckless  courage,  to  gain  a  place  for  his  family,  and 
feel  a  greater  desire  to  aid  him  than  they  do  to  aid  the 
young  man  who  quenches  all  affection  because  he  fears  the 
future.  . 


528 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 


II, The  Balance  between  Keason  and  the  Eeligious 

Instinct 

§  16.  With  the  light  thrown  upon  our  path  by  the 
conclusion  of  the  first  part  of  this  chapter  we  may  now 
turn  confidently  to  the  closely  related  problem  concerning 
the  relation  of  Eeason  to  the  Eeligious  Instinct*  Here  we 
have  a  new  order  of  instinct  which  appears  to  have  been 
formed  for  the  very  purpose  of  opposing  variation,  and  for 
the  emphasis  of  instinct :  what  shall  be  our  answer  where 
variant  reason  demands  the  suppression  of  this  highest 
instinct,  the  religious  instinct  ?  Shall  we  invariably  close 
our  ears  to  reason  in  such  cases,  or  are  there  times  when 
reason's  dictates  shall  be  obeyed  and  the  religious  instinct 
repressed  ? 

We  have  argued  that  religious  activities  are  the  expres- 
sion of  a  true  instinct;  and  that  this  religious  instinct 
must  be  looked  upon  as  our  highest  instinct  because  its 
function  is  regulative  of  reason,  tending  to  bring  about 
subordination  of  variation  to  the  typical  reactions  lower 
than  those  expressive  of  the  religious  instinct  itself,  in  case 
variation  becomes  over-influential. 

That  this  religious  instinct  is  of  the  greatest  importance 
is  necessarily  implied  in  this  statement ;  but  if  it  be  a  true 
instinct,  the  relation  of  its  functioning  to  that  of  reason 
cannot  differ  fundamentally  from  the  relation  we  have 
approved  for  instinct  in  general. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance 
that  we  should  act  in  accord  with  our  reason  after  having 
taken  full  account  of  the  racial  forces  that  our  instincts  press 
upon  our  notice.  So  here  we  are  compelled  to  hold  that 
we  should  act  in  accord  with  our  reason  after  having  taken 


CHAP.  XXI  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  529 

full  account  of  the  teaching  of  this  highest  of  all  instincts. 
Acknowledging    the   nobility   and   weight   of  the   religious 
instinct  we  surely  should   act   in  relation  to   its   teaching 
with  deep  reverence  and  with  a  just  appreciation  of  the 
overwhelming  force  of  its  teachings.     But,  although  never  'A. 
too  ready  to   act   in   opposition  to   this  religious   instinct, 
nevertheless  where,  after  its  guidance  has  been  given  full 
weight,  reason  still    speaks   in    opposition,  we    should    be    I 
willing,  though  with  fear  and  trembling,  to  take  the  risk    ! 
involved  in  the  vital  variation  from  the  forms   of  racial    1 
action   that   this   religious    instinct   demands.     We   should 
take  this  very  great  risk  that  this  variation  of  ours  may  be 
ineffective,  acting  thus  in  the  interests  of  progress  in  the 
Universe    in   which   we    are    but   small    and    unimportant 
parts. 

In  other  words,  we  should  be  willing  to  act  in  accord 
with  reason  in  opposition  to  even  this  highest  of  all 
instincts,  if  reason's  demands  still  appear  to  us  to  be 
effective,  after  reverent  and  full  consideration  of  the  dictates 
of  this  noblest  instinctive  racial  force. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  very  acknowledgment  of  the 
risk  we  are  taking  in  this  variation  from  racial  dictates 
should  lead  us  to  the  greatest  caution  in  guiding  others 
whom  we  influence.  If  there  be  a  chance  that  we  are 
right,  there  are  many  more  that  we  are  wrong.  Moreover, 
we  must  frankly  acknowledge  that  common  practice  and 
normal  beliefs  are  closely  related  to  instinctive  capacities, 
that  they  to  some  extent  at  least  represent  the  effective 
experience  of  the  race ;  if,  then,  we  displace  them  we  should 
at  least  use  the  greatest  care  not  to  displace  their  resultants 
in  the  life  of  action.  We  should  avoid  with  the  greatest 
care  the  guidance  of  others  in  paths  which  we  acknowledge 
are  filled   with   dangers,  although   with   these   dangers  we 

2  M 


530  INSTINCT  AND  EEASON  part  v 

believe  ourselves  prepared  to  cope ;  for  they  whose  insight 
differs  from  ours  may  all  too  easily  fall  in  the  way,  because 
they  lose  the  guidance  to  which  they  have  been  accustomed 
to  trust,  and  fail  to  gain  any  substitute  for  what  is 
lost. 


CHAPTEE    XXII 

ETHICS    AND    HEDONISM 

§  1.  The  student  of  Ethics  who  peruses  these  pages  will 
without  doubt  have  noticed  already  that  the  ethical 
doctrines  which  have  unfolded  before  us  as  the  result  of 
our  study  of  impulse  have  been  stated  in  terms  which  make 
no  reference  whatever  to  the  theories  of  hedonism  which 
fill  so  many  pages  of  all  modern  ethical  treatises.  I  think, 
however,  that  no  step  in  our  argument  has  been  the  less 
sure  because  of  this  omission ;  and  it  seems  to  me  to  be  a 
fact  of  no  inconsiderable  significance  that  when  we  study 
the  nature  of  instinct,  and  consider  the  rise  of  impulse  and 
the  results  of  the  clash  of  impulses,  we  find  ourselves  led  to 
state  certain  doctrines  of  ethical  importance  with  entire 
disregard  of  hedonistic  hypotheses.  This  is  the  more 
significant  for  me  for  the  reason  that  in  many  of  my 
previous  studies  my  thought  has  been  centred  upon  alge- 
donic  problems,  and  this  would  naturally  lead  me  to  treat 
any  hedonic  relation  as  of  major  importance ;  for  this 
reason  I  feel  that  the  necessity  of  the  dependence  of  ethical 
upon  hedonic  doctrine  is  denied  in  the  very  ease  with 
which  our  argument  has  developed  without  reference  to  the 
relation  of  pleasure  to  the  processes  involved.  Further- 
more, when  one  comes  to  consider  this  matter  in  the  light 
thrown  upon  it  by  a  correct  psychological  analysis,  it 
becomes  perfectly  clear  to  my  mind  that  the  independence 
thus  suggested  must  be  maintained. 


532  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

§  2.  Under  the  theory  that  I  defend,  pleasure  and  pain 
are  qualities  which  together  with  indifference  (the  transition 
point  between  the  two)  are  of  such  nature  that  one  of  them 
must,  and,  given  the  proper  conditions,  any  one  of  them 
may,  belong  to  any  element  of  consciousness.-^ 

In  what  follows  I  shall  assume  the  correctness  of  this 
doctrine.  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  the  positions 
here  maintained  are  by  no  means  entirely  dependent  upon 
this  theory,  nor  do  they  become  untenable  even  if  this 
theory  be  not  sustained.  The  reader  will  note,  however, 
that  this  algedonic  hypothesis  is  strengthened  in  no  small 
degree  by  the  perfect  manner  in  which  it  harmonises  with 
the  facts  here  considered. 


^  It  will  also  be  recalled  that  I  have  suggested  that  as  pain,  indifference, 
pleasure,  are  phenomena  of  quality  in  relation  to  psychic  elements  ;  so  their 
physical  coincidents  are  phenomena  of  quality  in  relation  to  the  activity 
of  neural  elements,'  being  determined  by  the  relation  of  action  to  the 
condition  of  nutrition  in  the  neural  substance  concerned.  This  may  be 
expressed  as  follows:  If  "a"  represent  the  psychic  coincident  of  a  physical 
activity  "A,"  which  is  usually  produced  by  stimulus  "  S,"  then 


Physical  side. 

Psychic  side. 

If 

;.S. 

'  produces  "A"  we  have 

Content  "a"  with  no  pleasure  and  no  pain 
(this  is  usually  spoken  of  as  a  state  of 
indifference). 

If 

-S' 

~"-          })                  ))               >)          5) 

Content  "  a  "  and  pleasure. 

If 

Ug. 

'+n         „                  „               „          „ 

Content  "a"  and  pain. 

Or  to  state  the  relation  as  I  have  done  elsewhere :  when  the  stimulus 
produces  in  the  nerve  concerned  onore  activity  than  is  normal,  it  is  because 
the  neural  substance  is  in  a  condition  of  hypernutrition,  which  enables  the 
stimulus  to  set  free  surplus  stored  force  :  then  we  have  not  only  the  content 
which  is  the  psychic  coincident  of  the  activity  referred  to,  but  also  a  qualita- 
tive state  which  we  call  pleasure. 

When  the  stimulus  produces  in  the  neural  substance  concerned  less 
activity  than  is  normal  it  is  because  the  neural  substance  is  not  sufficiently 
nourished,  and  is  unable  to  react  completely :  then  we  have  not  only  the 
content  which  is  the  psychic  coincident  of  the  activity  referred  to,  but  also 
a  qualitative  state  which  we  call  ^?am. 

When  the  conditions  of  stimulus,  and  of  nutrition,  and  of  action  are 
normal,  we  have  neither  pleasure  nor  pain  ;  and  then,  these  qualities  being 
lacking,  we  experience  what  is  usually  called  a  state  of  indifference. 


CHAP.  XXII  ETHICS  AND  HEDONISM  533 

§  3.  Let  us  now  consider  the  relation  of  pleasure  and 
pain  to  our  activities.  Our  actions  when  viewed  objectively 
consist  (1st)  of  typical  organised  instinct  actions;  and  (2nd) 
of  modifications  of  these  instinct  actions,  variations  as  we 
call  them.  These  variations,  as  we  have  suggested,  are 
determined  by  the  strengthening  of  elemental,  partial, 
reactions  of  certain  elementary  parts  of  wider  systems, 
which  as  a  whole  give  rise  to  those  wider  instinct  actions 
from  which  the  divergence  is  noted.  In  case  of  reaction 
without  variation  these  elemental  partial  actions,  if  they 
occurred  at  all,  would  occur  in  less  vigorous  form. 

§  4.  On  the  subjective  side,  corresponding  with  Class  1, 
we  have  the  "instinct  feelings,"  the  coincidents  of  the 
"instinct  actions."  These  instinct  feelings  may  be  either 
pleasurable  or  painful,  or  may  be  of  mixed  algedonic 
quality,  but  neither  their  pleasure  nor  their  pain  moves 
our  volitional  life  in  any  direct  way.  If  certain  of  these 
actions  are  pleasant,  in  that  very  fact  they  indeed  tend 
to  persist :  and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  they  are  painful, 
in  that  very  fact  they  tend  to  be  suppressed ;  their  algedonic 
quality  may  thus  affect  our  future  conduct,  but  only  by 
influencing  in  the  future  the  springs  of  action.  So  far  as 
these  pleasures  and  pains  are  related  to  the  actions  of  the 
moment,  when  the  instinct  actions  occur  and  their  instinct 
feelings  appear  in  consciousness  the  end  in  us  is  already 
reached :  the  antecedents  to  this  end  are  then  no  longer  of 
importance  in  reference  to  the  action  which  is  at  the  moment 
developed.  But  it  is  with  these  antecedents  to  the  action 
that  ethics  has  to  deal ;  hence  the  algedonic  quality  of  the 
instinct  feelings  is  without  immediate  ethical  significance. 

Inasmuch  as  what  we  usually  speak  of  as  instinct 
actions  are  not  determined  by  prevision  of  result  to  be 
attained,   no   one   would   claim   in   the   case   of  recognised 


534  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

instinct  action  that  conditions  of  pleasure  or  pain  about 
to  be  attained  in  the  act  determine  the  action  itself;  this 
was  determined  by  the  form  of  the  stimulus  and  the 
conditions  of  the  organic  system  reacting. 

§  5.  This  being  true  of  what  we  usually  call  instinctive 
reactions,  our  interest  is  at  once  concentrated  upon  the  process 
involved  in  variation  from  these  typical  forms  of  reaction. 

If  it  be  true  that  variation  is  but  a  special  form  of 
instinct  action,  as  I  have  suggested  in  Chapter  XVII., 
then  the  argument  just  made  must  with  certain  changes 
of  expression  apply  as  well  to  variant  actions  as  it  does  to 
recognised  instinct  actions;  and  we  must  hold  that  the 
algedonic  quality  of  the  antecedents  to  action,  even  in  the 
case  of  variation,  is  without  immediate  and  direct  ethical 
significance.  It  may  be  well,  however,  to  examine  these 
variant  actions  from  a  different  point  of  view,  which  leading 
us  to  the  same  conclusion  materially  strengthens  us  in  our 
contention. 

As  we  have  already  noted,  wherever  instinct  actions 
which  are  of  sufficient  importance  to  affect  our  mental 
life  are  inhibited,  we  find  appearing  in  consciousness  what 
we  call  impulses,  which  are  often  preceded  by  desires ;  upon 
these  elements  our  reasoning  works,  and  the  result  is  what 
we  know  psychologically  as  the  act  of  will  which  leads  to 
conscious  variation.  Now  all  of  these  four  processes  involve 
mental  activity,  which  under  the  algedonic  theory  which  I 
defend  must  entail  the  presence  of  pleasure  or  of  pain  in 
some  degree. 

§  6.  In  considering  the  process  of  variation  in  relation 
to  algedonic  theory  we  may  begin  by  speaking  of  the  act  of 
will,  for  a  few  words  on  this  subject  will  suffice  us,  inas- 
much as  the  reader  will  perceive  that  ethics  does  not  have 


CHAP.  XXII  ETHICS  AND  HEDONISM  535 

to  do  directly  with  the  act  of  will  but  with  the  antecedents 
to  the  act  of  will. 

Will  as  it  appears  in  the  act  of  choice  is  the  outcome 
of  a  conflict  of  impulsive  ideas.  This  conflict  implies 
repression  of  opposed  instincts,  and  therefore  a  state  of 
systemic  pain.  The  resolution  of  a  conflict  implies  the 
breaking  into  activity  of  one  of  the  opposed  elements, 
which  will  act  pleasurably,  as  all  action  after  repression 
is  pleasant ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  also  implies  the  increase 
of  the  pain  from  the  elements  opposed  to  the  one  that 
develops,  these  elements  being  now  positively  prevented 
from  developing.  Habit  apart,  however,  the  pleasure  in 
connection  with  the  winning  element  must  as  a  rule  over- 
balance the  repressive  pain  of  its  opposed  elements,  largely 
because  the  pleasurable  persistent  idea  through  its  intensity 
will  take  possession  of  the  field.  Hence  it  may  be  laid 
down  as  a  rule  that  the  act  of  will  ^er  se  is  pleasurable. 

But  here  again,  as  in  connection  with  the  instinct  actions 
above  discussed,  it  is  evident  that  when  the  act  occurs, 
the  voluntary  act  in  this  case,  and  when  the  algedonic 
qualities  connected  with  the  act  appear  in  consciousness, 
the  conclusion  of  the  process  is  already  reached ;  the  ante- 
cedents to  the  will  act  are  therefore  no  longer  of  moment 
in  reference  to  the  action  which  is  developed,  and  it  is  with 
these  antecedents  only  that  ethics  has  to  deal.  The  algedonic 
quality  of  the  will  act  cannot  affect  the  action  to  which  it  is 
attached ;  it  may  indeed  affect  our  future  conduct,  but  even 
then  only  by  influencing  in  the  future  the  springs  of  action 
which  we  shall  next  consider. 

§  7.  Turning  now  to  the  antecedents  of  the  will  act  we 
find  that  as  a  rule  they  begin  in  desire  and  end  in  impulse, 
and  that  the  reasoning  process  arises  in  connection  with 
both  desire  and  impulse. 


636  .  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

As  I  have  already  stated/  the  will  act  is  necessarily 
preceded  in  consciousness  by  a  psychic  state  which,  if  it  is 
attended  to,  is  felt  either  as  an  impulse  which  is  recognised 
to  involve  restriction,  or  as  a  conflict  of  impulses.  An 
impulse  consists  of  (1)  the  psychosis  of  the  painful 
obstruction  of  systBmic  motor  activities,  and  (2)  the 
persistent  image  of  the  realisation  of  a  distinctly  motor 
activity,  of  which  latter  we  judge  in  reflection  that,  were 
it  realised,  it  would  bring  relief  of  the  obstructive  pain : 
this  judgment,  however,  being  of  course  no  part  of  the 
psychosis  of  impulse  but  resulting  from  general  experience. 
It  appears  to  me  that  neither  the  pain  of  repression  (which 
under  my  theory  is  due  to  systemic  activities  apart  from 
the  organs  whose  actions  are  inhibited),  nor  such  algedonic 
quality  as  attaches  to  the  image  of  the  unrealised  motor 
activity,  can  be  spoken  of  as  the  cause  of  the  motor  activity 
that  is  to  follow.  They  do  serve  to  indicate  the  conditions 
of  those  activities  of  neural  elements  which  are  represented 
in  the  consciousness  of  the  moment ;  they  serve  to  show  us, 
when  we  happen  to  be  able  to  review  the  process  in  retrospect, 
what  elements  in  the  antecedent  to  the  act  had  efficiency ; 
but  they  themselves  surely  cannot  be  said  to  originate  that 
efficiency  unless  the  algedonic  theory  which  I  uphold  is 
altogether  incorrect.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  expression 
of  an  impulse  is  usually  a  pleasurable  action,  as  activity 
after  repression  always  tends  to  be  pleasant  in  some  degree ; 
this  fact  appears  of  importance  later  on. 

The  conflict  of  impulses  is  often  preceded  by  a  conflict 
of  desires,  which  are  the  first  marks  in  consciousness  of  the 
inhibition  of  instinct  actions. 

As  I  have  indicated  above,  and  also  in  my  Pain, 
Pleasure,  and  Mstlietics  (p.  227),  impulse  may  appear  without 

1  Cf.  Chapters  XIII.  and  XVIII.  above. 


CHAP.  XXII  ETHICS  AND  HEDONISM  537 

the  antecedent  appearance  of  desire  because  of  the  very 
power  of  the  instincts  which  cry  out  for  an  opportunity 
to  function.  Desire,  on  the  other  hand,  when  it  does  appear 
in  connection  with  impulse,  precedes  impulse. 

Now  a  desire  consists  (1)  of  the  painful  psychosis  of  not 
distinctly  motor  obstruction ;  of  effort  by  the  system  to 
force  channels  for  the  "  pent-up  stream  of  action  "  (Ward), 
i.e.  to  get  around  or  break  down  the  restriction  to  the 
realisation,  i.e.  a  craving:  and  (2)  of  the  persistent  image 
of  the  realisation  of  an  unrealised  idea,  which  is  not  a 
distinct  motor  idea ;  which  idea,  if  it  could  be  realised,  we 
learn  in  reflection  would  bring  relief  of  the  desire  pain ; 
neither  this  act  of  reflection  nor  its  outcome,  however,  being 
necessary  to  the  desire.-^ 

Here  again  it  seems  clear  that  neither  the  pain  of 
repression,  nor  such  algedonic  quality  as  attaches  to  the 
image  of  the  unrealised  idea,  can  be  spoken  of  as  the 
cause  of  the  motor  activity  that  is  to  follow;  rather  are 
they  the  indication  of  the  conditions  of  these  activities  of 
neural  elements  which  are  represented  in  the  consciousness 
of  the  moment :  they  serve  to  show  us  what  elements  in  the 
activities  antecedent  to  the  appearance  of  the  impulses  had 
efficiency ;  but  they  themselves  cannot  surely  be  said  to 
originate  that  efficiency.  Here  it  is  to  be  noted  also  that 
the  satisfaction  of  a  desire  is  without  exception  pleasant 
per  se,  as  activity  after  repression  always  tends  to  be 
pleasant  in  some  degree. 

Similarly  in  the  case  of  the  reasoning  process,  which 
works  upon  desire  and  impulse,  either  consciously  or  by  the 
artificial  emphasis  given  from  within  the  field  of  inattention, 
i.e.  from  the  ego,  to  the  unrealised  idea ;  it  seems  clear  that 
here  too  the  algedonic  quality,  usually  pleasurable,  is  in- 

^  Cf.  my  Fain,  Pleasure,  and  jEsthetics,  p.  275,  and  Chapters  XIII.  and 
XVIII.  above. 


X^        OF  THE 

UNIVERcI' 


638  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

dicative  of  the  conditions  of  activity  rather  than  originative 
of  this  activity. 

§  8.  It  appears,  then,  that  pleasure  and  pain  are  side 
issues,  so  to  speak,  in  relation  to  the  mental  states  ante- 
cedent to  the  act  of  will;  marks  of  what  is  happening 
rather  than  the  causes  of  the  action ;  influencing  indeed 
the  trend  of  future  activities,  but  in  no  sense  serving  as  the 
stimulus  to  the  activity  under  discussion ;  and  it  thus  appears 
quite  clear  why  it  is  that  ethics,  when  treated  in  connection 
with  the  psychology  of  impulse,  develops  without  relation  to 
hedonic  theory. 

§  9.  I  realise  that  in  what  has  preceded  this  I  have  not 
stated  the  real  question  at  issue  between  the  ethical  hedonist 
and  his  opponent ;  and  this  because  I  have  been  aiming  to 
show  that  the  questions  concerning  which  they  contend, 
most  interesting  in  themselves  to  psychologist  as  well  as 
metaphysician,  are  quite  aside  from  ethical  study  as  we 
have  approached  it ;  and  I  may  add  that  it  seems  to  me 
that  undue  importance  is  attached  to  these  contentions  in 
current  ethical  studies. 

The  basis  of  the  controversy,  it  appears  to  me,  lies  in  the 
longing  of  the  human  soul  for  some  guiding  rule  of  conduct. 
The  man  finds  constantly,  as  he  reviews  his  life  in  retro- 
spect, that  he  has  acted  unwisely  and  sinfully  :  he  longs  to 
discover  some  way  by  which  he  may  avoid  foolishness  and 
sin.  Looking  back  of  the  developed  acts  themselves,  and  of 
the  impulses  which  press  for  expression,  he  finds  in  con- 
sciousness the  relatively  long  and  slow  preliminary  stages 
of  desire,  and  he  asks  himself  whether  there  is  not  some 
characteristic  of  conflicting  desires  which  may  serve  as  a 
guide  to  him,  so  that  in  the  future  he  may  avoid  the  folly 
and  the  sin. 


CHAP.  XXII  ETHICS  AND  HEDONISM  .        539 

In  the  course  of  this  introspective  study  he  has  struck 
upon  the  fact,  already  noted,  that  the  outcome  of  desire  and 
of  impulse  in  action  is  a  pleasurable  action,  and  having 
assumed  the  postulate  that  desire  is  determined  by  the  idea 
of  pleasure  to  be  reached,  he  has  developed  the  theory  that 
the  most  powerful  of  conflicting  desires  determines  the  act, 
and  that,  therefore,  the  act  is  determined  by  the  idea  of  the 
greatest  pleasure  to  be  reached.  In  connection  with  this 
he  endeavours  to  work  out  a  practical  guide  for  conduct. 
How  far  he  succeeds  we  shall  not  attempt  to  inquire  in  this 
chapter :  but  we  shall  consider  the  validity  of  this  theory  in 
the  light  of  the  psychological  analysis  which  has  preceded 
this. 

§  10.  The  main  point  at  issue  between  the  ethical 
hedonist  and  his  opponent  is  this,  that  the  one  claims 
and  the  other  denies  that  the  desire  for  pleasure  (or,  what 
the  hedonist  incorrectly  claims  is  the  same  thing,  for  the 
avoidance  of  pain)  is  the  cause  of  all  our  voluntary 
activity.  Do  we,  for  instance,  desire  the  pleasure  of 
eating  when  we  are  hungry,  or  do  we  desire  the  food 
which  is  to  assuage  our  hunger  ?  In  other  words,  is  the  idea 
which  becomes  emphatic,  and  which  determines  the  desire, 
the  idea  of  a  pleasure  to  be  reached ;  or  is  it  the  idea  of  an 
object  to  be  attained,  in  the  attainment  of  which,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  we  find  by  experience  we  gain  pleasure  ?  I 
hold  to  the  latter  view,  which  in  modern  times  has  such 
well-known  advocates  as  Green  and  Sidgwick ;  it  would 
indeed  be  wasting  words  for  me  to  discuss  this  question  did 
it  not  seem  to  me  that  the  way  in  which  we  have  approached 
the  subject  enables  us  to  give  answer  to  the  problem  quite 
positively  in  favour  of  the  latter  of  the  two  alternatives. 

Much  of  the  difficulty  that  has  arisen  in  reference  to 
this  point  has  been  due,  it  seems  to  me,  to  an  inadequate 


540  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

analysis  of  the  psychic  processes  involved,  to  the  assump- 
tion, which  I  consider  invalid,  that  it  is  possible  to  have  a 
revived  "  idea  "  of  a  pure  pleasure  as  mere  pleasure,  so  that 
the  non- realisation  of  this  idea  of  pleasure  may  induce  a 
desire. 

We  can  see  without  difficulty  how  it  is  possible  to  have 
an  idea  of  an  object  which  by  its  emphasis  may  stimulate  a 
desire,  for  desire  involves  the  emphasis  of  a  non -realised 
idea;  but  if  we  use  the  term  "idea"  without  change  of 
meaning,  it  does  not  appear  to  me  to  be  true  that  we  can 
have  an  idea  of  a  pleasure  per  se  which  can  stimulate  a 
desire.  For  what  we  mean  by  idea  in  this  case  is  what  is 
most  frequently  nowadays  called  a  representation,  that  is, 
a  presentation  of  a  psychic  occurrence  which  we  feel  to 
have  belonged  to  our  ego  in  the  past  but  which  is  not  fully 
realised  at  the  moment,  being  notably  lacking  in  the 
elements  which  would  constitute  it  a  perception.  If  it  be 
true  that  pleasure  is  a  quality  which  under  the  proper  con- 
ditions may  belong  to  any  element  of  consciousness,  then 
this  idea,  this  "representation,"  may  have  the  quality  of 
pleasure  inherent  in  it  under  the  proper  conditions,  but  the 
pleasure  itself  cannot  appear  without  some  "  idea  "  to  which 
it  is  attached. 

It  is  true  that  certain  presentations  have  emphatic  plea- 
sure connected  with  them  so  invariably,  or  apparently  so 
indissolubly,  that  we  find  it  difficult  to  disconnect  the  quality 
from  the  idea,  and  thus  in  common  thought  we  come  to 
consider  the  pleasure  as  the  idea;  we  thus,  as  Professor 
Woodbridge  has  put  it,^  practically  use  the  word  "  pleasure  " 
in  two  senses,  "  the  psychological "  and  "  the  material  senses," 
and  find  it  difficult  to  avoid  the  substitution  of  the  term 
"  pleasure  "  with  the  material  connotation  which  has  become 
attached  to  it,  in  place  of  "  pleasure  "  with  its  correct  psy- 

^  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  vii.  4. 


CHAP.  XXII  ETHICS  AND  HEDONISM  541 

chological  significance.  What  is  more,  we  learn  by  experi- 
ence that  the -satisfaction  of  desires  is  so  closely  connected 
with  pleasure-getting  that  the  separation  of  the  object  of 
the  satisfaction  of  desire  from  the  notion^  of  pleasure  as 
inherent  in  that  satisfaction  becomes  all  but  impossible 
even  for  many  of  those  who  are  accustomed  to  careful  seK- 
examination. 

We  may  experience  in  consciousness  a  pleasant  occur- 
rence :  following  this  pleasant  occurrence  we  may  have  an 
"  idea "  of  this  occurrence  (which  was  pleasant),  and  this 
"  idea "  indeed  may  itself  be  pleasant ;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  may  at  times  be  painful.  Or  this  "  idea  "  may  lead 
to  reactions  that  are  pleasant ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
may  at  times  lead  to  other  reactions  which  are  directly  or 
indirectly  painful.  Of  the  pleasure  itself,  properly  speak- 
ing, we  can  have  no  "  idea  "  in  the  sense  of  revived  presenta- 
tion, pleasure  being  a  quality  of  the  mental  element  involved 
in  our  thought.  The  pleasure  in  connection  with  the 
original  occurrence  was  of  a  qualitative  nature ;  so  in  case 
of  the  ideal  thought  of  this  occurrence  the  pleasure  con- 
nected with  it  is  qualitative. 

We  can  no  more  have  a  revival  of  pleasure  apart  from  a 
content  which  is  pleasant,  than  we  can  have  a  revival  of  a 
special  intensity  without  a .  somewhat  that  is  intense,  or  a 
revival  of  a  special  realness  without  a  somewhat  that  is 
real.  So  far  as  we  think  of  pleasure,  and  of  intensity,  and 
of  reality,  except  as  attached  to  some  content,  we  are  not 
discussing  the  experienced  qualities  themselves,  but  abstrac- 
tions which  we  have  made  for  purposes  of  thinking,  which 
abstractions  are  themselves  contents  with  all  the  quahties 
of  intensity,  realness  and  pleasure- pain.^ 

1  This  notion  of  what  we  call  pleasure,  it  is  to  be  noted,  is,  as  we  shall  see 
below,  itself  an  abstraction,  an  "idea,"  and  not  one  necessarily  pleasant,  but 
subject  to  the  same  algedonic  relations  to  which  all  ideas  are  subject. 
,2  Cf.  Ward,  Art.  "  Psychology,"  Enmj.  Brit.  p.  74. 


542  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

§  11.  There  is  a  difficulty  which  may  occur  to  the 
reader  in  connection  with  this  analysis  which  it  is  worth 
while  to  consider  at  some  length.  If  it  be  true  that  plea- 
sures and  pains  cannot  be  revived  per  se,  how  is  it  that  they 
can  be  compared  one  with  another  as  to  fulness,  for  in- 
stance, how  can  they  be  balanced  one  against  another  ?  for 
comparison  involves  revival  of  the  contents  compared.  I 
answer  that  this  comparison  is  made,  not  by  the  revival  of 
the  pleasures  or  pains,  but  by  the  revival  of  their  imagined 
effects  upon  us. 

If  this  seem  a  position  difficult  to  accept,  I  would  point 
out  that  a  similar  position  must  be  maintained  in  reference 
to  the  quality  of  intensity  which  bears  so  close  a  relation 
to  algedonic  quality  in  many  respects.  My  claim  is  that 
intensities  are  also  compared  and  weighed  by  revivals  of 
the  effects  we  judge  they  would  produce,  although  of  course 
the  process  is  in  ordinary  cases  in  no  sense  brought  into 
consciousness. 

The  intensity  of  moonlight  and  the  intensity  of  sunlight 
can  easily  be  compared.  That  the  intensities  of  the  ideas 
of  sunlight  and  of  moonlight  are,  however,  not  revived  in 
this  process  of  judgment  becomes  clear  when  we  make  the 
comparison  between  the  thought  of  these  intensities  imme- 
diately after  stepping  into  the  house  on  a  bright  moonlight 
night.  We  are  likely  then  to  say,  "  It  is  almost  as  bright 
as  day."  Here  the  intensity  of  the  revival  of  the  just- 
experienced  moonlight  is  evidently  much  greater  than  the 
intensity  of  the  revival  of  the  sunlight  experienced  some 
hours  ago ;  yet  we  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  the  intensity 
of  the  day's  sunlight  was  greater  than  that  of  the  present 
moonlight. 

Travelling  in  a  rushing  railroad  train  and  looking  out  of 
the  window  I  see  a  white  horse  with  a  black  tail,  and  after 
riding*  a  mile,  another  white  horse  with  a  white  tail.      A 


CHAP.  XXII  ETHICS  AND  HEDONISM  543 

moment  later  I  compare  the  two  without  difficulty,  and  if  I  am 
asked  the  question  as  to  the  intensity  of  the  two  impressions 
I  am  willing  to  assure  the  questioner  that  the  two  impres- 
sions were  equally  intense,  I  cannot  help  thinking  them  so. 
Yet  it  is  evident  that  the  intensity  of  the  revival  of  the 
horse  seen  a  mile  back  must  be  less  than  the  intensity  of 
the  revival  of  the  horse  just  seen.  The  judgment  as  to  the 
intensities  is  due  to  comparison  of  the  revivals  of  unanalysed 
and  unanalysable  presentations  determined  by  the  effects  of 
the  intensities  upon  us. 

So  it  is  with  the  comparison  of  the  qualities  of  pleasure 
and  of  pain.  The  revival  "  idea,"  the  so-called  representa- 
tion, of  a  pleasure,  is  part  of  the  total  content,  is  not  itself 
necessarily  a  pleasure  (although  it  may  be  a  pleasant  re- 
vival) but  is  a  distinct  partial  presentation  in  the  midst  of, 
or  part  of,  the  total  complex  presentation  of  the  moment  of 
revival.  And  so  of  pain.  I  judge  that  the  pain  experienced 
in  the  drawing  of  a  tooth  two  years  ago  was  the  same  as  the 
pain  experienced  in  the  drawing  of  the  corresponding  tooth 
on  the  other  side  of  my  jaw  yesterday,  and  I  make  this 
judgment  not  because  I  have  revived  the  two  pains ;  the 
intensity  of  the  revival  of  the  experience  of  two  years  ago 
is  evidently  much  less  than  the  intensity  of  the  revival  of 
the  experience  of  yesterday;  the  revival  of  yesterday's 
performance  is  painful,  and  the  revival  of  the  performance 
of  two  years  ago  is  not  painful  at  all ;  nevertheless  I 
judge  that  the  intensities  and  the  pains  were  equal,  and  I 
make  this  judgment  by  the  comparison  of  two  "revivals" 
which  are  wont  to  be  called  (but  incorrectly)  intensities  of 
pain,  which  are  distinctly  contents,  presentations ;  I  make 
this  judgment  as  the  result  of  a  comparison  of  the  effects 
produced  in  my  conscious  life  in  the  two  cases. 

This  view  is  corroborated  by  the  well-recognised  fact^ 
1  Cf.  Prof.  Sidgwick,  op.  cit.  p.  143. 


644 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 


that  pleasures  and  pains  from  widely  different  sources  are 
not  easily  compared.  This  fact  would  be  inexplicable  were 
the  pleasures  and  pains  themselves  revived;  but  it  is  a 
necessary  implication  of  the  view  here  maintained:  for 
where  the  source  of  algedonic  quality  is  very  diverse,  the 
effects  must  be  diverse,  and  there  must  be  a  lack  of  com- 
mon elements  in  the  total  experiences,  which  in  turn  will 
make  comparison  difficult. 

§  12.  If  all  that  is  claimed  above  be  true,  then  the 
postulate  that  desire  is  determined  by  the  pleasures  to  be 
gained,  as  stated  in  §  10,  upon  which  the  whole  hedonistic 
theory  depends,  turns  out  to  be  meaningless. 

The  facts  upon  which,  through  misconception,  this  postu- 
late has  been  based  seem  to  be  simply  these ;  that  the  idea 
which  in  being  emphasised  in  thought  calls  out  desire,  is  an 
idea  which  if  realised  would  give  us  pleasure  in  the  realisa- 
tion :  and  furthermore  that  while  it  is  not  an  idea  of  a 
future  pleasure,  it  is  itself  frequently  a  pleasant  idea;  and 
this  for  the  very  reason  that  it  usually  arises  from  the  ego 
"  spontaneously "  as  we  say,  and  avails  to  hold  attention, 
notwithstanding  obstructive  restriction ;  spontaneous  atten- 
tion and  pleasurableness  of  content  being  always  coincident.^ 

^  It  is  therefore  not  correct  from  the  psychologist's  point  of  view  to  state 
the  hedonist's  position  as  it  is  commonly  stated,  namely  that  my  acts  are 
determined  by  the  idea  of  the  greatest  pleasure  ;  rather  is  it  more  correct  to 
state  it  as  Leslie  Stephen  does  {Science  of  Ethics,  p.  47) :  "  It  is  more  accurate 
to  say  that  my  conduct  is  determined  by  the  pleasantest  judgment  than  to 
say  that  it  is  determined  by  my  judgment  of  what  is  pleasant." 

Where  the  case  is  one  which  is  usually  described  as  a  desire  to  avoid  a 
pain,  I  should  state  it  thus  :  the  idea  of  the  action  or  object  which  will  avoid 
or  negate  the  disturbing  occurrence  which  we  remember  to  have  attached  to 
the  pain,— this  idea  is  usually  pleasurable,  and  it  also  stimulates  in  us  the 
desire  for  the  realisation  of  those  actions  or  objects.  The  object  of  desire  is 
not  directly  related  to  the  production  of  the  painfulness  of  restriction,  which 
latter  is  determined  by  elements  apart  from  those  active  in  defining  the  ob- 
ject,— a  fact  which  seems  to  argue  against  the  notion  that  the  conscious  spring 
of  action  lies  in  the  attempt  to  free  oneself  from  the  restrictive  pains  involved 
with  the  contemplation  of  the  desired  object. 


CHAP.  XXII  ETHICS  AND  HEDONISIk\  545 

This,  however,  does  not  take  away  from  the  fact  that  desire 
is  also  strongly  coloured  with  pain  in  consequence  of  the 
restriction  of  the  realisation  of  the  idea,  desire  as  a  whole 
being  indeed  more  painful  than  pleasant ;  nor  does  it  take 
away  from  the  fact  that  pleasure  of  satisfaction  is  in  many 
cases  entirely  unconnected  in  mind  with  desire,  as  for  in- 
stance when  we  desire  to  remember  the  name  of  a  man  or 
of  a  botanical  specimen.  The  reader  will  note  that  there  is 
nothing  in  these  facts  which  necessarily  involves  the  notion 
that  the  most  pleasurable  idea  productive  of  desire  will  be, 
or  ought  to  be,  sufficient  to  produce  action. 

§  13.  It  has  been  suggested  by  a  critic  that  I  have 
misconceived  the  position  of  those  whom  I  oppose :  that  no 
hedonist  worth  considering  really  means  that  we  desire 
pleasure  in  abstraction  from  the  experience  that  is  pleasant ; 
that  the  logical  hedonist  would  say :  "  When  I  desire  the 
eating  of  food,  that  being  a  pleasant  experience,  I  desire  the 
whole  experience  with  all  its  features,  but  I  desire  it  in 
proportion  to  its  pleasantness :  the  discussion  whether 
pleasure  taken  simply  in  itself  is  any  more  representable 
than  intensity  is  therefore  irrelevant." 

In  answer  to  such  a  criticism  I  would  say  that  if  the 
question  of  the  revival  of  pleasure  'per  se  is  considered 
irrelevant,  then  the  hedonist  must  hold  that  it  is  the 
pleasantness  of  the  revived  idea  which  determines  our 
desire  and  the  resultant  act  of  will.  But  it  is  very  certain 
that  the  pleasantness  of  a  revived  idea  is  in  no  sense 
co-ordinate  with  the  pleasure  of  the  past  activity  which  is 
represented  at  the  moment  of  desire.  It  is  not  true  that 
the  revival  of  a  past  pleasant  experience  is  necessarily 
pleasant;  in  fact,  the  revival  of  the  very  pleasantest  of 
experiences  of  the  past  may  itself  be  perfectly  "  indifferent," 
and  the  revival  of  the  most  painful  experience  of  the  past 

2n 


546  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

may  be  equally  indifferent  or  even  pleasurable  to  some 
degree.  The  revival  of  the  pleasant  experiences  of  my 
boyhood  in  exploding  fire-crackers  is  not  now  a  pleasant 
revival :  the  revival  of  my  painful  experience  in  having  a 
tooth  extracted  five  years  ago  is  now  as  purely  an  indifterent 
revival  as  I  can  experience. 

But  if  it  be  true  that  the  pleasantness  of  a  revival  is  in 
no  sense  co-ordinate  with  the  pleasure  of  the  past  activity 
which  is  represented  in  the  revival,  then  it  is  clear  that  if 
our  acts  were  guided  by  the  pleasantness  of  the  revival  we 
would  seldom  if  ever  be  able  to  act  in  a  way  which  would 
bring  us  the  greatest  pleasure  or  the  fullest  pleasure  in  the 
long-run. 

And  yet  it  is  not  denied,  of  course,  that  at  times  we  can 
so  act ;  and  beyond  that,  whilst  I  do  not  believe  we  always 
or  even  often  (relatively  speaking)  make  the  attainment  of 
future  pleasure  our  end,  still  I  think  we  may  do  so  and 
with  some  success,  and  this  I  think  will  be  acknowledged. 
Indeed  I  think  it  true  that  on  the  whole  where  other  im- 
pulses do  not  interfere  (as  they  very  often  do)  our  voluntary 
actions  tend  to  correspond  with  those  which  would  result 
in  the  production  of  our  greatest  or  .fullest  pleasure  in  the 
long-run.  And  that  this  is  generally  acknowledged  is 
clear  in  the  fact  that  the  average  hedonist,  whose  doctrines 
I  am  here  combating,  is  able  to  hold  with  some  degree  of 
plausibility  that  introspection  shows  us  not  only  that  we 
can,  nor  only  that  we  often  do,  but  that  we  always  do  and 
always  must,  act  to  produce  that  result  which  will  on  the 
whole  give  us  the  greatest  or  fullest  pleasure. 

§  14.  But  suppose  it  be  claimed  that  it  is  not  the 
pleasantness  of  the  revived  idea,  but  the  revival  of  a 
pleasant  idea,  that  the  hedonist  would  make  the  source 
of  action.     The  phrase  "the  revival  of  a   pleasant  idea" 


CHAP.  XXII  ETHICS  AND  HEDONISM  547 

either  implies  that  a  pleasure  itself  can  be  revived,  and 
such  revival  of  a  pure  pleasure  we  have  already  argued 
is  impossible;  or  it  means  a  revived  idea  to  which  not 
the  quality  of  pleasure  but  the  concept  of  pleasure  is 
attached. 

It  is  of  course  not  an  impossible  hypothesis  that  the 
revival  of  an  idea  to  which  the  concept  of  pleasure  is 
attached  alone  draws  us  to  action.  But,  as  I  shall  show 
in  §  4  of  the  next  chapter,  a  rule  of  conduct  based 
upon  this  hypothesis  would  fail  altogether  to  prove  of  value 
to  us. 

§  15.  Before  leaving  this  subject  let  me  add  a  few  lines 
concerning  a  point  which  is  of  interest  here.  The  analysis 
we  have  made  seems  to  carry  with  it  a  virtual  denial  of  the 
ethical  hedonist's  position,  and  we  are  thus  enabled  to 
account  for  the  unwillingness  on  the  part  of  ethical  students 
to  accept  the  hedonist's  doctrine  even  where  they  have 
been  unable  satisfactorily  to  reply  to  their  opponent's 
argument. 

But  if  it  be  true  that  the  hedonistic  theory  is  based 
upon  an  incorrect  psychological  analysis,  then  it  ought  to 
be  possible  to  account  for  the  persistence  of  this  doctrine, 
and  this  I  think  it  not  difficult  to  do.  I  have  elsewhere^ 
called  attention  to  the  error,  common  amongst  psychologists 
as  well  as  laymen,  of  classifying  pleasure  and  pain  together 
with  the  emotions.  Emotions  are  instinctive  phenomena, 
as  the  word  "  instinctive  "  is  commonly  used.  Pleasure  and 
pain,  on  the  other  hand,  are  qualitative  phenomena,  which 
attach  not  only  to  these  instinctive  phenomena  but  also  to 
other  mental  phases  than  those  of  such  instinctive  nature. 
Pre-eminently,  however,  they  attach  to  that  type  of  instinct 
feelings  which  we  call  the  emotions,  and  this  leads  to  an 

^  Pain,  Pleasure,  and  JEsthetics,  chap.  i. 


548  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

apparent  identity  between  these  two  diverse  mental  states. 
Pleasures  and  pains  are  often,  but  quite  improperly,  classified 
as  emotions. 

It  is  quite  natural  indeed  that  the  every-day  thinker 
should  speak  of  pleasure  and  pain  as  emotional,  for  the 
reason  that  he  finds  the  most  markedly  algedonic  part  of 
his  mental  life  to  be  the  emotional  part.  Nor  in  view  of 
the  facts  is  it  much  more  remarkable  to  find  theorists 
trying  to  uphold  a  psychologically  vicious  and  baseless 
atomistic  theory  that  emotions  are  sums  of  pleasures  and 
pains. 

This  identification  of  pleasure-pain  with  emotion  being 
thus  commonly  accepted  as  correct,  it  is  not  at  all 
surprising  that  the  error  in  ethical  doctrine  to  which  we 
refer  has  been  made.  For  moral  activities  would  not 
appear  as  such  were  there  no  conflicting  concurrent  in- 
stincts :  when  the  instincts  conflict,  then  arise  the  impulses 
with  which  our  moral  codes  have  to  do.  But  pleasure  and 
pain  as  we  have  just  seen  being  currently  held  to  be  of  the 
nature,  and  by  some  thinkers  to  be  the  very  elements,  of 
that  class  of  instinct  feelings  which  we  name  emotions,  it 
certainly  is  not  at  all  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  importance 
of  the  connection  between  pleasure  and  pain  and  impulsive 
ethical  activities  has  been  exaggerated,  and  the  nature  of 
the  connection  misconceived. 

There  is  another  ground  for  the  persistence  of  the  errors 
we  are  considering.  As  we  have  already  seen,  variation 
through  voluntary  action  involves  the  emphasis  of  an  action 
which  is  partial  in  relation  to  the  typical  action  of  the 
system  of  which  it  forms  a  part.  In  the  most  emphatic  of 
such  cases  of  partial  action  the  emphasis  is  that  of  an 
individualistic  instinct  in  opposition  to,  or  out  of  relation 
with,  an  instinct  of  significance  for  the  social  system  of 
which   we    individuals    are    elements.     In    such    emphatic 


CHAP.  XXII  ETHICS  AND  HEDONISM  649 

cases  voluntary  variation  is  evidently  due  to  individualistic 
reaction,  and  hence  it  is  not  unnatural  that  we  should  tend 
to  identify  our  choices  with  our  impulses  to  self-gratification, 
and  should  thus  find  apparent  evidence  in  self-examination 
in  favour  of  the  hedonist's  claims. 


CHAPTEK    XXIII 

THE    RULE    OF    CONDUCT 

§  1.  As  we  have  said  in  the  preceding  chapter,  foolish  and 
sinning  men  have  from  time  immemorial  been  endeavouring 
to  discover  some  rule  of  conduct  which,  if  followed,  would 
enable  them  to  live  without  folly  and  sin,  and  to  avoid 
thus  the  upbraidings  of  conscience  within  them.  We  have 
seen  that  some  theorists,  having  been  struck  by  the 
intimate  relation  between  pleasure  and  the  desire  preceding 
action,  have  based  upon  this  relation,  as  they  have  inter- 
preted it,  a  rule  of  conduct  determined  by  the  supposed 
pleasure  which  is  pictured  at  the  moment  of  desire.  But 
we  have  also  seen  reason  to  believe  that  the  nature  of  this  re- 
lation of  pleasure  to  desire  had  been  misinterpreted  by  these 
theorists,  and  this  would  seem  to  warrant  us  in  passing 
over  without  further  consideration  the  hedonistic  doctrine 
of  moral  action  founded  upon  this  misinterpretation. 

The  hedonistic  doctrine,  however,  in  its  developed  forms 
has  gained  so  strong  a  hold  upon  thinking  men  and  women, 
and  appears  to  have  led  to  so  much  noble  unselfish  devotion 
to  the  welfare  of  humanity,  that  it  seems  desirable  to  ask 
whether  a  satisfactory  rule  of  conduct  can  be  found,  if  we 
express  the  old  formula  in  terms  of  what  we  have  concluded 
is  the  true  relation  between  pleasure  and  desire. 

§  2.  The  ethical  doctrine  of  egoistic  hedonism  of  ancient 
lineage  may  be  stated  as  follows :    each  voluntary  act  is 


CHAP.  XXIII  THE  RULE  OF  CONDUCT  551 

determined  by  the  most  effective  desire  experienced  at  the 
moment  of  willing;  but  each  one  of  us  desires  his  own 
pleasure,  and  he  desires  this  always  in  proportion  to  the 
magnitude  of  the  pleasure  which  he  pictures ;  hence  it 
appears  that  we  always  act  voluntarily  to  attain  our  own 
pleasure,  and  we  may  with  propriety  adopt  this  rule  of 
conduct ;  examine  carefully  the  scale  of  pleasures  desired,  and 
seek  to  gain  that  pleasure  which,  when  all  is  considered,  seeTos 
likely  to  prove  the  fullest. 

So  few  thinking  men  now  defend  this  extreme  doctrine  ' 
that  it  would  seem  scarcely  worth  while  to  consider  it  at 
length  did  it  not  lead  us  naturally  to  the  study  of  revisions    , 
of  the  doctrine  which  have  great  influence  in  our  day.  ' 

From  a  narrow  point  of  view  the  statement  above  made 
might  be  held  to  mean  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  always 
will  to  do  that  which  will  produce  the  most  pleasant  act,  and 
this  being  assumed  it  might  also  be  affirmed  that  we  should 
endeavour;  so  to  will  whenever  we  find  ourselves  called  upon 
to  decide  upon  a  course  of  action. 

Although  no  one  of  authority  can  now  be  found  who 
would  uphold  such  an  interpretation  of  this  formula, 
nevertheless  it  is  tacitly  accepted  by  many  thinkers;  it 
may  be  well,  therefore,  before  passing  to  the  study  of  more 
acceptable  interpretations  to  note  briefly  the  reasons  why 
it  appears  clear  that  we  actually  do  not,  and  for  the  most 
part  cannot,  will  in  the  direction  of  the  pleasantest 
immediate  reaction. 

In  those  cases  where  we  determine  our  conduct  to  a 
special  end  there  must  be  a  questioning,  a  conflict  of 
impulses.  The  conflict  involved  with  hesitancy  and  doubt 
is  resolved  in  the  act  of  will,  in  choice.  The  question 
before  us  is  whether  this  choice  always  involves  the  attain- 
ment of  the  greatest  immediate  pleasure.     Is  it  true  that 

% 


/ 


552  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

the  one  of  the  two  conflicting  impulses  which  wins  in  this 
act  of  will,  results  in  immediate  reactions  pleasanter  than 
those  which  would  have  occurred  had  the  opposing  impulse 
found  its  expression  ?  Surely  no  such  claim  can  well  be 
made. 

The  resolution  of  a  conflict  implies,  to  be  sure,  the 
breaking  into  activity  of  one  of  the  opposed  elements,  which 
will  act  pleasurably,  as  all  action  after  repression  is 
pleasant ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  implies  also  the 
probability  of  an  increase  of  pain  from  the  opposed 
elements,  now  positively  prevented  from  developing.  In 
general,  to  be  sure,  the  pleasure  in  connection  with  the 
winning  element  will  overbalance  the  repressive  pain  of 
the  opposed  elements,  principally  because  the  pleasurable 
persistent  idea  through  its  intensity  will  take  possession  of 
the  field ;  and  hence  it  may  be  laid  down  as  a  rule  that  the 
will  act  jper  se  is  pleasurable :  it  is  not  unnatural,  therefore, 
that  in  anticipation  the  outcome  of  a  state  of  conflict  in 
v/ill  should  (in  most  cases)  be  looked  forward  to  as  a 
pleasure ;  and  if  there  ivere  no  other  consideration  it  would 
be  true  to  say,  1st,  that  the  most  effective  element  will 
win;  and  2nd,  that  of  the  two  possible  will -pleasures 
which  could  result  from  the  conflict,  the  greater  will  be 
attained. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  cannot  be  held  that  in  all  cases 

the  act   of  will   leads   to   the   immediate   resultant   which 

would  give  the  greatest  pleasure  under  the  circumstances, 

for  the  reason  that  other  considerations  do  enter  to  disturb 

\  the  algedonic  balance. 

The  first  alteration  of  this  balance  that  attracts  attention 
is  due  to  the  effect  of  habit,  which  makes  the  appearance 
of  certain  resultants  easier  than  the  appearance  of  others, 
apart  from  the  inherent  efficiency  of  the  contending 
elements. 


CHAP.  XXIII  THE  RULE  OF  CONDUCT  553 

In  such  cases  the  more  powerful  impulsive  idea  (A)  may 
be  obstructed  by  a  less  powerful  one  (B),  which  latter  never- 
theless wins  because  it  holds  the  road,  so  to  speak.  The 
immediate  outcome  then  will  be  a  will-pleasure  (/3)  which 
we  must  acknowledge  to  be  less  than  would  have  been  the 
will-pleasure  (a),  which  would  have  resulted  had  the  more 
powerful  element  (A)  won :  and,  moreover,  the  immediate 
pain  of  opposition  connected  with  (A)  which  is  repressed 
will  be  sharper  than  the  pain  which  would  have  accrued 
if  the  less  strong,  but  habitually  occurring,  element  (B)  had 
been  obstructed ;  notwithstanding  that  in  such  a  case  the 
fact  that  habit  had  led  to  the  formation  of  nutritive 
and  active  associations  would  not  improbably  have  finally 
resulted  in  a  more  persistent  pain  of  obstruction  if  the 
habitual  line  of  movement  had  been  overcome. 

A  second  disturbance  of  the  balance  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  most  natural  outcome  of  the  conflict  of  impulses  is 
at  times  overborne  by  an  influence  from  the  ego,  from  the 
field  of  inattention ;  this  is  of  the  very  essence  of  many 
emphatic  cases  of  voluntary  action.  We  act,  as  Professor 
James -^  says,  in  what  we  distinctly  appreciate  to  be  the 
line  of  greater  resistance.  That  is,  some  influence  from  the 
field  of  inattention  appears  which  forces  the  activity  in  the 
direction  in  which  the  volitional  outcome  is  least  pleasur- 
able, and  in  which  at  the  same  time  the  maximum  of 
obstructive  pain  is  brought  about  by  the  repression  of 
what  appears  to  be  the  more  powerful  of  the  conflicting 
activities. 

Both  of  these  disturbances  of  the  algedonic  balance  are 
of  such  frequent  occurrence  that  it  cannot  possibly  be  main- 
tained that  the  average  will  act  is  in  the  direction  of  the 
greatest  immediate  pleasure. 

^  Psychology^  ii.  p.  548. 


554  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

§  3.  But  as  I  have  said  before,  the  interpretation  of  the 
doctrine  of  egoistic  hedonism  considered  in  the  discussion 
in  the  last  section  is  not  generally  upheld.  Thinkers 
usually  concentrate  their  attention,  not  upon  the  notion  of 
the  pleasure  of  the  act  of  will,  but  upon  the  notion  of  the 
totality  of  pleasure  which  it  is  thought  may  result  from 
the  act.  Let  us  ask  ourselves  whether  the  above -stated 
rule  of  egoistic  hedonism  as  thus  interpreted,  if  it  be 
expressed  in  terms  of  our  doctrine  of  the  relation  between 
pleasure  and  desire,  gives  us  any  valuable  guide  to  conduct. 

The  rule,  as  it  is  usually  understood,  may  be  expressed 
thus  :  examine  carefully  the  scale  of  pleasures  desired,  and 
strive  to  attain  that  pleasure  which  it  seems  likely  will 
prove  to  be  the  fullest.  The  rule  as  it  should  be  expressed, 
however,  if  my  analysis  be  correct,  will  read  thus  :  Examine 
carefully  the  scale  of  pleasure  attached  to  the  ideas  which  create 
the  conflicting  desires,  amd  reach  out  to  that  idea  luhich  is  most 
pleasurable.  JError  is  due  to  the  fact  that  we  carelessly  aim  to 
realise  the  less  pleasant  idea. 

It  is  evident  that  if  we  follow  this  rule  the  most  vivid  or 
the  fullest  pleasure  we  can  obtain  at  the  time  of  considera- 
tion will  mark  the  direction  of  our  activity.  But  it  is  equally 
clear  that  the  realisation  of  the  pleasantest  idea,  even  as 
thus  construed,  will  not  as  a  rule  produce  results  that  will 
be  satisfactory,  for  it  will  not  lead  to  actions  which  will 
prevent  the  subsequent  upbraidings  of  our  conscience.  For 
this  pleasantest  idea  will,  in  most  cases,  override  certain  less 
vivid  and  less  pleasant  ideas,  which  latter,  however,  are 
more  persistent  than  the  former.  For  instance,  the  pleasure 
attached  to  the  idea  of  a  sensuous  gratification  will  cer- 
tainly in  most  cases  be  more  vivid  and  fuller  in  any  such 
process  of  consideration  than  the  pleasure  attached  to  the 
idea  of  activities  of  social  significance  which  are  determined 
by  the  trend  of  actions  of  a  complex  nature :   yet,  as  we 


CHAP.  XXIII  THE  RULE  OF  CONDUCT  555 

have  seen,  it  is  these  latter  pervasive  and  persistent  im- 
pulses, determining  the  broader  trend  of  our  activities, 
which  institute  that  inquisitorial  court,  conscience,  which 
condemns  us  to  regret  and  remorse,  whenever,  and  for  the 
very  reason  that,  we  act  in  accord  with  the  less  persuasive 
and  persistent  impulses  which  are  at  the  moment  of 
temptation  more  vivid,  and  at  the  same  time  more 
pleasant. 

It  is  apparent,  therefore,  that  the  rule  of  conduct  enun- 
ciated by  egoistic  hedonists,  even  when  stated  in  terms  of 
a  correct  psychology,  cannot  result  in  action  which  will 
satisfy  our  conscience  and  enable  us  to  avoid  the  sting 
which  accompanies  the  consciousness  of  folly  and  sin. 

§  4.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this  rule  in  this  form  is 
really  seldom  discussed,  it  is  usually,  and  quite  unconsciously, 
changed  into  quite  another  form  with  which  by  most  people 
it  is  hopelessly  confounded.  The  rule  of  action  just  con- 
sidered is  based,  as  we  have  seen,  upon  an  unsatisfactory 
psychological  assumption,  the  error  involved  in  the  assump- 
tion, however,  being  most  difficult  to  lay  hold  upon  because 
of  the  perplexities  of  algedonic  analysis.  It  thus  happens 
that  because  the  validity  of  the  rule  first  formulated  is 
with  difficulty  controverted,  the  rule  into  which  it  is  trans- 
formed is  often  felt  to  have  more  strength  than  in  reality  it 
has. 

This  modified  rule  to  which  I  refer,  and  which  is  usually, 
but  incorrectly,  supposed  to  be  the  corner-stone  of  egoistic 
hedonism,  in  accordance  with  our  analysis  must  be  stated 
thus :  each  one  of  us  should  act  to  gain,  not  that  pleasure 
which  seems  likely  to  be  the  fullest,  but  that  end  which  as 
an  idea  has  attached  to  it  for  himself  the  greatest  number  of 
associated  ideas  that  are  called  pleasures.  This  is  really 
what  is  meant  by  the  rule  as  ordinarily  discussed. 


556  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

Here  the  term  "  pleasure "  designates  a  notion,  an 
abstract  presentation,  not  necessarily  in  itself  a  pleasure  at 
all,  but  one  which  where  pleasant  has,  as  pure  pleasure,  a 
force  exceedingly  low  in  degree  in  comparison  with  the 
force  of  the  presentation  itself :  and  this  abstract  presenta- 
tion is  quite  a  different  thing  from  the  notion  of  the  "  idea 
of  pleasure "  or  revived  pleasure,  which  we  have  above 
discussed  and  have  finally  concluded  to  be  meaningless. 
Nevertheless,  as  I  have  just  said,  the  obscurity  which 
renders  the  denial  of  the  validity  of  the  first  rule  so  diffi- 
cult leads  men  to  feel  that  this  modified  rule  has  a  good  deal 
of  strength  which  in  reality  does  not  belong  to  it;  for 
when  one  studies  the  matter  with  the  least  bit  of  care  its 
failure  becomes  at  once  apparent. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  rule  cannot  suffice  unless  it  leads 
to  acts  which  satisfy  our  conscience, — to  acts  which  show  a 
correspondence  with  our  relatively  permanent  impulse 
series ;  and  it  is  very  evident  to  any  one  who  has  followed 
our  previous  argument,  that  no  amount  of  attention  that 
can  be  given  to  the  attainment  of  ideal  ends  to  which  our 
personal  pleasure  is  attached  can  satisfy  the  social  impulses 
within  us  w^hich  would  so  often  lead  to  self-sacrifices ;  yet 
these  social  impulses  are  the  very  ones  which  are  emphatic 
in  that  relatively  permanent  impulse  series  which  gives  us 
the  moral  code  of  the  time  of  reflection,  and  which  deter- 
mines whether  conscience  will  signify  approval  or  dis- 
approval. 

§  5.  Notwithstanding  this  weakness  the  modified  rule 
of  egoistic  hedonism  just  discussed  has  great  ethical  im- 
portance because  (principally,  I  imagine,  on  account  of  the 
fact  that  it  is  felt  to  be  unrefuted  and  nevertheless  unsatis- 
fying) it  has  led  ethical  thinkers  to  make  attempt  to 
modify  it,  in  order  to  develop  from  it  some  more  valid  rule 


CHAP.  XXIII  THE  RULE  OF  CONDUCT  557 

of  action.  Many  able  ethical  thinkers  have,  as  a  result, 
come  to  believe  that  the  difficulty  with  the  old  rule  lay  in 
its  assumption  that  our  existence  is  that  of  isolated  beings 
in  this  world,  and  they  have  been  led  to  the  statement  that 
we  gain  a  satisfactory  rule  if  we  include  in  our  thought 
other  beings  who  surround  us.  If  we  express  the  new  rule 
in  what  seem  to  me  to  be  proper  psychological  terms,  it  tells 
each  of  us  to  act  to  gain  that  end  which,  as  an  idea,  ha^ 
attached  to  it  for  himself,  and  for  all  the  rest  of  mankind,  the 
greatest  number  of  associated  ideas  that  are  called  pleasures. 
It  is  usually  expressed  less  technically,  and  gives  us  the  rule 
of  "  universal  hedonism,"  which  bids  us  to  act  to  produce 
the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number. 

If  the  reader  go  back  of  the  rule  in  its  usual  form  as 
just  stated,  to  its  more  careful  statement  italicised  in  the 
sentence  just  preceding  the  last,  he  will  perceive  that  here 
again  the  term  "  pleasure  "  designates  a  notion,  an  abstract 
presentation  which  is  not  necessarily  in  itself  a  pleasant 
presentation  at  all ;  and  moreover,  this  presentation  is  one 
which,  when  pleasant,  has  through  its  pure  pleasure  a  force 
exceedingly  low  in  degree  in  comparison  with  the  force  of 
the  presentation  itself; — an  abstract  presentation  which  is 
quite  a  different  thing  from  the  supposititious  "idea  of 
pleasure,"  or  revived  pleasure,  which  we  have  above  dis- 
cussed and  found  to  be  psychologically  meaningless. 

§  6.  This  new  rule,  however,  has  become  of  great  con- 
sequence in  modern  ethical  theory,  for  it  forms  the  basis 
of  what  we  call  Utilitarianism. 

John  Stuart  Mill  thus  expresses  the  doctrine  in  his 
famous  essay  on  "  Utilitarianism " :  "  The  creed  which 
accepts,  as  the  foundation  of  Morals,  Utility,  or  the 
Greatest-happiness  Principle,  holds  that  actions  are  right 
in  proportion  as  they  tend  to  promote  happiness,  wrong  as 


558  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

they  tend  to  produce  the  reverse  of  happiness."  The  rule 
that  is  deduced  from  this  is :  Act  to  produce  what  you 
conceive  to  be  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest 
number. 

Assuming  that  we  are  able  to  surmount  the  great  prac- 
tical difficulty  of  acquainting  ourselves  with  what  constitutes 
this  greatest  happiness,^  let  us  consider  for  a  moment  what 
we  mean  by  this  greatest  number. 

It  is  apparent  to  the  modern  biological  student  that  the 
community  of  highly  moral,  highly  civilised,  men  with  whom 
we  live  cannot  by  any  process  be  separated  by  any  logical 
line  of  demarcation  from  those  of  our  own  race  who  have 
not  this  high  morality  and  civilisation.  It  is  equally 
apparent  that  our  own  part  of  the  human  race  cannot  be 
separated  from  the  semi-barbarous  inhabitants  of  the  plains 
of  Persia,  of  the  fastnesses  of  Hindustan,  of  the  Steppes  of 
Siberia  :  nor  can  we  draw  any  line  which  enables  us  logically 
to  cut  off  the  lowest  barbarian  of  the  interior  of  Africa  from 
consideration  in  connection  with  the  proposed  rule  of  action 
here  discussed. 

But  beyond  that,  although  there  is  a  gap  unbridged 
between  the  lowest  man  and  the  highest  animal,  evolutionary 
doctrine  forbids  us  to  consider  the  genus  homo  as  a  class 
against  which  the  whole  race  of  animals  must  be  arrayed. 
Theoretically  I  am  unable  to  see  any  reason  why  we  should 
not  include  the  whole  of  animal  life  in  any  scheme  which 
looks  to  general  happiness.^ 

This  difficulty  was  not  apparent  to  those  who  lived 
before  the  evidence  of  our  kinship  with  the  animals  had 
become  so  convincing  as  it  is  to-day.  Later  utilitarian  writers 
who  are  faced  by  this  difficulty  are  likely  to  evade  it  by 

^  Concerning  these  difficulties  cf.  Green's  Prolegomena  to   Ethics;    also 
Sidgwick,  op.  ciL  book  ii.  cliap.  iii. 

^  Cf.  Green,  ojj.  cit.  book  iv.  chap.  iii.  p.  373. 


CHAP.  XXIII  THE  RULE  OF  CONDUCT  559 

assuming  that  there  are  assignable  limits  to  the  effects  of 
our  conduct ;  and  that  we  have  to  take  into  account  only 
"  all  whose  happiness  is  affected  by  the  conduct,"  as  Pro- 
fessor Sidgwick  puts  it.^  But  it  seems  to  me  that  our 
modern  conception  of  the  nature  of  organic  life,  as  a  whole, 
necessarily  implies  that  our  actions  affect  all  other  organisms 
which  can  in  any  way  either  directly  or  indirectly  be  in- 
fluenced by  our  activity. 

But  lest  I  be  thought  to  be  going  too  far,  I  am  willing 
for  the  sake  of  argument  to  assume  that  mankind  has  a 
special  nobility,  and  I  agree  to  limit  to  mankind,  as  a  whole, 
the  number  whose  happiness  we  must  consider  under  this 
rule. 

If  any  valid  reason  can  be  presented  why  any  of  man- 
kind should  be  excluded  from  our  consideration,  I  fail  to 
appreciate  it.  Criminals  are  men  who  act  deliberately  to 
satisfy  cravings  which  seem  to  them  perfectly  rational,  but 
which  we  think  warrant  us  in  making  a  separate  class  of 
them,  but  this  only  in  order  that  we  may  protect  ourselves 
from  harm,  and  our  civilisation  from  disintegration  :•  that 
their  happiness  is  involved  in  their  actions,  and  that  their 
characters  differ  from  ours  only  in  certain  directions,  or 
only  in  degree  of  emphasis  of  capacity,  is  self-evident.  The 
weak-minded  in  like  manner  can  in  no  way  be  eliminated 
from  our  consideration.  Even  if  we  assume  with  Cumber- 
land that ,  our  guide  should  be  the  "  common  good  of  all 
rationals,"  our  extension  of  the  application  of  reason  prevents 
us  from  thus  avoiding  the  conclusion  just  reached. 

If  we  bear  this  in  mind  we  are  at  once  struck  by  the 
fact  that  it  is  impossible  to  uphold  that  the  most  thorough- 
going utilitarian  moralist  does  or  can  desire  the  greatest 
happiness  of  all  mankind,  or  that  he  could  satisfy  his  con- 
science if  he  did  so. 

^  Op.  cit.  book  iv.  sec.  1. 


560  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

As  a  matter  of  fact  what  he  does  is  to  attempt  to 
imagine  the  sum  total  of  the  happiness  of  that  special  group 
of  mankind  which  comes  within  his  necessarily  limited 
experience  of  the  race,  and  whose  desires  and  motives  he  is 
able  to  picture  somewhat  vividly,  and  to  which  he  finds  a 
response  within  his  own  soid. 

The  fact  that  the  best  of  men  do  thus  limit  the  classes 
of  mankind,  to  say  nothing  of  animal  life,  whose  happiness 
they  take  into  account  leads  us  naturally  to  consider 
whether  this  limitation  is  not  a  necessary  one,  and  whether 
this  necessity  does  not  involve  a  failure  of  the  rule  we  are 
studying. 

I  for  one  think  this  limitation  is  necessary  and  the 
failure  of  the  rule  therefore  positive.  None  of  us  in 
practice  takes  into  consideration  all  sentient  beings : 
"  enthusiasm  for  Humanity  "  is  the  highest  ideal  the  most 
ardent  utilitarian  ever  sets  before  himself;  but  this  is  an 
ideal  rather  than  a  possible  working  rule.  There  are  ex- 
ceedingly few  if  any  actions  which  can  be  determined  by 
the  consideration  of  their  effects  upon  the  whole  race  of 
men.  The  most  we  can  do,  if  we  labour  to  the  uttermost, 
*is  to  endeavour  to  broaden  our  view  to  include  the  masses 
of  the  civilised,  and  this  is  possible  in  relatively  few  cases. 
For  the  most  part  our  actions  can  be  determined  only  by 
reference  to  the  relatively  small  group  of  mankind  which 
make  up  our  own  civic  communities :  patriotism  forces  us  to 
exclude  from  consideration  the  desires  of  all  who  call  them- 
selves our  enemies ;  opposition  to  adultery  excludes  from  con- 
sideration the  desires  of  a  still  larger  group ;  the  family 
virtues  exclude  from  consideration  a  still  more  numerous  class 
of  men.  In  fact  I  think  it  might  be  argued  that  certain 
virtues  of  intense  personal  interest  necessarily  compel  us, 
under  the  rule  we  are  considering,  to  uphold  the  doctrine  of 


CHAP.  XXIII  THE  RULE  OF  CONDUCT  561 

egoistic  hedonism  which  we  have  already  seen  is  entirely 
untenable.^ 

In  fact  when  we  study  the  subject  with  care  it  be- 
comes clear  that  as,  under  the  theory,  happiness  is  held 
to  be  equivalent  to  utility,  we  must,  if  we  act  under  it, 
strive  for  the  happiness  of  only  the  group  in  which,  at 
the  moment  of  consideration,  we  include  ourselves ;  and 
this  because  of  our  belief  that  benefit  will  then  accrue  to 
that  group  as  the  result  of  our  action,  and  that  it  will 
by  our  action  be  in  better  condition  to  prove  successful  in 
the  contest  for  persistence  than  it  otherwise  would  have 
been. 

But  even  suppose  we  could  and  did  always  extend  our 
vision  to  include  the  happiness  of  the  whole  race,  then  it 
becomes  evident  that  our  action  thus  determined  could 
never  satisfy  conscience.  For  the  order  of  efficiency  of 
the  impulse  series  which  determines  moral  codes  differs,  as 
we  have  seen,  because  of  inheritance  from  ancestors  whose 
instincts  have  differentiated  and  diverged,  differs  in  indi- 
viduals and  still  more  in  special  groups  of  individuals  ;  and 
it  is  impossible  to  suppose  that  any  action  taken  to  gratify 
to  the  uttermost  all  those  who  have  inherited  impulses 
different  from  ours  can  harmonise  with  the  gratification 
which  is  possible  of  attainment  by  the  relatively  small 
group  which  has  inherited  traits  like  our  own ;  impossible 
to  suppose  that  such  actions  can  in  retrospect  be  found  to 
fit  in  with,  can  fail  to  stand  in  opposition  to,  the  impulse 
series  which  determines  the  approval  or  disapproval  of 
conscience  within  us. 

§  7.  This  objection  may  perhaps  be  brought  out  more 
forcibly  in  another  manner. 

^  Professor  Sidgwick  {op.  cit.  book  iv.  chap.  3,  sec.  iii.)  tries  to  break 
the  force  of  this  objection  by  referring  to  the  obvious  utility  of  such  partial 
reference,  but  he  does  not  seem  to  me  to  have  removed  the  difficulty. 

2o 


562  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

The  one  great  advantage  of  the  utilitarian  rule  of  con- 
duct lies  in  the  fact  that  it  casts  aside  individualism  and 
expresses  itself  in  terms  of  racial  value,  of  racial  vigour. 
But  this  fact  itself  marks  the  limits  of  its  service  to  the 
moral  man.  For  assuming  for  the  moment  that  pleasure 
and  benefit  are  always  coincident,  then  evidently  the  old 
formula  may  be  stated  in  the  form  which  names  as  the  end 
of  action  the  highest  efficiency  of  the  largest  number.^  But 
if  the  rule  is  thus  stated  we  at  once  perceive  its  weakness 
as  a  practical  guide.  For  no  iotelligent  man  would  be 
willing  to  take  as  his  guide  in  action  the  efficiency  of  the 
average  man  as  he  knows  him — a  notion  which  becomes  the 
more  distasteful  when  we  consider  that  Darwinian  doctrine 
has  broken  down  the  boundary  between  the  rational  and 
irrational,  and  has  indefinitely  extended  our  racial  brother- 
hood. 

Nor  would  developmental  theory  allow  that  such  an  end 
of  action  would  tend  to  the  advance  of  our  race.  What 
developmental  theory  demands  is  the  encouragement  of  the 
more  effective  groups  and  the  discouragement  of  the  less 
effective  groups.  Individuals  of  the  type  which  is  the  most 
effective  in  any  special  direction,  and  which  is  to  win,  will 
indeed  gain  pleasure  from  activity  in  that  direction.  But 
action  in  this  same  special  direction  will  as  clearly  be  pain- 
ful for  all  but  the  few  who  are  qualified  to  act  efficiently  in 
this  special  direction ;  painful  because  of  the  strain  con- 
nected with  the  attempt  to  act  in  a  direction  in  which  their 
capacities  are  limited  or  lacking,  and  because  of  the  restric- 
tion of  other  actions  which  they  are  more  fully  capable  of 
performing.  Evidently  action  towards  what  we  conceive 
of  as  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number  cannot 
coincide  with  action  towards  the  emphasis  of  the  most 
effective  life. 

1  Cf.  Leslie  Stephen,  Science  of  Ethics,  chap.  ix. 


CHAP.  XXIII  THE  RULE  OF  CONDUCT  563 

But  beyond  the  objection  thus  stated  it  is  easy  to  show 
that  the  assumption  that  pleasure  and  value  to  life  are 
necessarily  conjoined,  made  above  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
is  one  which  cannot  be  upheld.  As  I  have  attempted  to 
show  elsewhere,  pleasure  is  indicative  of  the  efficiency  of 
the  special  nerve  tracts,  the  activity  in  which  is  involved 
in  the  production  of  the  mental  state  that  is  pleasant ;  that 
is  really  the  most  that  can  be  said  of  the  correspondence 
between  pleasure  and  efficiency.  It  is  true  that,  as  a  result 
of  evolutionary  laws,  pleasure  tends  to  become  coincident 
with  the  vigour  of  the  organism  as  a  whole,  but  this  is  true 
only  under  approximately  normal  conditions,  and  is  subject 
to  numerous  exceptions,  to  so  many  in  fact  that  it  becomes 
clear  that  while  pleasure  is  indicative  of  vigour  in  the  nerve 
tract,  the  action  in  which  is  coincident  with  the  appear- 
ance of  the  pleasurable  content,  it  is  by  no  means  indicative 
necessarily  of  vigour  in  the  individual  life.  Much  less  can 
it  be  shown  that  pleasure,  which  pertains  to  the  action  of 
only  a  special  part  of  an  individual,  can  indicate  value  to 
the  race  of  which  that  individual  is  only  one  element. 

Professor  Woodbridge,  of  whose  distinction  between  the 
use  of  the  word  "  pleasure "  in  the  psychological  and  the 
material  senses  I  have  above  spoken,  calls  attention  to  the 
fact  that  as  the  psychological  aspect  of  pleasure  can  only  be 
conceived  to  have  to  do  with  individuals,  it  can  have  no- 
thing to  do  with  morality,  which  is  determined  by  the  exist- 
ence of  social  groups,^  and  therefore  he  argues  that  in  no 
possible  way  can  universal  hedonism  be  founded,  if  psycho- 
logical truth  is  not  violated.  This  objection  seems  to  me 
to  be  a  valid  one  and  quite  in  line  with  the  preceding  argu- 
ment. 

We  are  thus  brought  to  see  that  from  the  evolutionary 

1  O'p.  cit.  p.  478. 


564  INSTINCT  AND  REASON     .  part  v 

point  of  view  the  existence  of,  and  the  strengthening  of, 
certain  relatively  persistent  impulses  in  each  group  is  of 
importance  in  order  that  these  impulses  may  be  put  to  the 
test  in  the  struggle  for  supremacy.  It  is  the  strengthening 
of  these  impulses,  and  not  the  pleasure  or  the  avoidance  of 
pain,  for  which  Nature  is  watching,  for  by  means  of  these 
impulses  she  is  able  to  produce  racial  efficiency. 

But  even  suppose  for  the  moment  that  we  can  and  do  act 
to  produce  the  efficiency  of  all  rational  beings,  then  it  seems 
to  me  clear  that  actions  directed  to  such  an  end  must  fail 
to  satisfy  our  consciences.  For,  reasoning  as  we  did  in  the 
last  section,  we  perceive  that  the  order  of  efficiency  of  the 
impulse  series  which  determines  our  moral  codes  differs  in 
individuals  and  still  more  in  special  groups  of  individuals ; 
and  that  therefore  it  is  impossible  to  suppose  that  any 
action  taken  to  effect  the  efficiency  of  the  whole  race  of 
men  who  have  inherited  different  capacities  in  varying 
degrees,  and  different  capacities  than  those  which  we  have 
inherited,  can  harmonise  with  the  impulse  series  which  will 
arise  in  our  minds  in  reflection,  determined  as  that  impulse 
series  is  by  special  capacities  which  are  especially  emphasised 
in  us  ;  it  is  impossible  to  suppose  therefore  that  such  actions 
can  in  retrospect  be  found  to  fit  in  with,  can  fail  to  stand 
in  opposition  to,  the  impulse  series  which  determines  the 
approval  or  condemnation  of  conscience. 

§  8.  It  may  be  well  in  passing  to  speak  of  one  point 
urged  by  Professor  Sidgwick  ^  in  favour  of  the  Utilitarian 
position ;  viz.  the  fact  that  when  the  ordinary  man  finds 
himself  in  doubt  as  to  the  relative  importance  of  conflicting 
claims  he  is  wont  to  determine  his  action  "  by  forecast  of 
the  effects  on  human  happiness  to  be  expected  from  the 
general  establishment  of  any  proposed  rule."    This  of  course 

1  Op.  cit.  pp.  433  and  451. 


CHAP.  XXIII  THE  RULE  OF  CONDUCT  665 

cannot  be  doubted,  but  it  seems  to  me  it  goes  to  show  merely 
that  at  certain  times  conflicting  impulses  are  so  evenly 
balanced  that  our  sympathetic  impulses  turn  the  scale ; 
it  surely  does  not  prove  that  our  conception  of  the  happi- 
ness of  humanity  at  large  should  always  be  the  basis  of 
moral  action. 

§  9.  On  the  whole  it  seems  to  me  that  if  the  hedonist 
is  to  hold  his  ground  at  all  he  must  come  out  boldly  as  an 
egoistic  hedonist.  Then  he  might  contend  that  our  ethical 
aim  should  be  the  subordination  of  temporary  to  permanent 
impulses  to  the  end  that  our  memory  of  past  intentions  may 
show  our  acts  to  have  accorded  with  the  relatively  permanent 
order  of  impulse  efficiencies  experienced  in  reflection  :  for  if 
we  do  not  so  act,  the  memory  of  our  acts  will  show  an 
opposition  of  past  impulse  to  the  impulse  most  persistent 
at  the  time  of  reflection,  and  this  will  give  us  pain  due  to 
this  opposition :  the  avoidance  of  the  pain  might  thus  be 
claimed  to  be  for  us  a  valid  guide. 

I  do  not  imagine,  however,  that  any  such  extreme  view 
would  be  upheld.  But  if  it  were,  the  objections  above 
considered  to  egoistic  hedonism  still  hold  with  no  loss  of 
cogency :  and  furthermore,  this  argument  is  evidently  un- 
available for  any  one  holding  to  the  evolutionary  point  of 
view ;  for  under  that  view  the  avoidance  of  the  pain  inci- 
dent to  revival  is  not  of  great  moment,  it  is  the  existence 
and  strengthening  of  the  relatively  persistent  impulses 
which  is  of  moment,  as  it  is  the  impulse  to  activity,  and  not 
the  avoidance  of  the  pain,  which  leads  to  the  racially  effec- 
tive resultant. 

Under  the  postulates  of  survival  the  tendency  which  is 
important  to  ethics  is  the  tendency  to  work  towards  far-off 
ends ;  and  those  ends  will  persist  in  the  thoughts  of  men 
which,  when  attained,   are  effective   to   living.     It   is   the 


566  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

persistence  of  these  ends  that  is  important,  not  the  pre- 
vision of  pleasure  to  be  gained  nor  of  pain  to  be  avoided. 

§  10.  We  are  led  so  naturally  from  the  position  we  have 
thus  reached  to  the  statement  of  a  rule  of  conduct  in  con- 
formity with  our  previous  studies  that  I  hesitate  to  stop 
to  consider  other  rules  of  conduct  than  those  proposed  by 
the  hedonists,  especially  as  it  w^ould  make  too  great  a  break 
in  our  line  of  argument  to  attempt  to  touch  upon  the  ques- 
tions involved  without  appearing  to  deal  with  authoritative 
thinkers  in  a  careless  and  unappreciative  manner.  But  it 
is  worth  while,  I  think,  to  consider  one  high  authority  whose 
doctrines  are  opposed  by  the  Utilitarians ;  to  ask  ourselves 
whether  the  rule  of  conduct  enunciated  by  Kant  is  able  to 
stand  the  test  of  introspection  in  accord  with  the  psycholo- 
gical insight  gained  from  the  study  of  biological  phenomena. 

"  So  act,"  says  Kant,  "  that  the  rule  on  which  thou 
actest  would  admit  of  being  adopted  as  a  law  by  all  rational 
beings." 

I  think  it  must  be  apparent  to  any  one  who  has  followed, 
and  agreed  with,  my  argument  above,  that  an  objection 
almost  identical  with  that  raised  against  the  "  greatest 
happiness  theory "  holds  also  against  the  rule  thus  stated. 
For  we  have  come  to  see  that  it  is  impossible  to  draw 
between  rational  and  irrational  beings  any  line  which  will 
enable  us  to  cut  ourselves  away  from  brotherhood  not  only 
with  all  of  mankind,  but  with  all  of  the  animal  creation ;  and 
if  this  be  so  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  of  a  rule 
which  could  be  adopted  by  all  rational  beings.  Moreover, 
if  such  a  general  rule  were  conceived  and  followed,  the 
actions  involved  could  surely  never  appear  in  retrospect  to 
correspond  to  our  own  special  relatively  permanent  impulse 
series,  in.  other  words,  could  never  satisfy  conscience.  The 
rule  proposed,  furthermore,  could  not  be  countenanced  by 


CHAP.  XXIII  THE  RULE  OF  CONDUCT  567 

I^ature,  who  looks  to  us  to  emphasise  and  enforce  certain 
impulses  which  have  been  gained  only  by  those  relatively 
few  rational  beings  with  whom  we  are  classed,  in  order  that 
our  type  may  contend  for  supremacy  with  others  in  which 
these  same  impulses  have  not  developed  in  the  same  order 
of  emphasis ;  and  she  demands  this  of  us  in  order  that  she 
may  test  in  her  vast  laboratories  the  relative  efficiency  of 
the  several  groups  to  cope  with  the  varying  and  complex 
conditions  of  the  environment  in  which  we  all  live. 

§  11.  Passing  from  this  parenthetical  suggestion  we  may 
now  turn  to  the  attempt  to  formulate  a  rule  of  conduct 
which  will  appear  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  psychological 
considerations  that  have  been  emphasised  in  what  has  pre- 
ceded this. 

The  whole  drift  of  our  argument  in  preceding  sections 
has  made  it  apparent  that  the  important  consideration  in 
the  guidance  of  our  lives  is  attention  to,  and  the  strengthen- 
ing of,  the  more  far-reaching  and  pervasive  and  persistent, 
although  often  less  emphatic,  impulses  within  us ;  and  that 
this  is  necessary  if  we  are  to  become  efficient  individuals  in 
the  racial  group  to  which  we  belong,  and  which  we  hope 
will  persist  and  develop  in  the  future.  Unless  our  habit 
of  action  leads  to  such  results  we  can  never  expect  our  acts 
as  viewed  in  retrospect  to  harmonise,  even  approximately, 
with  the  relatively  permanent  impulse  series  which  presents 
itself  to  our  mind  at  the  moment  of  retrospect ;  or  in  other 
words,  can  never  expect  to  satisfy  in  any  degree  the  demand 
of  conscience,  which  is  determined  by  the  existence  of  this 
relatively  permanent  hierarchy  of  impulses. 

It  is  apparent  that,  if  we  are  to  satisfy  conscience,  in 
each  case  we  must  so  act  that  the  remembrance  of  our  act 
will  show  it  to  be  harmonious  with  our  ethical  ideal — 
will  show  it  to  have  been  one  which  was  the  outcome  of  a 


568  INSTINCT  AND  REASON  part  v 

contest  of  impulses  in  which  the  relative  potency  of  the 
impulses  involved  corresponded  with  that  of  the  series 
which  determines  our  ethical  ideal, — corresponded,  in  other 
words,  with  that  series  which  presents  itself  to  consciousness 
as  that  relatively  permanent  field  of  impulse  revival  which 
is  determined  by  our  highest  notion  of  the  impulse  series 
in  the  ideal  man.  If  we  so  act  we  shall  find  our  conscience 
satisfied. 

But  how  shall  we  most  certainly  ensure  our  action  under 
this  rule  ?  Evidently,  if  my  previous  argument  be  correct, 
by  the  restraint  of  those  instincts  which  are  wont  to  be 
stimulated  to  vigorous  and  immediate  reaction,  by  the  re- 
straint of  the  variations  which  are  determined  by  rationalistic 
emphasis,  until  such  time  as  those  more  pervasive  instincts 
that  are  not  wont  to  be  stimulated  to  vigorous  and  imme- 
diate reaction  have  time  to  assert  themselves  and  to  gain 
due  prominence  in  the  determination  of  our  action. 

That  it  is  the  part  of  greater  wisdom  to  restrain  the 
quicker  response  of  the  earlier  formed,  the  so-called  "  lower," 
instincts  seems  clear.  And  if  we  take  another  point  of  view, 
it  appears  equally  clear  that  similarly  it  is  on  the  whole 
most  rational  to  restrain  the  momentary  emphasis  of  some 
special  element  of  our  conscious  life  by  reason ;  for  the 
effect  determined  by  this  momentary  act  of  reason  relates 
to  the  field  of  attention  only,  the  field  of  inattention  being 
overlooked :  but  the  fields  of  attention  and  of  inattention 
together  represent  all  of  the  results  of  experience  in  our  own 
lives  and  in  the  lives  of  our  ancestors  as  well,  and  the  mass 
of  this  experience  is  represented  in  what  resides  at  the 
moment  of  this  rationalistic  emphasis  in  the  field  of  in- 
attention. It  were  surely  safer,  then,  to  act  in  such  a  way  as 
to  permit  the  whole  of  our  own  experience,  and  also  the 
results  of  ancestral  experience,  to  influence  our  acts ;  and 
this  can  only  be  done  by  allowing  the  influences  from  the 


CHAP.  XXIII  THE  RULE  OF  CONDUCT  569 

field  of  inattention  to  have  full  play,  which  in  turn  can 
only  be  accomplished  by  the  temporary  restraint  of  the 
momentary  leadings  of  reason  in  attention,  until  all  of  the 
influences  from  the  field  of  inattention  within  us  can  have 
an  opportunity  to  assert  themselves. 

So  soon  as  this  habit  of  restraint  in  this  manner  be- 
comes instinctive,  then,  as  we  have  argued  above,  we  find 
ourselves  governed  by  the  religious  instinct  within  us,  then 
we  find  our  trends  of  action  determined  not  only  by  the 
simple  conscience  which  balances  particular  impulses,  but 
by  that  wider  development  of  conscience  which  teaches  us 
to  emphasise  habitually  the  most  permanent  order  of  impulse 
efficiencies  of  which  we  can  conceive ;  then,  in  other  words, 
we  find  ourselves  guided  by  the  "  sense  of  duty."  As  the 
highest  morality  must  take  account  of  all  existing  impulses 
and  must  weigh  all,  so  it  seems  to  me  that  no  ethical  life 
can  be  of  the  highest  form  which  does  not  include  in  its 
consideration  the  highest  of  all  impulses,  the  governing  im- 
pulse, the  religious  impulse. 

We  are  thus  led  to  see  that  the  rule  of  action  which  will 
best  satisfy  conscience,  which  will  produce  the  closest  corre- 
spondence between  our  action  as  viewed  in  retrospect  and 
our  most  permanently  efficient  impulse  series,  is  one  which 
is  based  upon  this  religious  instinct,  and  which  involves  the 
presence  in  mind  of  the  sense  of  duty.  This  rule  we  may 
formulate  as  follows :  Act  to  restrain  the  impulses  which 
demand  immediate  reaction,  in  order  that  the  impulse  order 
determined  hy  the  existence  of  impulses  of  less  strength,  hut  of 
loider  significance,  may  have  full  weight  in  the  guidance  of 
your  life. 

In  other  words— BE  EELIGIOUS. 


INDEX 


Acinetae,  163/. 

-(Esthetics  and  religion,  293 

Algedonic  theory,  532 

theory  in  relation  to  action,  533- 
538 
"Amplitude  "  in  consciousness,  57/. 
0  Anger,  120 
Animistic  theory,  236/ 
Apperceptive  systems,  452 
Aristotle,  21,  375 
Arnold,  Matthew,  311,  329 
Art  instinct,  144,  152 
Attention,  field  of,  38 

"Back  stroke,"  theory  of  emotions, 

123 
Bain,  Prof.  A.,  98 
^    Balance  between  reason  and  instinct, 

495-527 
between  reason  and  the  religious 

instinct,  528-530 
Baldwin,  Prof.  J.  M.,  158,  177,  183, 

303,  375,  404,  460 
Bastian,  26 
Beare,  J.  I.,  328 
Belief,  222,  249/.,  253 
Benevolence,  144,  522/ 
Berkeley,  5 
Bradley,  350 

Causal  relation,  32  ff. 
Celibacy,  282-284 
0  Choice,  415-418,  424,  461 
Cicero,  327 
CiUa,  73 

"Circular  process,"  158 
Circumcision,  314 
Classification  of  instincts,  chap.  v. 
Clifi'ord,  34,  42,  45 


Comte,  5 

Conduct,  rule  of,  chap,  xxiii. 
Connate  instincts,  88 
Conscience,  385-396 
Continuity,  mental,  41/ 
Conversion,  301-309 
Craving,  345,  348,  351 
Cumberland,  559 

Dana,  C.  L.,  vii. 

Daniels,  A.  H.,  292/ 

Darwin,  3,  6,  85,  87,  123,  386  /., 

390,  391,  402,  407  /. 
Deferred  instincts,  88 
Definitions,  general,  chap.  iii. 
Descartes,  5,  21,  81 
Desire,  346,  348,  351,  452/,  536/ 
Double  consciousness,  53  / 
Dread,  113 
Drobisch,  350 
Duty,  the  sense  of,  396-399 

Effort,  feeling  of,  455 
Ego,  54 

Egoistic  hedonism,  550-557 
Emerson,  245 
Emotions,  113/. 
"Erethism,"  164 
0  Essential  characteristic  of  religion, 

325-332 
Ethical      standards.        See     moral 

standards 
Ethics  and  hedonism,  chap.  xxii. 
Evolutionary  hypothesis,  limits  of, 

13/ 

Faith  versus  reason,  278 
"Falling  in  love,"  306/,  519/ 
Fasting,  265,  267 


572 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON 


Fechner,  34 
<'i   Fear,  120 

Field  of  inattention,  38,  54 
Fission,  72 

Function    of    religious    expression, 
chap.  X. 
of  reason,  445-447 
Functioning  of  reason,  447-462 

0  Genetic  method,  12 

Oilman,  B.  I.,  14 
9  Governing  instinct,  chap.  viii. 

Green,  376,  418,  539,  558 

Gross,  Karl,  158,  159 

Habit,  23,  27,  69 
Hallucinations,  nature  of,  235 
Hartley,  5 
Hedonism,  egoistic,  550-557,  565 

universal,  557-565 
Hedonism  and  ethics,  chap.  xxii. 
Hegel,  329 
Heraclitus,  328 
Herbart,  349 
Hierarchy  of  impulses,  chap.  xiv. 

of  instincts,  179-181 
Hobbes,  406,  407 
Hodder,  229 
Hodgson,  Shadworth,  86 
Hoffding,  42,  352 
Horwicz,  352 
Hume,  5 
Huxley,  28,  163 

Imitation,  158 

instinct,  157,  204 
Impulse,  part  iii.  453  /.  I 

hierarchy  of,  chap.  xiv.  s] 

nature  of,  chap.  xiii. 
Inattention,  field  of,  38,  54 
Initiatory  rites,  290-293 
Instinct,  part  ii. 
and  habit,  69 
c    balance  between  reason  and,  495- 
527 
classification  of,  chap.  v. 
definition,  68/. 
i         distinction  from  reason,  439/. 
function  of,  495-513 
nature  of,  chap.  iv. 
Instincts  of  individualistic  import, 
103-126 
regulative,  157/. 
relating  to  persistence  of  species, 

127-138 
relating  to   persistence   of  social 

groups,  139-156 
connate  and  deferred,  88 


i 


Instincts,  definiteness  of,  89 
"  Instinct  actions,"  86 
''Instinct  feelings,"  86 
Instinct  groups,  order  of  rise  of,  160- 
178 
relations  between,  chap.  vi. 
Intensity,  541 

James,  35  /,  51,  54,  63  /.,  86,  123, 

158,  341,  415/.,  457,  553 
Joy,  113 

Kant,  5,  329,  566 
Kidd,  Benj.,  333/. 
Knowlton,  399,  403 

Lange,  123 
Leibnitz,  63 
Lewes,  352 
Lipps,  350 
Locke,  5 
Love,  120 

falling  in,  306/.,  519/ 

romantic,  168/ 
Lowell,  67 
Lubbock,  222 
Lustration,  289 

Martineau,  Dr.,  329,  363,  405, 
407/. 

Mating  instinct,  130,  134  /. 

Means,  D.  McG.,  vii. 

Mental  and  physical  parallelism, 
chap.  ii. 

Mentality,  definition  of,  38 

Method,  the,  chap.  ii. 

Mill,  Jas.,  5 

John,  5,  352,  406,  557 

Miller,  D.  S.,  vii. 

Mind  stuff  theory,  63  /. 

Moral  codes,  nature  of,  357-384 
relation  of  reason  to,  471-474 
relation  of  religion  to,  475-494 
relativity  of,  379-384 

Moral  standards,  368-379 
ideal,  377-379 

individual,  of  moment,  368-371 
of  most  highly  moral  man,   374- 

377 
relativity  of,  379-384 
relatively  stable,  371-374 

Morgan  C.  Lloyd,  28,  72,  85  /. 
97  /,  123  /.,  137,  158,  221, 
231,  344,  415/,  448 

Miiller,  Max,  260 

Nervous  systems,  42  f. 
Nichols,  H.,  456 


INDEX 


573 


Order  of   rise  of   instinct    groups, 
160-178 

Parallelism,    mental  and    physical, 

chap,  ii. 
Patriotic  instinct,  146 
Patten,  439 
Paulhan,  28 

Phallic  religions,  309-315 
Pilgrimage,  284/. 
Plato,  328 
Play  instinct,  158 
Pleasure  as  ethical  end,  539-549 

as  related  to  action,  533-538 

revival  of,  540-544 
Pleasure-pain,  532 
Positivism,  5 
Prayer,  271-278 
Priestley,  5 
Problem,  the,  chap.  i. 

solution  of  the,  chap.  xxi. 
Progress,  13 
Pseudo-consciences,  394 
Pseudo-instincts,  70 

Reason,  part  iv. 
balance  between  instinct  and,  495- 

527 
balance  between  religious  instinct 

and,  528-530 
definition  of,    70  /.,    chap,   xvi., 

418,  441 
distinction  from  instinct,  439  ff. 
function  of,  445/.,  514-518 
functioning  of,  447-460 
nature  of,  chap.  xvi. 
relation  of,  to  moral  codes,  471-474 
stated  in  terms  of  instinct,  437  ff. 
versus  faith,  278 
Reasoning,  450,  459/ 
Reflex  actions,  98  ff. 
Relations     between     instinct    and 

reason,  part  v. 
Relief,  114 

Religion,  essential  characteristic  of, 
325-332     • 
is  it  instinctive  ?  218-246 
phallic,  309-315 
relation  of  to  moral  codes,  chap. 

XX. 

and  action,  299 

and  aesthetics,  293 
Religious  beliefs,  250 

expression,  function  of,  chap.  x. 

instinct,  chap.  viii. 

instinct,   balance  between  reason 
and,  528-530 
Renan,  218 


J 


Repression  of  social  variation,  209- 

217 
Reverberant  continua,  42 
Rhythm  in  consciousness,  59/ 
Ribot,  42 
Richet,  28 
Romanes,  226 
Romantic  love,  168/ 
Royce,  177,  330,  376,  392,  457 
Rule  of  conduct,  chap,  xxiii. 

Sacrifice,  278-182 

Schleiermacher,  328 

Seclusion  religious,  254-264 

Seeley,  329 

Self-exhibiting  reactions,   121,  129, 

132 
Sexual  instincts,  127/.,  131 
Shand,  458 
Sidgwick,  Prof.,  376,  379,  384,  405, 

418  /.,  539,   543,   558  /.,  561, 

564 
Social  organism,  chap.  vii. 
consciousness,  65,  189 
instincts,  139-156 
Socialism,  191-193 
Socrates,  328 

Solution  of  the  problem,  chap.  xxi. 
Sorrow,  113 
Spencer,  Herbert,  13,  72,  86,  98/, 

184  /.,  251,  266,  278,  349,  381, 

439 
Spiritualism,  243 
Stanley,  H.  M.,  236 
Starbuck,  292 
Stein,  164 
Stephen,  Leslie,  176,  182,  188,  405, 

408/,  544,  562 
Stout,  353,  450,  458 
Strong,  Chas.  H.,  vii. 
Stumpf,  31 
Subordination  of  instinct  groups  and 

of  instincts  in  a  definite  order, 

179-181 
of  reason  to  instinct,  497-513,  525 

Success,  203 
Sully,  J.,  144,  352 
Surprise,  121 
Systems,  nervous,  42 

Torture,  268-271 
Trieb,  348,  351 
Tyler,  266 

Universal  hedonism,  557-565 
"Unreasonable  action,"  418/". 
Utilitarianism,  557-565 


INSTINCT  AND  REASON 


Variation,    excessive    tendency    to, 
in  social  aggregates,  194-207 
nature  of,  chap.  xvii. 
Volkmann,  350,  352 

Ward,  Jas.,  38,  348,  541 

"Wilful  unreasonableness,"  418^7". 


Will,  417 
Wish,  451 

Woodbridge,  540,  563 
Wundt,  42,  54,  222,  328,  352 

Zollner,  34 


THE    END 


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